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ABSTRACT 
In 2014 the African Union (AU) and African states set in motion the establishment of 
African justice mechanisms for addressing international crimes including a new section 
of the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights, the International 
Criminal Law Section (ICLS). In this thesis it will be determined whether or not there is a 
need for this new regional criminal court and what role it might play in the international 
criminal justice system.  
It is clear that the existing system has a number of shortcomings particularly in the areas 
of: universal jurisdiction; accountability; complementarity; ownership; and immunity. 
There is also a wider question as to whether the original purposes of international 
criminal law (ICL) are being effectively fulfilled. In this thesis it is determined that the 
new regional court does not need to be a competitor court to the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) but can offer complementary jurisdiction to strengthen international 
criminal justice and develop ICL in the same manner that the ad hoc courts and ICC 
have done. It is also shown that the new court is a legitimate response, albeit with some 
weaknesses, to the inequalities of the international system and has the potential to 
create a forum through which African states can increase their ownership. The new court 
will have the ability to address many of the underlying crimes leading to conflicts 
thereby linking the judicial organ to the AU’s peace and security agenda. By placing the 
ICLS into the African Peace and Security Architecture, a more holistic understanding of 
the new court is achieved. This helps to erode the misconception that the initiative is 
pursued purely as an anti-ICC mechanism.  
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Overview  
 
With the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 1998 a permanent 
court capable of addressing international crimes was finally in place, reducing the need 
for ad hoc or permanent tribunals. Yet, despite this, in 2009 the African Union (AU) 
decided to explore the possibility of endowing the organisation’s judicial organ with 
criminal jurisdiction. From the outset there has been much scepticism over the proposed 
court as set out in the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights (Malabo Protocol).1 Many see the new AU 
court as an attempt to replace the ICC2 or to shield African leaders from accountability. 
It is argued in this thesis that such assumptions are an inaccurate and incomplete 
assessment of the situation.  
 
The concept of international courts is not new and much literature exists concerning the 
judicial mechanisms utilised in Africa.3 There is also scholarship concerning regionalism 
and universalism in human rights, the emergence of the regional human rights courts 
and the development of the ICC.4 Much of this literature starts with the assumption that 
the International Criminal Law Section (ICLS) of the African Court of Justice and Human 
                                                        
1 Max du Plessis, ‘A case of negative regional complementarity? Giving the African Court of Justice 
and Human Rights Jurisdiction over International Crimes’ (EJIL:Talk!, 27 August 2012) 
<http://www.ejiltalk.org/a-case-of-negative-regional-complementarity-giving-the-african-court-
of-justice-and-human-rights-jurisdiction-over-international-crimes/> accessed 2 April 2005; 
Amnesty International, ‘Malabo Protocol: Legal and Institutional Implications of the Merged and 
Expanded African Court’ (Amnesty 2016). 
2 Max du Plessis, ‘A New Regional International Criminal Court for Africa?’ (2012) 25 South 
African Journal of Criminal Justice 286; Amnesty International (ibid) 9.  
3 See Part I and II of this thesis. 
4 William Schabas, ‘Regions, Regionalism and International Criminal Law’ (2007) 4 New Zealand 
Yearbook of International Law 3; Timothy Shaw, J. Andrew Grant and Scarlett Cornelissen (eds), 
The Ashgate Research Companion to Regionalisms (Ashgate: 2011) and Lorenzo Fioramonti (ed) 
Civil Society and World Regions: How Citizens Are Reshaping Regional Governance in Times of 
Crisis (Lexington Books 2013) as cited by Lorenzo Fioramonti, ‘The Evolution of Supranational 
Regionalism: From Top-down Regulatory Governance to Sustainability Regions?’ (2014) UNU-
CRIS Working Paper W-2014/2, 6; Rudolf Bernhardt, ‘International Protection Of Human Rights: 
Universalism And Regionalism’ in Seinho Yee and Jacques-Yvan Morin (eds), Multiculturalism 
and International Law: Essays in Honour of Edward McWinney (Martinus Nijhoff 2009). 
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and Peoples’ Rights (African Court) is intrinsically anti-ICC and thus undermines 
accountability. By contrast, in this thesis, extensive research on the ICC, its 
shortcomings, and its relationship with Africa is utilised to investigate if there really is a 
case for Africa establishing a regional criminal court. It will be shown that the idea for an 
African criminal court actually predates the ICC. Instead of assessing the ICLS as an 
alternative mechanism, an objective of this thesis is to identify the purpose behind the 
new court and whether it offers anything of benefit to the international system. 
 
When a state fails to discharge its responsibility to prosecute international crimes, the 
ICC is not the only mechanism deployed by international law for fighting impunity. The 
principle of universal jurisdiction (UJ) permits unconnected states to prosecute certain 
international crimes before domestic courts. While the ICC was established partly in 
response to the inability of UJ to fight impunity, both mechanisms are investigated to 
establish whether there is a need for an African regional criminal court.  
 
The overarching question addressed in this thesis is whether there is a need for a 
regional criminal court in Africa. In order to answer this, it is necessary to examine a 
number of other questions. First, whether UJ contributes to the need for a regional 
criminal court. Second, whether the set up and actions of the ICC itself contributes to 
the need for a regional criminal court. And finally, what contribution the ICLS might 
make to international criminal justice. 
 
While the research question focuses on the need for an African regional criminal court, 
the issues and international system’s shortcomings identified in this thesis are pertinent 
for other regions. Therefore, while the thesis discussion is centred around an African 
regional criminal court this does not preclude the need for other regional criminal 
courts, or for the ICLS to serve as an example for the development of additional regional 
mechanisms. Where reference is made to the need for a regional criminal court, unless 
otherwise stated, this denotes an African regional criminal court. 
 
This is the first comprehensive examination of the proposed regional criminal court as a 
contribution to and not a detraction from ICL.5 It is argued in this thesis that both 
                                                        
5 The EU has recently proposed establishing a European Prosecutor. European Council Press 
Release, ‘20 member states agree on details on creating the European Public Prosecutor's office 
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internal and external factors have led to the development of the ICLS and that the 
current dual system of international and national courts has left space for a 
complementary regional mechanism which African states can use to fulfil their 
accountability obligations. Existing scholarship concerning ICL and transitional justice 
(TJ) is utilised to assess the ICLS. The theories of and approaches to accountability are 
placed into the AU institutional objectives, to assess to what extent the ICLS is compliant 
with international law and what contribution a permanent regional court can make.6  
 
The devaluing of African initiatives and values is countered in this thesis. It is shown that 
the current understanding of the ICLS as an anti-ICC response is incorrect and 
prejudices the development of ICL. The generally accepted view that there is a 
fundamental difference between what the international community wants from 
international justice and accountability and what African states want is also shown to be 
incorrect. African states are advocating for a broader notion of justice than the current 
debate allows for. It is argued in this thesis that the true point of divergence is in the 
scope of accountability and the means by which to achieve it.  
 
A central point made in this thesis is that the ICLS, as an organ of the AU, must be 
placed into the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). This allows a holistic 
depiction of the court and prevents oversimplification and misunderstanding of the 
judicial mechanism. Simply claiming that the ICLS is a response to AU and some African 
states’ concerns regarding the ICC does a disservice to all concerned. This also enables 
African concerns to be dismissed, and the moral high ground to be adopted by ICC 
advocates, demonising African states who raise legitimate concerns.7 The narrative that 
the ICC is the only direction in which ICL should develop is effectively dismissed. 
 
Adopting a narrow view of justice and de-coupling it from reconciliation enables a false 
sense of accountability to be achieved and raises doubts over the motivation for pursuing 
criminal justice. The ICLS is potentially a key method by which the AU and African 
states can exert ownership of the process and develop an ecosystem of harmoniously 
                                                                                                                                                                  
(EPPO)’ (8 June 2017) <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/06/08-
eppo/> accessed 29 June 2017. 
6 To distinguish between the ICLS and the ICC the use of ‘the new court’ refers to the ICLS and 
‘the international court’ to the ICC.   
7 Dire Tladi, ‘When Elephants Collide it is the Grass that Suffers: Cooperation and the Security 
Council in the Context of the AU/ICC Dynamic’ (2014) 7 African Journal of Legal Studies 381, 382. 
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working organs and bodies. While, for a variety of reasons, this ecosystem has not yet 
been fully realised, this fact alone does not mean any AU attempts should be 
automatically dismissed or discarded for not fitting a particular narrative.  
 
Overall, it is argued that there is a need for an African regional criminal court based on 
the international system’s shortcomings. Neither UJ nor the ICC are adequate tools for 
fighting impunity within Africa because they undermine domestic prosecutions and 
ignore key concerns and the underlying crimes which lead to conflicts. Additionally, 
corporate actors and complicity of external states is overlooked fuelling the 
dissatisfaction of African states with the inequality of the international system and the 
ICC’s double standards. The ICLS can provide innovative solutions to the inadequacies of 
both UJ and the ICC while recognizing that the new court is not without its own flaws 
that need to be addressed. It is entirely possible for regional systems to develop and 
support the international accountability initiatives.   
 
 
1.2 Theory8  
 
ICL is ‘a body of international rules designed both to proscribe certain categories of 
conduct […] and to make those persons who engage in such conduct criminally liable’.9 
But despite being ‘the criminal law of the international community’,10 and one of the 
newer branches of public international law (PIL),11 the theoretical basis of ICL does not 
follow that of PIL. ICL theory is ‘all over the place’12 and under theorised while PIL’s 
theory is vast and diverse.13 This difference can be explained by the background to ICL 
which has influenced the approach, or lack thereof, to a theoretical foundation. ICL and 
international criminal justice has been shaped by events and practice as opposed to 
                                                        
8 This thesis acknowledges that the theories presented are more nuanced than can be presented 
in one chapter. What is provided in this chapter is a basic overview to highlight to the reader the 
main issues and theoretical approaches. 
9 Antonio Cassese et al., Cassese’s International Criminal Law (3rd edn, OUP 2013) 3. 
10 Alexander Zahar & Göran Sluiter, International Criminal Law (2nd edn, OUP 2012) vii. 
11 Cassese et al. (n 9) 4. 
12 Sarah Nouwen, ‘International Criminal Law: Theory all over the place’ in Anne Orford and 
Florian Hoffman (eds), Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law (OUP 2016). 
13 On the theories of PIL see Anne Orford and Florian Hoffman F, (eds), Oxford Handbook of the 
Theory of International Law (OUP 2016); Andrea Bianchi, International Law Theories: an Inquiry 
into Different Ways of Thinking (OUP 2016).  
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theory.14 Hence the underpinning stems from domestic criminal law, international 
human rights (IHR) and international humanitarian law (IHL) theories and purposes. 
Consequently, the arguments for ICL and the pursuit of justice are varied and at times 
contradictory.15  
 
While IHR and IHL focus on state and collective responsibility, ICL is concerned with 
individual responsibility through the pursuit of accountability in the form of punishment 
through prosecution. Given the focus on criminal accountability, ICL turns to domestic 
criminal law theories on punishment as a basis for its prosecutions. It is to this 
theoretical argument that this section now turns and the meaning and justification for 
punishment adopted is that provided by John Rawls:  
 
A person is said to suffer punishment whenever he is legally deprived of 
some of the normal rights of a citizen on the ground that he has violated 
a rule of law, the violation having been established by a trial according to 
the due process of law, provided that the deprivation is carried out by the 
recognised legal authorities of the State, that the rule of law clearly 
specifies both the offence and the attached penalty, that the courts 
construe statutes strictly, and that the statute was on the book prior to 
the time of the offence.16 
 
Accordingly, the purpose of a criminal trial is to impose punishment and promote 
accountability.  
 
The next section considers the theoretical basis for ICL prosecutions and punishment in 
two distinct parts: domestic criminal law; and IHR and IHL. This will then be used 
throughout the thesis to analyse whether there is a need for a regional criminal court in 
Africa.  
 
 
 
                                                        
14 Nouwen, ‘Theory all over the place’ (n12) 738. 
15 On the contradictions of ICL see Darryl Robinson, ‘The Two Liberalisms of International 
Criminal Law’ in Carsten Stahn and Larissa van den Herik (eds), Future Perspectives on 
International Criminal Justice (TMC Asser Press 2010). 
16 John Rawls, ‘Two Concepts of Rules’ in Samuel Freeman (ed), John Rawls: Collected Papers 
(Harvard University Press 1999) 26. 
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1.2.1 Domestic Criminal Law Theories of Punishment and International 
Criminal Prosecutions 
 
The two theoretical approaches applied to prosecution and punishment follow the 
Kantian (Deontological) and Utilitarian schools of thought.17  
 
1.2.1.1 The Deontological Approach  
 
The Kantian school of thought, attributable to Immanuel Kant’s work,18 focuses on 
retribution and how the court and society are prevented from treating the perpetrator as 
a means to an end, but rather as an end themselves.19 Therefore, punishment is not to be 
used to advance a societal goal but only for the crime actually committed. The rationale 
being to ensure retributive punishment is fair and just as:  
  
Punishment by a court (poena forensis) […] can never be inflicted merely 
as a means to promote some other good for the criminal himself or for 
civil society. It must always be inflicted on him only because he has 
committed a crime […] He must previously have been found punishable 
before any thought can be given to drawing from his punishment 
something of use for himself or his fellow citizens. The law of punishment 
is a categorical imperative.20 
 
Known as “just desert”, the punishment is required to be as severe as the crime 
committed, no more and no less. A non-consequentialist approach is used to focus on 
retribution as justification for punishment and the level of punishment suffered, which 
should be proportionate, is linked to the perpetrator’s ‘moral wrongdoing’21 while all 
other considerations are irrelevant. Hence, punishment is determined by weighing up 
the harm done and the degree of responsibility.22 Even with a variety of retributive 
theories and approaches the underlying characteristic is that of “just desert”,23 and while 
                                                        
17 George Fletcher, ‘The Theory of criminal Liability and International Criminal Law’ (2012) 10 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 1029. 
18 Ibid 1031; See Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals (Gregor M tr, CUP 1996). 
19 Kant (n 18) 6.332. 
20 Ibid 6.332. 
21 J. W. Harris, Legal Philosophies (2nd edn, OUP 2004) 53. 
22 Ibid 60. 
23 Ralph Henham, ‘The Philosophical Foundations of International Sentencing’ (2003) Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 64; On the various types of retribution see I. Cottingham, 'Varieties 
of Retributivism' (1979) 29 Philosophical Quarterly, 238 as cited in Ralph Henham, ‘The 
Philosophical Foundations of International Sentencing’ (2003) Journal of International Criminal 
Justice’ 74; On the retributive theories under Kant and Thomas Aquinas see, Peter Kortiasky, ‘Two 
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the effect of retribution cannot be empirically tested the severity of the punishment 
imposed ‘is rooted deep in a society’s culture’.24  
 
1.2.1.2 Utilitarian Theories 
 
The converse is Utilitarian Theory, which its founding philosopher Jeremy Bentham 
explained in his seminal work: 
 
By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or 
disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which 
it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party 
whose interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in other words, to 
promote or to oppose that happiness.25 
 
His view on punishment was that it ‘was in itself an evil, and could only be justified as far 
as it prevented some greater evil’.26 The notions of pain and pleasure are used to measure 
happiness and consequences,27 which in turn is used to determine whether a punishment 
is justified based on the premise that it is correct to choose the path promoting the most 
happiness. Subsequent utilitarian theories have modified Bentham’s approach by moving 
away from the pain and pleasure list while maintaining the underlying rationale. 
Distinctions have been drawn between act-utilitarianism (‘an act is right if it has best 
consequences’) and rule-utilitarianism (‘an act is right if required or permitted by a rule 
where the general following of that rule would have best consequences’).28  
 
For legal utilitarian philosophers the approach adopted is ideal-rule-utilitarianism.29 
Under such an approach, what an individual does is considered right if a rule permits 
such action or requires it and, when the rule is obeyed by all, it has better consequences 
than ‘any other rule governing the same act’.30 For utilitarians when the social conditions 
point towards the action being less wrong or morally culpable a lesser sentence should 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Theories of Retributive Punishment: Immanuel Kant and Thomas Aquinas’ (2005) 22(4) History of 
Philosophy Quarterly 319. 
24 Ian Dunbar and Anthony Langdon, ‘Justifications and Purposes of Imprisonment’ in Yvonne 
Jewkes and Gayle Letherby (eds), Criminology: A Reader (Sage 2006) 322. 
25 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation as cited in Harris, 
(n 21) 41. 
26 Harris (n 21) 53. 
27 Ibid 41. 
28 Ibid 43. 
29 For example, John Stuart Mill, as explained in Harris (n 21) 43-4. 
30 Ibid. 
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be given.31 There are usually complex social contexts in which the international crimes 
have been committed and the moral culpability may be less obvious where society has 
condoned the acts. Thus, it may follow that in such situations it is inappropriate to 
impose strict or severe sentences.32 However, as explained below, this may in fact go 
against some of the other aims of ICL and criminal prosecutions.  
 
The above theories on punishment have influenced the development of both domestic 
and international criminal law but it has been questioned whether they are appropriate 
in the African context. Western legal systems and misplaced Western notions of justice 
and accountability are felt to be foreign to those understood locally,33 as the local 
mechanisms may adopt a different understanding and approach which prevents the 
international method from being accepted.34  
 
Yet, when looking at the practice of international tribunals and courts, Robert Cryer 
finds the thinking behind pursuing criminal accountability is based on naturalism which 
is hidden behind legal positivist arguments.35  
 
Naturalism reflects the notion of a human society as articulated by the likes of Grotius 
and later returned to, and developed, by Hersch Lauterpacht. While Grotius argued for 
natural law which encompassed a right to intervene in times of injustice, Lauterpacht 
viewed natural law as the expression of the international society’s self, incorporating the 
general principles, contractual agreement, and customs ‘which no civilized community 
                                                        
31 Ibid 61. 
32 On the differences in sentences imposed for international crimes by international courts and 
tribunals than under domestic law sentences see Mark Drumbl, ‘A Hard Look at the Soft theory of 
International Criminal Law’ in Leila Nadya Sadat and Michael P. Scharf (eds), The Theory and 
Practice of International Criminal Law: Essays in Honor of M. Cherif Bassiouni (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 2008) 10; Mark Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2007) 11.  
33 Jeremy Sarkin & Erin Daly, ‘Too Many Questions, Too Few Answers: Reconciliation’ (2004) 35 
Columbia Human Rights Law Review 661; Antony N. Allot, ‘African Law’ in J. Duncan & M. 
Derrett (eds), An Introduction To Legal Systems (Frederick a Praeger 1968); Laurence Juma, 
‘Africa, its Conflicts and its Traditions: Debating a Suitable Role for Tradition in African Peace 
Initiatives’ (2005) 13 Michigan State Journal of International Law 417; Okechukwu Oko, ‘The 
Challenges of International Criminal Prosecutions in Africa’ (2007) 31(2) Fordham International 
Law Journal 343.  
34 Oko (n 33). 
35 R Cryer, ‘The Philosophy of International Criminal Law’ in A Orakhelashvili (ed), Research 
Handbook on the Theory and History of International Law (Edward Elgar Cheltenham 2011) 232–
67. 
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can afford to ignore’.36 While the theory of natural law has been found lacking because of 
its use to justify colonialism37 and the disempowerment of certain actors, it is still of 
value. Koskenniemi finds the theory useful when ‘basic aspects of the world are 
questioned’ following a crisis or transformative period,38 while Gordon claims naturalism 
retains its relevance with regards to the dialectical and hegemonic perspective.39 
 
In contrast to naturalism, legal positivism seeks to remove the connection to morality 
and human dignity by instead focusing on formal legal status. As such, importance is 
placed on those legal bodies which make law, observed through court decisions, custom, 
treaties and other legislative instruments. Recent positivists include Hans Kelsen and 
Herbert Hart and while ‘positivism is not popular and no longer claimed to be used’,40 it 
is still highly influential in the practice of international law as ‘the dominant approach 
amongst international lawyers’.41 
 
This return to naturalism and positivism, as opposed to solely relying on Kantian and 
utilitarian theories, can be attributed to ICL’s background incorporating IHR and IHL 
thinking. There is a shift away from states as the primary focus of international law to 
one where human dignity and human values are taking centre stage42 as IHR and IHL 
view ‘sovereignty in elemental opposition to normative progress’.43  
 
Therefore, the domestic criminal law theories alone are insufficient to understand ICL. 
This is further reflected in the justifications put forward for ICL and the accompanying 
pursuit for international criminal justice. The next section sets out these justifications as 
a means through which to analyse whether there is a need for an African regional 
criminal court.  
                                                        
36 Hersch Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community (reissue OUP Oxford 
2011 [1933]) 429–30 as cited in Geoff Gordon, ‘Natural Law in International Legal Theory: Linear 
and Dialectical Presentations’ in Anne Orford and Florian Hoffman (eds), Oxford Handbook of the 
Theory of International Law (OUP 2016) 292.  
37 Geoff Gordon, ibid, 297.  
38 M Koskenniemi, ‘Law, Teleology and International Relations: An Essay in Counterdisciplinarity’ 
(2011) 26 International Relations 3 as cited in Gordon (n 36) 304. 
39 Gordon (n 36) 305.  
40 Jörg Kammerhofer, ‘International Legal Positivism’ in Anne Orford and Florian Hoffman (eds), 
Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law (OUP 2016) 407. 
41 Robert Cryer et al. Research Methodologies in EU and International Law (Hart 2013) 39. 
42 Dylan Bushnell, ‘Re-thinking International Criminal Law: Re-Connecting Theory with Practice 
in the Search for Justice and Peace’ (2009) 28 Australian Year Book of International Law 61. 
43 Robinson (n 15) 153. 
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1.2.2 Justifying International Criminal Prosecutions: The Purpose of 
International Criminal Law 
 
1.2.2.1 A Domestic Criminal Law Understanding 
 
Most literature identifies the following justifications for punishment pursuant to ICL:44  
 
 Retribution 
 Deterrence  
 Reconciliation 
 
Retribution would fall under the Kantian approach given its focus on punishment for 
punishment’s sake based on the crime committed, while deterrence and reconciliation 
are utilitarian because the focus is aimed at the consequence of the punishment.45  
 
1.2.2.1.1 Retribution 
 
Retribution is based on the notion of punishment for the violation of the law and the 
perpetrator deserving punishment as well as potential vengeance motivations.46 The 
latter is linked to the oft-heard claims of victor’s justice.47 Yet, international criminal 
prosecutions are typically seen to have moved beyond the retributive only purpose 
                                                        
44 M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for Accountability’ 
(1996) 59 Law & Contemporary Problems 9; Ralph Henham and Mark Findlay, ‘Rethinking 
International Criminal Justice?’ in Ralph Henham and Mark Findlay (eds), Exploring the 
Boundaries of International Criminal Justice (Ashgate 2011); Christopher W Mullins and Dawn L 
Rothe, ‘The Ability of the International Criminal Court to Deter Violations of International 
Criminal Law: A Theoretical Assessment’ (2010) 10 International Criminal Law Review 771; Jan 
Klabbers, ‘Just Revenge? The Deterrence Argument in International Criminal Law’  (2001) Finnish 
Yearbook of International Law 249; Laurel E. Fletcher and Harvey M. Weinstein, ‘Violence and 
Social Repair: Rethinking the Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation’ (2002) 24(3) Human 
Rights Quarterly 573; Henham (n 23); Gerhard Werle and Florian Jeβberger, Principles of 
International Criminal Law (3rd edn, OUP 2014); Zahar & Sluiter (n 10). 
45 For a different view on Kant’s work on deterrence see B. Sharon Byrd, ‘Kant’s Theory of 
Punishment: Deterrence in Its Threat, Retribution in its Execution’, (1989) 8(2) Law and 
Philosophy 151. 
46 Fletcher, ‘The Theory of Criminal Liability’ (n 17) 1032. 
47 Kirsten Sellars, ‘Imperfect Justice at Nuremberg and Tokyo’ (2010) 12(4) European Journal of 
International Law 1085. 
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characteristic of post-World War II (WWII) prosecutions.48 It is often claimed that ICL 
punishment incorporates additional purposes beyond mere retribution.49  
 
While retribution as a purpose of ICL can be criticised, Harris explains its appeal to the 
average person’s understanding of justice and, as such, is still a common feature of 
punishment’s purpose.50 It is highly unlikely that this aim of punishment will disappear 
as a justification for prosecuting international crimes given its connection to justice and 
thus, the purpose and aims of ICL. The public outcry against many international crimes 
and the fact certain acts shock the whole of humanity’s values mean retribution and 
vengeance are likely to always play a role.51  
 
1.2.2.1.2 Deterrence 
 
Another of the most commonly cited purposes of ICL is that of deterrence which has 
been promulgated by the ad hoc tribunals, the ICC and other international institutions. 
The ICTY confirmed deterrence is a part of its considerations ‘when imposing 
sentences’;52 the ICTR considered it in terms of both sentencing and more generally,53 as 
did the SCSL.54  
 
The theory underlying deterrence centres on two distinct forms: specific deterrence and 
general deterrence.55 Specific deterrence assumes an individual’s experience of 
punishment will alter their subsequent behaviour so as to avoid future imprisonment. 
General deterrence on the other hand is not focused on specific perpetrators but people 
more broadly. The assumption being that if punishment is provided for, shown to be 
                                                        
48 Ruti G. Teitel, ‘Transitional Justice Genealogy (Symposium: Human Rights in Transition)’ 
(2003) 16 Harvard Human Rights Journal 69, 73; A H J Swart, Comments on Teaching 
International Criminal Law’ (1988-90) 1 Touro Journal of International Law 335, 341. 
49 n 44; Daniel Joyce, ‘The Historical Function of International Criminal Trials: Re-Thinking 
International Criminal Law’ (2004) 73 Nordic Journal of International Law 461. 
50 Harris (n 21) 60. 
51 Klabbers (n 44) 265; On the ‘deep intuitive duty to punish those who inflict great evil on 
innocent victims’ see Fletcher, ‘The Theory of Criminal Liability’ (n 17) 1032. 
52 Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al. (Judgment) ICTY-95-16-T (14 January 2000) para 848. 
53 On sentencing see The Prosecutor vs. Ildephonse Hategekimana (Judgement and Sentence) 
ICTR-00-55B-T (6 December 2010) para 732; On general deterrence see The Prosecutor vs. 
Elizaphan and Gerard Ntakirutimana (Judgement and Sentence) ICTR- 96-10 & ICTR-96-17T (21 
February 2003) para 772. 
54 Prosecutor vs. Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao (Sentencing Judgment) 
SCSL-04-15-T (8 April 2009) para 13. 
55 Dunbar and Langdon (n 24) 323 and 324. 
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implemented, and people are aware of this, it will deter them from committing crimes. 
Yet, for deterrence to be effective specific factors are required which include certainty, 
immediacy, severity and comprehensibility.56  
 
However, despite the persistent reiteration of this aim the actual deterrent impact is 
highly disputed.  
 
1.2.2.1.3 Reconciliation  
 
Reconciliation is distinct from the other two objectives in that it seeks to go beyond 
typical criminal justice and accountability by assuming prosecutions and trials enable 
the affected society to heal.57 Due to what reconciliation seeks to achieve many of the 
concepts and terminology comes from biomedical work on trauma.58  
 
The legal community’s influence over the promotion of human rights norms, its 
enforcement and institutions has resulted in criminal prosecutions and courts being 
adopted as a means through which to achieve justice. Therefore, punishment ‘serves the 
societal goals of re-enforcing acceptable norms, removing potential threats to a new 
regime and deterring future abuses’.59 The overall aim is to help society and the affected 
communities move forward, heal and rebuild themselves into stable environments where 
international crimes are neither normalised nor condoned.  
 
Through the use of trials it is possible for victims to be heard, facts and information 
about the violations and abuse to become public record, and the assignment of 
individual guilt can shift the focus away from collective guilt. These factors are 
considered to promote reconciliation by helping societies come to terms with the events, 
gain closure and start rebuilding upon different norms. Individual accountability 
promotes reconciliation as it removes collective guilt, enabling a new narrative which 
removes the stigmatisation of the acts from those groups in whose name they were 
                                                        
56 Mullins and Rothe (n 44) 773; James McGuire has advocated for a fifth factor - alternative 
means by which the perpetrator can achieve the goal otherwise sought through his conduct - 
explained in Dunbar and Langdon (n 24) 325.  
57 Bassiouni, ‘Searching for Peace’ (n 44) 23-24; Julie Mertus, ‘Only a War Crimes Tribunal: 
Triumph of the International Community, Pain of the Survivors’ in Belinda Cooper (ed), War 
Crimes: The Legacy of Nuremberg (TV Books 1999) 232-7. 
58 Fletcher and Weinstein (n 44) 597. 
59 Ibid 590.  
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committed, to those directly responsible for planning the acts.60 Thus, promoting unity 
within communities and society at the national level as opposed to victim communities 
only. The underlying assumption is ‘that holding a people accountable for direct or 
indirect involvement with or passive acquiescence to the crimes committed inhibits the 
possibility for rebuilding a nation’.61 However, concerns have been raised as it is not 
necessarily understood what reconciliation means for individuals and there is very little 
empirical research on what is required for a society to rebuild.62  
 
Nevertheless, the increase in reconciliation as a purpose of ICL is acknowledged by 
academics and the ICTR.63 The Security Council Resolution authorising the tribunal’s 
creation includes ‘national reconciliation’ as a purpose.64 However, the extent to which 
this was pursued is questionable.65  
 
It must be asked whether courts can realistically discharge such a mandate. There is 
concern over the use of theological and medical concepts to justify such an aim for legal 
prosecutions.66 As already noted, there is a lack of evidence as to what a post conflict 
society requires to rebuild. Added to this are criticisms regarding the pursuit of 
individual guilt over acknowledging and addressing the collective guilt and collective 
nature of the conduct.67 It is hard to see how ICL, enforced through courts, can live up to 
such a purpose. Furthermore, the claimed cathartic experience of witnesses providing 
evidence is not universally applicable, as not all benefit from participation and for those 
who do there is no guarantee of positive long-term effects.68  
 
                                                        
60 Dwight Macdonald, Memoirs of a Revolutionist (Farrar 1957) as cited in Aryeh Neier, 
‘Rethinking Truth, Justice and Guilt after Bosnia and Rwanda’ in Carla Hesse and Robert Post 
(eds), Human Rights in Political Transitions: Gettysburg to Bosnia (Zone Books 1999) 45. 
61 Fletcher and Weinstein (n 44) 601. 
62 Ibid 600. 
63 Zahar & Sluiter (n 10) vii. 
64 Preamble UNSC Res 955 (8 November 1994) UN Doc S/Res/955. 
65 International Crisis Group ‘International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Delayed Justice (ICG 
Africa Report No. 30, 7 June 2001) 19 <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-
africa/rwanda/international-criminal-tribunal-rwanda-delayed-justice> accessed 31 January 2017. 
66 Fletcher and Weinstein (n 44) 600. 
67 Ibid. 
68 On the cathartic benefits see Oliver Diggelman, ‘International Criminal Tribunals and 
Reconciliation: Reflections on the Role of Remorse and Apology’ (2016) 14 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 1073, 1074; On the short-term benefits of the cathartic experience see Fletcher 
and Weinstein (n 44) 593-4. 
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This is further complicated when there is a lack of remorse displayed and insincere 
apologies offered.69 There are also links to the ideological belief of the perpetrator and 
the context in which such crimes are committed. The cumulative effect is the potential 
for a trial to prevent reconciliation amongst those victims and segments of society who 
feel there has been no justice or remorse shown, or apology received.  
 
1.2.2.2 An International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Understanding 
 
For Hannah Arendt the purpose of trials, and by analogy ICL, is for justice only.70 Yet, 
Werle and Jeßberger take the view that ICL ‘protects ‘peace, security and [the] well-being 
of the world’’, due to its ability to enforce and protect the fundamental values of the 
international community.71 The link between ICL and peace and security finds its origin 
in the legacy of Nuremberg and in the ways used to legitimise the UNSC’s establishment 
of the ICTY and ICTR.72 This demonstrates a positivist instrumentalist view of what ICL 
is meant to achieve, which in turn is legitimised by ‘moralist ideals of humanity’.73  
 
Others argue against this based on the undemocratic nature of the values and rules and 
the dominance by certain states, yet Werle and Jeßberger dismiss these objections using 
the ‘universally recognized minimum standard of civilization, which is a necessary 
condition for any democratic process’.74 Additionally, ICL’s core notion of humanity 
‘contributed significantly to strengthening protection for individual human rights’,75 
despite IHR and IHL’s focus on the protection of collective entities through state 
responsibility, as opposed to the individualistic approach of domestic criminal law.76  
 
It can therefore be concluded that in the relevant scholarship ICL’s purpose is expanding 
beyond punishment, accountability and justice to include a greater role in peace and 
security promotion. At the same time, too many purposes can lead to confusion and the 
pursuit of cross-purposes. While the concepts and framework for accountability and 
punishment are clear the theoretical framework of ICL, and thus how to achieve its 
                                                        
69 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (Penguin Books 1994). 
70 Ibid 253. 
71 Werle and Jeβberger (n 44) 33. 
72 Bushnell (n 42) 64. 
73 Ibid 67. 
74 Werle and Jeβberger (n 44) 34. 
75 Bushnell (n 42) 70. 
76 Robinson (n 15) 147-8. 
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purpose, is less so.77 From the above, it becomes clear that despite being a branch of PIL, 
the justificatory theories on which ICL relies are not those of PIL.78  
 
Increasingly, additional roles are being attributed to ICL weakening the above domestic 
criminal law rationales and the overall purpose of accountability. These include truth-
telling, providing a historical record, encouraging national prosecutions, rehabilitation, 
ending conflicts and promoting peace and security.79 While some are identified as part of 
the objectives of reconciliation all have received wide-ranging criticism.80 Even though 
these additional roles prove difficult to address through criminal prosecutions, advocacy 
efforts from human rights groups, the need for retribution and the symbolism of holding 
the key instigators and perpetrators accountable ensure prosecution remains the primary 
narrative for international criminal justice.81  
 
The above shows that there is a no one single theory through which ICL can achieve 
individual accountability.82 Instead, there is a mixture of theory and aims from the 
Kantian (retribution) to the Utilitarian (deterrence and reconciliation) approaches. The 
aims of ICL are consistent with pursuing a judicial course of action and in fact it can be 
said that international criminal justice calls for the punishment of perpetrators by a 
court of law. Nevertheless, serious concerns have been expressed as to the 
appropriateness of these aims and the ability of a judicial approach to deliver them.  
 
1.2.3 A Theoretical Alternative: Transitional Justice 
 
As the above illustrates the objectives of ICL might be achieved if a broader approach is 
adopted and one such method is TJ. Defined as ‘the ways countries emerging from 
                                                        
77 M Damaška, ‘What Is the Point of International Criminal Justice’ (2008) 83 Chicago-Kent Law 
Review 348; Caroline Fournet, ‘Mass Atrocity: Theories and Concepts of Accountability – on the 
Schizophrenia of Accountability’ in Ralph Henham and Mark Findlay (eds), Exploring the 
Boundaries of International Criminal Justice (Ashgate 2011); Henham (n 23); For a different 
approach to theorising ICL see Nouwen (n 12). 
78 Swart (n 48) 339-342. Klabbers (n 44) 250.  
79 Damaška (n 77); M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Justice and Peace: The Importance of Choosing 
Accountability over Realpolitik’ (2003) 35 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 191; 
Bassiouni, ‘Searching for Peace’ (n 778); Fournet (n 77); Joyce (n 49); Werle and Jeβberger (n 44); 
Drumbl, ‘A Hard Look at the Soft theory’ (n 32). 
80 Damaška (n 77); Joyce (n 49). 
81 For example, the work of human rights organisations such as Human Rights Watch and 
Amnesty International. 
82 On the various theories of ICL see Nouwen, ‘Theory All Over the Place’ (n 12).  
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periods of conflict and repression address large scale or systematic human rights 
violations so numerous and so serious that the normal justice system will not be able to 
provide an adequate response’,83 TJ is the ‘umbrella term for approaches to deal with the 
past in the aftermath of violent conflict or dictatorial regimes’.84  
 
Originally there was no specific theoretical framework to TJ, but this did not stop it from 
being utilised in numerous situations of gross human rights violations. Nowadays, the 
theoretical basis is argued to stem from moral universalism and political liberalism.85 
Liberalism has been described as the ‘dominant political expression of progressive 
thought in the modern age, but it itself encompasses a range of doctrines…centr[ing] on 
the core ideas of autonomy, of universal rights, of equal citizenship and democracy’.86 It 
can also be seen as a theoretical means by which to ‘blend international relations and 
law, and politics and constitutionalism’.87 Applying liberalism enables an analysis of 
international law using liberal political theories and thus liberalism encompasses many 
other doctrines/theories and is typically seen in interdisciplinary studies. There are two 
distinct ways to use liberalism: as an internal critique or external critique.88 The main 
critique of liberalism is that it reflects the views and bias of liberal elites and applies 
‘domestic political theories’ to international law.89 
 
TJ theory is dominant by two distinct approaches: First, TJ pursues justice and 
prosecutions to prevent the perpetrators escaping justice and to halt the return to 
conflict or lawlessness if there was impunity. Second, is the focus on capacity 
development and the potential for prosecutions to leave a ‘lasting legacy in the countries 
concerned’.90 
 
                                                        
83 International Center for Transitional Justice ‘What is Transitional Justice’ available at 
<https://www.ictj.org/about/transitional-justice> accessed 31 January 2017.  
84 Susanne Buckley-Zistel et al., ‘Transitional Justice Theories: An introduction’ in Susanne 
Buckley-Zistel et al. (eds), Transitional Justice Theories (Routledge 2014) 1. 
85 Vasuki Nesah, ‘Theories of Transitional Justice: cashing in the blue chips’ in Anne Orford and 
Florian Hoffman (eds), Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law (OUP 2016) 787. 
86 Nicola Lacey, ‘Feminist Legal Theory and the Rights of Women’ in Karen Knop (ed), Gender and 
Human Rights (OUP 2004) 19. 
87 Daniel Joyce, ‘Liberal Internationalism’ in Anne Orford and Florian Hoffman (eds), Oxford 
Handbook of the Theory of International Law (OUP 2016) 486. 
88 Cryer et al. (n 41) 44. 
89 Ibid 45. 
90 Secretary General, ‘The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-
Conflict Societies’ (23 August 2004) UN Doc S/2004/616. 
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The key feature of TJ is its context specific approach with additional aims including the 
recognition of the dignity of individuals, redress, acknowledgement of violations, and 
prevention.91 Other scholars have expanded on this and argue it must provide for: truth; 
a public platform for victims; accountability and punishment; the rule of law; 
compensation for victims; institutional reform; long-term development; and 
reconciliation and public deliberation.92 Such objectives are compatible with those of 
ICL, however a key distinction is that TJ makes allowance for delaying prosecutions 
while simultaneously utilising alternative methods to achieve its aims and purpose. 
Under TJ there are four interlinked aspects: criminal prosecutions; truth seeking 
initiatives; reparations; and reform of law and related institutions, which are not to be 
used in isolation. 
 
TJ’s strength is in its analysis of the prevailing political, legal and social conditions before 
determining what is appropriate and at what stage to implement the initiatives. It is a 
move away from the ‘cookie cutter approach’, seeking the broadest inclusion possible 
and it appreciates that at times it may be that ‘the most meaningful ways of redressing 
massive human rights violations do not fit with conventional concepts of 
accountability’.93  
 
The various theoretical bases for ICL and the multiple aims of international courts and 
the pursuit of criminal prosecutions identified in this section form the basis of the 
analysis which is undertaken throughout the thesis. In turn, this is used to argue for the 
need for an African regional criminal court.  
 
 
1.3 Methodology 
 
The research methodology utilised is socio-legal based as the main question lacks a 
purely doctrinal dimension. The primary concern is with the relationship between law 
and politics, and the social and political reasons influencing the creation of the ICLS. 
Adopting a purely legal doctrinal approach would prevent the wider context from being 
considered. In addition, the concepts of justice and accountability, as understood in the 
                                                        
91 International Center for Transitional Justice (n 83). 
92 David Crocker as cited by Susanne Buckley-Zistel et al. (n 84) 4-5. 
93 International Center for Transitional Justice (n 83). 
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AU context, have greater implications for those in whose name lawyers undertake 
prosecutions. As the ICLS comprises one third of the judicial organ of a regional 
institution it is difficult to isolate it from institutional ideology and aims, which are not 
always legal in nature but have legal consequences.  
 
Two main methods were used to answer the research questions. Firstly, desk-based 
research for the documents related to the ICC and ICLS negotiations. The treaties, 
conventions and policy documents of the organisations, institutions and programme 
bodies were consulted to understand and ensure their aims were included in the 
analysis. Cases, articles, books, blogs, opinion pieces and newspapers have also been 
used. However, as the Malabo Protocol was only adopted in 2014, and has yet to enter 
into force, there is not a vast amount of literature on the subject. Throughout my time 
writing this thesis more scholars have engaged with the topic and where relevant 
scholarship has been published, I have attempted to include it in my analysis and thesis 
as far as possible up to 30 June 2017. 
 
The second method used was semi-structured interviews, undertaken as field work, with 
AU, African state and ICC officials. This was to verify and supplement desk-based 
research and add to the originality of the thesis. Semi-structured interviews were chosen 
to enable a more natural flow to the interviews and promote a conversation as opposed 
to an inflexible structured approach. From these interviews I gained an insight into 
perceptions which were missing or unclear in the official documents or simply 
unavailable due to the lack of publicly available materials.   
 
Prior to undertaking the fieldwork, I sought ethics approval from my university’s Ethics 
Board. I was granted approval in April 2015 as my interviews did not present any ethical 
concerns and was of extremely low risk: the potential participants were adults with no 
identifiable vulnerability, were unpaid and the interviews would be conducted on official 
premises or other public venues and not the individual’s home. Furthermore, the 
questions to be asked were unlikely to uncover illegal activities, cause stress or anxiety to 
the interviewee, and were not of a personal sensitive nature.  
 
 29
In identifying the interviewees I approached each African state embassy in Addis Ababa 
and the ICC’s Jurisdiction, Complementarity and Cooperation Division with a request to 
interview an official, accompanied by the list of questions/topics to discuss:94  
 
 What is your understanding behind the International Criminal Law Section 
(ICLS) of the African Court? (historical background)*  
 What were the main driving factors?* 
 Is there any element of marginalisation by Western atates and dissatisfaction 
with the UN and ICC which are contributing factors to the ICLS’ establishment?  
 What advantages and/or disadvantages will the ICLS have over the ICC?* 
 Are there any commonly held misconceptions about the ICLS or why the AU is 
pursuing this initiative? 
 Which states were against or less supportive of extending jurisdiction? 
 Is [state of the official] in support of the ICLS? If so, why? and if not, what are the 
hurdles to support?  
 How does the presence or threat of ICC involvement impact on peace and 
security initiatives undertaken by the AU?* 
 Is there anything you feel I should know which I have not covered in the above 
questions?* 
 
I interviewed 6 state officials and 1 ICC official.95 The decision was made to limit the 
number of ICC officials interviewed because the main purpose of the interview was not 
to garner insight into the ICC’s vision for the new court.  
 
The officials were willing to discuss the issues on the condition that it be anonymised as 
they provided the information in their personal capacity. Before each interview, I 
confirmed with the official that the data would be anonymised in my thesis. 
Additionally, I recorded interviews with 3 African state officials and the ICC official, the 
other 3 African state officials requested I took notes only. The interview notes and 
recordings are stored on my laptop, with password protection, in accordance to my 
university’s policy on data collection.  
 
                                                        
94 Questions included with the ICC interview request indicated by *.  
95 On the challenges securing interviews see section 1.4 of this thesis. 
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1.4 Challenges and Caveats  
 
When conducting research relating to Africa, it is easy to make the mistake of treating 
the continent as a monolithic group with no discernible differences or views. In this 
thesis African states, ideas and concepts are not treated homogenously. However, it is 
inevitable when discussing the AU and its member states to refer to them as ‘Africa’. 
Care has been taken to avoid misrepresentation of the views of states as much as possible 
yet generalisations have been made on the assumption that common AU perspectives 
‘provide examples of common values’.96 
 
One of the hardest challenges when researching the AU is the lack of publicly available 
material. Despite an official website, which is difficult to navigate, key sections are either 
missing links or simply non-existent. While the AU makes available a selection of the 
organisation’s key documents anything beyond this is difficult to find. Unlike 
researching the United Nations (UN), with its wealth of available information, there is 
little transparency in the negotiations and meetings of AU bodies. There are no public 
records of meeting notes, travaux préparatoires, or other such documents. Due to 
capacity constraints the AU is unable to provide official transcriptions of meetings and 
debates.97 Therefore, reliance has been placed on the summarised reports by AU bodies 
and the Assembly and Executive Council decisions. Some debates may have been held 
and issues discussed which have been omitted from this thesis due to lack of access or 
availability. It is also often difficult to identify positions taken by individual states. 
Reliance is therefore placed on second hand accounts to identify positions taken and fill 
the gap left by non-existent records of debates. The majority of the work and 
negotiations of the AU are conducted behind closed doors and this lack of transparency 
is an institutional weakness.  
 
The field research and interviews were undertaken towards the beginning of the research 
in a three month trip to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from May to July 2015.98 The AU proved a 
valuable source of information for early documents unrelated to the specific ICLS 
negotiations but was unhelpful in relation to the specific documents requested on the 
                                                        
96 Interview with African State Official (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 24 May 2015).  
97 Ibid. 
98 The AU Headquarters is in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and all African states have representatives in 
situ.  
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court. An AU official explained that this was because no decision had been taken on the 
classification of the documents. Despite the initial willingness of the AU official to 
discuss the negotiating process and their involvement, attempts to follow up either in 
person or via email were unsuccessful. I did gain access to AU summit documentation 
from other contacts. However, due to the lack of official transcripts and lack of access to 
the confidential reports I was unable to scrutinise any records of the actual debates 
during the negotiation stage.  
 
Attempts to interview African state officials based in Addis Ababa proved challenging. 
Nevertheless, I was able to interview officials from three of the five main regions,99 the 
majority of whom had been directly involved in the negotiations. I also have had email 
correspondence with additional state officials as well as face to face meetings during 
attendance at various conferences throughout my research. The interviews proved 
fruitful and key themes and a common understanding on the court become apparent. 
Yet, these findings are not representative of all African states and are insufficient for 
empirical analysis. However, this anecdotal evidence is important in advancing the 
limited research on the ICLS to date. An unexpected finding from the interviews was the 
role played by the judges of the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights in the 
Malabo Protocol negotiations. The AU official interviewed explained how the judges 
played a role throughout the negotiation stages and suggested that I interview them. 
While this would undoubtedly have enriched the findings, funding limitations prevented 
this as the Human and Peoples’ Rights Court is located in Arusha, Tanzania.  
 
Finally, a constant challenge when researching a topic like the ICLS amidst the ongoing 
tensions between the ICC and AU, and the organisation’s internal politics, is the sudden 
changes to the landscape. During the writing of this thesis, several African states 
threatened and/or started withdrawal processes from the ICC. Some of these states 
subsequently recanted their withdrawal or changed their stance due to changes in 
governments.  
 
Additionally, for decades the AU has not been fully representational of all African states. 
Morocco withdrew its membership in protest about the AU’s recognition of the Western 
Sahara which the North African country does not recognise as an independent state but 
                                                        
99 The five regions being Central, East, North, South and West Africa. 
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as a part of its own territory. However, in January 2017 Morocco re-joined the AU, 
presenting new challenges to referring to the AU as a group in consensus.100  
 
 
1.5 Structure 
 
In Chapter 2 the ICLS is placed in context. A brief overview of the evolution of the AU 
and its prioritisation of peace and security is presented so it is possible to understand the 
ideological background of the organisation and identify its objectives. The landscape of 
international criminal justice within Africa is described in order to trace the evolution of 
the justice mechanisms and their stated aims, and to set out how Africa got to the point 
of establishing its own regional criminal court. The penultimate section delves into the 
various African proposals for a regional criminal court from the 1960’s to date, to 
determine how far back the idea goes and what the motivating factors were. As the ICC 
was created during this timeframe African state engagement with the Rome Statute 
negotiations is considered. Finally, the drafting history of the Malabo Protocol is 
addressed and the issues and rationales promulgated at the time are highlighted. 
 
The thesis is then separated into three distinct parts each dealing with a different judicial 
mechanism. Part I concerns UJ and whether its scope and use contributes to the need for 
an African regional criminal court. In Part II the focus shifts to the ICC and finally, using 
the findings of the previous parts, in Part III the ICLS is evaluated.  
 
1.5.1 Part I 
 
Part I starts with an exploration of the principle of UJ, its purpose and what it offers in 
the fight against impunity. In Chapter 3 there is an investigation of the crimes covered 
under UJ through an examination of both treaty and customary law. As states 
unconnected to the crime use UJ before their domestic courts, the international law on 
immunity is studied to bring to light the limitations it places on the prosecutions. The 
                                                        
100 AlJazeera, ‘Morocco rejoins the African Union after 33 years’ (AlJazeera, 31 January 2017) 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/morocco-rejoins-african-union-33-years-
170131084926023.html> accessed 29 June 2017.  
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very limited scope of UJ and the rationale for upholding immunity for state officials is 
highlighted as well as the impact on the ability of UJ to fight impunity.  
 
In Chapter 4 the discussion moves to consideration of state practice and African UJ 
legislation. Best efforts have been made to obtain primary sources such as copies of 
legislation where provided in English to check the accuracy of statements and 
interpretations. However, reliance in this chapter is placed predominantly on secondary 
sources. Given the subject matter of this thesis, the UJ prosecutions considered only 
relate to African individuals. In assessing the cases pursued by both African and non-
African states the limited use of UJ becomes apparent. The AU’s model law on UJ is 
examined, and together with the findings on African UJ legislation, this chapter 
establishes the differences between the AU’s approach and international law’s approach 
to UJ. In the final section the prosecution of Habré before the Senegalese courts is 
considered to determine whether this precedent contributes to the need for a regional 
criminal court. Focusing on the uniquely enabling factors surrounding the former 
Chadian President’s trial, the ability to replicate the use of UJ in other African states is 
considered.  
 
It is concluded in Part I that UJ is of limited use in the fight against impunity and that 
these shortcomings contribute to the need for an African regional criminal court. 
 
1.5.2 Part II  
 
The focus in Part II of the thesis shifts to the ICC. To determine whether the set up and 
operation of the ICC contribute to the need for an African regional criminal court, the 
Rome Statute, the international court’s judgments, and the Office of the Prosecutor’s 
(OTP) policies and practices are scrutinized. The structure reflects the five evaluative 
criteria employed by this thesis (accountability, complementarity, ownership, immunity 
and purpose).  
In Chapter 5 it is asked if accountability before the ICC contributes to the need for a 
regional criminal court by investigating the court’s jurisdictional and institutional 
capacity. The various provisions which set out and/or impact the court’s jurisdiction in 
the Rome Statute are considered. The OTP’s policies and practice provide the other 
points of reference in order to assess how the court and Prosecutor have responded to 
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the jurisdictional and institutional capacity framework in pursuing individual criminal 
responsibility. It is argued that the ICC’s form of accountability is inadequate to address 
the range of actors, crimes and situations occurring in Africa, thereby demonstrating a 
need for a regional criminal court.   
 
The ICC is a court of last resort with primary responsibility for prosecuting crimes 
remaining with states. As such, the principle of complementarity is considered in 
Chapter 6. The first half of the chapter concentrates on complementarity as admissibility 
criteria, looking at the court’s interpretation and the impact this has on encouraging 
domestic prosecutions. The policy approach to complementarity makes up the 
remaining part of the chapter and focuses on positive complementarity as defined by the 
Prosecutor and court. It is concluded that instead of encouraging domestic prosecutions, 
the ICC has adopted a restrictive interpretation to complementarity at the expense of 
national efforts.  
 
The focus then turns to the ICC’s impact on African ownership over the justice process 
and prosecutions. African states and the AU have expressed dissatisfaction over the 
double standards and inequality of the international system. In Chapter 7 African states’ 
and the AU’s relationship with the ICC are explored. It is asked whether or not the 
international court has facilitated or hindered African involvement and ignored their 
preferred approaches. It is shown that the role granted to the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) has the potential to introduce inequality into the court structure, 
undermining the ICC as well as AU peace and security efforts. It is concluded that the 
policies and practice of the ICC takes away ownership from African states and the AU, 
which is only made worse by the UNSC’s use of the court.   
 
The law on immunity prevents both national and international courts from prosecuting 
Heads of States and Government and certain state officials. Yet, the ICC has a provision 
excluding such protection, meaning no individuals are beyond the reach of the court. 
However, the court has struggled to prosecute senior state officials and the question 
raised in Chapter 8 is whether the practice of the ICC establishes a customary law 
exception to immunity. It is argued that such an exception has not yet materialised as 
the elements for establishing a custom have not been satisfied. Therefore, the lack of 
immunity has not removed the need for an African regional criminal court.  
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Lastly, Chapter 9 asks if the ICC advances any of the theories or purposes of ICL and 
international prosecutions. Using the findings of Chapter 5 to 8, it is argued that the ICC 
does not achieve ICL’s aims, nor those of TJ providing the basis for a need for an African 
regional criminal court. Finally, the notion of regional criminal courts is briefly 
considered to see how such courts can contribute to ICL’s purposes and address any 
shortcomings of the ICC.  
 
It is concluded that what the ICC offers in terms of accountability, complementarity, 
ownership, immunity and purpose contributes to the need for an African regional 
criminal court. Together with the findings of Part I, it is argued that the identified 
shortcomings in the mechanisms demonstrate the need for a regional criminal court.  
 
1.5.3 Part III 
 
The focus in Part III is whether the ICLS can offer ICL and the AU something that 
neither UJ nor the ICC can as well as addressing problems identified in Part I and II. As 
the Malabo Protocol has yet to enter into force reliance is placed on the Protocol, 
international law principles and the AU’s legal and institutional frameworks. As part of 
the AU’s judicial organ the ICLS is an international court like the ICC, therefore, the 
appropriate point of comparison is with the ICC and not UJ.  
 
Utilising the evaluative criteria set out in Part II, in Chapter 10 the purpose of the African 
Court and whether the AU’s structure and ideology are evident are established. This 
provides the opportunity to examine whether the purpose of the ICLS differs from the 
ICC’s and ICL purposes generally. It is argued that the ICC is inadequate to fulfil the 
purposes pursued by the ICLS. The ICC provides for a very specific form of justice – 
criminal in nature – whereas the AU’s notion of justice is broader because of the 
importance placed on peace and security and the lens applied to conflict analysis.  
 
In Chapter 11, the approach to accountability is interrogated, highlighting the distinction 
from the ICC. The ICLS’ ability to prosecute a wider range of actors, including 
corporations, and crimes offers a region-centric approach to accountability addressing 
some of the shortcomings of the ICC. The inclusion of definitions for the core crimes, 
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building on those of the ICC and its jurisprudence, help situate the ICLS as a 
complementary and not an alternative mechanism.  
 
The Malabo Protocol has been heavily criticised for not referring to the ICC in its 
complementarity provision. However, it is argued in Chapter 12 that the Protocol sets out 
a relationship of cooperation and assistance. Such an approach reflects the concerns of 
the AU over its marginalisation and undermining of its peace and justice initiatives. This 
chapter also includes an interpretation approach to the admissibility criteria that 
incorporates both the ICC and the Regional Economic Communities and Mechanisms 
(REC/RMs). The inclusion of REC/RMs’ courts expresses the continental structure and 
broadening complementarity.  
 
In Chapter 13, it is concluded that the Malabo Protocol provides an unparalleled 
opportunity to advance African ownership, promote Pan-Africanism and the AU’s focus 
on peace and security. The purpose of the ICLS means it should be situated within APSA 
to further the fight against impunity, address the underlying causes of conflicts and 
promote the AU’s notion of justice. However, the institutional weaknesses of the AU are 
presented as these may create barriers to achieving the purposes of the ICLS and its 
ability to promote ownership. Given the ICC’s undermining of national prosecutions and 
the absence of capacity building it is argued that there is a need for the ICLS to take up 
this role. Placement within APSA locates the court in the best position to do this.  
 
In Chapter 14 the most controversial aspect of the Protocol, the immunity provision, is 
considered. The aim is to determine the extent to which the upholding of immunity 
negates the solutions offered by the ICLS to the international system’s shortcomings. It is 
concluded that adopting a personal immunity interpretation to Article 46A bis will limit 
the number of state officials covered by the provision. As undesirable as the provision is 
it is also the strongest argument to prove the ICLS is not anti-ICC. By protecting such 
individuals from prosecution, the jurisdiction of the ICC is left unaffected.  
 
The conclusion set out in Chapter 15 brings together the findings from Part I – III to 
establish that there is a need for an African regional criminal court based on the 
shortcomings of UJ and the ICC. The ICLS is an attempt by the AU to address these 
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shortcomings, notwithstanding flaws in the Malabo Protocol which need to be 
addressed.  
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Chapter 2 
The African Criminal Court in Context 
 
 
On 27 June 2014 the AU Assembly adopted the Malabo Protocol101 introducing criminal 
jurisdiction to the African Court. The Protocol has yet to enter into force as fifteen 
ratifications are required102 and only eleven states are signatories with no ratifications to 
date.103 When the Protocol comes into force, the African Court will be composed of three 
sections: General Affairs; Human and Peoples’ Rights; and the International Criminal 
Law Section.104 Therefore, the ICLS will not be an independent court within the AU 
structure but a section within the AU’s judicial organ. The new court will be made up of 
a Pre-Trial Chamber; a Trial Chamber; an Appellate Chamber;105 an Office of the 
Prosecutor governed by Article 22A; a Presidency and Vice Presidency;106 a Registry107 
authorised to establish a Victims and Witnesses Unit and Detention Management Unit; 
and a Defence Office.108 All are common features of international courts and hybrid 
tribunals.109 
 
2.1 The AU and the Importance of Peace and Security 
 
To understand the AU’s approach to the African Court and criminal justice, the 
background and context of the organisation must be taken into account.110 The AU was 
established in 2000 in response to the waning relevance of and dissatisfaction with its 
                                                        
101 Decision on the Draft Legal Instruments, Assembly/AU/Dec.529 (XXIII) adopted during the 
Assembly of the Union, Twenty-Third Ordinary Session 26-27 June 2014, Malabo, Equatorial 
Guinea.  
102 Article 11 Malabo Protocol. 
103 As of 8 February 2018, <https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7804-sl-
protocol_on_amendments_to_the_protocol_on_the_statute_of_the_african_court_of_justice_and
_human_rights_5.pdf> accessed 14 May 2018.  
104 Article 6 African Court Statute (hereafter ACS).  
105 Article 16(2) ACS. 
106 See Article 22 ACS. 
107 Article 22B(9) ACS. 
108 Article 22C ACS. 
109 Examples of international courts include The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, 
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon, and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. 
110 Tim Murithi, ‘The role of the African Peace and Security Architecture in the implementation of 
Article 4(h)’ in Dan Kuwali and Frans Viljoen (eds), Africa and the Responsibility to Protect: Article 
4(h) of the African Union Constitutive Act (Routledge 2014) 141-2.  
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predecessor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The OAU was set up to unite 
Africa, fight colonialism and later the Apartheid systems in Southern Africa and South 
Africa. The driving force was the Pan-African ideology which helped to spread and grow 
African solidarity.111 
 
Yet, while the OAU’s credibility was built on its stance against anti-colonialism and 
support of African independence, this focus ‘inexorably masked the growing culture of 
repression’ and human rights violations occurring within the newly independent 
countries.112 Despite the OAU being ill-equipped to deal with the numerous conflicts that 
erupted across the continent the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and 
Resolution was established by the organisation. This proved ineffective and gross 
violations of human rights continued. Eventually African states became disillusioned 
with the OAU’s inability to address peace and security and the heavy reliance on the 
international community for assistance.   
 
After deliberation and consideration and appraisal of continental priorities, a decision 
was made to replace the OAU.113 The AU was established in 2000 to ‘take up the 
multifaceted challenges that confront our continent and peoples’.114 No longer fighting 
for decolonisation, the organisation’s priorities were to: strengthen the African identity 
through Pan-Africanism; solidify the newly independent states by defending 
‘sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence’ of states;115 and address peace and 
security and associated matters.116 In line with these priorities, Articles 2 and 3 of the 
Constitutive Act of the African Union (AUCA) enumerated the organisation’s fourteen 
aims and sixteen objectives. While socio-economic development matters are included, of 
particular relevance to criminal justice and peace and security are those regarding: unity 
and solidarity;117 sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence;118 promotion and 
                                                        
111 Timothy Murithi, The African Union: Pan-Africanism, Peacebuilding and Development 
(Routledge 2005). On Pan-Africanism see Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, Pan-Africanism and International 
Law (Hague Academy of International Law 2014). 
112 Ademola Abass, ‘African Peace and Security Architecture and the Protection of Human 
Security’ in Ademola Abass (ed), Protecting Human Security in Africa (OUP 2010) 249. 
113 OAU, Sirte Declaration, adopted at the Fourth Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads 
of State and Government, 8-9 September 1999, Sirte, Libya. EAHG/Draft/Decl. (IV) Rev.1. 
114 Preamble AUCA. The AU was established in 2000 and inaugurated in 2002.  
115 Article 3(b) AUCA. 
116 Preamble AUCA, Article 3 sets out the AU’s objectives.  
117 Article 3(a). 
118 Article 3(b). 
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defence of African common positions;119 promotion of peace, security and stability;120 
promotion of democratic principles and institutions;121 protection and promotion of 
human rights;122 and the harmonisation with regional economic communities’ policies.123  
 
Seeking to promote the self-reliance of African states within its framework and social 
justice124 Article 4 reiterates some of the aims as organisational principles.125 The 
historical disappointment in the OAU is reflected in the reinforcement of the AU’s 
‘respect for the sanctity of human life, condemnation and rejection of impunity and 
political assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive activities’,126 and the 
condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of governments.127 
 
The prioritisation of peace and security, as a means to improve the socio-economic and 
development conditions of Africa, has influenced the AU’s organisational approach to 
justice.128 The linking of these issues has resulted in a broader conceptualisation and 
understanding of the justice, peace and security needs of the continent. However, over 
the years the AU has faced financial capacity and capability restraints hindering its 
ability to achieve its aims and objectives.   
 
In response to the limitations, and the ever-increasing demands of the African continent 
that were not contemplated at the time of the AU’s creation, alternative sources and 
avenues of funding are being explored.129 This in part has been a result of the proactive 
role granted to the AU Commission Chairperson in response to the inaction of the now 
defunct OAU.130  The role of the Commission Chairperson is key in shaping the approach 
adopted by the AU. While previously the Commission had often sought out external 
financial assistance, recently a more introspective and insular approach has been 
pursued. There has been a lessening of dependencies on outside states and partners 
                                                        
119 Article 3(d). 
120 Article 3(f). 
121 Article 3(g). 
122 Article 3(h). 
123 Article 3(l).  
124 Article 4(k) and (n).  
125 Article 4(a), (m) and (n).  
126 Article 4(o).  
127 Article 4(p). 
128 Chapter 10.2 of this thesis. 
129 Scale of Assessment and Alternative Sources of Financing the African Union 
(Assembly/AU/Dec. 578(XXV)) 2015.  
130 Abou Jeng, Peacebuilding in the African Union Law, Philosophy and Practice (CUP 2015) 173-4. 
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through prioritising financial independence in line with the institutional psychology of 
Pan-Africanism and the prioritisation of peace and security. 
 
 
2.2 The Pursuit of International Criminal Justice within Africa 
 
Africa has suffered from conflict for decades.131 In response, the UN established the ad 
hoc International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone (SCSL). With the establishment of the ICC, the international court became the 
default mechanism for addressing conflict related crimes.  
 
The ICTR was the UNSC’s response to the 1994 genocide.132 The tribunal was never 
intended to be a permanent mechanism but rather to fulfil a very specific and limited 
purpose: to prosecute instances of genocide and violations of international humanitarian 
law committed within the territory of Rwanda ‘between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 
1994’.133 A retributive judicial mechanism was favoured by the UNSC and Rwandan 
government134 because of the scale and gravity of the atrocities committed,135 the cyclical 
nature of violence and impunity within the country.136 With only a few states finding 
potential for reconciliation to be simultaneously promoted.137 
 
                                                        
131 59% of conflicts worldwide occur within African. Out of 42 ongoing conflicts 22 are in Sub-
Saharan Africa and 3 in North Africa. See the Armed Conflict Database of the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies <https://acd.iiss.org/en> accessed 25 September 2015. 
132 UNSC Resolution 955 (n 64). 
133 Ibid. 
134 See Spain and the UK’s comments UNSC 3400th Meeting, Friday 1 July 1994, UN Doc S/PV. 
3400, 3 and 7; Russia’s preference supported retribution in order to send a clear signal of no 
toleration for IHL and international norm violations, UNSC 3453rd Meeting, Tuesday 8 November 
1994, UN Doc S/PV. 3453 2; and for Rwanda’s preference see Letter Dated 28 September 1994 from 
the Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the 
Security Council, UN Doc S/1994/1115. On the theories of retribution and Rwanda’s preference for 
the ICTR see Jason Benjamin Fink, ‘Deontological Retributivism and the Legal Practice of 
International Jurisprudence: the Case of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’ (2005) 
49(2) Journal of African Law 101.  
135 Matthew Saul, ‘Local Ownership of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Restorative 
and Retributive Effects’ (2012) 12 International Criminal Law Review 427, 437. 
136 Victor Peskin, International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans: Virtual Trials and the Struggle 
for State Cooperation (CUP 2008) 157. 
137 Preamble UNSC Res 955; Russia and Pakistan, UNSC 3453rd Meeting (n 134) 2 and 10 
respectively; contrast with the position of Czech Republic, UNSC 3453rd Meeting (n 134) 6-7. 
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The SCSL was established following the Sierra Leone civil war at the request of the Sierra 
Leone Government.138 It sought ‘assistance from the United Nations Security Council in 
establishing a strong and credible court that will meet the objectives of bringing justice 
and ensuring lasting peace’.139 Eventually, an agreement was reached for the 
establishment of the SCSL140 to prosecute those with the ‘greatest responsibility for 
serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed 
in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996’.141 
 
Once again a temporally, geographically and substantively limited court was established, 
albeit a unique and potentially revolutionary hybrid mechanism with high 
expectations.142 While retribution was part of the court’s purpose,143 it was also to end 
impunity and contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to the restoration 
and maintenance of peace’.144 Yet the ability of the SCSL to promote reconciliation has 
been seriously questioned.145 
 
With the creation of the ICC the international criminal justice project gained a 
permanent criminal court. The international court was meant to reduce the need for 
future ad hoc mechanisms by providing a permanent forum to address impunity. At 
present thirty-three African states are ICC members making it the largest regional 
grouping of states. The sizable number of African state parties has been thought to stem:  
                                                        
138 On the legacy of the SCSL see Charles Chernor Jalloh (ed), The Sierra Leone Special Court and 
its Legacy: the impact for Africa and international criminal law (CUP 2014). 
139 Annex to the letter dated 9 August 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone to 
the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council UN Doc S/2000/786, 2. 
<www.rscsl.org/Documents/Establishment/S-2000-786.pdf> accessed 04 April 2017. 
140 Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the 
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, 16 January 2002, 2178 UNTS 137, 
<www.rscsl.org/Documents/scsl-agreement.pdf> accessed 04 April 2017. 
141 Article 1, Special Court for Sierra Leone Statute UN Doc S/2002/246, appendix II. The SCSL 
never did apply local law. 
142 Robert Cryer, ‘A “Special Court” for Sierra Leone’ (2001) 50 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 435; Nicole Fritz and Alison Smith, ‘Current Apathy for Coming Anarchy: building the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone’ (2001) 25 Fordham International Law Journal 391; Micaela Frulli, 
‘The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Some Preliminary Comments’ (2000) 11 European Journal of 
International Law 857, 869. 
143 Preamble (n 140). 
144 Preamble, UNSC Resolution 1315 (2000) UN Doc S/RES/1315. 
145 Lydia A. Nkansah, ‘Justice Within the Arrangement of the Special Court for Sierra Leone Versus 
Local Perception of Justice: a Contradiction or Harmonious?’ (2014) 22(1) African Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 103; Charles Chernor Jalloh, ‘Special Court for Sierra Leone: 
Achieving Justice?’ (2010-11) 32 Michigan Journal of International Law 395; Antonio Cassese 
‘Report on the Special for Sierra Leone: submitted by the Independent Expert’ (12 December 2006) 
<www.rscsl.org/Documents/Cassese%20Report.pdf> accessed 04 April 2017. 
 43
 
out of frustration with the existing international institutions, including 
the Security Council and the African Union, whose initiatives have proven 
to be unable to address conflict in the region in a satisfactory manner. It 
is as if Africa has volunteered itself for the International Criminal Court, 
and for good reason.146  
 
This view has been challenged by Kamari Clarke who argues that African states joined 
the ICC, in part, to demonstrate their commitment to good governance and facilitate 
their active engagement with the international system.147 The ICC has become 
synonymous with Africa as ten out of eleven of the international court’s current 
investigations relate to an African situation.148 
 
In conjunction with other international courts and tribunals the above three 
mechanisms have contributed greatly to the advancement of ICL. The ICTR set the 
precedent for the first genocide ruling by an international court, as well as defining rape 
as a genocidal act.149 The SCSL was the first to find individuals guilty of the crime of 
recruiting child soldiers.150 However, there are legitimate concerns over the ICC’s 
inclusivity and the replication of the international system’s inequalities.151  
 
Notwithstanding the existence of the ICC and the experiences with the ICTR and the 
SCSL, it is both positive and heartening that African states are open and receptive to the 
idea of a regional criminal court. With the adoption of the Malabo Protocol the 
landscape of criminal justice within the continent has shifted. However, many assume 
that the Malabo Protocol was a direct response to the dissatisfaction of African states 
and the AU with the ICC, particularly with regards to the indictment of Sudanese 
President Omar al Bashir.152 For example, du Plessis dismisses claims by the AU that the 
ICLS is not ‘motivated by anti-ICC sentiment’153 based on: tensions with the ICC and the 
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UNSC; the upholding of immunity within the protocol; the Malabo Protocol’s failure to 
mention the ICC or any institutional relationship to the international court; and the 
apparent ‘belief’ by African states that non-African courts should not be holding African 
leaders to account.154 This perspective ignores other key factors at play.155 There are 
tensions between the AU and the ICC but it would be naïve to see this as the only factor 
as the perspective does not acknowledge the background to the Protocol’s adoption and 
the challenges the ICC and ICL face.  
 
 
2.3 African Proposals for a Regional Criminal Court (1960’s – 2014) 
 
One of the major disadvantages of seeing the Malabo Protocol as anti-ICC is the 
dismissal of the numerous regional debates and discussions held over the need for a 
regional court. Prior to the ICC’s establishment the question of a regional court was 
raised by African states and recommendations made for its establishment.156 The OAU 
and African states considered proposals for the inclusion of international crimes during 
negotiations for the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charter). 
However, despite recognising the proposal’s value, criminal accountability was never 
included157 because it was felt unnecessary as the UN was discussing proposals for an 
international court and the Apartheid Convention held the promise of a penal court.158 
 
2.3.1 African States Support the Establishment of the ICC  
 
African states supported the establishment of an ICC style court for many reasons, 
including the horrific history of apartheid and the adoption of the International 
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Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid.159 The 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide had envisioned 
and enabled an ‘international penal tribunal [with] jurisdiction’ over the crime of 
genocide.160 Coupled with the UN discussions over an international court,161 an 
assessment by African states of their capabilities and resources would have made the 
international system more attractive. Within this context African states, to varying 
degrees, were involved in the negotiations leading up to the creation of the ICC. They 
were present during the Ad Hoc Committee and Preparatory Committee on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court (Prep Com) meetings held between 
1995-1998,162 which was the first opportunity for African states to wield influence on the 
type of court that would emerge.  
 
Alongside the international meetings regional discussions were also taking place. As the 
Apartheid regime of South Africa had recently ended, ‘the issue of human rights and the 
issue of punishment of apartheid as a crime was high on the agenda of most African 
countries, and particularly within SADC [the Southern African Development 
Community]. This is why SADC took the lead in promoting the court’.163 On the initiative 
of the South African Ministry of Justice and a local non-governmental organisation 
(NGO), Lawyers for Human Rights,164 SADC convened meetings over a two-year period 
with the aim of ‘fostering a better understanding of the proposed court’, looking at the 
potential ‘implications and benefits’, and to develop a common position.165 The meetings 
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culminated in ‘the adoption of ten basic principles of consensus’ on an International 
Criminal Court (SADC 10 Principles)166 which sought an ‘effective, independent and 
impartial’ international court167 where the possibility for a UNSC veto in relation to the 
court’s business was prevented.168 The principles were adopted by SADC and therefore, 
can be viewed as the official position of the organisation’s member states.  
 
The experience of these states was such that they realised their best chance of getting 
their views across, developing a strategy and thus having an ‘impact’, would be to 
negotiate as a bloc during the multilateral negotiations.169 This is clearly seen from how 
the SADC Members behaved during the Rome Conference.170 Also Lesotho’s subsequent 
‘lobbying drive […] to co-ordinate the African group on issues pertaining to the ICC’ also 
helped shape the approach and increased SADC’s influence during the Rome 
Conference.171 
 
In a more inclusive regional meeting, Senegal hosted the Pan-African Conference [Dakar 
Conference]172 aiming to ‘trigger greater political will in the months leading up to the 
Rome Diplomatic Conference’.173 This was to be achieved by ‘rais[ing] awareness amongst 
African governments and people about the implications of the International Criminal 
Court’.174 It should be noted that this was done with the support of the NGO No Peace 
Without Justice175 and through co-sponsorship and co-chairing along with George Soros 
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from the Open Society.176 The Dakar Conference had delegates from 25 African states177 
who were encouraged to develop an independent approach towards the ICC.178 The 
outcome of the conference was the adoption of the Dakar Declaration on the 
Establishment of the International Criminal Court. Once again, the preference of the 
states was for an ‘independent, permanent, impartial, just and effective’ court, free of the 
political influence of the UNSC.179  
 
Interestingly, the Dakar Declaration mimics the wording of the Prep Com negotiations in 
that the principle of complementarity was to apply in situations where the domestic 
judicial system is ‘unwilling or unable’ to take legal action.180 Thus, the link is established 
between these side events to the Ad Hoc Committee meetings and Prep Com in the 
earlier stages. The commitment of most African states to the negotiation process 
provided continental understanding of the legal implication for these member states:  
 
for the first time, African countries from all parts of the continent 
participated actively in a committee session and cooperated closely on 
many issues on the basis of principles adopted by representatives of 
members of the Southern African Development Community in September 
1997, and the Dakar declaration adopted by government and NGO 
representatives at a conference in Senegal in February 1998.181 
 
Subsequently, Africa was represented at the Rome Conference by 47 African states182 and 
the OAU.183 Furthermore, the official records show that African states were represented 
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within the Vice-Presidents of the Conference,184 the General Committee of the 
Conference,185 the Committee of the Whole,186 the Drafting Committee,187 and the 
Credentials Committee.188 Thus, there would have been a level of understanding of the 
international court’s objectives and resulting expectations placed on the ICC. However, 
despite the large number of African states present during the negotiations not all of 
those states went on to sign and ratify the Rome Statute.  
 
Regardless, the Rome Conference Plenary Meetings provide evidence of African state 
support for an international criminal court to end impunity as ‘the legitimate concern of 
the community of nations to ensure that atrocious crimes did not go unpunished.’189 
While no African state opposed the ICC’s creation, the one common factor shared 
amongst all African and non-African states alike was the desire for the court to be free 
from political interference. There were reservations over the role the UN and the 
accompanying level of interference in internal state affairs.190 Mirroring the SADC 10 
Principles and Dakar Declaration, the generalised view was for a permanent, 
independent, impartial, credible, just and fair international court.191 It was also made 
clear that the international court would neither eradicate the need for other mechanisms 
in the future and ‘should not be regarded as an end in itself’,192 nor obviate the need for 
ad hoc tribunals.193 This position was in conflict with that of the International Law 
Commission (ILC) which envisioned the court working ‘in close relationship with the 
United Nations [and] would therefore obviate the need for further ad hoc tribunals.’194 
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An important issue was the type of legal system the international court would follow. 
African states do not share a common legal system or history. Libya called for a court 
which was inclusive of all legal systems as ‘[W]estern values and legal systems should not 
be the only source of international instruments’.195 This was a common concern for all 
African states where the legal system is not based on, or solely on, the English common 
law or Roman civil law. All African states present envisioned an international court 
complementary to the national system196 whereby domestic prosecutions would be given 
preference, unless the national court was unable or ineffective.197 Yet, complementarity 
was not to be used to supplant national jurisdiction or be a supervisory body performing 
a watchdog function.198 
 
While certain states wanted the court to be truly universal with its competency 
recognised by all,199 the consensus was in favour of automatic jurisdiction by state 
consent when signing up to the treaty and not an opt-in/opt-out system.200 There was 
more disagreement over how cases and situations were to come before the court and the 
Prosecutor’s ability to initiate their own investigations and prosecutions. The majority 
were in favour of granting such powers but wanted the Pre-Trial Chamber to exercise 
some form of control.201 Three African states rejected this approach: Egypt ‘for practical 
and legal reasons’ not expanded upon;202 Nigeria as granting ‘such power without any 
safeguards might entail the risk of political manipulation which would not augur well for 
the independence of the Court’;203 and Sudan on the basis that the ‘Prosecutor should be 
under reasonable and logical control, and should not act ex officio’.204 As only three out 
of 47 states objected, there was clear support for the Prosecutor to enjoy such powers. 
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Proposals for NGOs, states or individuals to be able to initiate investigations received 
little support.205 
 
The consensus was for the international court to be independent from the UN, but the 
role of the UNSC and the UN General Assembly (UNGA) was harder to resolve. Proposals 
included the UNSC having no role in referring cases,206 referrals but no veto permitted207 
and only referrals in line with its mandate.208 African states voiced concern over the 
political nature of the UNSC and manipulation of its work which would impact on the 
investigations deferred or obstructed.209 The UNGA was felt to play a more minor role 
over procedural aspects, except by Sudan who believed a ‘role in punishing war criminals 
[and] the right to express reservations should also have been granted’ to the UNGA.210 
This preference may be because the UNGA is less manipulated by the UNSC Permanent 
Five Members due to the voting requirements.  
 
The records of the Rome Conference negotiations show that African states were fully 
supportive of an independent court (free from political influence of the UN and states) 
which would be fair, just and effective. The role of the Prosecutor was to be fairly broad, 
but with oversight controls, while the UNSC’s role was limited and not to be used for 
political reasons. The likelihood of achieving this was always dubious given the political 
nature of the UNSC. The divergent positions of African states expressed throughout the 
negotiation process is reflected in the uptake on membership to the ICC.  
 
Many of the concerns and objections held by African states have been consistent 
throughout their dealings with the ICC.211 This is a consequence of the package deal 
offered by the Rome Statute.212 According to the Algerian representative Mr. Bouguetaia, 
this ‘all or nothing’ approach necessitates in that ‘[t]he text of the Statute of the Court 
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met some, if not all, of his major concerns. He still had some regrets and some fears, but 
hoped that, with time, those fears would be overcome’.213   
 
The ICC emerged as a universal international criminal system, a court addressing 
international crimes that was open to all states.214 Distinguishing itself from previous 
international courts and tribunals, the primary responsibility for the prosecution of the 
crimes lies with states therefore, the ICC is a court of last resort.215 While the ICC is 
considered to be a universal system of justice, the reality is that until every single state is 
a party to the Rome Statute this universal aspiration will never be realised. The fact the 
UN has near universal membership, and also has the ability to refer situations to the ICC, 
does not alter the lack of universal nature of the ICC’s jurisdiction. Given the reality of 
the UN system, the UNSC’s Permanent Members’ veto power and power politics, certain 
states will forever be out of the reach of the ICC.  
 
2.3.2 African States Pursue the Creation of a Regional Criminal Court 
 
Concurrently in 1998, a protocol amending the Banjul Charter created an independent 
African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR) entering into force in 2005. Yet, 
when the AU was established in 2000 it had its own judicial organ, the Court of Justice 
(ACJ). Proposals to merge the two courts were put forward although initially rejected.216 
During one such debate in 2005 the then Nigerian President Obasanjo suggested the 
merged court could have different divisions dealing with specific matters, including ‘a 
division for cross-border criminal issues or whatever’.217 While not explicitly calling for 
international criminal jurisdiction, he had called for a judicial mechanism through which 
crimes of concern to the region could be addressed. The AU Assembly eventually 
decided to merge the ACtHPR and the ACJ, but neither international nor transnational 
criminal jurisdiction was included.218 The Malabo Protocol would go on to build on 
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Obasanjo’s idea of including transnational crimes as well as crimes of concern within the 
continent.  
 
Separate to this, concerns over the use of UJ by non-African states culminated in calls for 
a regional court.219 For example, the debates over the prosecution of former Chadian 
President Hissène Habré220 resulted in the AU Assembly setting up a Committee of 
Eminent African Jurists (Habré Committee), ‘mandated to make concrete 
recommendations on the above [Habré] matter as well as ways and means of dealing 
with issues of a similar nature in the future’.221 Consequently, the Habré Committee, 
reflecting on the merger of the two African Courts, proposed granting it criminal 
jurisdiction over ‘crimes against humanity, war crimes and violations of Convention 
Against Torture’.222 The Committee’s report further recommended strengthening the 
ability of national and regional institutions to protect human rights and, most 
importantly, ‘ensure […] exposure to international criminal law norms for judges and law 
enforcement agencies in Africa, to ensure they are equipped to handle such international 
crimes’.223 
 
Amongst the regional discussions over establishing a judicial system the African Charter 
on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) was adopted in 2007. The AU took 
the opportunity to translate its vehement opposition to unconstitutional changes of 
government and move beyond sanctions, calling for criminal accountability where 
individuals ‘may also be tried before the competent court of the Union’.224 As the only 
judicial organ was the ACJ no criminal jurisdiction existed,225 making it plausible that the 
treaty drafters were taking cognisance of the potential future criminal jurisdiction of the 
AU’s court. The ACDEG provides an example of an instrument reflecting the context and 
ongoing debates over ways to address criminal accountability within African courts.  
 
Overall, the momentum to build regional capacity to pursue crimes of concern to the 
continent is evident from as early as the development of the African human rights 
                                                        
219 AU-EU Expert Report. 
220 For an in-depth explanation on the key developments see Human Rights Watch 
<https://www.hrw.org/tag/hissene-habre> accessed 29 June 2017. 
221 Habré Committee Report, para 2. 
222 Ibid para 35. 
223 Ibid para 39. 
224 Article 25(5) ACDEG.  
225 The merged ACtJHR protocol has yet to enter into force. 
 53
system. Therefore, it is misrepresentative and overly simplistic to see the Malabo 
Protocol’s creation of the ICLS as solely an anti-ICC response. But, this is not to imply 
that the ICC had no influence at all. Instead, the broader context, expectations and 
influences at play need to be brought into any analysis of the need for the new court and 
its potential contribution to ICL. 
 
 
2.4 Drafting the Malabo Protocol 
 
While the concept of an African regional criminal court goes back decades, the history of 
the Malabo Protocol is presented from the date of the first official decision taken by an 
AU organ to pursue amending the ACtJHR.   
 
During the February 2009 Summit, the AU Assembly, addressing the concerns over the 
use of UJ, called on the AU Commission ‘to examine the implications of the Court 
[merged ACtJHR] being empowered to try international crimes’.226 When the 
Commission followed up in 2010, the Assembly took a further decision ‘request[ing] the 
Commission to finalise the study on the implications of empowering the African Court 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights to try international crimes […] and report […] in 
January/February 2011’.227 Consequently the Commission engaged a consultant 
organisation ‘to produce a detailed study with comprehensive recommendations and a 
draft legal instrument amending the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights’.228  
 
During June and August 2010 the Commission’s Office of the Legal Counsel received a 
draft proposal. This proposal was then part of the validation workshops hosted by the 
Pan African Parliament in late 2010. In attendance were the Commission’s officials, legal 
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counsel and advisors from the various AU bodies and the REC/RMs.229 The closed nature 
of the workshops has been criticised for not including state representatives, civil society 
and other experts in the field.230 The AU, as an institution, lacks transparency and the 
approach taken to the workshops is in contrast to that of the Rome Statute negotiations 
and preparatory meetings. Furthermore, there are concerns over not including AU 
member states as the success of the African Court rests solely on states buy in. The 
Commission missed an opportunity to ensure state understanding of the court which is 
crucial to building support continentally.  
 
Instead, it was only in 2011 that African Government participation occurred when in 
March, May, October and November expert meetings were convened which provisionally 
adopted a draft protocol.231 A review of the draft was conducted by another expert 
meeting in May 2012, followed by a meeting of the African Ministers of Justice and 
Attorneys General whom supported the draft.232  
 
During the process, while never hindering progress, the issue of how to define the crime 
of unconstitutional changes of government (UCG) proved to be a major point of 
contention because of its political nature.233 Another issue was how to adopt a definition 
with a penalty that would deter the conduct,234 while refraining from derailing the 
Unconstitutional Changes of Government Convention. Specifically, there were 
difficulties over how to reconcile the collective action nature of the crime with individual 
criminal responsibility,235 and to avoid creating a right to overthrow or encourage 
unconstitutional changes.236 It is hard to understand why the AU and states continued 
with the process given the inability to reach consensus over a UCG definition. There may 
                                                        
229 Ibid 24.  
230 du Plessis (n 1); Frans Viljoen, ‘AU Assembly should consider human rights implications before 
adopting the Amending Merged African Court Protocol’ (AfricLaw, 23 May 2012) 
<https://africlaw.com/2012/05/23/au-assembly-should-consider-human-rights-implications-
before-adopting-the-amending-merged-african-court-protocol/> accessed 30 June 2016; Amnesty 
International (n 1) 9-10. The validation workshops were not completely void of any non-AU 
presence, the Centre for Human Rights, Faculty of Law, University of Pretoria, South Africa had 
representatives present, see Deya (n 228) 24. 
231 Deya (228) 24. 
232 The Report, the Legal Instruments and Recommendations of the Ministers of Justice/Attorneys 
General on Legal Matters, Min/Legal/Rpt. 
233 Report, the Legal Instruments and Recommendations of the Ministers of Justice/Attorneys 
General – Draft Protocol on Amendments to the AfCtJHR EX.CL/773(XXII) 3. 
234 Ibid para 11(iii). 
235 Ibid para 11(ix). 
236 Ibid para 11(x). 
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have been a strong desire for the Protocol’s adoption process to be concluded to 
establish the regional court, or it is possible that states may have been pushing for 
adoption without the inclusion of the specific crime.  
 
In July 2012, despite support for the Draft Protocol, the Assembly did not adopt the 
instrument but instead requested further studies be done on the financial implications of 
establishing such a court and on a definition of UCG.237 In December 2013, the 
Commission considered the study’s finding that the human resources financial 
implications would be ‘marginal’,238 and that progress had been made on the definition 
of UCG. Regardless, the Assembly was dissatisfied with the submissions received and 
called for further consideration.239  
 
It was only in May 2014 that a Ministerial Meeting of the Specialized Technical 
Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs successfully adopted a definition of UCG and 
considered the draft Protocol’s immunity provision for Heads of State and 
Government.240 Finally, the Assembly adopted the Protocol during the 23rd Ordinary 
Session of the AU held in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea in June 2014. It became known as 
the Malabo Protocol named after the city in which it was adopted.241 
 
Within five years, the AU had managed to adopt a protocol to empower its judicial organ 
with criminal jurisdiction. This quick turnaround has been criticised for being rushed 
and without any real consultation process.242 While the Malabo Protocol ‘went through 
                                                        
237 Decision on the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court 
of Justice and Human Rights, Decision Assembly/AU/Dec. 427 (XIX) para 2.  
238 Report on the Financial and Structural Implications of Extending the Jurisdiction of the African 
Court of Justice and Human Rights to Encompass International Crimes; EX.CL/773 (XXII) Annex 2 
Rev, para 4. The report’s finding that the costs are marginal is most likely due to the phased in 
approach to the resourcing of the court identified in the Report.  
239 January 2012 Decision on the Draft Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of 
the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, EX.CL.Dec. 766(XXII) para 2 and 3; 
Doc.PRC/Rpt(XXV), EX.CL.Dec. 766(XXII) para 3. 
240 Opening Statement by Prof. Vinvent O. Nmehielle, Legal Counsel and Director for Legal 
Affairs of the African Union Commission, 1st Session of the Specialized Technical Committee on 
Justice and Legal Affairs (Government Legal Experts) as cited by Amnesty International (n 1) 11 
footnote 47. Prior to this meeting, immunity was not an issue considered by the draft protocol, 
Deya (n 228); confirmed by the Report of the Meeting of Ministers of Justice And/Or Attorneys 
General on Legal Matters 14 and 15 May 2012, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia Min/Legal/Rpt. (part of 
EX.CL/731 (XXI); The Report, the Draft Legal Instruments and Recommendations of the 
Specialized Technical Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs EX.CL/846(XXV) Rev.1. 
241 Assembly/AU/Dec.529 (XXIII) (n 101). 
242 du Plessis (n 1). 
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the normal processes of the AU […] but then if you go into the content, then you can 
always raise issues from the content itself, but on the processes, it followed exactly that 
what they require for it to get to where it is now’.243 According to the AUCA, the 
Assembly has the power to ‘take decisions on the reports and recommendations from the 
organs of the Union’244 and ‘establish any organ of the Union’.245 It was pursuant to these 
powers that the Malabo Protocol came to be. As the ‘supreme policy and decision-
making organ’,246 the Assembly is made up of Member states’ Heads of State and 
Government who ‘determines the AU policies, establishes its priorities’247 and ‘can create 
any committee, working group or commission as it deems necessary’.248 The body tasked 
to consider the expansion of the merged ACtJHR’s jurisdiction was the Commission, the 
secretariat of the organisation, thus, the logical and appropriate organ to assign the task.  
 
For a draft protocol to be adopted by the Assembly such decisions are taken by 
‘consensus or, failing which, by a two-thirds majority of the Member States of the 
Union’.249 The way the Malabo Protocol was adopted conformed to the institutional 
procedure and the involved organs and bodies are permitted under the AUCA to perform 
those tasks. Thus, the Malabo Protocol is a legally binding treaty, and furthermore, there 
was no ultra vires act due to the engagement of a consultant by the Commission. 
 
What is evident from the drafting process is the push to gain as many concessions that 
could be managed at the time, most obviously with the fourteen crimes enumerated.250 
The thinking surrounding the crimes was that ‘if we are establishing a court, why wait 
another twenty years, let’s all put them [the crimes] together. So that is why you have all 
that list of other crimes besides genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity’.251 
 
Whether adopting the Malabo Protocol was undertaken to: broaden international 
criminal justice beyond the international level’s approach to include those of the 
                                                        
243 Interview with African State Official (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 29 April 2015). 
244 Article 9(1)(b) AUCA. 
245 Article 9(1)(d) AUCA. 
246 African Union Handbook 2016 (African Union Commission and New Zealand Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade 2016) 12 <http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/auhb-2016-english-
pdf-final-january-2016.pdf> accessed 30 June 2016. 
247 Ibid 16.  
248 Ibid 16. 
249 Article 7(1) AUCA. 
250 Article 28A ACS.  
251 Interview with African State Official (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 8 May 2015). 
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region;252 in preference to the ICC or UJ prosecutions by non-African states;253 or simply 
as an important development for the African Court,254 the Protocol is ground breaking 
as, to date, no other regional court has criminal jurisdiction.255  
 
African States and the AU have pursued a regional criminal court for decades. However, 
given the existence of the ICC and the ability of domestic courts to prosecute 
international crimes is there a need for an African regional criminal court?  
 
            
                                                        
252 Report of the Ministers of Justice Attorneys General EX.CL/478 (XIV) 14; AU-EU Expert Report; 
Progress Report of the Commission on the Hissene Habre Case – Assembly/AU/9(XVI)Rev. 1 
253 Libya and Sudan’s view in Report of the Meeting of Ministers of Justice and/Or Attorneys 
General on Legal Matters (n 240) 4.   
254 Egypt’s view, ibid. 
255 The European Union has proposed a more limited body, the European Public Prosecutor’s 
Office, mandated to ‘investigate and prosecute EU-fraud and other crimes affecting the Union's 
financial interests’. <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/judicial-cooperation/public-
prosecutor/index_en.htm> accessed 25 June 2017.  
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Part I 
The AU and Prosecutions under Universal Jurisdiction 
 
 
In Part I, the first of the research sub questions - whether UJ contributes to the need for 
an African regional criminal court – is answered. The analysis starts in Chapter 3 with an 
investigation into the purpose and scope of UJ as a mechanism for fighting impunity. 
While UJ prosecutions before domestic courts offer a forum to pursue accountability, 
under international law state officials are protected from coming before the court of 
another state. The extent to which an immunity plea in relation to a domestic court’s 
prosecution of international crimes inhibits UJ is the final factor considered in Chapter 3.  
 
The discussion then moves on to consider state practice in Chapter 4, which includes the 
African response to European UJ prosecutions. The similarities between African and 
non-African states is highlighted to dispel any assumption that the AU and African states 
are opposed to the concept of UJ. The last section of this chapter focuses on the 
prosecution of Habré before the Senegalese court, exploring whether a promising 
precedent has been set for future African UJ prosecutions. The critical analysis 
undertaken in both chapters provides the basis of the conclusion that UJ is of limited use 
in the fight against impunity, and as such, contributes to the need for an African regional 
criminal court.  
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Chapter 3  
Domestic Prosecutions of International Crimes 
 
 
Prior to the establishment of international courts the only way to address international 
crimes was through national courts. Today, despite the emergence of international 
courts and the ICC, the relevance of and need for national prosecutions has not 
diminished. In fact, it is thought to be the most appropriate way to address international 
crimes.256  
 
However, when the state within which the crimes occurred chooses not to, or is unable 
to prosecute, other states can step in. In such cases, one method by which to base a 
prosecution on is UJ. This is the most contentious principle of jurisdiction because there 
is neither a nationality nor a territory link to the crime, accused or victim. Yet, it enables 
any state to pursue cases related to specific international crimes in an attempt to reduce 
impunity.  
 
Therefore, given the ability of any state to use UJ as a jurisdictional basis, this chapter 
investigates how UJ contributes to the need for an African regional criminal court by 
scrutinizing its purpose, how the crimes covered assist in meeting its purpose, and what 
limitations are placed on the principle.  
 
 
3.1 Purpose of Universal Jurisdiction 
 
At its most basic form UJ provides a jurisdictional basis for the prosecution of certain 
crimes by any state, unconnected to the commission of the crime, the place it occurred, 
the accused or the victim because the conduct is of universal concern.257 The purpose of 
                                                        
256 Mark S Ellis, Sovereignty and Justice: Balancing the Principle of Complementarity between 
International and Domestic War Crimes Tribunals (Cambridge Scholars Publishing 2014).  
257 Kenneth C Randall, ‘Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law’ (1988) 66 Texas Law 
Review 785, 788 as cited in Steven W Becker, ‘Universal Jurisdiction: How Universal Is It? A Study 
of Competing Theories’ (2002-3) 12 Palestine Yearbook of International Law 49, 50; Roger O’Keefe, 
‘Universal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concept’ (2004) 2(3) Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 735. 
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UJ is thus to contribute to ending impunity, by providing a means by which to address 
international crimes when the state in question cannot or will not prosecute. Yet, the 
jurisdictional principle of UJ lacks a common definition which causes complications in 
its application.258 Due to the many diverse approaches and differing terminological use of 
UJ generalising the principle and determining an understanding proves problematic,259 
and has ‘probably been among the reasons why confusion has surrounded its legal 
significance’.260  
 
Given the diverse definitions and conceptualisation of UJ a group of prominent jurists 
sought ‘to clarify an increasingly important area of international criminal law’ by 
developing The Princeton Principles.261 The premise being, that international interests 
are harmed by the commission of certain crimes, and there was a need to ‘legitimize the 
controversial idea that ordinary national courts should be able to hear charges against 
anyone found within their jurisdiction who is alleged to have committed a serious crime 
under international law’.262   
 
The Princeton Principles were intended to further the cause of UJ, end impunity and 
promote a universal standard of accountability. Therefore, many of the principles reflect 
aspirational elements as opposed to a grounding in state practice and law.263 For 
example, Principle 3 enables prosecution in the absence of national UJ legislation,264 but 
does not address its compatibility with the principles nullum crimen sine lege (no crime 
without law) and nulla poena sine lege (no penalty without law). The authority for UJ 
                                                        
258 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v Belgium) (Dissenting Opinion 
of Judge ad hoc van den Wyngaert) [2002] ICJ Rep 121, paras 44-45 (hereafter Arrest Warrant case 
Dissenting Opinion). 
259 Bassiouni notes five distinct meanings of universality, demonstrating the wide meaning of 
universality in ‘Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical Perspectives and 
Contemporary Practice’ (2001) 42 Virginia Journal of International Law 81, 152; Luc Reydams 
separates UJ into three categories: co-operative general universality, co-operative limited 
universality and unilateral limited universality, in Universal Jurisdiction: International and 
Municipal Legal Perspectives (OUP 2003) Chapter 2. 
260 Bassiouni (n 259) 152. 
261 Marks M, Press Release, ‘Jurists Announce “Princeton Principles” (23 July 2001) 
<https://www.princeton.edu/news/2001/07/23/jurists-announce-princeton-principles> accessed 
16 June 2017.   
262 Ibid.   
263 Macedo S, et al. ‘Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction’ (Princeton University Program 
in Law and Public Affairs 2001) 39, <https://lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/unive_jur.pdf> 
accessed 15 May 2015.  
264 ‘With respect to serious crimes under international law as specified in Principle 2(1), national 
judicial organs may rely on universal jurisdiction even if their national legislation does not 
specifically provide for it’. 
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treaty crimes stems from an explicit provision, which contradicts Principle 3’s attempt to 
remove the need for legislation.265 Additionally, states have implementing procedures 
which must be adhered to. In contrast, a customary law-based UJ prosecution would 
neither violate nullum crimen nor nulla poena sine lege as the conduct would already 
have been classified as an international crime by custom. 
 
In contradiction to Principle 3, Principle 11 requests that ‘a state shall, where necessary, 
enact national legislation to enable the exercise of universal jurisdiction and the 
enforcement of these Principles’. The only logical explanation for this inconsistency is 
the distinction made between ‘serious crimes under international law’266 and ‘the 
application of universal jurisdiction to […] other crimes under international law’.267  Yet, 
the Princeton Principles provide no guidance as to which crimes are covered as neither 
the mention of ‘the nature of the crime’,268 nor the ‘category of offences generally 
regarded as universal concern’269 clarify the matter.  
 
Overall, the Princeton Principles demonstrate the problem of claiming the law is one 
thing when the discussion is not focused on the law as it exists (lex lata), but rather with 
a view to the future (de lege ferenda) or the law as desired (lex desiderata). Thus, it is 
hard to see how the principles provide clarity or further the cause of ending impunity. 
Instead, it entrenches further confusion and raises further points of contention.  
 
UJ, in theory, is meant to reduce impunity for international crimes by providing a means 
by which any state can prosecute the conduct. However, the international community 
has not produced any concrete measures to establish clear guidelines on UJ, to improve 
clarity and its consequent use. But, at the regional level the AU has attempted to develop 
its own approach270 in response to the use of UJ by non-African states over Africans and 
to increase the principle’s utility for African states.  
                                                        
265 On the distinction between treaty and customary crimes, see section 3.2 of this chapter.  
266 Principle 2(1). 
267 Principle 2(2). 
268 Principle 1.1. 
269 Randall (n 257) 50. 
270 As evidenced by Report of the Commission on the Use of the Principle Of Universal 
Jurisdiction by Some Non-African States as Recommended by the Conference of Ministers of 
Justice/Attorneys General, EX.CL/411(XIII) as adopted at the Thirteenth Ordinary Session of the 
Executive Council, 24-28 June 2008, Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt (hereafter Report of the Commission 
on UJ); AU-EU Expert Report; the Cairo-Arusha Principles on Universal Jurisdiction in Respect of 
Gross Human Rights Offences, 
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The AU agrees that the purpose of UJ is to end impunity271 by acting as a gap filler and 
not a replacement for national or international prosecutions.272 Its definitional approach 
reflects this and the basic premise of UJ is  
 
the assertion by one state of its jurisdiction over crimes allegedly 
committed in the territory of another state by nationals of another state 
against nationals of another state where the crime alleged poses no direct 
threat to the vital interests of the state asserting jurisdiction. In other 
words, universal jurisdiction amounts to the claims by a state to 
prosecute crimes in circumstances where none of the traditional links of 
territoriality, nationality, passive personality or the protective principle 
exists at the time of the commission of the alleged offence.273 
 
While states’ primary responsibility for prosecuting their own international crimes is 
emphasised,274 UJ is needed because states do not discharge this obligation. What’s more 
‘certain crimes are of such heinous character and of most serious concern to the 
international community that they must not go unpunished’.275 Yet, while the nature of 
the crime is important, ‘moral reprehensibility cannot be equated to universal 
jurisdiction’.276  
 
However, African states have come to view UJ as a political tool used by European states 
against African state officials.277 Therefore, the AU’s view is that it’s the scope of UJ and 
not its existence which is contested.278 Consequently, in May 2012, the AU adopted The 
African Union (Draft) Model Law on Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes 
(AU Model Law). This was done in an attempt to control the development of the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
<http://www.africalegalaid.com/download/policy_document/Policy_Document.pdf>  accessed 25 
March 2016 (hereafter Cairo-Arusha Principles); and the African Union (Draft) Model National 
Law on Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes EX.CL/731 (XXI)c, adopted at Twenty-
First Ordinary Session of the Executive Council, 9-13 July 2012, Addis Ababa Ethiopia (hereafter 
AU Model Law).  
271 Article 3(a) AU Model Law. 
272 Edward Kwakwa, ‘The Cairo-Arusha Principles on Universal Jurisdiction in Respect of Gross 
Human Rights Offences: Developing the Frontiers of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction’ 
(2002) 10 African Yearbook of International Law 407, 411. 
273 AU-EU Expert Report, para 8. As a document endorsed and adopted by the AU it is possible to 
equate the report to the organisation’s official view and approach. 
274 AU Model Law Preambular para 4. 
275 AU Model Law Preambular para 1. 
276 Report of the Commission on UJ, para 40. 
277 AU-EU Expert Report.  
278 Report of the Commission on UJ, para 9. 
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principle and that of ICL ‘[i]nstead of leaving the subject of UJ to a group of Western 
states’.279    
 
Hence, the AU and African states have sought to protect sovereignty and promote the 
principle of non-interference through adopting a policy, and not a legal approach, to 
UJ.280 While UJ emerged in an era when no permanent international criminal court 
existed, this is no longer the case. The AU uses this to its advantage by encouraging ICC 
referrals as a check against the use of UJ and by removing the need for such 
prosecutions.281 However, there are limitations to the ICC’s usage as its jurisdiction is 
only for crimes committed after 2002 and the international court requires membership 
or acceptance of its jurisdiction by an official declaration.282 
 
Overall, the purpose of UJ has not significantly changed under the AU’s approach, 
however the manner in which it is to be achieved and by whom is the point of 
divergence. The following section investigates what UJ can achieve in its pursuit to end 
impunity and to assess whether the principle contributes to the need for a regional 
criminal court.  
 
 
3.2 The Scope of Universal Jurisdiction  
 
For African states and the AU to have created a regional criminal court, the means by 
which UJ addresses international crimes must be lacking. The way in which UJ seeks to 
fulfil its purpose, and assists in ending impunity, can contribute to the need for the 
regional criminal court if it does not address the needs of African states in terms of 
criminal prosecutions. 
 
                                                        
279 A Dube, ‘The AU Model Law On Universal Jurisdiction: An African Response to Western 
Prosecutions Based on the Universality Principle’ (2015) 18(3) PER 450, 457 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/pelk.v18i3.01> accessed 28 March 2016. 
280 Report of the Commission on UJ, para 40. 
281 Ibid, para 91. 
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This section interrogates the crimes under UJ. Although the nature of the conduct must 
be heinous and of concern to the international community,283 the act must be 
established by either treaty or by customary international law as a UJ crime.    
 
3.2.1 Universal Jurisdiction Treaty Law Crimes284  
 
While treaties provide an unequivocal means to designate a crime of UJ concern, only 
four crimes are definitively included:285 the crime of piracy as provided for in the 
Convention on the Law of the Sea;286 the crime of apartheid under the International 
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid;287 torture 
under the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CAT);288 and enforced disappearances under the 
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons From Enforced 
Disappearances.289 
 
Attempts to expand the reach of UJ treaty crimes are made by including the aut dedere 
aut judicare (extradite or prosecute) provisions, but the distinctions between treaty 
based UJ crimes and the principle of aut dedere aut judicare should not be blurred.290 As 
the scope of UJ is hotly contested it would be better to secure agreement on the 
principle’s fundamentals before trying to expand it.291 For example, with Article 1 of the 
Genocide Convention. While a laudable attempt to include the conduct as UJ, the 
Genocide Convention is not the correct method to classify the crime as such because the 
                                                        
283 Section 3.1 of this chapter. 
284 For an in-depth analysis on the different approaches of treaties to UJ see Reydams (n 259) 
Chapter 3. 
285 Ibid chapter 3. The AU-EU Expert Report, footnote 5 lists the UJ treaties identified by the Ad 
Hoc Expert Group. 
286 Article 105. 
287 Article IV(b).  
288 Article 5(2) 2.   
289 Article 9(2). 
290 On the distinctions see Reydams (n 259) Chapter 1; Bassiouni (n 259); Julia Geneuss, ‘Fostering 
a Better Understanding of Universal Jurisdiction: A Comment on the AU-EU Expert Report on the 
Principle of Universal Jurisdiction’ (2009) 7 Journal of International Criminal Justice 945, 949. 
291 On the controversy see Reydams (n 259) 28; Geneuss (n 290) 949; George P Fletcher, ‘Editorial 
Comments: Against Universal Jurisdiction’ (2003) 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice 580; 
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treaty does not explicitly provide for UJ.292 Furthermore, customary international law 
does not appear to support this expansion.293  
 
Despite the ability of treaties to establish UJ there are limitations for their applicability 
because no obligations arise for non-state parties unless expressly agreed otherwise.294 
However, the United States of America (USA) has nevertheless tried to impose UJ 
obligations, including the use of aut dedere aut judicare provisions, against non-state 
parties.295 Regardless, treaty law is very clear as to which states UJ provisions apply to. It 
applies only to states which are a party to the treaty.  
 
In brief, very few treaties explicitly provide for UJ restricting the number of crimes and 
the principle’s ability to contribute to ending impunity. Yet, as customary international 
law also establishes UJ conduct the limitation of treaty crimes may be overcome, 
potentially negating the need for an African regional criminal court to fill the gap.   
 
3.2.2 Universal Jurisdiction Customary Law Crimes 
 
For conduct to be considered a UJ customary crime it must be ‘general practice accepted 
as law’.296 To satisfy this requirement three elements must be met:297 the state practice 
must be consistent and of appropriate duration, although no time frame is set out for 
said practice to emerge;298 there must be generality of the practice, which requires 
general acceptance by the majority of states, or uniform practice amongst states;299 and it 
must reflect opinio juris sive necessitatis (accepted as law) although some inconsistencies 
or state objections do not negate the practice’s customary nature.300 However, the ability 
                                                        
292 Reydams (n 259) 47; William Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes 
(CUP 2000); A. Hays Butler, ‘The Growing Support for Universal Jurisdiction in National 
Legislation’ in Stephen Macedo (ed), Universal Jurisdiction: National Courts and the Prosecution of 
Serious Crimes under International Law (University of Pennsylvania Press 2004) 73. 
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294 Article 34 and 35 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 
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295 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th edn, CUP 2012) 471. 
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of a persistent objector to negate a custom’s establishment in law, or the applicability of 
that custom in relation to the objecting state, is unclear. Provided no other state 
condones the objection and it is not officially adopted by the objecting Government such 
conduct does not bar a customary law from existing.301 
 
If customary law requirements were applied, certain conduct can be said to be a UJ 
crime. While piracy has been codified within the 1982 United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) it is still the most commonly cited customary UJ crime.302 As 
piracy is committed on the High Seas, outside any state’s jurisdiction, it is of universal 
interest that every state has jurisdiction over those accused of being hostes humani 
generis (enemies of humankind).303 Similarly, certain war crimes committed during an 
international and/or a non-international armed conflict were developed through state 
practice and later became customary law.304 While the 1949 Geneva Conventions largely 
codified the customary practice,305 not all associated treaties have reached customary 
status.306  
 
                                                        
301 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v 
United States) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, 98, § 186. 
302 Reydams (n 259) Chapter 2. For an alternative view on piracy not falling under UJ see Tasmin 
Paige, ‘Piracy and Universal Jurisdiction’ (2013) 12 Macquarie Law Journal 131. 
303 Joaquín Alcaide Fernández, ‘Hostes humani generis: Pirates, Slavers, and Other Criminals’ in 
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304 The International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Study on the Customary International Law: 
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Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (First Geneva Convention), 12 
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306 The debate over the customary law status of the Additional Protocols to the Geneva 
Conventions, generally holds that such status is not extended to either the Protocol Additional to 
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3, or the Protocol Additional to 
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609.  
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The categorisation of other core international crimes is unclear307 because the arguments 
for inclusion are based on ‘disparate, disjointed, and poorly understood’ jurisprudence to 
meet the state practice threshold.308 As tempting as it is to use the notions of jus cogens 
(compelling law)309 and obligations erga omnes (towards all) to base a UJ claim,310 this 
does not address the problem of a lack of a legal obligation imposed on states to exercise 
jurisdiction.311 
 
However, the literature is supportive of imposing such an obligation to prosecute 
because state practice ‘offers just about sufficient support to ground a right to do so in 
custom’.312  This is unconvincing as the legislation and types of trials using UJ do not 
reflect a monolithic approach to the core crimes. Furthermore, state practice is either 
sufficient or not, yet the assessment is that the evidence is ‘just about sufficient’ 
(emphasis added). Likewise, customary law does not permit the exercise of UJ in absentia 
as it remains controversial.313 States’ opposition and protest to in absentia trials clearly go 
against the method by which customary law develops. 314  
 
As highlighted above, under international law states are able to pursue a UJ case 
categorically based on the customary law crimes of piracy and a limited number of war 
crimes. When it comes to the core-crimes of aggression, genocide and crimes against 
humanity a customary basis is contested. States who are party to the relevant treaties 
may pursue UJ cases for the crimes of piracy, apartheid, torture, and enforced 
disappearances.  
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For the AU this form of UJ is insufficient to address genuine regional concerns. As such, 
the AU Model Law calls on African states to legislate to provide for UJ over ‘international 
crimes and for connected matters’,315 including the crimes of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, piracy, trafficking in drugs and terrorism.316 The addition of 
trafficking and terrorism offences is unique to Africa reflecting regional concerns. 
Previous attempts at carving out a regional niche to UJ included ‘acts of plunder and 
gross misappropriation of public resources, trafficking in human beings and serious 
environmental crimes’.317 This was done in an attempt to adopt a contextual approach to 
UJ in response to African concerns.318 The ICJ recognised this when the draft version of 
the Cairo-Arusha Principles was referred to as reflective of the African understanding 
and perspective.319 
 
While UJ coverage is limited it is supported by the ICC in providing a forum for the 
majority of the crimes to be prosecuted when a state is unable or unwilling to 
prosecute.320 Yet, while the AU Model Law incorporates crimes outside of the ICC’s 
jurisdiction there is no supporting mechanism, thus sole responsibility is left with 
African states. As the AU lacks the authority to impose implementation of the AU Model 
Law alternative ways to address the resulting impunity needs exploration. Additionally, 
in response to Africa’s perceived abuse of UJ by non-African states, the AU Assembly 
called for a study into the possibility of extending the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights’ (ACtJHR) jurisdiction to include international crimes.321 
 
 
3.3 Immunity as a Limitation of Universal Jurisdiction 
 
UJ fights impunity by providing a way for unconnected states to prosecute specific 
crimes of concern to the international community. However, it is limited by its stated 
                                                        
315 Article 1 AU Model Law. 
316 Article 8 AU Model Law. 
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318 Kwakwa (n 272) 412-13. On the potential for an inappropriate use of UJ based on the lack of 
context and inability to take into account the society’s needs, see Chandra Lekha Sriram, 
‘Universal Jurisdiction: Problems and Prospects of Externalizing Justice’ (2001) 12 Finnish Yearbook 
of International Law 47.  
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specific crimes and by those individuals capable of being prosecuted. For UJ prosecutions 
to occur jurisdictional competence is required, but the ability of domestic courts to 
adjudicate is limited by the immunity afforded to state officials. Therefore, the extent to 
which immunity prevents UJ from fulfilling its purpose is interrogated to answer 
whether this is a contributing factor to the need for an African regional criminal court.   
 
The individual immunity plea bars the court from adjudicating on the criminal charges 
related to a state official. While this is undesirable for the fight against impunity, the 
immunity has specific clear rationales and is not all-encompassing. Two theories 
underlie the immunity: functional necessity theory, based on the need of state officials to 
carry out their functions unimpeded by other states or treaty-based institutions;322 and 
representative character theory, which considers the state official the representative and 
personification of the state and thus afforded the applicable state immunities.323 While 
these are both distinct theories, in practice neither one has been exclusively used in 
either international conventions or case law.324  
 
Regardless of the theory, the state official is granted immunity not ‘for their personal 
benefit’, but in relation to the state’s immunity.325 This reflects the fundamental principle 
of sovereign equality in interstate relations and international law, regardless of any 
‘differences of an economic, social, political or other nature’.326 Consequently, the notion 
that adjudicating on the conduct of another state would violate the principle that all 
‘States are judicially equal’327 has been translated into individual immunity. Therefore, 
the dignity of the status of the office is upheld rather than that of the individual per se.328 
 
The law on immunity distinguishes between an act done in a personal or official 
capacity. Thus, two distinct types of immunity exist. The broadest of the two is personal 
                                                        
322 International Law Commission ‘Preliminary report on immunity of state officials from foreign 
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immunity (immunity ratione personae) covering both acts done in an official and 
personal capacity. The immunity is granted because of the status and office of the 
individual and therefore is limited to who it applies to – typically Heads of State and 
Government and certain other senior state officials.329 
 
The second type is functional immunity (immunity ratione materiae) which covers acts 
done in an official capacity. The immunity is dependent on the ‘nature of the act’ and the 
official capacity within which it was performed.330 The purpose of which is to protect the 
conduct of states and state functionaries not the individual conduct of officials, whether 
private or not. Overall, immunity should be seen as ‘a question of right’331 and an 
international legal obligation.332 
 
While immunity prevents UJ prosecutions, it is procedural and not substantive in nature, 
thus it is not a permanent barrier.333 The individual is not removed from the legislative 
jurisdiction of the state, instead it merely protects them from ‘the law enforcement 
process in the State from whose jurisdiction immunity exists but not from the law of that 
State’.334 Hence immunity and jurisdiction are linked but separate concepts, an 
important distinction often confused in the literature.335 Therefore, the individual’s 
responsibility is not excused or removed and the laws are still relevant. It is the 
enforcement and judgment of the law which is prevented while the immunity applies. 
Once the immunity ceases to apply criminal proceedings are possible. Consequently, 
immunity is not the same as impunity.336  
 
 
                                                        
329 Akande and Shah ‘Immunities of State Officials, International crimes and Foreign Domestic 
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335 Ibid para 64-77; Arrest Warrant case Judgment, para 59; O’Keefe, International Criminal Law (n 
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3.4 Immunity and UJ Before Foreign Domestic Courts  
 
While immunity clearly limits a court’s ability to use the UJ principle, the nature of the 
conduct is paramount and is considered to be of concern to the whole international 
community. Therefore, questions have been raised over the ability to set aside immunity 
when prosecuting international crimes before domestic courts. Given the difference 
between personal and functional immunity this section asks what impact the distinction 
has on UJ prosecutions and, consequently, the overall contribution to the need for an 
African regional criminal court. 
 
UJ crimes are regarded as such because of the nature of the conduct which is of concern 
to the international community. Therefore, it may seem counter-intuitive that Heads of 
State and Government are entitled to ‘full immunity from criminal jurisdiction and 
inviolability’ and any similar act of a state which would ‘hinder [them] in the 
performance of [their] duties’.337 Yet, the reasoning is that if the immunity was not 
upheld the Head of State or Government would be subject to ‘a constraining act of 
authority’.338 Furthermore, state practice grants immunity for incumbent Heads of State 
and Government from criminal proceedings regardless of the act being personal or 
official.339  
 
Under international law Heads of State and Government enjoy personal inviolability.340 
As ‘the Head of State acts in a public capacity with effect on other jurisdictions, it 
seemed appropriate to accord the same privileges and immunities on the acts of a Head 
of State as were accorded to the state itself’.341 Thus, incumbent Heads of State and 
Government enjoy broad and comprehensive immunity. While this makes sense for his 
or her official (public) acts it is not as easily explained when considering their private 
conduct. As a result, certain states grant Heads of State private conduct immunity 
similar to that of the Head of a Diplomatic Mission.342 Although this is not universally 
accepted, the ICJ supported the line of reasoning in their application of customary rules 
                                                        
337 Ibid para 54. 
338 Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v France) (Judgment) 
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on diplomatic immunity to a Head of State.343 Nevertheless, Fox and Webb’s argument 
for considering Heads of State and Government a unique category not related to 
diplomatic immunity is more convincing.344  
 
The personal immunity of senior state officials follows the same rules as for that of 
Heads of State or Government. Despite the attempted prosecutions of officials enjoying 
personal immunity, state practice has upheld immunity before domestic courts.345 In the 
ICJ Arrest Warrant judgment the Democratic Republic of Congo’s Minister of Foreign 
Affairs’ immunity was upheld, although it is not clear which type of immunity the court 
discussed.346 Therefore, personal immunity prevents a domestic court from pursuing a UJ 
prosecution against a select few state officials. Thus, the ability of UJ to fight impunity is 
hindered.  
 
While there is no official list defining senior state officials, those considered the official 
representative of the state are likely to fall into this category when applying the 
representative theory.347 Also, applying the functional theory, concerning officials who 
perform the functions of the state, would be impeded by criminal proceedings and would 
fall into this category. 
 
The ICJ has upheld immunity for senior state officials,348 whether they applied personal 
or functional immunity is unclear.349 Although personal immunity should be extended to 
any minister acting as a state representative who travels officially,350 the counter 
argument is that such an approach is incorrect because of the lack of a comparable effect 
on the dignity and sovereignty than when the official is a Head of State.351 Yet, state 
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practice and the ICJ have taken the broader approach.352 In the Congo v Rwanda case the 
ICJ reiterated that Heads of Government and Ministers of Foreign Affairs are 
representatives of states,353 but declined the immunity for those officials whose functions 
are by nature predominantly internal.354 The state will need to prove that the official in 
question is part of ‘its organs, agencies or instrumentalities’ to benefit from the 
immunity defence.355 Therefore, the number of individuals who can claim immunity for a 
UJ prosecution as a senior state official is more limited and defined than it first appears. 
Furthermore, former senior state officials are afforded functional immunity only356 
making UJ prosecutions over these individuals a viable option.  
 
Contrastingly, former Heads of State enjoy functional immunity only as they are neither 
state representatives nor performing state functions. Official acts performed during their 
tenure however will be subject to functional immunity after the individual has left office. 
Such an application of immunity protects the official conduct to prevent other states 
adjudicating on official state conduct by prosecuting the individual official. Accordingly, 
criminal proceedings over conduct not of an official character cannot be subject to an 
immunity plea. 
 
However, for those officials granted functional immunity, any crimes committed in a 
personal capacity are not protected whereas the conduct will be if it is part of their 
official duties. While this limits the applicability of UJ an exception based on the 
conduct’s characterisation as an international crime has been raised.357 Should such an 
exception exist UJ prosecutions against an increased number of state officials would be 
possible.  
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The classical approach finds no exception to immunity barring acts committed in a 
private capacity. For this approach the ICJ Arrest Warrants judgment does not 
distinguish between the position of an incumbent and former official as it undermines 
the functional justification and purpose of such immunity. What’s more, immunity was 
not perceived as a bar to prosecutions.358 There are four main arguments for why the 
Arrest Warrant case does not distinguish between former and incumbent Officials.359  
 
First, the immunity is that of state immunity and therefore exists without interference 
regardless of the change in status of the individual. It is hard to see how a former Head 
of State can be viewed in this light as personal immunity is justified on the basis of the 
individual being the representative of the state, which a former Head of State is not. It is 
harder still to see why the same breadth of immunities as state immunity should be 
applied to such an individual when acting in a private capacity. Contrastingly, the status 
of the acts undertaken by a former official as part of their official capacity does not 
change when the person leaves office. For such acts the law on state responsibility 
provides a more appropriate method of liability as it is placed on the state. Additionally, 
the Arrest Warrant case identifies four situations where prosecutions can still be brought 
against such an individual.360  
 
Second, if immunity or amnesty is not provided there would be little to no incentive for a 
sitting Head of State to relinquish power, incentivising them to extend their term 
indefinitely.361 As a result the perpetrators will remain in a position to continue 
committing crimes and, should the conduct in question end, the individual would still 
enjoy impunity. While the argument on the lack of incentive to relinquish power appears 
convincing – note should be taken of the recent case of The Gambia362 and also that of 
the deferral request of the ICC prosecution against Sudanese President Omar al Bashir363 
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- it is not inevitable that individuals will remain in power. Former Gambian President 
Jammeh initially refused to step down when threatened with prosecution, however he 
relinquished power shortly after losing the election.  
 
Third, the assumption that if one removes functional immunity for former Heads of 
State it would also be removed for all other officials enjoying the same immunity is 
flawed. This would create an unacceptable level of potential intervention by third states 
into the working of another state. As the exception is limited to international crimes 
interference from UJ prosecutions is likely to be limited. This would be in line with state 
practice and the prosecution of low-level state and military officials for core 
international crimes.364 
 
Fourth and finally, are the concerns raised about the political impact such an approach 
would have. There would be a negative impact on ‘international communications and 
good relations between States’ which is not ideal and is also likely to impede on the 
equality of states.365 A point stressed in the Arrest Warrant case, by the ILC Special 
Rapporteur and by the AU and European Union (EU).366    
 
The alternative to the classical approach, accepts an immunity exception whereby the 
status of the accused is no defence when it comes to international crimes.367  This was 
the approach adopted by England’s House of Lords in the Pinochet (No 3) judgment.368 
Despite former officials enjoying functional immunity for criminal acts, Pinochet was 
found to have no applicable immunity plea because the alleged conduct (torture) was 
considered jus cogens and prohibited accordingly under international law (as per the 
Convention Against Torture). However, there was no consistent reasoning for the 
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removal of the immunity in the judgments and this has ultimately limited the influence 
and persuasiveness of the judgment.369  
 
However, the alternative approach relies on obiter dicta in the Arrest Warrant case and 
the possibility of an immunity exception where a treaty obligation to prosecute an 
international crime exists when the accused is in the forum state.370 The focus is 
therefore on the jus cogens nature of the crime and international prohibition with the 
need to protect ‘fundamental human rights […] and the standing of the individual 
victim’.371 While relying on the state practice of prosecuting low-level officials, it is hard 
to equate such prosecutions as infringing on the dignity of the state or diminishing 
interstate relations. Despite the existence of superior rules in international law,372 relying 
on the jus cogens nature of the crime ignores the ICJ’s finding that immunity and jus 
cogens are ‘two sets of rules [that] address different matters’.373 Thus, basing a UJ 
prosecution on the grounds of the discussed exception under international law is 
problematic. 
 
While neither the classical or alternative approach provides a means to address the 
limiting impact of immunity on UJ, it has been suggested that serious international 
crimes be treated as ‘neither normal State functions nor functions that a State alone […] 
can perform’.374 However, the legal fiction of this is hard to ignore as the distinguishing 
feature between private criminal acts and official conduct tantamount to an 
international crime is reliance on the state apparatus for its commission.375 It also has the 
effect of introducing an unwanted intrusion by the ultra vires concept into the matter.376 
A more convincing and compelling approach is based on Lord Hoffman’s interpretation 
of the Arrest Warrant case’s Joint Separate Opinion. He asks whether torturing people 
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could be an exercise of the functions of a Head of State, ‘which is a very different 
question from whether it could be an official act for the purpose of common law 
immunity ratione personae’.377 Therefore, ‘immunity may be separated from the concept 
of attribution’.378  
 
On the whole, the academic literature is more in favour of creating an exception for 
functional immunity than state practice demonstrates.379 As previously stated, the lack of 
clear reasoning in the Pinochet case prevents any particular legal argument from being 
advanced. The Arrest Warrant judgment is again of limited use in that it did not specify 
whether functional or personal immunity is addressed. Ostensibly claiming that the act 
is not an official act is illogical given the reliance on the state apparatus or participation. 
Furthermore, when state responsibility is taken into account, merely having conduct 
treated as an official act does not automatically excuse the state from responsibility.380  
 
The argument is also not advanced by the justification of the jus cogens nature of the 
crimes and the UJ requirement for punishment for such crimes.381 Customary 
international law does not impose an obligation based on the jus cogens nature and thus, 
the argument cannot be relied on. This is different to treaty obligations which are 
imposed on state parties.382 For crimes dependent on official capacity, a jus cogens 
exception ‘cannot logically co-exist with’ functional immunity,383 and has not been 
endorsed or applied by state practice. Thus, the ability to set aside immunity and 
prosecute jus cogens crimes before a foreign domestic court is still unclear despite 
limited state practice pointing towards the prosecution of former State officials.384  
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If there is any exception to functional immunity it would apply more for low-level 
officials, who are afforded functional immunity to protect state sovereignty both during 
and after their tenure in office; former senior state officials; and more recently with 
former Heads of State and Government under the Pinochet and Habré precedent.385 
Thus, UJ prosecutions are not possible against all state officials necessitating an 
alternative mechanism not subject to the same limitations.  
 
The AU’s regional approach to UJ and immunity replicates international law and 
consequently, the accompanying prosecutorial limitations.386 However, despite being 
criticised for preventing the development of international law and the harmonisation of 
laws,387 state practice has yet to demonstrate any inclination to disregard personal and 
functional immunities for Heads of State and certain senior state officials. Furthermore, 
the complete removal of all immunity ‘would be more likely to damage than to advance 
chances of international peace’ because of the impact on diplomatic relations and the 
dissuading of peacekeeping forces due to potential legal action.388  
 
Despite upholding immunity, it will not apply ‘in situations where these crimes are 
covered by a treaty to which the State and the State of nationality of such officials are 
parties and which prohibits immunity’.389 Thus, the AU Model Law wording enables ICC 
and non-ICC AU members to adopt the Model Law as implementing both instruments 
can conform to the international law on immunities. Additionally, only the jurisdictional 
immunities ‘under international law’ are to be enforced, therefore, should the law 
develop and further restrict which officials are entitled to immunity, Article 16(1) will 
apply. An unintended consequence of the immunity provision is the potential lack of 
harmonisation amongst African states. Yet, this is no different from the situation 
globally.390  
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3.5 Conclusion 
 
UJ is a means by which to fight impunity when states fail to fulfil their primary 
responsibility for prosecuting crimes of concern to the whole international community. 
However, as ICL developed and with the establishment off the ICC, African states 
increasingly saw UJ as a gap filler, not a replacement for international courts. This is 
partly a reaction to the AU’s perception of European states using UJ as a political tool. In 
an attempt to circumvent UJ from becoming purely Western state led, the AU adopted 
the AU Model Law on UJ for its member states, in turn further protecting African 
sovereignty.  
 
The ability of UJ to end impunity is intertwined with the crimes under its jurisdiction 
pursuant to treaty and customary law. While UJ conduct is conceived of as “heinous” and 
of concern to the international community, there are a limited number of crimes 
applicable: piracy; apartheid; torture; enforced disappearances; and certain war crimes. 
The inclusion of genocide and other core crimes are still contested. From the perspective 
of African states, the crimes included are insufficient and fail to take a contextual 
approach to regional situations and concerns. At the same time, the ICC provides a 
supporting mechanism for the majority of UJ crimes, but there is no comparable judicial 
body capable of addressing the additional crimes of the AU Model Law. There appears to 
be little reason for punishment of UJ crimes beyond retributive aspects and the 
application of naturalism and moral universalism – that the crimes are so heinous as to 
affront the whole of humanity. The limited notion of ‘humanity’ is insufficient to address 
African concerns and as such contribute to the need for a regional criminal court of their 
own which does.  
 
Even when an unconnected state is able to pursue a UJ prosecution, the limitations of 
immunity still apply. Presently, international law prevents adjudication of cases against 
state officials who enjoy personal immunity. When it comes to functional immunity, the 
trend over the years has been to slowly erode away that protection. Currently, low-level 
officials, former senior state officials and, occasionally, former Heads of State and 
Government have been subject to successful UJ prosecutions. While immunity does not 
equate to impunity, it does present a hurdle to prosecutions, limiting the applicability of 
UJ and potentially reducing any deterrent effect.  
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Given its current structure, UJ contributes to the need for an African regional criminal 
court because its limited range and breath are insufficient in an African context, and the 
accompanying constraints governing immunity, protect key individuals from 
prosecution. An African regional criminal court is required to counteract these 
limitations.   
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Chapter 4  
State Practice and Universal Jurisdiction 
 
 
The previous chapter has shown that UJ is an imperfect tool in the fight against impunity 
because of its structural limitations. What remains to be identified is whether the use of 
UJ by both African and non-African states has compensated for these limitations.  
 
To gauge whether the use of UJ contributes to the need for an African regional criminal 
court, this chapter starts with an examination of UJ cases pursued by non-African states. 
The response of African states to the UJ prosecutions is then considered. Finally, the 
focus moves to the African legislative approach and whether any UJ prosecutions have 
been successfully undertaken within Africa. The findings from this chapter and Chapter 
3 are brought together to determine whether there is a need for an African regional 
criminal court.  
 
 
4.1 Non-African States’ Use of Universal Jurisdiction  
 
There a significant number of cases before the courts of non-African states against 
alleged African perpetrators. The African states concerned have either experienced civil 
war or have a regime that has committed gross human rights violations. Regardless of 
the validity of African concerns and disquiet over the use of UJ by non-African states, 
whether state practice contributes to the need for an African regional criminal court 
needs to be answered. As a review of individual state’s UJ laws is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, reliance is placed on Luc Reydams study on UJ for the understanding of legislative 
approaches.391 Table 1 sets out, in alphabetical order, a non-exhaustive list of such cases 
and investigations from which observations and implications are made over the need for 
a regional criminal court. 392    
 
                                                        
391 Reydams (n 259). 
392 This list is not an exhaustive representation of every UJ case brought against an African 
individual by a non-African state. Cases may be missing due to language constraints and reliance 
on secondary sources. There is no inclusion of cases dealing with piracy because of the 
uncontroversial nature of such prosecutions. For Table 1 see pages 82 – 89. 
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TABLE 1  – UNILATERAL  CASES  AGAINST  AFRICAN   INDIVIDUALS  BY  NON-AFRICAN  STATES 
PROSECUTING 
STATE 
AFRICAN 
STATE 
CONCERNED 
OFFICIAL / 
CITIZEN INFORMATION OUTCOME YEAR 
CRIMES 
CHARGED 
France Algeria 
Alleged 
Relizane 
militia 
leaders 
Algerian officials refused rogatory commission request 
by France to investigate Relizane Case (Mohamed 
brothers) Abdelkader Mohamed and Hocine 
Mohamed. Investigation commenced after 2003 
request by International Federation for Human Rights 
and the Ligue des Droits de l'Homme filed with Office 
of the Prosecurot with the NîmesTribunal. December 
2014 final order to bring accused to trial, which was 
appealed by the defendants. Jan 2016 saw the repel of 
the final order for trial by the Investigation Chamber 
of the Court of Appeal in Nîmes  
Appeal ongoing 2003 -ongoing Torture 
Switzerland Algeria 
Official and 
Military 
General 
Victims filed criminal complaint in France 2001 
against Khaled Nezzar. New complaint filed in 
Switzerland in Oct 2011 as he was travelling to Geneva 
where arrested. Federal Criminal Court heard Nezzar's 
appeal to the procedure due to immunity claim. 
Immunity argument rejected on the basis of not 
applying to international crimes 
Under judicial 
supervision as 
investigation 
ongoing. Immunity 
not upheld 
2011 - 
ongoing War crimes 
Belgium Cameroon 
Head of 
State and 11 
officials 
President Paul Biya and 11 other officials had 
complaint filed against them by opponents 
Dismissed due to 
immunity and 
change in law in 
2003 
2001 
War crimes, 
Torture & 
Arbitrary 
arrests 
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Belgium 
Central 
African 
Republic 
Head of 
State 
Complaint in Belgium against President Ange-Félix 
Patasse 
Dismissed on 
grounds of 
immunity 
 
  
Gross human 
rights 
violations 
Belgium Côte d’Ivoire Head of State 
Complaint in Belgium against President Laurent 
Gbagbo 
Dismissed on 
grounds of 
immunity 
2001 
Crimes 
against 
humanity 
Belgium 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo 
State 
Official 
Public Prosecutor v Ndombasi, 16 April 2002, Court 
of Appeal of Brussels 
Lead to the Arrest 
Warrant Case before 
the ICJ. Arrest 
Warrant revoked 
2002 Incitement of genocide 
Spain Equatorial Guinea 
President 
and Other 
State 
Officials 
Obiang Nguema et al., 23 December 1998, Audiencia 
Nacional (Central Examining Magistrate N° 5) Upheld immunity 1998 
 
  
Belgium Liberia 
Former 
Liberian 
Commander 
of the NPFL 
(front line)  
Victims filed complaint with Belgian authorities in 
2012 as accused Martina Johnson was living in 
Belgium at the time 
Under investigation 2012 
Crimes 
against 
humanity & 
War crimes 
USA Liberia 
Former 
Rebel 
Commander 
Victims filed complaint and Alieu Kosiah arrested in 
Nov 2014. Judge determined detention would hold 
Under investigation, 
accused under 
provisional 
detention 
2014-
ongoing War crimes 
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USA Liberia 
Former 
Head of 
States son 
Case brought against son of Former Liberian President 
Charles Taylor. Case was an off shot of investigations 
into arms trafficking and Taylor's involvement. The 
USA relied on law that enables prosecution for torture 
when the accused is either present in the territory, a 
legal resident or a citizen 
Convicted and 
sentenced to 97 
years 
2009 Torture 
France Mauritania Army officials 
Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits 
de l’Homme et al. v Ould Dah, 8 July 2002, Court of 
Appeal of Nîmes/1 July 2005, Nîmes Assize court 
(France) – went to European Court of Human Rights 
17 March 2009, upheld universal jurisdiction for acts 
of torture  
Ould Dah v France, Application N° 13113/03, 
decision on admissibility, 17 March 2009 (ECHR) 
Amnesty did not 
apply to France, 
only would apply to 
local jurisdiction 
which granted the 
amnesty. Accused 
left France, 
convicted in 
absentia 
2005-2010 Torture & 'Brutalities' 
Belgium Mauritania Head of State 
Complaint against President Maaouya Ould 
Sid’Ahmed Taya 
Dismissed on 
grounds of 
immunity 
 
  
 
  
Spain Morocco State Official 
Hassan II, 23 December 1998, Audiencia Nacional 
(Central Examining Magistrate N° 5) 
Dismissed on 
grounds of 
immunity 
1998 Genocide 
Spain Morocco State Officials 
Sahara, 30 October 2007, Audiencia Nacional 
(Central Examining Magistrate N° 5) – After changes 
to UJ law in 2014 issues arose as to the ability to 
continue the case. Prosecution argued territorial 
jurisdiction still applicable, judge accepted this based 
on facts the alleged crimes took place before Spain 
had left the territory  
11 Indictment issued 
for officials and 7 
international arrest 
warrants in May 
2015 
2007-
present 
Genocide & 
Torture 
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Belgium Morocco State Official 
Complaint filed in Belgium (pre-Sharon and pre-5 Aug 
2003) against Minister for the Interior Driss Basri  Did not go forward 
  
   
France Morocco 
Head of 
Moroccan 
Intelligence 
Services 
3 separate complaints filed against the accused 
Abdellatif Hammouchi, first one was in May 2013, 
the second and third both filed the same day in 
February 2014 to the Specialised Unit in France  
Under investigation 2013 - ongoing Torture 
Spain Nigeria 
Boko Haram 
leader and 
members 
The International Foundation Baltasr Garzon 
(FIBGAR) filed complaint in 2014 against Abubaka 
Shekau Leader of Boko Haram and members of the 
group. Spanish Prosecutor opened an investigation 
based on these facts  
Under investigation 2014-ongoing 
Crimes 
against 
humanity & 
Terrorism 
France Republic of Congo 
General, 
Overall 
Superintend
ent of the 
Armed 
Forces & 
Gendarmerie 
NGOs filed a complaint in 2001 alleging torture and 
crimes against humanity by Norbet Dabira in Dec 
2001 (along with President Denis Sassou Nguesoo and 
Minister of the Interior Pierre Oba). Dabira indicted 
in August 2013 
Indicted, under 
investigation 
 
 
 
  
Crimes 
against 
humanity & 
Torture 
France Republic of Congo 
Head of 
Police and 
other 
officials 
Ndengue et al., 10 January 2007, Court of Cassation. 
Dec 2001 complaint filed against Jean 
François Ndengue and others. In 2001 NGOs and 
victims filed a complaint before a French court. After 
numerous appeals, in 2008 French Supreme Court 
allowed the investigation to continue 
Investigation under 
way. This lead to 
Republic of Congo 
pursuing an ICJ case 
(France never 
accepted 
jurisdiction) 
2001-
ongoing 
Genocide, 
Crimes 
against 
humanity & 
War crimes 
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France Republic of Congo 
Head of 
State 
Complaint filed against President Denis Sassou 
Nguesso. This was part of the complaint filed against 
Ndengue and others 
Dismissed due to 
immunity 
 
 
 
  
Genocide, 
Crimes 
against 
humanity & 
War crimes 
France Rwanda 
Former 
head of 
Sainte-
Famille 
parish, 
Kigali 
Dupaquier e al. v Munyeshyaka, 127 ILR 134, 6 
January 1998 Court of Cassation (France). European 
Court of Human Rights criticised France for exceeding 
reasonable time for bringing accused to trial. Rwanda 
had tried him in absentia in 2006. ICTR issued arrest 
warrant for him, but in Feb 2008 declined jurisdiction 
and referred it to the France  
French courts 
dismissed the case, 
however the civil 
parties appealed. 
 
 
 
 
  
Genocide, 
Crimes 
against 
humanity & 
Torture 
(complicity 
in) 
Belgium Rwanda Citizens 
Public Prosecutor v Higaniro et al., 8 June 2001, 
Brussels Assize Court. Complaints filed in 1994 and 
investigation began in 1997. Rogatory commissions 
were allowed by Rwanda. The ICTR had not taken 
over the prosecution and was aware of Belgium 
pursuing the case  
Convicted, 
sentences ranging 
from 12-25 years 
1995-2001 War crimes 
Belgium Rwanda Citizens 
Nzabonimana and Ndashyikirwa, 29 June 2005, 
Brussels Assize Court.  Following complaints filed in 
Beligum, both arrested in 2002 while living in 
Belgium. Trial began and finished in 2005 
Convicted, 
sentenced to 12 and 
10 years 
2005 War crimes 
Belgium Rwanda 
Major in 
Rwandan 
Army 
Ntuyahaga, 5 July 2007, Brussels Assize Court. ICTR 
found him not guilty and charges withdrawn. 
Surrendered to Belgian authorities in 2004. Trial 
began in 2007. 
Convicted, 
sentenced to 20 
years (appeal 
denied) 
2007 
Genocide, 
Crimes 
against 
humanity & 
War crimes 
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Spain Rwanda State officials 
Rwanda, 6 February 2008, Audiencia Nacional 
(Central Examining Magistrate N° 4). International 
arrest warrants issued for a number of Rwandan 
officials. A result of complaints filed by victims 
families (the victims had been Spanish) 
Case dismissed. 
Indictment did not 
include President 
Kagame due to 
immunity while 
sitting head of state 
2008-2015 
Crimes 
against 
humanity, 
Terrorism & 
Genocide 
France Rwanda 
Head of the 
Central 
Intelligence 
Services 
After a criminal complaint was filed in February 2009, 
the Office of the Prosecutor of the Specialised unit in 
March 2013 requested the accused Pascal 
Simbikangwa indicted.  
Sentenced to 25 
Years 
imprisonment. 
Appealed filed 
March 2014 
2009-2014 
Genocide & 
Crimes 
against 
humanity 
France Rwanda 
Former 
Rwandan 
Mayors 
Octavien Ngenzi and Tito Barahira 
Convicted in 2016, 
sentenced to life 
imprisonment, 
verdict currently on 
appeal 
2016 - 
ongoing 
Genocide & 
Crimes 
against 
humanity 
Germany Rwanda 
Mayor of 
Muvumba 
commune 
After arresting Onesphore Rwabukombe based on a 
Rwandan international arrest warrant, Germany 
denied the extradition request based on concerns over 
the fairness of the trial 
December 2015 - 
Convicted and 
sentenced to life 
imprisonment, 
decision on appeal 
2008-2015 Genocide 
Germany Rwanda 
Head of 
FDLR and 
Deputy 
Head  
Arrest warrant issued by Germany Federal Court of 
Justice Nov 2009 for Murwanashyaka and Musoni. 
Higher Regional Court of Stuttgart held trial which 
ended Sept 2015. Judgment on appeal. The charges of 
crimes against humanity were dropped, as were a 
number of counts of war crimes 
Convicted and 
sentenced, under 
appeal 
2009-2015 
Crimes 
against 
humanity, 
War crimes, 
Belonging to 
terrorist 
group 
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Sweden Rwanda Citizen 
Clever Berinkindi detained September 2014, indicted 
by Stockholm District Court Sept 2015, trial started 
Sept 2015. Swedish court undertaken trips to Rwanda 
as part of the investigation and trial. Tried due to his 
having obtained Swedish citizenship  
Trial ongoing 2014-ongoing 
Genocide, 
Crimes 
against 
humanity & 
Gross offence 
France Rwanda Head of State 
Both a French and Spanish Magistrate claimed 
evidence which implicated Paul Kagame in an 
international crime related to the Rwandan genocide, 
but upheld his immunity. See Tribunal de Grand 
Instance de Paris, Cabinet de Jean-Louis Bruguière, 
Ordonnance de soiit-communiqué Delivrance de 
mandats d'arrêts internationaux (November 17, 2006)  
Immunity upheld 
 
 
 
  
Crimes 
relating to 
terrorism & 
Assassination 
Canada Rwanda Citizen 
After a five year investigation Désiré Munyaneza was 
arrested in 2005. Jan 2007 rogatory mission to Rwanda 
to interview witnesses. Quebec Superior Court found 
him guilty in May 2009 on all charges 
Convicted 
sentenced to 25 
years no parole. 
Appeal refused 
2005 - 
2014 
Genocide, 
War Crimes & 
Crimes 
Against 
Humanity 
Norway Rwanda 
Citizen - 
member of 
Interahamw
e militia 
Sadi Bugingo arrested in Norway (May 2011) pursuant 
to a Rwandan arrest warrant issued in 2008. Feb 2013 
sentenced in Norway. Bugingo appealed to the 
Borgarting Court of Appeal (Oslo) in Aug 2014. Dec 
2014 confirmed verdict and conviction upheld in Jan 
2015 
Convicted, 21 years 
imprisonment 2011-2015 
Aiding and 
Abetting 
Genocide & 
murders 
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Sweden Rwanda Citizen 
2009 Gacaca court sentenced Stanislas Mbanenande 
in absentia. Arrested in Dec 2011 in Sweden due to 
Interpol's issuance of a red notice. Nov 2012 
Stockholm district court issued indictment, trial held 
Nov 2012 - Jun 2013 where convicted and sentenced to 
life imprisonment. Appeal upheld conviction and 
sentence Jun 2014. Case based on his having 
citizenship - active personality principle. 
Convicted, life 
sentence 2011-2015 Genocide 
Spain 
Rwanda (DRC, 
SA have 
residence of 
some of the 
individuals) 
High-
ranking 
officials of 
Rwandan 
Patriotic 
Front/Army. 
Commande
ering officer 
of Directory 
Military 
Intelligence 
(DMI) 
Families of victims filed criminal complaint in 2005. In 
2008 the Spanish National Court issued indictment 
and arrest warrant (both international and European) 
for 40 high ranking officials. Rogatory missions went 
to Rwanda, DRC and SA. Sept 2015 the Supreme Court 
closed the case provisionally due to procedural 
requirements. General Karenzi Karake (DMI 
Commander) arrested at Heathrow in June 2015 and 
released on conditional bail after a hearing. The 
Crown Prosecution Service did not consider the 
extradition request satisfied all legal requirements and 
he was released in August 2015 whereupon he 
returned to Rwanda. 
Provisionally closed 2005-2015 
Genocide, 
Torture, 
Crimes 
against 
humanity 
 War crimes 
Terrorism 
Membership 
of terrorist 
group 
France Tunisia State Official 
Ghabri et al. c Ben Saïd 15 December 2008, 
Strasbourg Assize Court 
Convicted in 
absentia 2010 Torture 
England Zimbabwe Head of State 
Re Mugabe ILDC 96(UK 2004) 14 January 2004, Bow 
Street Magistrates’ Court (England UK) 
Upheld immunity - 
arrest warrant 
denied 
2004  
  
France Zimbabwe Head of State Complaint against Mugabe rejected in 2003 in France Upheld immunity 2003 
 
  
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First, both treaty and customary law UJ crimes as well as contested crimes have been 
prosecuted.393 The cases include charges of genocide (sixteen), crimes against humanity 
(fifteen), war crimes (twelve), torture (ten), terrorism (five) and gross human rights 
violations (two).394 The modes of liability for the crimes include the inchoate offences of 
incitement, complicity and belonging to a terrorist group. The majority (39%) of cases 
relate to the Rwandan genocide, which accounts for the high number of genocide 
charges. While the basis of genocide as a UJ crime is contested, UNSC resolutions 
impose legal obligations on all states to prosecute crimes related to the Rwandan 
genocide and may account for the high number of prosecutions. Furthermore, despite 
the relatively high number of crimes against humanity charges, neither treaty nor 
customary law has definitively included such crimes. Some of these cases were 
dismissed, or are still under investigation, making it difficult to conclusively say there is 
sufficient state practice for a custom to have developed. Out of the thirty-eight cases 
only eleven have led to a conviction, while seventeen are still ongoing or in the 
investigative stage.  
 
Table 1 demonstrates that prosecutions were initiated against a mixture of Heads of State 
and Government, state officials, militia, rebels and ordinary citizens. While militia, 
rebels, and ordinary citizens have not posed any procedural problems, thirteen cases 
have dealt with individuals who put forward an immunity plea.395 The one decision to 
date which did not uphold immunity based their decision on the fact that such 
immunity does not apply to international crimes,396 a controversial position.  
 
On the whole immunities for incumbent Heads of State and Government are 
consistently upheld. However, for state officials there is no consistent application 
upholding either amnesties or immunity. The determining factor appears to be the 
prosecuting state’s law and their interpretation of immunities and amnesties.397 It is this 
lack of recognising state officials’ immunities which has caused tension between African 
                                                        
393 See Chapter 3.2 of this thesis. 
394 On the zones of impunity which emerge from the externalisation of justice, see Chandra Lekha 
Sriram and Amy Ross, ‘Geographies of Crime and Justice: Contemporary Transitional Justice and 
the Creation of ‘Zones of Impunity’’ (2007) The International Journal of Transitional Justice 45.  
395 On immunity before domestic courts see Chapter 3.3 of this thesis.  
396 The case against Khaled Nezzar, table 1.   
397 On the interpretation of immunities see Chapter 3.3 and Chapter 8 of this thesis. 
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and prosecuting states, occasionally resulting in the filing of a complaint before the 
ICJ.398  
 
A disproportionate number of cases are tried by Belgium, France and Spain. Of the thirty 
eight cases, France has attempted to prosecute twelve (32%), Belgium ten (26%) and 
Spain six (16%). This is not surprising given these states’ broad UJ legislation, in 
particular Belgium.399 Eighteen of the cases have been pursued by former colonial powers 
with only four of the ten prosecuting states not having a direct colonial legacy.400 Given 
the historical context and legacy of such states, the ‘courts of former colonial powers 
should be extremely careful in taking the lead in the prosecution and trial of suspects of 
international crimes’.401 The tumultuous relationship between the states raises questions 
over whether there is sufficient divestment of interest by the prosecuting state. Concerns 
over hypocrisy and political sensitivities exist402 such as the continued impunity for the 
colonial powers and their past crimes. Belgium’s impartiality in relation to the Rwandan 
genocide is questionable due to concerns over the withdrawal of Belgian peacekeepers 
prior to the start of the genocide, despite knowledge and warnings given of the potential 
for further international crimes.403 As will be shown in this chapter, African states have 
shown great scepticism over the impartiality of their former colonial masters’ 
involvement in UJ prosecutions, and the perceived continued interference in their State 
sovereignty. The historical context has also enabled African state officials guilty of 
                                                        
398 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v Belgium) (Preliminary 
Objections, and Merits) [2002] ICJ Rep 3 (hereafter Arrest Warrant case Merits); Certain Criminal 
Proceedings in France (Republic of the Congo v France) (Merits) [2003] ICJ Rep 102; the application 
by Rwanda against France before the ICJ, however France never accepted the court’s jurisdiction. 
ICJ Press Release, ‘The Republic of Rwanda applies to the International Court of Justice in a 
dispute with France’ (18 April, 2007) <http://www.icj-cij.org/presscom/files/1/16921.pdf> accessed 
28 March 2016. 
399 On the domestic UJ laws see Reydams (n 259) Chapters 6, 9 and 14 of this thesis. On Belgium’s 
UJ law post the 2003 amendment see Malvina Halberstam, ‘Belgium’s Universal Jurisdiction Law: 
Vindication of International Justice or Pursuit of Politics?’ (2003-04) 25 Cardozo Law Review 247.  
400 Canada, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.  
401 Harmen van der Wilt, ‘Universal Jurisdiction under Attack: An Assessment of African 
misgivings towards International Criminal Justice as Administered by Western States’ (2011) 9 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 1043, 1066. 
402 van der Wilt, ibid; A. Salomon, ‘The politics of prosecution under the convention against 
torture’ (2001) 1 Chicago Journal of International Law 310; Luc Reydams, ‘The rise and fall of 
universal jurisdiction’ (2010) Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies Working Paper 37, 25. 
403 Human Rights Watch, ‘Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda’ (Human Rights 
Watch Report, 1 March 1999) <https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno15-8-
01.htm#TopOfPage> accessed 30 November 2017. 
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committing UJ crimes, to portray the prosecutions as ‘an attack by outsiders on the 
nation’.404 
 
Yet, this argument should not be overstated. While there are genuine concerns about a 
previous colonial power interfering in a former colony, the evidence does not point 
towards the former colonial state always pursuing the cases itself. Rather, it is the role 
played by civil society and the general priority of human rights in the society that has 
driven things forward. Many of the cases are a result of victims, their families or NGOs 
filing complaints. European states have a broad approach as to who can request the 
opening of an investigation, particularly in civil law systems, whereby victims or a local 
prosecutor are able to initiate investigations as per the applicable rules on criminal 
procedure.405  The active role NGOs and civil society take in ensuring participation in the 
initiation of claims, providing evidence and supporting victims and their families in 
seeking a legal remedy is key in bringing such cases before courts.406 European courts 
have become attractive because of the lack of recourse for victims and their families to 
judicial remedies in the respective domestic courts.  
 
Additionally, other legal obligations may play a role in a court pursuing a UJ case. For 
example, the UNSC has adopted numerous resolutions calling on all states to cooperate 
and assist in the investigation, arrest, prosecution or extradition of the Rwandan 
genocide fugitives.407 This reflects the link between the UNSC, the maintenance of peace 
and security and the pursuit of criminal prosecutions. Following the end of the 1994 
Rwanda genocide, many of the perpetrators sought refuge in Europe and were 
subsequently arrested in the prosecuting states’ territory. Both the Norwegian and 
Swedish cases resulted from a Rwandan arrest warrant and Interpol red notice 
respectively, but the suspects were never extradited to Rwanda due to concerns over the 
human rights situation and the use of the death penalty. Instead, the states successfully 
prosecuted the individuals before their domestic courts. A similar situation occurred in 
the Canadian prosecution.408  
 
                                                        
404 Sriram (n 318) 62. 
405 Reydams (n 259) 221.  
406 Florian Jeßberger and Julia Geneuss, ‘‘Litigating Universal Jurisdiction’ — Introduction’ (2015) 
13(2) Journal of International Criminal Justice 205.  
407 Most recently in UNSC Res 2150 (16 April 2014) UN Doc. S/RES/2150. 
408 Table 1. 
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Finally, despite relying on UJ, table 1 points towards accompanying jurisdictional links: 
territory and nationality. Typically, the accused is present in the territory or is due to 
travel to the prosecuting state. For example, the two Swiss prosecutions were a result of 
the accused being in the country. Notwithstanding the accompanying jurisdictional link 
UJ is still applicable: the crime was committed outside the territory of the prosecuting 
state and the accused was not a national at the time of the alleged commission. There 
have been instances when the victim was a national of the prosecuting state and the 
passive personality principle was relied on together with UJ.409 There have been in 
absentia trials and two convictions fall into this category,410 highlighting the rarity of 
such trials. This is in contrast to the approach promoted by the AU in the AU Model Law 
which excludes trials in absentia.411 
 
Overall, the use of UJ by non-African states has been concentrated before those courts 
with the broadest domestic UJ legislation, fuelled by the active role of NGOs and the 
ability of victims and their families to file complaints. It is unlikely that it is a state policy 
to pursue UJ prosecutions, rather it is dependent on third party initiatives. Therefore, 
very few states have utilised UJ reducing its impact on impunity and contributing to the 
need for an African regional criminal court. When used, UJ prosecutions have targeted 
state officials, rebels and citizens alike, but are limited by the applicability of immunity 
for Heads of State and senior state officials. Thus, until such immunity is no longer 
applicable, there is de facto impunity, unless the individual leaves office. The ability of 
UJ prosecutions to contribute to international criminal justice and accountability is 
severely limited by the small number of recognized crimes, especially given that the 
inclusion of crimes against humanity and terrorism are controversial and legally 
uncertain. The lack of customary law permitting trials in absentia, has required the 
presence of the alleged perpetrator in the jurisdiction. Effectively this limits the ability of 
UJ to contribute to justice and accountability by reducing the number of applicable 
courts before which to file a complaint. Additionally, while UJ prosecutions contribute to 
retribution, there is little deterrence as certainty and immediacy of a UJ prosecutions is 
absent. Given the geographical distance of the UJ prosecution from the location of the 
crime the link to reconciliation is dubious.  
 
                                                        
409 See the Swedish cases brought against Rwandan nationals in Table 1. 
410 Table 1. 
411 Article 4 AU Model Law. 
 94
4.2 African Responses to Universal Jurisdiction Cases before Non-
African State Courts 
 
Despite both African and European states sharing a mutual understanding of UJ and a 
joint aim of ending impunity,412 the AU and African states expressed concern over:  
 
1) The abuse of UJ based on political and/or other grounds resulting in the 
targeting of Africans. 
2) The use of UJ against incumbent state officials and the implications for African 
and EU state relations. This is tied in to the perceived double standards in the 
principle’s application.  
3) The abuse by Western states undermining African states’ dignity and that of their 
officials, which risks eroding friendly relations. 
4) The international stigma attached to attempted UJ prosecutions. 
5) Being subjected to European jurisdiction goes against sovereign equality and 
independence, of particular concern when utilised by a former colonial power.  
6) The disregard of immunities for state officials constrains the state’s functioning 
on the international plane.413 
 
In response to the perceived abuse of the principle of UJ by non-African states the AU 
Assembly decided to explore extending the ACtJHR jurisdiction to include international 
crimes.414 These concerns were raised before the UNSC and UNGA where UN members 
were asked to ‘impose a moratorium on the execution of those warrants until all the 
legal and political issues have been exhaustively discussed between the African Union, 
the European Union and the United Nations’.415 The AU also managed to include the 
matter in the immunity work of the ILC. 
 
While the validity of the African perspective is debatable,416 placing value judgments on 
which states, methods and interpretations are more valuable or able to develop the law 
                                                        
412 AU-EU Expert Report, para 2 and R1.  
413 AU-EU Expert Report, Section IV.1, 35-7. 
414 Assembly/AU/Dec.213(XII) (n 226). 
415 Decision on the Report of the Commission on the Abuse of the Principle of Universal 
Jurisdiction, AU/Dec.199(XI), para 8 (emphasis added). 
416 On the AU-EU Expert Report and the validity of African concerns see Charles Chernor Jalloh, 
‘Universal Jurisdiction, Universal Prescription? A Preliminary assessment of the African Union 
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are not helpful.417 For example, when such value judgments ignore the legal colonialism 
context or justifying the use of such framing. It may be difficult to determine ‘[w]hether 
more traditional forms of justice and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms […] are 
an adequate reaction to systemic criminality’. However, the fact that ‘[i]t may take a 
lifetime for Western observers to grasp the finesses of communal justice’418 does not 
mean traditional mechanisms shouldn’t be accepted or have a role to play. A stronger 
argument would be based on the ability of traditional justice mechanisms to meet fair 
trial standards and appropriateness for dealing with mass atrocities and the possible 
remedies and reparations. Furthermore, this type of argument should not be used to 
ignore legitimate concerns of African states which may positively contribute to ending 
impunity.  
 
Yet, outside of the AU institutional response, and despite the ferocity of African criticism 
towards the exercise of universal jurisdiction by non-African States, the reality has been 
that of mixed reactions. Cases concerning ordinary citizens or government opponents 
have generated little criticism. This is demonstrated by the numerous UJ cases brought 
relating to the 1994 Rwandan genocide and the Rwandan government’s accompanying 
engagement.419 However, this cooperation occurs only where the prosecution concerns 
those with whom there is no government or state link. For example, President Kagame 
was extremely vocal against French attempts to prosecute nine Rwandan government 
officials for their alleged crimes against the Rwandan Patriotic Army, breaking off 
diplomatic ties in response to the French arrest warrants.420  
 
African state cooperation is manifested in several ways. By rogatory missions whereby 
the prosecuting state’s court officially requests judicial or investigative assistance 
channelled through formal diplomatic processes. Such missions are vital for UJ 
prosecutions which by nature involve extra-territorial work and rely on cooperation for 
investigative and evidentiary purposes. If African states were truly opposed to the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Perspective on Universal Jurisdiction’ (2010) 21 Criminal Law Forum 1; Geneuss (n 290); van der 
Wilt (n 401). 
417 For an example of a value judgment see, Van der Wilt (n 401) 1063-5. 
418 Ibid 1064. 
419 Table 1, Désiré Munyaneza; Clever Berinkindi; Ntuyahaga; Public Prosecutor v Higaniro et al.  
420 - ‘Rwanda/France - arrest of top Rwandan officer re-launches plane investigation’ 
(JusticeInfo.Net, 12 November 2008) <http://www.justiceinfo.net/en/component/k2/en-en-121108-
rwandafrance-arrest-of-top-rwandan-officer-re-launches-plane-investigation1157511575.html> 
accessed 16 June 2017.  
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exercise of UJ they would not cooperate on any front with the prosecuting state.421 Given 
this, the use of these investigative trips by certain European states into the territory of 
the respective African state can demonstrate cooperation and tentative support for the 
prosecution. At the very least it demonstrates a lack of obstruction. However, this is not 
to say there are no other motivating factors, such as prosecutions against political 
opponents which may be more accurately described as ‘strategic manoeuvring’.422 
 
The strongest reaction against UJ prosecutions emanate from cases against Heads of 
State and Government and other senior state officials.423 This is hardly surprising given 
the law on immunity and the importance of state sovereignty.424 A high-profile example 
is the ICJ Arrest Warrant Case brought by the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
against Belgium over the issuance of an arrest warrant for a senior DRC official.425  
Similarly, French attempts to exercise jurisdiction over three sitting Rwandan officials, 
while upholding the immunity of Rwandan President Kagame, resulted in an ICJ 
application.426 Yet, due to France not accepting the court’s jurisdiction the case was 
never heard.427 Table 1 shows that immunity based opposition is typically concerned with 
incumbent state officials and Heads of State and Government. A similar situation has 
developed around the ICC. Divisions emerged once the ICC ventured into the 
unchartered territory of an international criminal justice mechanism by issuing an arrest 
warrant for a sitting Head of State – Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir.428  
 
African opposition is not limited to prosecutions by European courts but also other 
African domestic courts. South Africa’s (SA) police have refused to investigate claims of 
                                                        
421 Investigative trips are identified in Reydams (n 259); Jalloh (n 416); van der Wilt (n 401). 
422 Similar has been argued with regards to the ICC self-referrals by African states, see Chapter 6.2 
of this thesis. 
423 One very high-profile case concerned the DRC’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr Abdulaye 
Yerodia Ndombasi, for whom a Belgian court issued an international arrest warrant. This resulted 
in the Arrest Warrant Case before the ICJ. See Table 1.  
424 Chapter 3.3 of this thesis. 
425 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v Belgium) [2002] ICJ Rep 3.  
426 The Officials where the Chief of General Staff to the Rwandan Defence Forces, Chief of 
Protocol attached to the Presidency and a Rwandan Ambassador to India. See n 398. 
427 France has not signed up to the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction as provided under Article 36(2), 
and thus was under no obligation to accept the jurisdiction.  
428 The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (“Omar Al Bashir”) (Warrant of Arrest for 
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir) ICC-02/05-01/09-1 (4 March 2009). 
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torture against Zimbabwean state officials despite court judgments requiring otherwise, 
including a 2014 Constitutional Court ruling.429 
 
Moreover, such immunity objections are not unique to African states. China, Israel and 
the USA have also publicly denounced European courts’ attempts to initiate 
investigations or arrest their officials during European trips.430 The USA were so 
vehemently opposed to an attempted Belgian UJ prosecution that it is widely thought 
that Belgium amended its legislation to narrow the scope and applicability of UJ.431 
 
Table 1 demonstrates that African states accept the principle of UJ. They are supportive, 
or at the very least not obstructive, of cases against ordinary African citizens and 
political opponents. Only when it concerns a sitting state official or Heads of State and 
Government do African states become uncooperative and oppose the prosecutions on 
grounds of immunity. This is not a uniquely African stance, as above shows.  
 
If African states accept and recognise UJ there should be evidence of the concept in 
domestic legislation and a show of potential cases within the continent, which will 
minimise the potential for the abuse of UJ prosecutions by non-African states. The next 
section considers to what extent there is evidence of UJ within the continent and what 
this could mean for addressing international criminal justice and, ultimately, the need 
for an African regional criminal court.  
 
 
4.3 Universal Jurisdiction under African States’ Domestic Legislation 
 
While an in-depth analysis of every African states’ legislation is beyond the scope of this 
thesis,432 an analysis of scholarship and reports is undertaken to find out what makes 
                                                        
429 National Commissioner of The South African Police Service v Southern African Human Rights 
Litigation Centre and Another (CCT 02/14) [2014] ZACC 30; 2015 (1) SA 315 (CC); 2015 (1) SACR 255 
(CC); 2014 (12) BCLR 1428 (CC) (30 October 2014). 
430 Louise Arimatsu, ‘Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Africa’s Hope for Justice?’ 
(April 2010) Chatham House Briefing Paper IL BP 2010/01, 11-12;  Human Rights Watch ‘Belgium: 
Universal Jurisdiction Law Repealed’ (HRW, 1 August 2003) 
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2003/08/01/belgium-universal-jurisdiction-law-repealed> accessed 
28 March 2016. 
431 Human Rights Watch (n 430).  
432 For an overview of African UJ legislation see Table 2, pages 100 – 102. 
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African States’ UJ legislative approach contributory to the need for an African regional 
criminal court?  
 
The AU-EU Expert Report included a survey of publicly available African states’ laws to 
‘highlight common observed and notable features of this law and practice’.433 The crimes 
included in their implementing UJ legislation includes both treaty and customary law 
crimes and the contested offences, encompassing breaches of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes, and terrorism.434 Despite a 
large number of African states being a Party to the Torture Convention, very few have 
implemented the offence within their UJ legislation.435 Overall, there appears to be little 
difference if the state follows a common law or civil law tradition, nor if the state has 
implemented legislation through incorporation or ratification.  
 
African states, similarly to European states, include requirements for the exercise of 
UJ.436 Provided the domestic law has stipulated the crime, states are able to exercise UJ 
subject to procedural requirements. These include: necessitating the presence of the 
accused before initiating proceedings; needing the Attorney General, Director of Public 
Prosecutions or Prosecutor to initiate the proceedings; or limiting jurisdiction to the 
higher courts only.437  
 
Only three of the fifty-five African states438 have removed the procedural barrier 
regarding immunity in relation to the core international crimes, with the exception of 
aggression.439 The reason for removing immunity, is most likely a result of the state’s 
implementing legislation being adopted in relation to the ICC as the three states are 
members of the international court.440 Furthermore, as no other African states have 
                                                        
433 AU-EU Expert Report, Section II.1 footnote 11. 
434 AU-EU Expert Report para 16 and footnotes 12-33.  
435 AU-EU Expert Report para 16. 
436 Reydams (n 259) Part II.  
437 AU-EU Expert Report para 18, footnotes 45-65; Dube (n 279) 465-475. 
438 The number of African states is contested as neither the United Nations nor Morocco 
recognise the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic. However, because of Saharawi Republic’s 
status as an AU member this thesis includes it as a state.  
439 AU-EU Expert Report para 17, footnotes 40-42 which identifies The Democratic Republic of 
Congo’s Penal Code, Book 1, Section VI, article 21-3; Niger’s Law N° 2003-025 of 13 June 2003 
article 208.7; and South Africa’s Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court Act 2002, S4(1).  
440 The DRC ratified the Rome Statute in April 2002, Nigeria ratified in September 2001 and South 
Africa ratified in November 2000.    
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followed, it can hardly be claimed that a regional custom of not applying immunity for 
core crimes has emerged.441 Interestingly, the Pact on Security, Stability and 
Development in the Great Lakes Region’s Protocol for the Prevention and the 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity and 
all forms of Discrimination remove immunity for these crimes.442 As eleven states from 
the Great Lakes region are party to the Protocol there may be the potential to claim a 
(sub)regional customary international law recognising the inapplicability of immunity 
for the core crimes.443 However, given the lack of actual state practice in implementing 
this provision, and the specific refusal to recognise this by states in that region, this is 
unlikely to be substantiated. A treaty which is never implemented is not good evidence 
in establishing a custom.   
  
Overall, African states’ legislation addresses crimes of a treaty and customary nature, but 
even with the inclusion of the contested crimes of genocide and terrorism it does not 
address the conduct identified as being of regional concern.444 As only three states have 
removed the procedural barrier of immunity for UJ prosecutions for three of the core 
crimes little has changed with regards to the limiting impact immunity has. In fact, 
additional hurdles have been implemented through the procedural requirements. Sadly, 
there is little within African states’ domestic law on UJ that minimises the need for an 
African regional criminal court that can contribute to the various purposes of pursuing 
international criminal prosecutions: there is little to no deterrence, reconciliation, 
improvement of peace and security, and no transitional justice approaches adopted.  
                                                        
441 The ICJ held regional practices can be considered as regional customs and thus international 
law, when there is a common culture or other common attribute. Asylum Case (Colombia v Peru) 
(Judgment) [1950] ICJ Rep 266. 
442 Article 12. 
443 The eleven states being: Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, The Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Kenya, The Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. With 
the succession of the Republic of South Sudan in 2011, the Protocol will apply to them as part of 
their membership to the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region.  
444 See AU Model Law’s inclusion of trafficking in drugs and the Cairo-Arusha’s principles. 
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Table 2 – African States Universal Jurisdiction (UJ) Laws445 
State Genocide 
Crimes 
Against 
Humanity 
War 
Crimes 
Terrorism 
Civil Law 
Tradition 
Ratified GC & 
Accepted UJ 
on This Basis 
Torture 
Immunity 
for Core 
Crimes 
Abrogated 
Limitations to UJ 
Territory 
Presence 
Initiated 
Initiated by 
Director of Public 
Prosecutions 
Initiated by 
Prosecutor 
No Jurisdiction 
for Low-level 
Courts 
Algeria            
Angola            
Benin            
Botswana            
Burkina Faso            
Burundi            
Cabo Verde            
Cameroon            
Central 
African 
Republic 
           
Chad            
Comoros            
Congo            
Côte d’Ivoire            
DR Congo            
Djibouti            
                                                        
445 Based on available information from AU-EU Expert Report; Amnesty International, ‘Universal Jurisdiction: A Preliminary Survey of Legislation Around the 
World – 2012 Update’ (October 2012). 
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Egypt            
Equatorial 
Guinea 
           
Eritrea            
Ethiopia            
Gabon            
Gambia            
Ghana            
Guinea            
Guinea Bissau            
Kenya            
Lesotho            
Liberia            
Libya            
Madagascar            
Malawi            
Mali            
Mauritania            
Mauritius            
Morocco            
Mozambique            
Namibia            
Niger            
Nigeria            
Rwanda            
Sahrawi Rep.            
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São Tomé and 
Príncipe 
           
Senegal            
Seychelles            
Sierra Leone            
Somalia            
South Africa            
South Sudan            
Sudan            
Swaziland            
Togo            
Tunisia            
Uganda            
UR of 
Tanzania 
           
Zambia            
Zimbabwe            
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Turning to African state practice, while at the time of the AU-EU Expert Report ‘[n]o 
African State is known to have exercised universal jurisdiction effectively’, there have 
been recent attempts.446 SA had to consider its ability to exercise UJ in terms of initiating 
an investigation into alleged torture committed in Zimbabwe of Zimbabwean nationals 
residing in SA.447 The SA Constitutional Court confirmed the ability of the South African 
Police Service (SAPS) to open an investigation into the allegations without requiring the 
presence of the accused in the territory.448 However, despite the ruling SAPS have yet to 
open an investigation, weakening any UJ precedent in either SA or Africa. More recently, 
former Chadian dictator Hissène Habré has been tried before a court in Senegal on the 
basis of UJ, which will be considered in detail in the next section.  
 
 
4.4 The Prosecution of Former President Hissène Habré 
 
The recent prosecution of Hissène Habré was the first UJ prosecution of its kind in 
Africa.449 Following the overthrow of Chadian President Habré in December 1990, 
bringing an end to his notoriously repressive rule, he fled to Senegal.450 1992 saw the 
release of the Nation Truth Commission’s report documenting 40 000 cases of torture by 
the Habré regime. Encouraged by what is known as the Pinochet precedent and the 
English court’s decision on former heads of state immunity,451 a Chadian victim’s group 
                                                        
446 Para 19. 
447 For a discussion on the case, see Gerhard Werle and Paul Christoph Bornkamm, ‘Torture in 
Zimbabwe under Scrutiny in South Africa: The Judgment of the North Gauteng High Court in 
SALC v National Director of Public Prosecutions’ (2013) 11 Journal of International Criminal Justice 
659; Christopher Gevers, ‘‘The Application of Universal Jurisdiction in South African Law’ 
(EJIL:Talk!, 24 April 2012) <http://www.ejiltalk.org/universal-jurisdiction-in-south-africa/> 
accessed 28 March 2016; Max du Plessis ‘South Africa’s police must investigate Zimbabwe torture 
allegations’ (ISS, 10 November 2014) <https://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/south-africas-police-
must-investigate-zimbabwe-torture-allegations> accessed 28 March 2016. 
448 National Commissioner of the South African Police Service (n 429) para 48. 
449 On the Habré prosecution see Sarah Williams, ‘The Extraordinary African Chambers in the 
Senegalese Courts: an African Solution to an African Problem?’ (2013) 11 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 1139; Sofie A. E. Høgestøl, ‘‘The Habré Judgment at the Extraordinary African 
Chambers: A Singular Victory in the Fight Against Impunity’ (2016) 34(3) Nordic Journal of 
Human Rights 147; M Bronner, ‘‘Our Man in Africa’, (Foreign Policy Magazine, 20 July 2015) 
<http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/24/our-man-in-africa/> accessed 30 November 2017; Reed 
Brody, ‘The Prosecution of Hissène Habré – An African Pinochet’ (2000-2001) 35 New England 
Law Review 321. 
450 For a timeline of the events, see Human Rights Watch, ‘Chronology of the Habré Case’ (HRW, 
April 27, 2015) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/27/chronology-habre-case> accessed 30 
November 2017.  
451 Pinochet case (n 368). 
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together with Human Rights Watch (HRW) compiled a case against Habré. In January 
2000 they brought a private complaint before the Senegalese courts. While the Tribunal 
régional hors-classe de Dakar confirmed the charges, the Cour d’Appel de Dakar 
overturned the ruling determining that Senegal had no jurisdiction as the acts occurred 
in Chad, which the Cour de Cassation confirmed. These decisions are widely agreed to 
have been reached under political pressure from the then Senegalese President, 
Abdoulaye Wade.  
 
Following the Cour d’Appel de Dakar’s decision, the victims filed criminal complaints in 
both Chad (October 2000) and Belgium (November 2000). Additionally, in April 2001, in 
response to the lack of jurisdiction before the Senegalese courts the victims filed a 
complaint before the UN Committee against Torture for violations of the Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.  
 
Meanwhile, in early 2002, Belgian investigators travelled to Chad to conduct interviews 
and site visits, eventually issuing an international arrest warrant for Habré in September 
2005. Belgium used Senegal’s failure to fulfil its aut dedere aut judicare (prosecute or 
extradite) obligation as the basis for the extradition request sent to Senegal. 
Subsequently leading to an ICJ complaint being filed. Despite the ICJ’s confirmation of 
Senegal’s aut dedere aut judicare obligation Habré was never extradited.452 Instead, in 
November 2005, Senegal placed Habré at the disposal of the President of the AU, 
resulting in the establishment of the Committee of Eminent African Jurists to 
recommend options for prosecuting Habré.453  
 
Accordingly, Senegal challenged its ability to prosecute Habré by bringing a case before 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) court, which incorrectly 
                                                        
452 Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite case, 422. Senegal was found to 
be in breach of its obligation to prosecute or extradite Habré, and must ‘without further delay, 
submit the case of Mr. Hissène Habré to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, 
if it does not extradite him.’ ICJ Press Release, ‘Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute 
or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal): The Court finds that the Republic of Senegal must, without 
further delay, submit the case of Mr. Hissène Habré to its competent authorities for the purpose 
of prosecution, if it does not extradite him’ (20 July 2012) 2012/24 <http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/144/17084.pdf> accessed 28 March 2016. 
453 African Union, Report of the Committee of Eminent African Jurists on the Case of Hissène 
Habré (May 2006), para 27 – 29, 
<https://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/habreCEJA_Repor0506.pdf> accessed 30 
November 2017. 
 105
found Senegal was prevented from undertaking a domestic prosecution due to the 
retroactive application of the law on the crimes charged which would violate the 
principle nullum crimen sine lege.454 Yet, the ECOWAS court did call on Senegal to try 
Habré before an international ad hoc style court.455 In the end, the AU and international 
community supported the establishment of the Extraordinary African Chambers (EAC) 
within the Senegalese courts. On 30 May 2016, before the EAC, Habré was ‘convicted of 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and torture, including sexual violence and rape’.456 
 
4.4.1 Universal Jurisdiction under the Extraordinary African Chambers 
 
The unclear status of the EAC as a domestic court or an internationalised court presents 
challenges for the applicability of UJ. Under the principle of UJ only domestic courts can 
prosecute the alleged perpetrator, whereas internationalised courts apply different 
jurisdictional bases. Given the EAC is placed ‘within the Senegalese judicial system’ it is 
not a separate or distinct judicial mechanism.457 Thus, the EAC is more akin to a 
domestic prosecution as opposed to a hybrid court on two main grounds: First, the 
limited participation of international judges and their involvement in other aspects of 
the court’s work. Despite the EAC including international judges, this is limited to two 
judges from AU member states and no international personnel or advisers. This is hardly 
international compared to the level of international employees in the ICTR, ICTY and 
SCSL.  
 
Second, both the substantive and procedural law relied on are from Senegalese law and 
not international law.458 The level of involvement from an outside party, i.e. the AU, is 
                                                        
454 Hissein Habre v. Republic of Senegal (Judgment) ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/10 (18 November 2010) para 
58.  
455 Ibid.  
456 Human Rights Watch, ‘The Trial of Hissène Habré’ (n 220). His conviction for rape was 
overturned on appeal on the grounds that ‘the Trial Chamber exceeded its powers of re-
characterising the crimes when it convicted the accused of a crime that did not feature in the 
indictment, and did not afford equal treatment to the parties to the case’. Forum Chambres 
Africaines ‘Press Release Final appeal decision in the Hissein Habré case before the EAC’ (27 April 
2017) <http://forumchambresafricaines.org/press-release-final-appeal-decision-in-the-hissein-
habre-case-before-the-eac/?lang=en> accessed 30 November 2017.  
457 Article 1(1) Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Senegal and the African 
Union on the Establishment of Extraordinary African Chambers within the Senegalese Judicial 
System.  
458 Ibid Article 1(4). This provision was subsequently changed by Article 16 of the Statute of the 
Extraordinary African Chambers within the Senegalese judicial system for the prosecution of 
international crimes committed on the territory of the Republic of Chad during the period from 7 
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likened ‘to situations in which national institutions receive assistance, finance, and 
training, but are not considered to be internationalized’.459 Therefore, despite having 
some of the characteristics of a hybrid tribunal the EAC is in fact not a hybrid court, but 
a domestic prosecution at ‘the limit of the category of internationalized criminal 
tribunals’.460  
 
This has far reaching implications for how UJ is applied. International and hybrid courts’ 
jurisdiction is bound by law to cover a specific time period. Either from the date of the 
court’s establishment,461 or as set out in the constitutive instrument.462 However, 
domestic UJ prosecutions only need to determine whether the crime was criminalised 
under international law at the time of commission. Pursuant to Article 15 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
 
No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act 
or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national 
or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a 
heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time 
when the criminal offence was committed. If, subsequent to the 
commission of the offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of 
the lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby.463 
 
Thus, it is for the EAC to determine if the crimes Habré was charged with were crimes at 
the time of their commission. The EAC has  
 
the power to prosecute and try the person or persons most responsible for 
crimes and serious violations of international law, customary 
international law and international conventions ratified by Chad, 
                                                                                                                                                                  
June 1982 to 1 December 1990 (hereafter EAC Statute). Article 17(1) sets out procedural law to 
apply. For an English translation see,  
<http://forumchambresafricaines.org/docs/Statute_of_the_Extraordinary_African_Chambers.pdf
> accessed 30 November 2017.   
459 Williams (n 449) 1147.   
460 Ibid. 
461 For example, The ICC has jurisdiction over crimes committed from 2 July 2002 onwards, or 
from the date the statute entered into force for the State if after July 2002.  
462 Article 1(1) of the SCSL Statute limits jurisdiction to crimes committed in Sierra Leone ‘since 30 
November 1996’. Article 1 ICTR Statute, limits jurisdiction to crimes committed ‘between 1 January 
1994 and 31 December 1994’.  
463 Article 15 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, 
entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR). Echoed in Senegal’s Constitution, Art. 9, 
Constitution de la Republique du Senegal du 22 Janvier 2001. 
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committed in the territory of Chad during the period from 7 June 1982 to 1 
December 1990.464 
 
In contrast to the ECOWAS judgment, if this is satisfied, there will be no violation of the 
nullum crimen sine lege principle.  
 
The charges against Habré consisted of crimes against humanity, torture and war crimes. 
As Habré was president from 1982 – 1990 to avoid retroactivity the conduct needs to have 
been criminalised under international law during that period. Under treaty law torture is 
a crime and Senegal ratified the CAT in 1986 and Chad acceded to CAT in 1995. 
Therefore, for both states, torture would not have been a crime for the duration of 
Habré’s dictatorship. Plus, as held by the ICJ, torture was a customary law crime at the 
time.465  
 
War crimes are generally accepted as customary law crimes with the exception of 
internal armed conflicts. While there are legal arguments that such crimes have become 
customary crimes following the ICTR and ICTY judgments they would not have been 
criminal under customary law at the time of commission in the 1980s.  
 
For crimes against humanity their inclusion as a customary crime is contested, making it 
uncertain whether it is a UJ crime. Nevertheless, the Nuremberg Tribunals enabled 
individual responsibility and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
(ECCC) held that since at least 1975 crimes against humanity have been customary law 
crimes.466  
 
Finally, as a former Head of State, Habré is entitled to functional immunity.467 However, 
since the Pinochet case it is accepted that there is no immunity for former Heads of State 
and Government for international crimes. Nevertheless, if the EAC had held there was an 
                                                        
464 Article 3(1) EAC Statute. Chad is a party to the CAT since 1995, the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
since 1970 and the Geneva Convention Additional Protocol II since 1997.  
465 Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite case, para 99.  
466 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Judgment) 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC (26 July 2011) § 292. However 
not all crimes may have been distinct crimes against humanity, for example Kaing Guek Eav alias 
Duch (Appeal Judgment) 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/SC (3 February 2012) § 180. 
467 Chapter 3.3 of this thesis. 
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applicable immunity Chad had already waived his immunity, consequently nullifying the 
issue.468 
 
4.4.2 A Unique Situation or Potential for Replication? 
 
Whether the reasoning for prosecuting Habré was political (to prevent a European court 
passing judgment on a former African leader) or based on the firm belief in promoting 
UJ by African courts, this case has set an important precedent. It is no longer possible for 
former Heads of State to avoid prosecution in Africa. Furthermore, the AU and African 
states have demonstrated they will not necessarily shield perpetrators from prosecution. 
Although the question remains whether the likes of the EAC or other UJ prosecutions are 
likely across Africa.  
 
The prosecution of Habré was not without its challenges and from the beginning certain 
factions sought to obstruct the process. Following the initial filing of the complaint to 
the Senegalese courts, and the election of then President Abdoulaye Wade, steps were 
taken to prevent the prosecution. Wade placed pressure on the courts and even 
transferred judges in order to obstruct the investigation and prevent judgments being 
made.469 The Cour d’Appel de Dakar’s quashing of the complaint and the ECOWAS 
decision created further legal hurdles to the prosecution, but these were ultimately 
overcome. Additionally, Senegal repeatedly raised concerns over the costs of the 
prosecution and its own limited financial capacity.470 
 
However, the numerous enabling factors proved more influential. Internal factors 
included the choice of Senegal as the forum because its ‘democratic tradition’ and review 
of the constitution and criminal laws helped facilitate the court’s jurisdiction.471 The 
removal, by election, of Wade created the political climate to remove the pressure on 
and interference in the court system, compounded by the Minister of Justice’s 
                                                        
468 L’immunité de Hissène Habré. definitivement levee, letter from M. Koudji-Gaou, 7 October 
2002, <http://www.hrw.org/legacy/french/press/2002/tchad1205a.htm> accessed 30 September 
2013. 
469 Brody (n 449) 328-330. 
470 Williams (n 449) 1143.  
471 Ntahiraja (n 387) 30.  
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background as a human rights advocate and President of the ICC’s Assembly of State 
Parties (ASP).472  
 
At the international level, there was the support or willingness from Chad for Senegal to 
prosecute Habré: as seen by their waiving of his immunity and their cooperation with 
the investigation.473 However, the Chadian government has used the demonization of 
Habré for their own political purposes over the years, casting doubt over whether its 
support was due to a belief in the pursuit of justice or for political reasons. Arguably, the 
strongest enabling factor was the role of local and international NGOs. From the end of 
the Habré regime they had continued to seek ways to keep the matter before the courts 
of various states and international bodies,474 which was made possible by the 
international community’s financial contributions.475 In addition, external pressure 
placed on Senegal to extradite or prosecute came from the Belgian extradition request,476 
followed by the Belgian complaint before the ICJ with the court ruling against Senegal,477 
as well as from the UN Committee Against Torture finding against Senegal and their lack 
of compliance to their obligations under the CAT.478  
 
At the continental level, the report of the Committee of Eminent African Jurists put 
further pressure on Senegal, and the AU, to find an appropriate African forum in which 
to prosecute Habré. Ultimately, the AU provided both support and financial assistance 
to the EAC.  
 
Perhaps more importantly, at least from a legal standpoint, was the Pinochet precedent 
and the removal of the immunity defence.479 The case had shown it was legally possible 
                                                        
472 Ibid 31. 
473 Case Concerning Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v 
Senegal) 
(Application Instituting Proceedings of 17 February 2009) 
<http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/144/15054.pdf> accessed 30 November 2017.  
474 Brody (n 449); Human Rights Watch, ‘Chronology of the Habré Case’ (n 368). 
475 Ntahiraja (n 387) 33. 
476 Case Concerning Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. 
Senegal), 
Application Instituting Proceedings of 16 February 2009, §6 available 
<http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/144/15054.pdf> accessed 30 November 2017.  
477 Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite case, para 122.  
478 Committee against Torture, ‘Decisions of the Committee Against Torture under Art. 22 of the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment’ 
(17 May 2006) UN Doc CAT/C/36/D/181/2001, paras 9.6–9.12. 
479  Pinochet case (n 368). 
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to prosecute a former head of state for torture and potentially other international crimes 
before domestic courts. Without this, it is unlikely an African court would have 
attempted such a prosecution.  
 
While such an enabling environment may be rare in Africa, the Habré prosecution offers 
the potential for future continental prosecutions. The EAC has demonstrated there is the 
appetite for ending impunity and for victims to receive justice. What’s more, an African 
court was able to undertake a prosecution against a former Heads of State creating 
ownership for African states, the AU and victims. Given the concern of the AU over the 
perceived abuse of UJ by Western states, this can go a long way in addressing this issue. 
The EAC prosecution was able to utilise predominantly national personnel, with the 
support of two African judges, undertake credible investigations and deliver an 
enforceable verdict. Such an approach will lead to improvement in judicial and 
institutional capacity in Senegal and throughout the continent if further such 
prosecutions are pursued. It may even contribute to deterring future crimes if African 
leaders perceive a prosecution as being likely. The EAC’s reliance on UJ meant the 
crimes, which were committed more than two decades ago, were within the court’s 
competence. Furthermore, as the judgment came from within the Senegalese judicial 
system there was no need to find a state willing to imprison Habré, unlike if he had been 
tried before an international court. The costs of the prosecution were significantly less 
than those of international and hybrid courts,480 which could address the financial 
constraints faced by many African states, especially when financially supported by the 
AU and the international community. This would also lead to the reduction in overall 
costs to the international community while advancing international criminal justice. 
 
However, whether other African states will follow Senegal’s lead remains to be seen. 
While a large number of states have UJ legislation it covers a limited number of crimes. 
Many states are also still facing their own repressive regimes and weak NGO and CSO 
presence remains a challenge for many victims’ communities to assist in mobilising and 
undertaking the work required for filing a complaint. Yet, the possibility exists for UJ 
prosecutions to become more common, even if clustered around certain states.481 This 
                                                        
480 Kerstin Carlson, ‘The Trial of Hissène Habré’ (IntLawGrrls, 24 May 2016) 
<https://ilg2.org/2016/05/24/the-trial-of-hissene-habre/> accessed 30 November 2017.  
481 This does not ignore the zones of impunity which emerge as a result. See Sriram and Ross (n 
394).  
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has been the European experience where the majority of cases are heard before a limited 
number of courts.  
 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
While there is undeniably a lack of UJ prosecutions taking place within Africa, both 
African and non-African states have passed UJ legislation. The crimes covered include 
both treaty and customary law based crimes and the contested crimes lacking a true UJ 
characteristic. Both African or non-African states include a mixture of crimes against 
humanity, genocide, war crimes, terrorism and breaches of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions. The effect of this is to limit the applicable crimes and consequently, the 
likelihood of pursuing a UJ prosecution. Nevertheless, for existing crimes there are less 
stringent time frames than under international and hybrid courts.482 
 
Unsurprisingly, prosecutions by non-African states are dominated by the three states 
with the most conducive judicial systems and the broadest UJ legislation. This is similar 
to the situation in Africa where only SA and Senegal have thus far considered UJ 
prosecutions. The ability to translate such practice into state policy is uncertain. The 
majority of complaints are filed by victims, their families and NGOs, demonstrating the 
need for a strong civil society and access to the courts. This is currently lacking across 
the majority of African states.  
 
Despite the limited number of UJ prosecutions, attempts to bring cases against citizens, 
rebels and state officials have been undertaken. This lack of discrimination is positive 
but is mitigated by the consistent upholding of sitting Heads of State and Government 
and senior state officials’ immunities. While the legality of the approach has been 
discussed in Chapter 3, the impact is to reduce the relevance of UJ prosecutions for 
addressing UJ crimes at the domestic level. Furthermore, such prosecutions have 
resulted in a backlash and criticism of the perceived abuse of UJ by African and non-
African states alike. This dispels the myth that it is only African leaders and states 
opposed to such prosecutions considering the protests of China, Israel and the US.  
                                                        
482 International and hybrid courts are bound by their temporal and geographical scope as set out 
in their constitutive instruments. 
 112
The likelihood of future UJ prosecutions by African states has been bolstered by the 
Habré prosecution, although the particular enabling environment and other factors limit 
this, but not completely. The advantages for capacity, including financial, and ownership 
concerns are addressed, offering an opportunity for African states to demonstrate their 
willingness to address impunity, even if only for former Heads of State and Government.  
 
Nevertheless, the limited number of applicable crimes and the problems associated with 
filing complaints curtails the ability of UJ prosecutions to address international criminal 
justice alone. UJ prosecutions further the retributive aspects of ICL, but Chapters 3 and 4 
demonstrate there is little contribution made to deterrence due to the uncertainty and 
delay in bringing prosecutions before national courts. The contribution made to peace 
and security is potentially improved with the Rwandan genocide prosecutions, yet this 
still lacks implementation. UJ has left many crimes unaddressed and ICL purposes 
unfulfilled. Given that the international criminal court is unable to address all situations 
and crimes left by UJ, there is a space for an African regional criminal court.483   
 
  
                                                        
483 See Part II of this thesis.  
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Part II 
The Interrelationship Between the AU and the ICC 
 
 
Part II moves from the domestic level explored in Part I to the ICC’s prosecution of 
international crimes. The aim being to answer whether the set up and actions of the ICC 
itself contributes to the need for an African regional criminal court. Each of the chapters 
focus on separate evaluative criteria starting with accountability in Chapter 5. As the ICC 
adopts accountability of a criminal nature an examination of the Rome Statute and the 
international court’s policies and practices is undertaken. Chapter 6 focuses on the 
ability of the ICC to encourage domestic prosecutions as part of the principle of 
complementarity. Chapter 7 investigates the international court’s impact on African 
ownership, exploring whether the ICC positively engages with AU and African states, 
and how the relationship contributes to creating a need for an African regional criminal 
court. In Chapter 8, the focus shifts to the ICC’s removal of immunity for all state 
officials and what this has contributed to ICL and the need for an African regional 
criminal court. Bringing together the findings from the four chapters, Chapter 9 
considers the theoretical basis for prosecution and the purpose of ICL and the ICC. The 
inability of the international court to live up to ICL’s enumerated aims is argued as a 
contributing factor to the need for an African regional criminal court. Furthermore, the 
additional purposes attributed to ICL and TJ are argued as another factor which requires 
an African regional criminal court which goes further than the ICC’s purpose to be 
established. 
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Chapter 5  
The ICC and Accountability 
 
The ICC offers accountability of a criminal nature with accompanying penal sanctions 
and that is how the term is used throughout Part II unless otherwise stated. Whether 
this contributes to the need for an African regional criminal court is the focus of this 
chapter. To answer this question an assessment of: the geographical and temporal reach; 
which individuals can be prosecuted; how the ICC gains jurisdiction; and the type of 
crimes under its scope is undertaken. This is followed by an appraisal of the institutional 
workings of the ICC and its capacity, cooperation and enforcement mechanisms. The 
purpose of this chapter is not to pass judgment on the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) 
nor to come up with solutions, instead the practice and policies are scrutinised to see 
whether they contribute to the need for an African regional criminal court. 
 
In an effort to become more transparent484 the ICC OTP has published numerous papers 
and reports indicating their understanding of their role and the overall approach taken 
to international criminal justice.485 Over the years, the OTP has tried to adapt its 
approach based on lessons learned, and with the change in Prosecutor in 2012 also came 
                                                        
484 This was partly in response to calls for greater transparency and the negative impact the OTP’s 
silence was having on public perceptions of the court and creating misunderstanding about its 
work.  
485 See OTP, Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor, September 2003 
(hereafter 2003 Policy Paper); OTP, Annex to the ‘Paper on some policy issues before the Office of 
the Prosecutor’, September 2003 (hereafter 2003 Policy Paper Annex): Referrals and 
Communications, September 2003 (hereafter 2003 Referrals and Communications); OTP, Report 
on the Activities During the First Three Years (June 2003-June 2006), September 2006 (hereafter 
First Three Years Report); OTP, Report on Prosecutorial Strategy, September 2006 (hereafter 2006 
Prosecutorial Strategy); OTP, Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice, September 2007 (hereafter 
2007 Policy Paper); OTP, Prosecutorial Strategy 2009-2012, February 2010 (hereafter 2009-12 
Prosecutorial Strategy); OTP, Strategic Plan June 2012-2015, October 2013 (hereafter 2012-15 
Strategic Plan); OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, November 2013 (hereafter 2013 
Policy Paper); OTP, Strategic Plan 2016-2018, July 2016 (hereafter 2016-18 Strategic Plan); OTP, 
Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2011, December 2011 (hereafter 2011 Preliminary 
Examination Report); OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2012, November 2012 
(hereafter 2012 Preliminary Examination Report); OTP, Report on Preliminary Investigations 2013, 
November 2013 (hereafter 2013 Preliminary Investigations Report); OTP, Report on Preliminary 
Examination Activities 2014, December 2014 (hereafter 2014 Preliminary Examination Report); 
OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2015, November 2015 (hereafter 2015 
Preliminary Examination Report); OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2016, 
November 2016 (hereafter 2016 Preliminary Examination Report).  
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a change in strategy.486 However, these changes did not bring with them a drastic change 
in strategy and approach to accountability.  
 
 
5.1 Jurisdictional Limitations 
 
The ICC is able to provide for accountability in those instances where it has jurisdiction 
and anything outside of this is beyond its scope. Whether these jurisdictional elements 
contribute to the need for an African regional criminal court is examined by referring to: 
the court’s temporal and geographical jurisdiction; which individuals; what crimes are 
covered; and how the international court gains jurisdiction.  
 
5.1.1 Temporal and Geographical Jurisdiction  
 
While states are free to create legal obligations through treaties, two general principles 
of law restrict what criminal jurisdictional can be imposed:  nullum crimen sine lege 
(non-retroactivity of the law); and nulla poena sine lege (no penalty without law). The 
Rome Statute explicitly recognises these principles,487 therefore the ICC’s temporal 
jurisdiction is limited to the date of entry into force – 1 July 2002.488 Consequently, 
international crimes which took place before July 2002 remain outside of the court’s 
jurisdiction. This limits the ICC from contributing to the purpose of ICL for any crimes 
committed before such time.  For states ratifying the Rome Statute after this date 
jurisdiction is limited to the date of entry for that state, unless the state declares 
otherwise.489 While any other mechanisms established by treaty would have exactly the 
same limitation, national systems are more likely to fill this gap. As Chapter 3 concluded 
the principle of UJ is not bound by such rigid timeframes. All that needs to be satisfied is 
that the crime was designated as such, by either treaty or custom, at the time of 
                                                        
486 Luis Moreno Ocampo was the first Prosecutor (2003 - 2012), succeeded by Fatou Bensouda 
(2012 – present). On the strategy see section 5.2 of this chapter.  
487 Article 22 and 23 respectively.  
488 Article 11(1) and Article 126. 
489 Article 11(2). 
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commission.490 Alternatively, it is still possible for a UN style ad hoc court to be 
established with a specific time frame provided for.491  
 
A further limitation is the geographical scope of jurisdiction. The ICC is permitted to 
exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed in a member state’s territory where the 
accused is a national of a member state, where a non-member state accepts jurisdiction, 
or is referred to the international court by the UNSC.492 Consequently, the ICC is 
severely limited by its membership and reliant on the UNSC to hold non-member states 
to account.493 The hope for a universal international criminal court has not yet been 
achieved and the potential for accountability before the international criminal court 
reduced. 
 
A possible result of these limitations, is the Court’s disproportionate focus on Africa 
given it’s the court’s largest group of members.494 Until recently all situations related to 
an African country.495 Yet, the African-centric caseload does not necessarily mean the 
ICC is biased496 as not all situations are under the ICC’s jurisdiction. While many of the 
cases were self-referrals the context must be considered as there are genuine concerns 
over the undue influence and pressure exerted by former Prosecutor Ocampo and 
European countries.497 Furthermore, some of the double standards and bias issues 
                                                        
490 Chapter 3.2 of this thesis.  
491 For examples, see Article 8 Statute of the ICTY, Article 7 Statute of the ICTR, Article 1 Statute of 
the SCSL and Article 1 Statute of the STL. Additionally, it could be possible for national and 
regional definitions of crimes to be utilised.  
492 Article 12(2), Article 12(3) and Article 13(b) Rome Statute. 
493 Section 5.1.3 of this chapter. 
494 33 of the international court’s 123 member states are African.  
495 The proprio motu investigation into Georgia was authorised in January 2016 by the Pre-Trial 
Chamber I. Situation in Georgia, Decision on the Prosecutor’s request for authorization of an 
investigation, ICC-01/15-12 (27 January 2016). 
496 Tor Krever, ‘‘Africa in the Dock: On ICC Bias’ (Critical Legal Thinking, 30 October 2016) 
<http://criticallegalthinking.com/2016/10/30/africa-in-the-dock-icc-bias/> accessed 21 April 2017; 
Chief Charles Achaleke Taku, ‘Has the International Criminal Court Inappropriately Targeted 
Africa?’ (ICC Forum, March 2013) <http://iccforum.com/africa> accessed 14 June 2017; Abdul 
Tejan-Cole, ‘Is the ICC’s exclusively African case docket a legitimate and appropriate intervention 
or an unfair targeting of Africans?’ (ICC Forum, March 2013) <http://iccforum.com/africa> 
accessed 18 June 2017.  
497 See Chapter 6 of this thesis. Krever (n 496); Phil Clark, ‘Chasing Cases: The ICC and the 
politics of state referral in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda’ in Carsten Stahn 
and Mohamed M El Zeidy (eds), The International Criminal Court and Complementarity: From 
Theory to Practice (CUP 2010) 1187-8, 1198-9, 1203; Michael Otim and Marieke Wierda, ‘Justice at 
Juba: International Obligations and Local Demands in Northern Uganda’ in Nicholas Waddell 
and Phil Clark (eds), Courting Conflict? Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa (Royal African Society 
2008) 22; Paul D. Schmitt, ‘France, Africa, and the ICC: The Neocolonialist Critique and the Crisis 
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regarding non-member states are in fact not an ICC issue, but rather a UNSC issue.498 
The political workings and priorities of the UNSC Permanent Five members’  prevent the 
referral of certain situations meaning that justice is subject to the politics of the UN 
regime.499  
 
It has been claimed that there is simply not enough evidence or precedent from the 
OTP’s own proprio motu investigations to say there is inappropriate targeting.500 
However, while there is undeniably a number of situations worthy of ICC investigation 
in Africa, the OTP does not diversify its prosecutions to other regions just as worthy of 
the international court’s investigation.501 The implication is that politically weak and 
easily manipulated states are vulnerable to ICC intervention,502 raising doubt over the 
notion of a fair and just international mechanism and undermining the court’s 
credibility. This is made more apparent by the unusually quick dismissal of cases where 
powerful states have interests,503 creating a sense of exceptionalism that these states 
either do not commit such crimes or that their domestic courts will prosecute, neither of 
which is true. 
  
5.1.2 Individuals under Jurisdiction 
 
ICL deals with individual criminal liability for international crimes and as such the ICC 
has jurisdiction over natural persons proven to have contributed to the commission of 
crimes through the various modes of liability and direct participation.504 As the 
international court’s aim is to hold to account those contributing to the cause of 
conflicts and ICL violations, while simultaneously helping restore peace and security, 
                                                                                                                                                                  
of Institutional Legitimacy’ in Kamari M. Clarke, Abel S. Knottnerus and Eefje de Volder (eds), 
Africa and the ICC: Perceptions of Justice (Cambridge University Press 2016).  
498 For example, calls for crimes committed in Iraq by UK troops to be investigated as a result of 
the court’s ongoing preliminary examination. Most recently calls for the situation in Syria to be 
referred to the ICC have been prevented by the UNSC’s Permanent Members’ veto power.  
499 The UNSC Permanent Members are China, France, Russia, The United Kingdom and the 
United States of America. 
500 Margaret M. deGuzman, ‘Is the ICC Targeting Africa Inappropriately?’ (ICC Forum, March 
2013) <http://iccforum.com/africa> accessed 21 April 2017.  
501 David Chuter, ‘The ICC: A Place for Africans and Africans in Their Place?’ in Vincent O. 
Nhemielle (ed), Africa and the Future of International Criminal Justice (Eleven International 
Publishing 2012) 179-80.  
502 Interview with African State Official (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 24 May 2015); Chuter (n 501) 179. 
503 ICC Press Release ‘ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I requests Prosecutor to reconsider decision not to 
investigate situation referred by Union of Comoros’ (16 July 2015) ICC-CPI-20150716-PR1133.  
504 Article 25 Rome Statute. 
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such a limited approach is problematic.505 To fully address international crimes, there 
needs to be a broader conceptualisation as to what and who drives the crimes.506 Whilst 
traditionally ICL only envisions individual liability of the natural person, an additional 
approach is possible – corporate criminal liability. By focusing on natural persons, there 
is potential for those corporations involved in committing or enabling the commission of 
international crimes to go unpunished.507 The concept of corporate criminal liability is 
not one which is widely accepted and was rejected during the Rome Conference 
Negotiations.508 However, the unintended gap left by the Rome Statute does not address 
the range of actors involved and the underlying causes of conflict.509 Corporations across 
all regions have been implicated in international crimes both directly and indirectly.510 
Not holding to account these entities increases the need for a regional court to provide 
recourse.  
 
5.1.3 How the ICC Gains Jurisdiction 
 
Having explored which individuals are within the ICC’s jurisdiction, the focus turns to 
examining how they come before the court. According to Article 13 the ICC gains 
jurisdiction in one of three ways: self-referrals by the concerned state; UNSC referrals; 
and the Prosecutor initiating a proprio motu investigation. This section considers 
whether the proprio motu investigations and UNSC referrals impact accountability and 
contribute to the need for an African regional criminal court. For further discussion on 
how self-referrals have reduced the level of accountability and legitimacy of the ICC see 
Chapter 6 of this thesis on complementarity. 
                                                        
505 Chapter 9 of this thesis.  
506 On corporate involvement in international crimes see Ken Roberts, ‘Corporate Liability and 
Complicity in International Crimes’ in Sébastien Jodoin and Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, 
Sustainable Development, International Criminal Justice, and Treaty Implementation (CUP 2013) 
190; International Commission of Jurists, ‘Corporate Complicity and Legal Accountability’, Report 
of the International Commission of Jurists Expert Legal Panel on Corporate complicity in 
International Crimes, <http://icj.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Vol.2-
Corporate-legal-accountability-thematic-report-2008.pdf> accessed 22 December 2017. The ICC 
Prosecutor has noted the illegal business practices in the DRC which fuelled the conflict, as cited 
in Sriram and Ross (n 394) 60. 
507 Harmen van der Wilt, ‘Corporate Criminal Responsibility for International Crimes: Exploring 
the Possibilities’ (2013) 12 Chinese Journal of International Law 43.  
508 French proposal, Working Paper on Article 23, A/Conf.183/C.1/WGGP/L.5/Rev.2, 3 July 1998, 
para 5-6. 
509 Whether this is an appropriate aim for the ICC and ICL is disputed in the literature. The ICC 
does not see addressing the underlying causes of conflict as being part of its role, OTP, Policy 
Paper on the Interests of Justice, September 2007, 9. 
510 van der Wilt, ‘Corporate Criminal Responsibility’ (n 419).  
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The Prosecutor’s proprio motu investigations are the least represented before the ICC as 
only three of the ten international court situations are a result of such investigations. 
Still, this does not mean the ICC is failing in terms of accountability as there may be no 
need for the Prosecutor to use this power if the other methods of gaining jurisdiction are 
utilised. In addition, the Prosecutor’s powers are curtailed as only information received 
that relates to member states is admissible. Furthermore, as the OTP has limited 
capacity consideration of the available resources and other admissibility criteria will 
need to be explored beforehand.511  
 
A UNSC referral pursuant to Chapter VII can potentially mitigate the limitations of 
proprio motu investigations over non-member states,512 as happened with both Sudan 
and Libya. Yet, the UNSC is not a reliable organ to address accountability. UNSC 
referrals are hindered by the Permanent Members’ veto powers as seen recently in the 
case of Russia and China vetoing a resolution referring the Syrian situation.513 Questions 
also surround the impartiality of UNSC referrals and the de facto impunity enjoyed by 
the Permanent Members and their allies’ due to the veto power.514 In addition, the lack of 
UNSC follow up has negatively impacted on ICC investigations when states’ lack of 
cooperation is left unchecked. In such instances politics overrides the legal possibilities 
and cases and situations are not investigated.515 
 
An additional problem has been non-states actively undermining the ICC. For example, 
the USA has adopted Status of Force Agreements (SOFAs) with numerous states with the 
sole aim of preventing USA nationals coming before the international court. While the 
                                                        
511 See section 5.3 of this chapter.  
512 Article 13(b) Rome Statute. 
513 UN Press Release, ‘Referral of Syria to International Criminal Court Fails as Negative Votes 
Prevent Security Council from Adopting Draft Resolution’ (22 May 2014) SC/11407. 
<https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11407.doc.htm> accessed 18 December 2017.  
514 Mark Kersten, ‘The Security Council’s Appalling Record of Referring Situations to the ICC’ 
(Justice in Conflict, 23 May 2014) <https://justiceinconflict.org/2014/05/23/the-security-councils-
appalling-record-of-referring-situations-to-the-icc/> accessed 28 June 2017; Ian Black, ‘Russia and 
China veto UN move to refer Syria to international criminal court’ (The Guardian, 22 May 2014) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/22/russia-china-veto-un-draft-resolution-refer-
syria-international-criminal-court> accessed 28 June 2017. 
515 See Mark Kersten, ‘Between justice and politics: The ICC’s intervention in Libya’ in Christian 
De Vos, Sara Kendall and Carsten Stahn (eds), Contested Justice: The Politics and Practice of 
International Criminal Court Interventions (CUP 2015); Carsten Stahn, ‘Justice civilisatrice? The 
ICC, post-colonial theory, and faces of ‘the local’ Libya’ in Christian De Vos, Sara Kendall and 
Carsten Stahn (eds), Contested Justice: The Politics and Practice of International Criminal Court 
Interventions (CUP 2015). 
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ICC itself is not to blame for these agreements, the process of how situations and cases 
come before the court has enabled a loophole to be exploited. The impact of which is to 
grant de facto impunity to a category of nationals. 
 
5.1.4 The Crimes under the Rome Statute 
 
The ICC has jurisdiction over the four core crimes under international law: crimes 
against humanity; war crimes; genocide; and aggression.516 During the Rome Conference 
negotiations, there was little debate necessary for agreement to include jurisdiction over 
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. There were concerns over aggression 
and in particular the lack of definition.517 There was no clear scope of the crime, nor was 
it clear who would determine what was and was not an act of aggression.518 Morocco’s 
view that ‘[t]o include the crime of aggression would be premature’,519 turned out to be 
true. The definition was left unresolved and to be agreed at a later date.520  The crime of 
aggression only came into effect in 2017 following ratification by thirty state parties and 
the adoption of a decision by the ASP.521   
 
Despite the ease of agreement over the inclusion of most of the core crimes, many of the 
problems plaguing these crimes and their definitions have been reinforced by the Rome 
Statute. For example, the genocide definition is taken from the Genocide Convention 
which has been criticised for not covering certain groups persecuted during international 
and non-international conflicts.522 Also, the double intention hurdle has to be overcome 
by satisfying both ‘a general intent as to the underlying acts, and an ulterior intent with 
                                                        
516 Article 5 Rome Statute. 
517 See Rome Conference Negotiation Minutes. 
518 Article 39 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI Move to 
background first mention of statute (hereafter UNCh), mandates the UNSC to determine acts of 
aggression. Due to the political nature of a determination and the accompanying repercussions, 
some states were unhappy granting this power to the court without any clearly provided for 
definition.  
519 Morocco Mr Taib, 6th Plenary Meeting (n 193) para 106.  
520 ASP Resolution RC/Res.6 adopted at the 13th plenary meeting, on 11 June 2010 <https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.6-ENG.pdf> accessed 22 December 2017. 
521 ASP, Report on the facilitation on the activation of the jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court over the crime of aggression, 27 November 2017, ICC-ASP/16/24 <https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP16/ICC-ASP-16-24-ENG.pdf> accessed 22 December 2017; ICC Press 
Release, ‘Assembly activates Court’s jurisdiction over crime of aggression’ (15 December 2017) 
ICC-ASP-20171214-PR1350. <https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1350> accessed 22 
December 2017.  
522 Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes (n 312) 246. 
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regard to the ultimate aim of the destruction of the group’.523 As the ICC and states did 
not address these contentious points the Rome Statute has limited potential in the area 
to ensure perpetrators are punished appropriately. This may encourage states to build on 
the genocide convention and ICC jurisprudence and seek alternative definitions from 
other judicial mechanisms more relevant to the requirements of a region or conflict 
situation.  
 
The OTP’s prosecutorial focus, adopted in support of their approach to investigations 
and prosecutions,524 has further reduced the scope of the crimes.  The Prosecutors have 
identified three areas of focus: sexual and gender-based crimes; crimes related to and 
impacting children; and most recently environmental crimes.525 While the OTP does not 
only bring cases related to these areas, placing a particular focus on or privileging three 
specific areas when there are also other types of crimes means the latter are overlooked. 
It would be of less concern if the ICC was adequately supported by national prosecutions 
with a complementary and supplementary focus. However, potential underexplored 
areas become evident from the limited national prosecutions, the very limited number of 
cases before the ICC and the narrowing down of focus and emphasis. 
 
5.1.4.1 Missing Crimes 
 
ICC offences are described as ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole’,526 implying that there are other crimes considered less serious 
which are not appropriately addressed at the international level. Yet, the ICC has 
recognised that certain crimes, beyond its mandate, are likely to simultaneously occur 
contributing to the escalation and continuation of conflicts.527 Whether to include 
crimes such as terrorism, drug-trafficking, crimes against UN and associated personnel 
was discussed prior to and during the Rome Conference negotiations, but proved yet 
                                                        
523 Kai Ambos, ‘What does ‘intent to destroy’ in genocide mean?’ (2009) 91 International Review of 
the Red Cross 833, 834 and footnote 1. 
524 See section 5.2.2 of this chapter.  
525 2012-2015 Strategic Plan, strategic goal; OTP, Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes, 
June 2014 (hereafter 2014 Gender-Based Crimes Policy Paper); 2016-2018 Strategic Plan, strategic 
goal 2; OTP, Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation, 15 September 2016, para 41 
(hereafter 2016 Case Selection Policy Paper); OTP, Policy on Children, November 2016. 
526 Preamble and Article 5(1) Rome Statute. 
527 2016-2018 Strategic Plan, para 30, 93 and 94.  
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another point of contention.528 For example, during the Rome Statute negotiations 
Caribbean states wanted to address the issue of drug trafficking which was of particular 
concern to them.529 This is an area where it is not always possible for national criminal 
systems to assume jurisdiction, as the transnational aspect of such crimes require a cross 
border aspect and cooperation. However, the view adopted was that such matters are 
best left to domestic judicial mechanisms and that their inclusion had the potential to 
weaken the international court and international crimes.530 Nevertheless, the DRC was 
also supportive of a broader scope of crimes, as ‘[t]he Court should have jurisdiction to 
deal with genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity and other offences to be 
defined by the Conference’,531 provided there was consensus amongst those states 
present. In fact, many African states were supportive of the inclusion of treaty crimes, 
albeit not necessarily all the crimes proposed. Some supported terrorism,532 some drug 
trafficking533 and others supported crimes against UN and associated personnel.534  
 
Yet, despite the willingness of some states to include a broad range of crimes, these were 
never included. While recognising the practical reasons for adopting a lowest common 
denominator approach to drafting international treaties,535 many other crimes which are 
linked to the core crimes, or fall short of the threshold, remain unaddressed.536 By not 
including other crimes the ability of the ICC to address such violations, contribute to 
peace and security, and end conflicts and other situations of gross violations decreases.537 
Reducing the impact the ICC has on ICL’s purposes related to deterrence and peace and 
security. Not to mention the limited contribution made to transitional justice. If 
domestic systems do not address these crimes, there will be de facto impunity. A heavy 
reliance on national courts is often misplaced. To date national courts are often errant or 
                                                        
528 Summary of the Proceedings of the Preparatory Committee During the Period 25 March – 12 
April 1996, 7 May 1996, A/AC.249/1, para 12 (hereafter Prep Com Summary). On calls to include 
crimes see Egypt, 9th Plenary Meeting (n 190) para 85; Nigeria, 7th Plenary Meeting (n 189) para 86. 
529 Cassese et al. (n 9) 263. 
530 Prep Com Summary, para 12.  
531 Mr Ruberwa, 7th Plenary Meeting (n 189) para 93. 
532 Algeria, Republic of Congo and Nigeria, Rome Conference Negotiations Minutes. 
533 Algeria, Madagascar, Nigeria, Rome Conference Negotiations Minutes. 
534 Nigeria, Rome Conference Negotiations Minutes. 
535 For a discussion on the effect of adopting a lowest common denominator approach see William 
Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (2nd edn, OUP 
2016) 153.  
536 Section 5.1.2.1 of this chapter.  
537 Chapter 9 of this thesis. 
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incapable of addressing the “lesser” crimes and transnational crimes.538 Furthermore, 
national systems are often incapable of addressing these crimes in conflict and post-
conflict environments when the judiciary and domestic institutions have been 
weakened. 539 
 
The ICC is unlikely to be able to agree on an expansive list of crimes if all states are not 
interested or consider it a crime of concern to the international community.540 By 
contrast, a regional court can take an expanded region-centric approach to the crimes 
under its jurisdiction and attempt to deal with its own specific problems and further the 
aims of ICL and transitional justice. It is unrealistic to expect the international criminal 
court to address region specific issues when its role is to apply universally accepted 
standards and reflect the seriousness of the crimes as considered by the international 
community as a whole. An African regional criminal court could address the narrow 
focus of the ICC’s crimes without questioning the international court’s validity and 
expand the potential for accountability.  
 
 
5.2 Institutional Capacity Limitations 
 
The Rome Statute has created certain jurisdictional limitations that contribute towards 
the need for an African regional criminal court. Alongside this, whether the court’s 
working environment exacerbates the jurisdictional limitations and creates its own need 
for an African regional court will be interrogated. To do this, this section starts with a 
discussion on whether the court’s finances limit accountability and contribute to the 
need for this regional criminal court.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
538 Chapters 3-4 of this thesis. 
539 2016-18 Strategic Plan, 33; OHCHR ‘Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Mapping the 
justice sector’ (United Nations 2006), foreword. 
540 Preamble and Article 5 Rome Statute. On the state-centric nature of ICL which shapes what 
crimes and individuals are pursued, see Sriram and Ross (n 394) 54. 
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5.2.1 Budget Constraints 
 
The calls to fund the court through the UN budget were never adopted to avoid any 
appearance of bias or undue influence.541 Instead, funding is sourced from assessed 
member contributions, UNGA approved UN funds and voluntary contributions. This 
funding structure means contributions are neither guaranteed, adequate nor easily 
responsive to changes in needs.542 For example, during the November 2016 ASP plenary 
meeting a group of states unsuccessfully sought to limit the budget.543 Additionally, the 
voluntary contributions’ income creates uncertainty, negatively impacting on the ability 
of the ICC to plan and respond quickly to new situations and cases.  
 
Additionally, the secrecy surrounding private contributions received raise impartiality 
concerns.544 One of the largest contributors is the European Union (EU),545 which also 
funds pro-ICC organisations such as the Coalition for the International Criminal Court 
(CICC) an NGO which targets individual states and heavily advocates for ICC 
membership. While this alone does not undermine the ICC, the EU’s statement that it 
will not fund the new court through its AU funding does imply a conflict.546 The EU’s 
interests in the international criminal justice project are clear: the EU will not accept any 
perceived challenge or move away from the ICC, a court which certain European states 
                                                        
541 See discussions on funding during the 4th plenary meeting, Tuesday, 16 June 1998, 
A/CONF.183/SR.4. The approach was also adopted because of the USA’s domestic law, which 
prevents funding of the ICC, see Tladi, ‘When Elephants Collide’ (n 7) 394-5. 
542 Jonathan O’Donohue, ‘The 2005 Budget of the International Criminal Court: Contingency, 
Insufficient Funding in Key Areas and the Recurring Question of the Independence of the 
Prosecutor’ (2005) 18(3) Leiden Journal of International Law 591; Lilian Ochieng, ‘ICC 
investigations threatened by budget crisis’ (Daily Nation, 25 November 2013) 
<http://mobile.nation.co.ke/news/International-Criminal-Court-Budget-Cases-Hague/1950946-
2087758-format-xhtml-135ubdkz/index.html> accessed 22 December 2017; Human Rights Watch, 
‘Briefing Note for the Sixteenth Session of the International Criminal Court Assembly of States 
Parties’ (HRW, 20 November 2017) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/11/20/human-rights-watch-
briefing-note-sixteenth-session-international-criminal-court> accessed 22 December 2017. 
543 Elizabeth Evenson and Jonathan O’Donohue, ‘States shouldn’t use ICC budget to interfere with 
its work’ (openDemocracy, 23 November 2016) 
<https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/elizabeth-evenson-jonathan-o-
donohue/states-shouldn-t-use-icc-budget-to-interfere-w> accessed 30 November 2016. 
544 Rome Statute Article 116 permits voluntary contributions from a range of actors including, 
‘Governments, international organizations, individuals, corporations and other entities’. 
545 General Secretariat of the Council, ‘The European Union and the International Criminal Court’ 
(February 2008) 16-7 <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ICC_internet08.pdf> 
accessed 20 June 2017. 
546 Interviews with African State Officials, (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, May – June 2015).   
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do not even consider applicable to themselves.547 This is in direct contrast to the new 
court where EU and other non-African states and businesses may be subject to criminal 
liability.548  
 
5.2.2 Policies and Prosecutorial Approach Under Resource Constraints 
 
As a direct result of the above budget constraints there are limited resources; both 
financial and human. The ICC has been given a challenging mandate and has to do a lot 
with little. The international court has grown exponentially since its establishment, and 
it is questionable whether there will ever be enough staff and/or resources to address all 
admissible situations.  
 
Due to the resource constraints, and the practicality of deploying staff across 
investigations, the OTP adopted a focused investigation and prosecution approach 
where investigative teams looked at specific cases.549 This approach resulted in very few 
cases being brought and many individuals were either overlooked or not prioritised.550 
Furthermore, very little deterrent effect was felt as individuals at lower levels were 
overlooked and investigations and prosecutions were slow. The policy shifted with the 
new Prosecutor to in-depth, open ended investigations while still maintaining focus.551 
As a result, the OTP is more adaptive to information and evidence it finds, increasing the 
likelihood of individuals coming before the court. One of the Prosecutor’s policies is 
‘quality over quantity of cases’,552 a pragmatic strategy given the ICC’s working 
                                                        
547 Rahim Kanani, ‘Kenneth Roth, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, on the State and 
Future of Human Rights Philanthropy and Policy’ (Huffington Post: The World Post, 12 April 2011) 
<https://www.huffingtonpost.com/rahim-kanani/kenneth-roth-executive-di_b_848130.html> 
accessed 30 January 2018; Henry Richardson, ‘African Grievances and the International Criminal 
Court: Issues of African Equity under International Criminal Law’ (2013) Temple University Legal 
Studies Research Paper Series No. 2013-24, 109 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2285474> accessed 27 March 2016. 
548 Chapter 11.1.2 of this thesis.   
549 Susana SáCouto and Kathryn Cleary Thompson, ‘Investigative Management, Strategies, and 
Techniques of the ICC’s OTP’ in Carsten Stahn (ed), The Law and Practice of the International 
Criminal Court (OUP 2015) 335. 
550 K Glassborow, ‘ICC Investigative Strategy Under Fire’ (Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 27 
October 2008) <https://iwpr.net/global-voices/icc-investigative-strategy-under-fire>; E Baylis, 
‘Outsourcing Investigations’ Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2010-20 
(September 2009) 133. 
551 2012-15 Strategic Plan, 6. 
552 2016-18 Strategic Plan, para 5. 
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environment and capacity. However, the overall outcome is that very few cases are 
before the ICC and many accused are still unprosecuted.  
 
The Rome Statue provides for ‘jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole’.553 As the ICC can only deal with so much, the 
strategy is to focus on those who ‘bear the greatest responsibility’,554 significantly 
narrowing the scope of the OTP’s work. Originally, those bearing the greatest 
responsibility included individuals in the ‘highest echelons of responsibility’555 and ‘the 
leaders of the State or organisation allegedly responsible for those crimes’.556 With the 
new prosecutor the approach changed to accommodate the OTP’s experience and 
challenges in achieving this: lower level perpetrators are tried as part of a strategy of 
building cases from the bottom up.557 There is a caveat, only those low-level individuals 
whose ‘conduct was particularly grave and has acquired extensive notoriety' will be 
looked at.558 Other low-level individuals are therefore unlikely to be held accountable.  
 
Despite the intention for national prosecutions to play a role, this reliance is often 
misplaced. In ICC situations national judicial systems are typically weak or either unable 
or unwilling to investigate and prosecute.559 Reliance on national prosecutions to 
supplement the policy approach is a major shortcoming as many individuals are 
effectively granted impunity. While acknowledging the ICC is a court of last resort for 
those bearing the greatest responsibility it is highly improbable, and perhaps impossible, 
for a national court to prosecute all the other offenders. What’s more, the OTP’s 
inconsistent implementation of the policy further hinders its capacity while eroding 
accountability. For example, the ICC cases chosen in Ituri, DRC do not reflect the policy 
as the international court has been unable to pursue those in the ‘highest echelons of 
responsibility’ as had been hoped.560 Additionally, the budgetary limitation means the 
ICC has had to focus and prioritise certain situations and cases over others. In practice, 
this means that there is a gap between what could be and what is looked at. National 
                                                        
553 Preamble Rome Statute.    
554 First Three Years Report, 9. 
555 2009-12 Prosecutorial Strategy, para 19. 
556 2003 Policy Paper, 7.  
557 2012-15 Strategic Plan June 2012-2015, 6. 
558 Ibid. 
559 2016-18 Strategic Plan, 33; OHCHR (n 539) foreword. 
560 Such as Omar al Bashir, Saif Gadaffi, Joseph Kony, Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto. Despite 
the OTP’s 2012 concessions, the bottom up approach is still fundamentally at odds with ending 
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 127
courts are not proving capable of filling this accountability gap and are themselves 
subject to resource and expertise limitations. From the above, it becomes evident that 
the ICC may be lacking in fulfilling ICL’s purpose and the basis for pursuing 
international prosecutions. 
 
5.2.3 Reliance on Cooperation and its Consequences 
 
According to the ICC ‘we would not be able to succeed in our work if we did not have 
cooperation from the states’.561 Although the Rome Statute provides for investigation 
without the situation state’s cooperation,562 the likelihood of a successful investigation 
and prosecution severely decreases. Many situations have government involvement, or 
complicity, and without cooperation and with restricted access to information and 
witnesses the OTP has turned to third party information. With this type of information 
there are always concerns about reliability and the Trial Chamber heavily criticised the 
OTP for its reliance on such information.563 However, the ICC’s lack of cooperation 
should not be overstated as ‘despite all that you hear about the AU and so on, individual 
African countries are cooperating with the ICC’.564 
 
This limitation is not unique to the ICC, UJ prosecutions before domestic courts are also 
capacity dependent on national legislation and state cooperation, which is not always 
forthcoming. State practice shows willingness to cooperate for low-level officials and 
ordinary citizens but not when it comes to high level officials and Heads of State and 
Government, leaving an accountability gap.565  
 
The ICC was designed as an independent judicial system investigating and prosecuting 
individuals, regardless of official position. Yet one of the major stumbling blocks, linked 
to reliance on cooperation, is the international court’s lack of enforcement powers. The 
ICC is completely dependent on states to implement its decisions, comply with arrest 
                                                        
561 Interview with ICC Official (The Hague, The Netherlands, 16 February 2016). 
562 Article 57(3)(d) Rome Statute. 
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warrants and help protect witnesses. The lack of an enforcement mechanism is a nod to 
state sovereignty and the general aversion to an international police or military force.566 
However, the concession negatively impacts on accountability. When states support the 
enforcement of judgments and cooperate, the ICC gets closer to reaching its aim and 
ICL’s rationale. However, some states are unwilling to enforce ICC decisions. This is 
typically in relation to immunity and Heads of State and Government,567 as: 
 
arrest is something else, but in terms of cooperation, receiving 
cooperation from African states, there is nowhere where an African state 
[…] has said, no we wouldn’t cooperate with you. Of course except for 
Kenya, but again, it has not been as pronounced as “no we are not going 
to cooperate”, it has been discreet, it has been delays.568 
 
The effect of this is that some individuals will never come before the ICC or any national 
court. While there is symbolic value in judgments which are not enforced, there is still de 
facto impunity. Without an international police force or willing national government to 
enforce the ICC judgments this will never change and constitutes the reality in which the 
ICC operates.  
 
The ICC is very aware of its limitations. Their admission that security concerns and 
issues of access contribute to decisions regarding which situations to investigate is very 
telling. The lack of any police/military force through which to protect its staff and 
witnesses, enforce judicial decisions and cooperation, or ensure access, negatively 
impacts on its work. This leads to de facto impunity as perpetrators are essentially 
protected by this lack of access and the inability to arrest.569 Additionally, some human 
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rights organisations have expressed concern over the lack of witness protection and 
enforcement powers which may in fact lead to a lack of cooperation.570  
 
 
5.3 Recognition of Space for Additional Accountability Mechanisms 
 
The ICC is a court of last resort and its intervention is rare. While the OTP has 
continually sought to entrench its presence, this has not ended impunity and/or brought 
complete accountability. This raises doubts over the international court’s ability to 
contribute to deterrence and peace and security as aims of ICL. While the Rome Statute 
enumerates a very specific type of court with strict jurisdiction limitations, it does not 
limit future international law developments nor the categorisation of international 
crimes.571 The vast number of international crimes committed and potential perpetrators 
are too profuse for any one institution to cope with.572 Hence, the OTP recognised the 
valuable role others have to play in the fight against impunity with collective responses 
needed as the court ‘can only address a handful of cases’.573 This is linked to the ICC’s 
limited resources, a point that is regularly made, which has shaped OTP policies and 
prosecutorial strategy.574 The fact that the international court has admitted that ‘us as 
the ICC have never claimed monopoly on justice’575 makes it hard to argue against a 
mechanism or initiative broadening accountability in line with international law. 
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The ICC’s acceptance that crimes beyond its mandate are helping to facilitate conflict 
and impact on peace and security576 highlights the need for a mechanism to address this. 
Article 22(3) of the Rome Statute recognises the ability for such conduct to be 
characterised as criminal under international law should states develop a custom or 
establish a treaty.577 This does not exclusively need to happen at the international level. 
Regions can play a role as regional customary law is accepted as law for that region 
only.578 While domestic prosecutions are a logical solution, given the need for cross-
border cooperation, these systems may not be set up to prosecute the crimes or be too 
corrupt to effectively tackle these issues. As the ICC is unlikely to expand its list of 
crimes states can address region specific crimes and accountability through a regional 
mechanism or regional state practice. Given the desire for the inclusion of additional 
crimes during the Rome Conference negotiations, this leaves the option open to those 
states to develop international law and design supporting mechanisms. Thus, both ICC 
member and non-member states can subject themselves to new, non-conflicting, 
principles, obligations and crimes through customary law and/or treaties. 
 
 
5.4 Conclusion  
 
The need for an African regional criminal court is evident from the limited 
accountability mechanism offered by the ICC. This is compounded by the limited crimes 
prosecuted under the Rome Statute that do not address the underlying causes, a fact the 
ICC itself has acknowledged.579 It was never intended that the ICC would deal with all 
international crimes and the budgetary and resource constraints negatively impact on 
what can be pursued. While any other judicial mechanism would also require state 
cooperation, the ICC has managed to secure cooperation in the majority of its work. It is 
only those highly contentious matters of Heads of State and Government and other 
senior state officials’ immunity where cooperation has been severely lacking.  
 
                                                        
576 2016-18 Strategic Plan, para 30. 
577 ‘This article shall not affect the characterization of any conduct as criminal under international 
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579 2007 Policy Paper, 9. 
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There is no one factor reducing the level of accountability before the ICC. Instead 
jurisdictional and institutional capacity limitations play a part. The international court’s 
jurisdiction is hampered by its membership, reliance on UNSC action for non-Member 
States and its limited temporal reach. Furthermore, the ICC is unable to address a 
plethora of crimes yet is expected to contribute to the advancement of peace and 
security. The narrow pursuit of those claimed to bear the greatest responsibility is 
questionable. The policies and practices of the OTP have led to only a select few cases 
being pursued, a lack of a consistent approach, unclear working practices and a potential 
failure to live up to the principles and objectives of ICL and the ICC. African states did 
not expect discriminatory and selective investigations and prosecutions,580 but a court 
which would at least have considered all sides without ignoring the responsibility and 
complicity of other actors in the conflict. But the ICC is constrained in its ability to 
deliver accountability and does not fairly apportion blame to all sides and actors.  
 
Overall, the Rome Statute and OTP policies and practices have contributed to an 
accountability gap, while the international court recognises the role other actors can play 
is an appreciation of the international court’s own limitations and the need for 
additional mechanisms. 
 
  
                                                        
580 Taku (n 496); Plenary meetings, Rome Conference Negotiations Minutes. 
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Chapter 6  
The ICC and Complementarity 
 
 
Given that the previous chapter established how the ICC’s accountability contributes to 
the need for an African regional criminal court, the next step is to investigate whether 
the ICC’s complementarity principle also bears relevance. While the recent UN Ad Hoc 
Tribunals had primacy over national courts581 the ICC does not. Instead, the Rome 
Statute protects sovereignty by ensuring the primary responsibility for prosecuting 
international crimes lies with national courts through the use of the complementarity 
principle.582 As such Article 17 specifies the admissibility criteria to ensure the court is 
one of last resort. The ability of national prosecutions to mitigate the ICC’s 
accountability gap is limited and, as this thesis concluded in Part I, UJ is incapable of 
ending impunity. Applying complementarity, the international and national systems are 
not ‘mutually exclusive, rather the fundamental idea is that the two systems exist 
simultaneously to complete the functions of one another’.583  
 
There is no explicit mention of complementarity, or its meaning, within the Rome 
Statute. Instead its usage was adopted by the Rome Statute negotiators and subsequent 
commentators to explain the relationship norms between the ICC and domestic 
courts.584 Thus, this chapter explores how the principle of complementarity has come to 
                                                        
581 ICTY Statute, Article 9(2), ICTR Statute Article 8(2).  
582 On the development of complementarity as a concept see Mohamed M. El Zeidy ‘The genesis 
of complementarity’ in Carsten Stahn and Mohamed M. El Zeidy (eds.), The International 
Criminal Court and Complementarity: From Theory to Practice (CUP 2014). On the importance of 
state sovereignty within complementarity see Markus Benzing, ‘The Complementarity Regime of 
the International Criminal Court: International Criminal Justice between State Sovereignty and 
the Fight against Impunity’ (2003) 7 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 595; Schabas, 
The International Criminal Commentary (n 535) 447; Sarah Nouwen, Complementarity in the Line 
of Fire: The Catalysing Effect of the International Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan (CUP 2013) 
16 and 409; The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed 
Hussein Ali (Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the 
Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute) ICC-01/09-02/11 (30 May 2011) 
para. 40. 
583 El Zeidy (n 582) 73. 
584 H. Duffy and J Huston, ‘Implementation of the ICC Statute: International Obligations and 
Constitutional Considerations’ in C Kreß and F Lattanzi, The Rome Statute and Domestic Legal 
Orders, Vol 1: General Aspects and Constitutional Issues (Il Sirente 2000) 29. This thesis does 
acknowledge the Rome Statute’s Preambular reference to the court being ‘complementary to 
national criminal jurisdictions’. 
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refer to the admissibility criteria under the Rome Statute, as well as being a policy 
approach.585  
 
To determine whether the ICC’s complementarity contributes to the need for an African 
regional criminal court, this chapter evaluates the legal admissibility criteria and 
associated tests. Subsequently, the OTP’s policy approach to complementarity is 
investigated and finally, which mechanisms and courts fall under ICC complementarity.   
 
 
6.1 Complementarity as an Admissibility Criteria  
 
While Article 17(1) includes gravity and double jeopardy (ne bis in idem) provisions, 
complementarity is provided in Article 17(1)(a) and (b) whereby a case is inadmissible 
before the ICC when: 
 
a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has 
jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to 
carry out the investigation or prosecution; 
b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it 
and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless 
the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State 
genuinely to prosecute 
 
This is not to say Article 17 considerations only occur at this stage as preliminary 
investigations also take Article 17 into account.586 From the above provisions, 
complementarity poses two distinct questions. The first is whether a case has been or is 
being investigated or prosecuted. According to the ICC Appeals Chamber, in order for a 
case to satisfy ‘being investigated or prosecuted’ the ‘national investigation must cover 
the same individual and substantially the same conduct as alleged in the proceedings 
before the Court’.587 This is known as the same conduct same person test, yet the 
                                                        
585 Nouwen (n 582). 
586 Schabas, The International Criminal Court Commentary (n 535) 452. The requirement being for 
Article 17 to be applied in accordance to Article 18 and Rule 55(2) of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence. 
587 The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali 
(Judgment on the appeal of the Republic of Kenya against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 
30 May 2011 entitled ‘Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the 
Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute’) ICC-01/09-01/11 OA (30 
August 2011) para 40. 
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international court has held that the test does not require the national case to be 
identical to that of the ICC.588 Where this is answered in the negative, the state is 
considered to be inactive and the case is admissible.  
 
Following an affirmative answer to Article 17(1)(a) the second complementarity question 
is whether the state is unwilling or unable to prosecute. Article 17(2) provides guidance 
as to when a state should be found unwilling: 
 
a)  The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision 
was made for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from 
criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court 
referred to in article 5; 
b)  There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the 
circumstances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person 
concerned to justice; 
c)  The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently 
or impartially, and they were or are being conducted in a manner which, 
in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person 
concerned to justice. 
 
And Article 17(3) sets out the guidance for determining inability: 
 
In order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court shall 
consider whether, due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability 
of its national judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the accused or 
the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its 
proceedings. 
 
6.1.2 The ‘Same Conduct Same Person’ Test  
 
The requirement that the national investigations and prosecutions must cover the same 
individual and substantially the same conduct is overly restrictive and will be shown to 
go against sovereignty – which Article 17 is meant to protect.589 Many have criticised the 
same conduct same person test590 for ‘impos[ing] structural limits on national 
                                                        
588 The Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (Separate Opinion of Judge Sang-Hyun Song) ICC-01/11-
01/11 OA 4 (21 May 2014); The Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Anita Ušacka) ICC-01/11-01/11 OA 4 (21 May 2014). 
589 Schabas, The International Criminal Court Commentary (n 535); Benzing (n 582).  
590 Kevin Jon Heller, ‘Radical Complementarity’ (2016) 14 Journal of International Criminal Justice 
637; Dov Jacobs, ‘The ICC and Complementarity: A Tale of false promises and Mixed up 
Chameleons’ (Post-Conflict Justice, 11 December 2014) <http://postconflictjustice.com/the-icc-
and-complementarity-a-tale-of-false-promises-and-mixed-up-chameleons/> accessed 6 January 
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proceedings that are inconsistent with the ICC Statute and counterproductive in 
practice’.591 One of the key concerns is the test’s impact on building cases from the 
bottom up - where lower level individuals are investigated in order to gain evidence and 
build a case against higher level individuals. This method proved successful at the 
ICTY592 and the ICC OTP has adopted it.593 Yet, the Pre-Trial Chamber and Appeals 
Chamber rejected the approach when Kenya argued that it was not inactive but 
gathering evidence against top level individuals through a bottom up approach.594 The 
lack of explanation by the Chambers for the decision has rightly been criticised.595 
 
The ‘substantially same conduct’ requirement further, unnecessarily, restricts 
prosecutions at the national level in two ways. In terms of situations under investigation 
before the ICC, a state can challenge admissibility subject to an assessment by the Pre-
Trial Chamber  
 
against certain criteria defining a ‘potential case’ such as: (i) the groups of 
persons involved that are likely to be the focus of an investigation for the 
purpose of shaping the future case(s); and (ii) the crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court allegedly committed during the incidents that 
are likely to be the focus of an investigation for the purpose of shaping 
the future case(s).596 
 
A state seeking to prosecute the crimes will be faced with the challenge of having to wait 
and see which cases the ICC brings and then challenge admissibility, regardless of the 
stigma from the investigation on the state’s reputation.597 Or the state can focus its 
national investigations on the individuals and conduct contained in the OTP’s 
                                                                                                                                                                  
2018. On the criticisms and the admissibility criteria see Rod Rastan, ‘What is ‘Substantially the 
Same Conduct’?: Unpacking the ICC’s ‘First Limb’ Complementarity Jurisprudence’ (2017) 15(1) 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 1. 
591 Heller (n 590) 639-40. 
592 Carla Del Ponte, ‘Investigation and Prosecution of Large-scale Crimes at the International 
Level: The Experience of the ICTY’ (2006) 4 JICJ 545. 
593 2012-15 Strategic Plan, 6. 
594 The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang 
(Application on Behalf of the Government of the Republic of Kenya Pursuant to Art. 19 of the ICC 
Statute, Ruto, Kosgey, and Sang & Muthaura, Kenyatta, and Ali) ICC-01/09-01/11 and ICC-01/09-
02/11, Pre-Trial Chamber II (31 March 2011) para 71. (hereafter Kenya Admissibility Challenge). 
595 Heller (n 590) 644. 
596 Situation in the Republic of Kenya (Corrigendum of the Decision Pursuant to Art. 15 of the 
Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of 
Kenya, Situation in the Republic of Kenya) ICC-01/09, Pre-Trial Chamber II (31 March 2010) para 
50. (Kenya Article 15 Decision). 
597 Nouwen (n 582) 26. 
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authorisation request. Neither of these options benefit international criminal justice 
because of the resulting inaction while the state waits to see which cases the ICC brings, 
stifling alternative and/or broader approaches.598 The scale of incidents, crimes 
committed and victims are numerous,599 making it hard to predict which individuals the 
ICC will target, especially given the OTPs willingness to target mid-level individuals.600 A 
further disproportionate effect is the implications for poorly resourced states which are 
less able to adapt and adjust to ICC investigations in such a manner. The dilemma is 
either to wait until the ICC has finished or to continue and challenge admissibility per 
case. This is of particular concern in states suffering from underdeveloped or 
compromised judicial systems, and even more so in situations where the conflict is 
ongoing and/or when the domestic system is struggling to function normally.601 Overall, 
there is a narrowing of focus of investigations at the national level, which defeats the 
overall purpose of international criminal justice to end impunity.  
 
At the individual case level, the ‘substantially same conduct’ test fares no better. There 
has been a lack of consistent interpretation as to when a national case ‘sufficiently 
mirrors’ that of the OTP.602 While there was some uncertainty over whether the conduct 
needed to be ‘the same’603 or ‘substantially the same’,604 the Al Senussi decision further 
complicated the matter by calling for comparison of the ‘temporal, geographic and 
                                                        
598 Stahn (n 515) 57; Clarke, Fiction of Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Challenge 
of Legal Pluralism in Sub-Saharan Africa (Cambridge Studies in Law and Society, CUP 2009) 3 and 
13 
599 M. Konforta and M.M. Vajda, ‘The Principle of Complementarity in the Jurisprudence of the 
ICC’ (2014) 3 Zagrebačka Pravna Revija 18. 
600 2012-15 Strategic Plan, 6. 
601 On the value and practicality of pursuing criminal justice in ongoing conflicts see Leslie 
Vinjamuri, ‘The ICC and the Politics of Peace and Justice’ in Carsten Stahn (ed), The Law and 
Practice of the International Criminal Court (OUP 2015) 28.  
602 The Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (Judgment on the appeal of Libya against the decision 
of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 31 May 2013 entitled ‘Decision on the admissibility of the case against 
Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi’, Gaddafi and Al-Senussi) ICC-01/11-01/11, Appeals Chamber, (21 May 2014) 
para 73 (hereafter Gaddafi Appeal Judgment). 
603 The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang (Decision on the Application by 
the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Art. 19(2)(b) of 
the Statute, Ruto, Kosgey, and Sang) ICC-01/09-01/11, Pre-Trial Chamber II (30 May 2011) para 55. 
604 The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang (Judgment on the appeal of the 
Republic of Kenya against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 entitled “Decision 
on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case 
Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute”, Muthaura, Kenyatta, and Ali) ICC-01/09-02/11 OA, 
Appeals Chamber (30 August 2011) para 39.  
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material parameters’ of the investigations,605 only for the Appeals Chamber to bring back 
consideration of ‘the degree of overlap […] with the focus being on whether the conduct 
is substantially the same’.606 The practical effect is that domestic prosecutions which are 
not closely aligned to the ICC’s are deemed insufficient on an admissibility challenge, 
which undermines the national system and its pursuit of international criminal justice. 
This limits the deterrent effect of ICL, minimises the contribution to peace and security 
and reconciliation by narrowing the scope of prosecutions and the method through 
which international criminal justice is pursued. Additionally, the ICC is seen to adopt a 
context insensitive understanding to the domestic attempts in direct contrast to the 
approach of TJ. 
 
Two examples clearly highlight this. The first is the ICC’s Lubanga prosecution. Despite 
the local courts charging him with crimes against humanity and genocide, the absence of 
the charge of recruitment of child soldiers led to the ICC finding the case admissible.607 
With the decision the international court nullified the domestic prosecution and any 
chance of the DRC exercising its sovereign right to prosecute Lubanga. The ICC’s 
approach to the Lubanga prosecution has undermined international criminal justice, the 
international court’s role as a mechanism of last resort, and Article 17’s complementarity 
principle. Second is the case against Côte d’Ivoire’s former first lady Simone Gbagbo. In 
March 2015, an Abidjan court held Simone Gbagbo guilty of ‘crimes including disturbing 
the peace, organizing armed gangs and undermining state security’,608 imposing a 
twenty-year sentence. However, the ICC held the OTP’s case against her admissible 
because the national prosecution did not replicate the OTP’s charges.609 Thus, Simone 
Gbagbo is held accountable at the national and international level, which is a needless 
overlap and a waste of already limited resources.610 Given the length of the sentence 
                                                        
605 The Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (Decision on the admissibility of the case against 
Abdullah Al-Senussi, Gaddafi and Al-Senussi) ICC-01/11-01/11, Pre-Trial Chamber I (11 October 
2013) para 75. 
606 Gaddafi Appeal Judgment, para 72. 
607 William Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (3rd edn, CUP 2007) 181-2. 
608Ange Aboa, ‘Ivory Coast jails ex-first lady for 20 years over poll violence’ (Reuters, 10 March 
2015) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ivorycoast-politics-trial/ivory-coast-jails-ex-first-lady-
for-20-years-over-poll-violence-idUSKBN0M60KO20150310> accessed 6 January 2018.  
609 The Prosecutor v. Simone Gbagbo (Judgment on the appeal of Côte d’Ivoire against the decision 
of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 11 December 2014 entitled ‘Decision on Côte d’Ivoire’s challenge to the 
admissibility of the case against Simone Gbagbo’) ICC-02/11-01/12 OA, Appeals Chamber, (27 May 
2015) para 14. 
610 On the ICC’s resource constraints see Chapter 5.2 of this thesis.  
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imposed domestically exceeding that sought by the OTP, questions are raised over what 
is gained by the ICC’s prosecution.611  
 
In conclusion, this admissibility test is overly restrictive forcing national prosecutions 
and investigations to take the same prosecutorial direction as the ICC. Thus, 
complementarity narrows the scope of accountability, limiting the number of cases 
domestically and creating a dependence on the ICC to shape the investigation and 
approach to take.  
 
6.1.3 When is a State ‘Unwilling and Unable’ 
 
While the ‘shielding the person’ element of Article 17(2)(a) has yet to be adjudicated 
before the court,612 what is an unjustified delay (Article 17(2)(b)) has been defined. A 
state will be considered unwilling when an unjustified delay is ‘inconsistent with an 
intent to bring the person concerned to justice’.613 In the Al Senussi decision, the Pre-
Trial Chamber held that ‘Libya has continued progressively to conduct its investigation 
… [and that] a period of less than 18 months between the commencement of the 
investigation […] and the referral of the case […] cannot be considered to constitute an 
unjustified delay’.614 When determining the conduct of the domestic proceedings, as per 
Article 17(2)(c), the court must apply the prescribed limits of Article 17(2) and ‘not one 
that involves an assessment of whether the due process rights of a suspect have been 
breached per se’.615 Instead it should 
 
generally be understood as referring to proceedings which will lead to a 
suspect evading justice, in the sense of not appropriately being tried 
genuinely to establish his or her criminal responsibility, in the equivalent 
of sham proceedings that are concerned with that person’s protection.616 
 
                                                        
611 Heller (n 590) 638. 
612 Schabas, The International Criminal Court Commentary (n 535) 467. 
613 Article 17(2)(a) Rome Statute.  
614 The Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (Decision on the Admissibility of the Case against 
Abdullah Al-Senussi) ICC-01/11-01/11 (13 October 2013) para 227 and 229. 
615 The Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (Judgment on the appeal of Mr Abdullah Al-Senussi 
against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 11 October 2013 entitled “Decision on the 
admissibility of the case against Abdullah Al-Senussi'”) ICC-01/11-01/11-565 (24 July 2014) para 2. 
616 Ibid para 2.  
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The Article 17(2)(a)-(c) guidelines are considered overly complex,617 leaving questions 
unanswered, particularly in relation to what happens when a state is inactive but is 
neither unwilling nor unable. Schabas finds Article 17(2) ‘leads inexorably to the 
conclusion that the issue of unwillingness or inability simply does not arise if there has 
been no investigation or judicial activity at the national level with respect to the case’.618 
The matter then becomes an issue of gravity for admissibility purposes.619 Typically the 
provision is considered to require some sort of judicial activity or investigation, however 
some have argued genuine non-judicial efforts, such as truth and reconciliation 
commissions, are enough to satisfy the complementarity criteria.620 Following the 
Prosecutor’s statements on Darfur that the traditional reconciliation mechanisms are ‘an 
important part of the fabric of reconciliation for Darfur, as recognized in [UNSC] 
resolution 1593 (2005)’,621 the ICC may find truth commissions or similar sincere 
initiatives constitute an investigation and not a genuine unwillingness on behalf of the 
state, but this is unlikely.622 
 
6.1.4. The Gravity Requirement 
 
While not part of complementarity gravity is one of the admissibility criteria of Article 17 
and is in line with the overall aim of the court to prosecute the most serious crimes.623 It 
                                                        
617 Schabas, The International Criminal Court Commentary (n 535) 455. 
618 Ibid. 
619 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga (Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Germain Katanga against 
the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility of the Case) ICC-01/04-
01/07 OA 8 (25 September 2009) para 78; The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo 
(Corrigendum to Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against the decision of 
Trial Chamber III of 24 June 2010 entitled ‘Decision on the Admissibility and Abuse of Process 
Challenges’) ICC-01/05-01/08 OA 3 (19 October 2010) 
para 109. 
620 Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko, ‘The International Criminal Court: Jurisdictional and Related 
Issues’ (1999) 10 CLF 87, 119–20; Michael P. Scharf, ‘The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of 
the International Criminal Court’ (1999) 32 Cornell International Law Journal 507; Carsten Stahn, 
‘Complementarity, Amnesties and Alternative Forms of Justice: Some Interpretative Guidelines 
for the International Criminal Court’ (2005) 3 JICJ 695;  Kai Ambos, ‘The Legal Framework of 
Transitional Justice: A Systematic Study with a Special Focus on the Role of the ICC’ in Kai Ambos 
et al. (eds), Building a Future on Peace and Justice: Studies on Transitional Justice, Peace and 
Development (Springer-Verlag, 2009) 19–103; Anja Seibert-Fohr, ‘The Relevance of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court for Amnesties and Truth Commissions’ (2003) 7 Max 
Planck Yearbook of UN Law 553.  
621 UNSC 5459th Meeting, Wednesday 14 June 2006, UN Doc. S/PV.5459, 3. 
622 Schabas, The International Criminal Court Commentary (n 535) 455. 
623 See n 131.  
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is therefore important to consider how gravity and the OTP policies have impacted on 
complementarity.  
 
When a ‘case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court’624 it is 
inadmissible. Yet, while the court ‘has rejected the application of a high threshold in 
defining gravity’,625 the OTP has taken the opposite approach.626 The gravity threshold 
makes sense to prevent the court being inundated with ‘peripheral complaints involving 
minor offenders, possibly in situations where the major offenders were going free’.627 But 
the actual cases pursued are required to meet an additional test as the OTP only pursues 
the ‘most responsible for the most serious crimes within the situation’.628 However, this 
approach to gravity was not adopted in the OTP’s assessment of the initial cases.629 It 
was only employed by the OTP to justify its one sided prosecutions of the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda630 and similarly in the decision not to pursue an 
investigation into the conduct of UK troops in Iraq.631 The OTP’s insistence that its policy 
of impartiality is not the same as ‘equivalence of blame’ undermines the gravity 
assessment by ignoring half the context of the situation and privileging victims.632 While 
the gravity criteria may allow the ICC to focus on one side of the conflict, the 
prosecutions do not reflect the true extent of the conflict and crimes committed. This 
lack of ‘equivalence of blame’ can explain why only one-sided prosecutions occur in 
relation to Uganda and the DRC.633 The OTP’s approach creates impunity and inaccurate 
perceptions of blame.  
 
 
                                                        
624 Article 17(1)(d) Rome Statute.  
625 The Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana (Separate Opinion of Judge Silvia Fernández de Gurmendi) 
ICC-01/04-01/10 OA 4 (30 May 2012) para 10. 
626 Schabas, The International Criminal Court Commentary (n 535) 462. 
627 ILC, Summary record of the 2330th meeting, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2330, 9 
628 2013 Preliminary Examinations Report, para 66.  
629 Schabas, The International Criminal Court Commentary (n 535) 462. 
630 Statement by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Informal 
meeting of Legal Advisors of Ministries of Foreign Affairs, New York, 24 October 2005, 7; 
Statement by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fourth 
Session of the Assembly of States Parties, 28 November—3 December 2005, The Hague, 28 
November 2005, 2. 
631 Letter of Prosecutor dated 9 February 2006 (Iraq), 8. 
632 2016 Case Selection Policy, para 20. 
633 Phil Clark, ‘Law, Politics and Pragmatism: The ICC and Case Selection in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo and Uganda’ in Nicholas Waddell and Phil Clark (eds), ‘Courting Conflict? 
Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa’ Royal African Society 2008, 42; Otim and Wierda (n 497) 22. 
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6.2 Complementarity as a Policy or Big Idea 
 
In addition to complementarity as an admissibility criteria, complementarity has also 
developed as a big idea or policy, taking a ‘more literal meaning’634 or what the 
Prosecutor has termed positive complementarity.635 Positive complementarity entails the 
promotion of national prosecutions simultaneous to the OTP undertaking preliminary 
examinations and investigations, even while ICC trials are ongoing.636 The Prosecutor 
further saw the potential for negotiating the division of labour between a state’s 
domestic courts and the ICC.637 Complementarity as a big idea, and the division of labour 
advocated for, is shaped by “norm entrepreneurs” and the UNSC members who have 
turned the concept into a political consideration.638 While the OTP and NGOs promote 
implementation of the Rome Statute at the domestic level through an obligation on 
states to prosecute, this is not an Article 17 requirement.639  
 
The OTP approached complementarity in the context of its limited resources, deciding 
to focus on high-level perpetrators, encourage national prosecutions of lower level 
individuals, ‘or work with the international community to ensure the offenders are 
brought to justice by some other means’.640 While the former Prosecutor Ocampo talked 
about positive complementarity from the beginning of his tenure, it was only in 2006 
that the terminology was adopted.641  
 
Since 2007, two years after starting work, the OTP adopted a policy of publicising the 
situations under examination in a bid to encourage national prosecutions.642 However, 
the approach to encouraging domestic cases has shifted. Initially the Prosecutor stated 
his intention for complementarity was to include capacity building through improving 
                                                        
634 Christian M. De Vos, ‘Complementarity in the Line of Fire: The Catalysing Effect of the 
International Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan. By Sarah M.H. Nouwen’ (2014) 84(1) British 
Yearbook of International Law 372. 
635 OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations (DRAFT), 4 October 2010, para 94.  
636 Luis Moreno-Ocampo, ‘A positive approach to complementarity: the impact of the Office of 
the Prosecutor’ in Carsten Stahn and Mohamed M. El Zeidy (eds), The International Criminal 
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national jurisdictions’ ‘efficiency’.643 He has since stated that the ICC is not in a position 
to train lawyers and prosecutors, nor to undertake rule of law reform, as ‘such activities 
belong to other rule of law organisations’.644 Most likely such a response was influenced 
by the ASP’s report on complementarity that: 
 
Positive complementarity refers to all activities/actions whereby national 
jurisdictions are strengthened and enabled to conduct genuine national 
investigations and trials of crimes included in the Rome Statute, without 
involving the Court in capacity building, financial support or technical 
assistance, but instead leaving these actions and activities for the States 
to assist each other on a voluntary basis.645  
 
This is not a position adopted by all commentators. Some argue that the ICC should 
offer material support to fulfil its policy of promoting national prosecutions.646 Given the 
international court’s capacity limitations, the OTPs approach makes sense as states are 
meant to be primarily responsible for prosecutions. Yet, the expertise of the ICC is kept 
in house. Under Article 93(10)(a) the ICC is able to offer assistance in the prosecution of 
international crimes provided it does not affect any future admissibility issues. The 
original approach of the OTP was not to offer direct involvement in capacity building, 
financial or technical assistance.647 After 2012 this was changed to a policy of assisting 
where appropriate in collaboration with others.648 The impact of this is to leave many of 
the states in which the ICC intervenes still unable to address accountability issues.649 
Therefore, only those cases and individuals the ICC considers appropriate to prosecute 
will be addressed. There may be very few national prosecutions, those which do take 
place may fall short of international standards and not reflect the severity of the crimes 
committed or address victim’s concerns. Ultimately, the ICC will not make any impact in 
the long term on the fight against impunity or further TJ aims. 
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649 See the failure of the OTP to effect change due to a lack of partnership and cooperation in the 
DRC as argued by Géraldine Mattioli and Anneke van Woudenberg, ‘Global Catalyst for National 
Prosecutions? The ICC in the Democratic Republic of Congo’ in Nicholas Waddell and Phil Clark 
(eds), ‘Courting Conflict? Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa’ (Royal African Society 2008) 58. 
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Regardless of whether one agrees with this argument, there are concerns with the OTP’s 
positive complementarity approach and the lack of promotion of national prosecutions. 
Despite the OTP and the Prosecutor’s claimed success of positive complementarity in 
Colombia,650 Georgia651 and Guinea,652 many are in disagreement,653 partly due to the lack 
of empirical data and research to back up these claims.  
 
The initial self-referrals also cast doubt over the ICC encouraging domestic prosecutions. 
While Article 13 was included for states to self-refer, it was never envisaged to be the 
most utilised method as demonstrated by the lack of attention paid to the provision 
during the negotiations.654 The use of the provision has led to claims of OTP bias and 
manipulation of states to gain a referral. For example, Uganda has ‘one of the most 
proficient and robust [judicial systems] in Africa’ and was willing to prosecute members 
of the LRA.655 However, instead of supporting national prosecutions and developing 
capacity to address the crimes,656 then Prosecutor Ocampo persuaded President 
Museveni to refer the situation.657 The OTP has been accused of prioritising the 
justification of its existence and pursuing a speedy first trial over supporting national 
prosecutions.658 Consequently, the OTP under charged the accused in relation to the 
available evidence and accusations.659 Whether true or not, the perception adds to the 
perceived marginalisation of African states and an undermining of their ownership over 
the process.  
 
                                                        
650 Moreno-Ocampo, ‘A positive approach’ (n 637) 30.  
651 2011 Preliminary Examination Report, 100. 
652 Ibid 102. 
653 Christopher Hall, ‘Positive complementarity in Action’ in Carsten Stahn and Mohamed M. El 
Zeidy (eds), The International Criminal Court and Complementarity: From Theory to Practice (CUP 
2011); William Burke-White, ‘Reframing Positive complementarity: reflections on the first decade 
and insights from the US federal criminal justice system’ in Carsten Stahn and Mohamed M. El 
Zeidy (eds), The International Criminal Court and Complementarity: From Theory to Practice (CUP 
2011). 
654 Rome Conference Negotiation Minutes. 
655 Clark, ‘Chasing Cases’ (n 497) 1202.  
656 Ibid 1190-6. 
657 Clark, ‘Chasing Cases’ (n 497) 1187-8, 1198-9, 1203; Otim and Wierda (n 497) 22; Nouwen (n 582) 
Chapter 3.  
658 William Burke-White, ‘Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and 
National Courts in the Rome System of International Justice’ (2008) 49(1) Harvard International 
Law Journal 53; Nouwen (n 582) 138-142. 
659 M Cherif Bassiouni and Douglass Hansen ‘The Inevitable Practice of the Office of the 
Prosecutor’ (ICC Forum, March 2013) <http://iccforum.com/africa> accessed 21 April 2016. 
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In Ituri, DRC local courts had successfully conducted trials for international crimes. Yet, 
despite having the capacity, willingness and the accused, Lubanga, in custody the OTP 
and ICC ignored this. Instead, the ICC used President Kabila’s claim that the judicial 
system was unable to cope with the prosecution660 to justify the prosecution of Lubanga 
in the Hague. The ICC would subsequently try Lubanga for the recruitment of child 
soldiers as opposed to the crimes against humanity and genocide charges that the 
national prosecutions would have pursued. In this example the ICC actively undermined 
a national prosecution, reflecting the court’s disinterest in sharing prosecutions with 
national institutions.661 Such practice also demonstrates a disregard of the affected state, 
raising questions over the genuineness of international efforts to pursue accountability. 
The ICC appears to have created a system of dependence where a select few 
actors/mechanisms are considered the champions in fighting impunity,662 with the local 
mechanisms being incapable or inadequate for the task.  
 
In addition, the pressure Ocampo placed on African states to refer their respective 
situations appears to have been done at the expense of investigating government officials 
and linked rebel groups who commit crimes. In Uganda, not a single case has been 
brought against any member of the government or military personnel; in the DRC 
situation only opposition rebels are being prosecuted and investigated despite the well 
documented reports of government forces’ crimes;663 and similar approaches have been 
adopted in relation to the Central African Republic (CAR).664 It is highly unlikely 
Ocampo or any other ICC Prosecutor would pressure one of the court’s member states to 
                                                        
660 Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for 
Warrants of Arrest, Article 58, International Criminal Court Pre-Trial Chamber I) ICC-01/04-01/07 
(10 February 2006) 35. 
661 On the removal of jurisdiction from local Ituri courts in the DRC see Clark, ‘Chasing Cases’ (n 
497) 1190-6. Similarly, see the arguments on Libya’s ability to try Saif Gaddafi as presented in 
Manisuli Ssenyonjo, ‘The Rise of the African Union Opposition to the International Criminal 
Court’s Investigations and Prosecutions of African Leaders’ (2013) 13 International Criminal Law 
Review 385, 401-6. 
662 On the development of a heroes/villains narrative in ICL see Tladi, ‘When Elephants Collide’ 
(n 7) 382.  
663 DRC opposition rebels, documented government crimes   Global Centre for the Responsibility 
to Protect, ‘DRC: Populations at Risk - Imminent Risk’ (ReliefWeb, 17 April 2017) 
<http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/drc-populations-risk-imminent-risk-17-
april-2017> accessed 20 June 2017; Mirna Adjami and Guy Mushiata ‘Democratic Republic of 
Congo: Impact of the Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court’, ICTJ Briefing (May 
2010) <http://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-DRC-Impact-ICC-2010-English.pdf> accessed 
20 June 2017. 
664 To date no prosecutions have been brought against individuals linked to either governments 
or state officials.   
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refer the situation if they did not feel the state was in a weak political position. Thus, it is 
likely Ocampo used the political interests of the leaders as a means of inducement.665 
This detracts from the ICC’s independence and perceptions of fairness, while also 
fuelling discontent locally through privileging certain victims, contributing to local 
tensions and making reconciliation difficult. Ultimately, ending impunity, helping the 
effected societies reconcile and promoting peace and security are not achieved, while at 
the same time states lose trust in the ICC.666  
 
 
6.3 Does the ICC have Sole Responsibility 
 
While the ICC is an international institution which has brought many advantages to ICL 
it is not the only response to justice permitted,667 and has ‘never claimed monopoly on 
justice’.668 The ICC has recognised this when considering the interests of justice669 and 
has stated that it considers itself just one possible response and it may in fact be 
‘insufficient’ to address accountability fully.670 It has appreciated that there may be other 
means by which to resolve situations,671 and national and international efforts may be 
combined to come up with a solution.672 While this relates more to the issue of justice 
and its role at the peace and security level - the ICC does not consider it appropriate to 
determine the political aspects of the interests of justice as the international court’s 
mandate is limited to criminal justice only.673 The ICC considers itself merely one 
institution or tool that international criminal justice and justice more broadly can utilise. 
Additionally, the ICC has advocated for a division of labour in addressing 
accountability.674 As the ICC does not consider itself the last word on ICL issues, nor on 
                                                        
665 Valerie Freeland, ‘Rebranding the State: Uganda’s Strategic Use of the International Criminal 
Court’ (2015) 46(2) Development and Change 293; Krever (n 496).  
666 On the importance of trust in international relations see Andrew H. Kydd, Trust and Mistrust 
in International Relations (Princeton University Press 2007). 
667 Chapter 5.3 of this thesis. 
668 Interview with ICC Official (The Hague, The Netherlands, 16 February 2016). 
669 2007 Policy Paper, 7-8. 
670 Ibid 7. 
671 Ibid 8. 
672 2003 Policy Paper, 7.  
673 2007 Policy Paper, 8; 2003 Policy Paper, 7. 
674 2003 Policy Paper, 5. 
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responses to crises and crimes, why should we. Or as Nouwen argues, seeking 
alternatives to the ICC is upholding complementarity.675  
 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
 
The ICC was never intended as a rival to national prosecutions, but rather as a 
complementary court of last resort.676 Pursuant to Article 17, which respects sovereignty, 
national prosecutions are to be encouraged to ultimately help tackle impunity. This was, 
and still is, the preferred approach of the ICC and the institution welcomes 
complementary prosecution efforts.677 However, this expectation has not been met for a 
number of reasons. First, the ‘same person same conduct’ test narrows the focus of 
investigations and prosecutorial efforts as the national focus becomes fixated on 
satisfying the ICC requirements, discouraging independent state action and preventing 
alternative approaches or broader initiatives being implemented. It makes more sense 
for national and ICC investigations to cover as broad a range of perpetrators as possible, 
rather than forcing a particular focus.  
 
Second, the different thresholds of gravity held by the court and OTP have helped justify 
one sided prosecutions in Uganda, the DRC and CAR, and decisions to not pursue cases 
even when no domestic prosecutions are likely.  
 
Third, complementarity as a big idea prevents capacity building while creating a 
dependency due to expertise being kept in house and the strict Article 17 admissibility 
tests. Despite complementarity’s positive aim of encouraging domestic prosecutions, it is 
a highly questionable tactic as national prosecutions have actively been undermined in 
Uganda and the DRC while prioritising the OTP’s own interests. This creates the 
perception that local initiatives are not good enough or incapable of conducting 
prosecutions, further undermining ownership and agency, local reconciliation and 
efforts to improve peace and security.  
 
                                                        
675 Nouwen (n 582) 24.  
676 On the court being a ‘last resort’ see the ICC official website, <https://www.icc-cpi.int/about> 
accessed 30 November 2016. 
677 Interview with ICC Official (The Hague, The Netherlands, 16 February 2016). 
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While there is a clear distinction to be made between complementarity as admissibility 
criteria and policy approach, both have resulted in removing ownership from those 
states the ICC relies on and those most in need of developing their national capability. 
The picture that emerges is of a court which seeks a division of labour, recognising its 
limitations and acknowledging the space for additional mechanisms and initiatives. This 
chapter concludes that there is a need for an African regional court to assist the ICC, 
especially given the lack of genuine encouragement of national prosecutions by the OTP 
and the strict Article 17 interpretation by the ICC judges.  
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Chapter 7  
The Question of African Ownership  
 
 
So far this thesis has ascertained that the structural inequalities within the ICC system 
facilitate a focus on unstable and post conflict situations which tend to be in weaker 
states.678 African states and the AU are not looking to be the ‘controlling authority’ in 
dispensing international criminal justice, instead they seek a form of ownership ‘more 
akin to having a stake in the program’.679 The limited Rome Statute crimes do not 
address the underlying causes of conflict, skewing the accountability narrative, 
narrowing justice and contributing little to peace and security.680 Clarke contends that 
the crimes included in the ICC’s jurisdiction were purposely kept small and narrow in 
focus to minimise the chance of Western states being indicted as, for example, their 
complicity in Africa’s resource conflicts is not within the definitions of the crimes.681 This 
is further exacerbated by the claims that those states with close ties to powerful Western 
states will not be prosecuted.682 
 
Certain self-serving African states have manipulated this double standard to justify their 
withdrawal from the ICC.683  The Gambia’s withdrawal may have been prevented with 
the change in leadership, but it also speaks to a larger issue – ICC and international 
criminal justice double standards undermine the credibility of the international court, its 
independence and its ability to strengthen international criminal justice. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to determine whether the ICC impacts on African states’ 
ownership and how, if at all, this contributes to the need for an African regional criminal 
court. As Chapter 5 and 6 explored accountability and complementarity as part of the 
reasoning for an African regional criminal court, the first half of this chapter investigates 
                                                        
678 Stahn, Justice civilisatrice’ (n 515) 61. 
679 Paul D Williams, ‘Keeping the Peace in Africa: Why “African” Solutions Are Not Enough’ 
(2008) Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs 315. 
680 Clarke, Fiction of Justice (n 598) 3.  
681 Clarke, ‘Is the ICC targeting Africa inappropriately or are there sound reasons and justifications 
for why all of the situations currently under investigation or prosecution happen to be in Africa?’ 
(ICC Forum, March 2013) <http://iccforum.com/africa> accessed 21 April 2017. 
682 Taku (n 496); Ssenyonjo (n 661) 424-7.  
683 The Gambia has used such a claim as one of the reasons for its intended withdrawal, although 
it has since rescinded its intention to withdraw; Krever (n 496).   
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whether these elements also undermine African ownership. The analysis then moves to 
investigate the former Prosecutor’s conduct, whether a contextual approach was adopted 
and whether the AU’s peace and security initiatives have been impacted by the ICC. The 
resulting perceptions of justice will then be set out.  
 
The second half scrutinises the UN and the international community’s role within the 
ICC framework and whether this contributes to the need for an African regional criminal 
court. The UNSC’s handling of the Article 16 deferral requests is the first point of 
analysis. This is followed by an assessment of whether the inequality of the international 
system has been replicated within the ICC structure. Finally, this chapter moves on to 
assess whether the use of the ICC by UNSC members and former African colonial powers 
contribute to the need for an African regional criminal court.  
 
 
7.1 The ICC and African Ownership  
 
7.1.1 The ICC’s Pursuit of Accountability 
 
In Chapter 5 the level of accountability offered by the ICC was concluded to be limited.  
The OTP’s case selection is meant to be representative of the crimes committed and 
suffered by the victims, and later of those affecting the communities.684 While this 
approach makes practical sense given the large numbers of crimes and accused the 
consequence is that certain crimes are unexplored as certain crimes, individuals, victims 
and communities are prioritised over others. The ICC ignored the desires and wishes of 
the local community in Uganda when these were not in line with the court’s strategy or 
those of its donors,685 removing ownership over the process. This raises doubts as to in 
whose name the ICC is pursuing justice, the international community or victims and 
victim communities.686 Additionally, it calls into question any reconciliatory or TJ basis 
for the international court. 
 
                                                        
684 2016 Case Selection Policy Paper, para 45. 
685 Nouwen (n 582) 142. 
686 Section 7.1.4 of this chapter.  
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The OTP’s decision that it is not always necessary to look at both sides of a situation 
does not reflect the true extent of the conflict and crimes committed.687  The ICC has not 
looked into crimes committed by the self-referring governments of CAR, the DRC, or 
Uganda. This removes the agency of unrecognised victims from having their crimes 
acknowledged, from having any ownership role in the process and threatens 
reconciliation and peace and security.  
 
7.1.2 The Principle of Complementarity  
 
The discussion on complementarity in Chapter 6 highlighted a number of points 
impacting on ownership. First, the ‘same person same conduct’ test has resulted in a 
reduction of sovereignty despite the opposite being stated in Article 17’s objective.688 The 
resulting narrow focus on prosecutions has undermined the ability of states to own the 
justice process and their ability to pursue innovative and broader approaches. Second, 
the bad faith of self-referrals by some states enabled the ICC to be manipulated and used 
for the government’s own political interest, preventing any true efforts being undertaken 
locally. Third, complementarity as a policy or big idea results in the ICC keeping its 
expertise in-house while leaving capacity building to other actors, creating a dependency 
on the court. This can only lead to a reduction in ownership as states are not in a 
position to pursue justice nationally or seek help from the institution with expertise.  
 
Yet, the most damaging aspect of complementarity on ownership has been the ICC’s 
undermining of domestic prosecutions. For example, Lubanga had been implicated 
nationally for a large number of crimes across various areas in the DRC, but the 
Prosecutor focused on a relatively small geographical area and a select number of 
crimes,689 simultaneously ignoring the ability of local courts to prosecute. The local 
court’s role was reduced to that of ‘unable’ or not good enough, therefore a genuine 
attempt at claiming ownership over the process was diminished. 
 
                                                        
687 2016 Case Selection Policy Paper, para 20. 
688 Chapter 6.1.2 of this thesis. 
689 Mattioli and van Woudenberg (n 649). Similar concerns have been raised over the 
representative nature of the crimes in the cases of Lubanga, Ongwen and Gbagbo and Blé Goudé, 
see Human Rights Watch, ‘Comments on the Draft Policy Paper’ (n 570) footnote 1. 
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7.1.3 The Role of the Former Prosecutor  
 
The conduct of the first, now former, Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo negatively 
impacted on the perception of the international court. In particular, his perceived bias 
and unequal treatment of states caused tension by replicating the inequalities of the 
international system and reducing ownership.690  
 
Ocampo’s close alignment to Western powers691 and his visibly close relationship with 
the White House – the administration of a non-ICC State – was inappropriate and 
opened the OTP up to claims of undue influence and political bias. His decision and 
dubious reasoning not to open an investigation into the Palestinian flotilla case was due 
to the USA’s and close ally Israel’s interests.692 This was challenged by the Pre-Trial 
Chamber where the matter was taken to be reconsidered.693 The discrepancy between 
the speed at which the flotilla decision was taken and Ocampo’s decision to open an 
investigation into Libya makes it hard to ignore the criticisms of political interference 
and double standards.694  
 
It is not only with regards to the handling of investigations that the ICC has seen fit to 
chastise Ocampo. Following a prejudicial interview with Philippe Sands on the 
prosecution and case against Saif Gaddafi, the Trial Chamber reprimanded the 
‘inappropriate behaviour on the part of the Prosecutor’.695 Furthermore his prejudgment 
of al Bashir’s guilt over charges of genocide is inexcusable as the trial has yet to 
commence.696  
 
Concerns over Ocampo’s conduct is not unique to those African states under 
investigation, many have criticised and queried his management style.697 While African 
                                                        
690 See section 7.2.1 of this chapter.  
691 Ssenyonjo (n 661) 424-5; Krever (n 496). 
692 Ssenyonjo (n 661) 425-6. 
693 See n 503.  
694 Kersten ‘Between justice and politics’ (n 515) 463.  
695 Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Decision on the "OPCD Request for 
authorization to submit observations concerning Guardian Article dated 15 July 2010”) ICC-02/05-
01/09 (13 September 2010) para 6. 
696 Ssenyonjo (n 661) 423-4. 
697 William Wallis, ‘‘Lunch with the FT: Luis Moreno-Ocampo’ (Financial Times, 23 September 
2011) <https://www.ft.com/content/8dce2894-e4fc-11e0-9aa8-00144feabdc0?mhq5j=e1> accessed 
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states have accused Ocampo of targeting Africa, there is the possibility that these states 
are not opposed to the ICC as an institution but rather the Prosecutor’s approach to 
pursuing justice: turning a blind eye to non-African atrocities while securing the 
interests of Western powers.698 In short, replicating international inequalities within the 
ICC system and international criminal justice, at the same time ignoring context.  
  
7.1.4 The Need for a Contextual Approach  
 
Carsten Stahn describes the ICC’s approach as decontextualized, despite requiring local 
buy in.699 According to Stahn, the division between “us” and “them” has resulted in using 
the local in a narrow manner with little concern for long-term impacts and contextual 
knowledge,700 therefore removing any real inclusion of local initiatives and reducing 
ownership. He links this to the fact that international criminal justice usually focuses on 
the ‘crime and perpetrators’ while ignoring social realities.701 This is evidenced by the fact 
crimes committed ‘in the context of protective or military action in foreign states’ are 
excluded,702 and the focus on a few select individuals distorts the reality of the conflict 
and possibly oversimplifies matters.703 Consequently, the court fails to address the 
underlying causes of conflict, preventing the ICC from attaining its aim of fighting 
impunity, promoting deterrence and reconciliation, and contributing to peace and 
security.704 Although, this may not be solely the fault of the court, as ICC advocates also 
have a role in this.705  
 
7.1.5 African Union Peace and Security Initiatives 
 
The ICC’s inability to contribute to peace and security is further undermined by its lack 
of context and insensitivity to the AU’s peace and security agenda and initiatives. As a 
justification for establishing international courts and the pursuit of international 
                                                                                                                                                                  
20 June 2017; Eric Stover, Victor Peskin, Alexa Koenig, Hiding in Plain Sight: The Pursuit of War 
Criminals from Nuremberg to the War on Terror (University of California Press 2016) 289. 
698 Ssenyonjo (n 661) 427; Kersten, ‘Between justice and politics’ (n 515) 474; Krever (n 496). 
699 Stahn, ‘Justice civilisatrice’ (n 515) 50. 
700 Ibid 60. 
701 Ibid 49. 
702 Ibid 61. 
703 Ibid 67-8. For a counter argument see Damaška (n 77). 
704 Clarke, Fiction of Justice (n 598) xviii; Clarke, ‘Is the ICC targeting Africa inappropriately’ (n 
681).  
705 Stahn, ‘Justice civilisatrice’ (n 515) 62. 
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criminal justice is based on the UNSC and improving peace and security, this factor 
cannot be ignored. The AU prioritises peace and security as part of its non-indifference 
policy706 and is mandated to ‘promote peace, security, and stability on the continent’.707 
While the UNSC has primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and 
security,708 the relationship of the UN and regional organisations is unclear. Beyond 
having a role in peace and security regional organisations did not have a clearly defined 
position under the UNCh.709  
 
Tensions have arisen between the UNSC, ICC and African states over situations when 
both the ICC and the AU are undertaking efforts to re-establish peace.710 The cases of 
Sudan and Libya are illustrative of the issue. The ongoing conflict in Darfur, Sudan has 
seen years of AU and UN negotiations, with the ICC gaining jurisdiction through a UNSC 
referral in March 2005.711 While the AU initially had little opposition to ICC presence and 
investigation, following the issuance of the warrant of arrest for President Omar al Bashir 
the AU voiced its objection. Their concern is that as the regional organisation they are 
responsible for peace and security, yet their ongoing endeavours are undermined by the 
ICC’s pursuit against al Bashir.712 A matter which the AU has brought before the UNSC in 
the form of an Article 16 deferral request.713 
 
Libya was, arguably, a more direct attack on and undermining of AU efforts.714 Following 
the February 2011 uprising the AU sent an envoy of prominent African leaders and 
negotiators to Tripoli in an attempt to negotiate peace. However, the North Atlantic 
                                                        
706 On the establishment of the AU and its ideological underpinning, see Chapter 2.1 of this thesis. 
707 Article 3 AUCA. 
708 Article 1(1) UNCh. 
709 Bruno Simma at al. (eds), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (3rd edn, OUP 
2012) 1446. 
710 On whether there should b e a right of referral for all regional bodies to the ICC as a means to 
ensure peace and security are dealt with properly see Phoebe Okowa, ‘The Security Council, the 
African Union and the International Criminal Court: Anatomy of a Problematic Relationship’ in 
Jonas Ebbesson, Maries Jacobsson et al. (eds), International Law and Changing Perceptions of 
Security: Liber Amicorum Said Mahmoudi (Brill Nijhoff 2014) 229. 
711 UNSC Res 1593 (31 March 2005) UN Doc. S/RES/1593. 
712 Interviews with various African State Officials (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, April - June 2015). 
713 Section 7.2.2 of this chapter.  
714 On the handling of the Libya situation and the fall of the Gaddafi regime see M. Cherif 
Bassiouni, ‘The NATO campaign: an analysis of the 2011 Intervention’ in M. Cherif Bassiouni (ed), 
Libya: From Repression to Revolution: A record of Armed Conflict and International Law Violations 
2011-2013 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2013); Kersten ‘Between justice and politics’ (n 515); Dire 
Tladi, ‘Security Council, the use of force and regime change: Libya and Cote d’Ivoire’ (2012) 37 
South African Yearbook of International Law 22. 
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Treaty Organisation (NATO), invoking UNSC Resolution 1972, undertook a bombing 
campaign in the same area despite knowledge of the African groups’ imminent arrival.715 
This was in addition to the rapidly adopted UNSC referral of the situation to the ICC and 
the OTP’s quick uptake of the investigation which side-lined and undermined AU peace 
efforts. To justify the side lining of the AU, the organisation is argued to lack impartiality 
because of Gaddafi’s patronage and investment in multiple African states and the AU.716 
However, the UNSC and NATO members’ also have interests in Libya and dealings with 
the Gaddafi regime.717 Thus, the hypocrisy of the UN and NATO’s claims cannot be 
ignored.   
 
Overall, the ICC undermined AU peace and security efforts in such a manner as to 
negate any ownership of the process and in determining the course of peace, security 
and justice within the continent. This went against one of the most important reasons 
for why the AU was originally set up – to manage peace and security within the 
continent.718 Additionally, it calls in to question whether ICC prosecutions further peace 
and security. 
 
7.1.6 Relative Approaches to Justice 
 
Lastly, the rhetoric and discourse surrounding ICC prosecutions negatively impacts 
ownership. The hero/villain narrative typically adopted places the ICC and its 
proponents as the “heroes”, while those who question, criticise, oppose or don’t 
cooperate are the “villains”.719 This narrative results in the ICC shaping the perception of 
justice and controlling how it should be meted out.  
 
This can clearly be seen when the AU and African States queried the ICC’s approach, 
resulting in their demonization and causing increased tensions with the international 
court. While not excusing the illegal individuals’ conduct, the argument put forward is 
                                                        
715 Imed Lamloum, ‘African mediators in Libya as NATO hits tanks’ (The Age, 10 April 2011) 
<http://www.theage.com.au//breaking-news-world/african-mediators-in-libya-as-nato-hits-
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717 Hugh Roberts, ‘Who Said Gaddafi had to go?’ (2011) 33 London Review of Books 8, 11. 
718 Chapter 2.1 of this thesis. 
719 Tladi, ‘When Elephants Collide’ (n 7) 382; Stahn, ‘Justice civilisatrice’ (n 515) 78. 
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that by utilising this discourse the ICC has prevented discussion on legitimate concerns 
and unfairly demonised states and the AU, focusing on the wrong aspect of the debate. 
Consequently, the international court does not take into account the views of all its 
members, creating a hierarchy, the exact opposite of the intention behind the ICC.  
 
It is not only the court and its advocates that have manipulated perceptions of justice 
but African states themselves.720 All sides have manipulated the concept of justice and 
the ICC’s work resulting in multiple perceptions, making it hard for the court to be fair, 
just and independent.721 Unfortunately, some states have tried to assert ownership by 
utilising the ICC for their own national political interests to retain or gain power. For 
example, Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto manipulated perceptions of the ICC 
investigation in Kenya to assist their chance of winning the national election which in 
turn enabled them to claim immunity.722 Similarly, Sudanese President al Bashir stirred 
up anti-ICC sentiments to ensure his election victory.723 Ugandan President Museveni 
dealt with his opposition and increased his patronage through the ICC’s work.724  
 
 
7.2 The Role of the United Nations  
 
It is clear that the approach of the ICC and the OTP has directly reduced the level of 
ownership of African states, but this is not the fault of the court alone. The use of the 
ICC by the UN system has fundamentally eroded African ownership over the justice 
initiatives. This section considers whether African concerns with the ICC are a direct 
result of UN action and the replication of the international system’s inequality.  
 
 
 
                                                        
720 On the importance of perceptions of justice, how they emerge and their impact see Clarke, 
Fiction of Justice (n 598); Kamari M. Clarke, Abel S. Knottnerus and Eefje de Volder (eds), Africa 
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 156
7.2.1 Replication of Inequality  
 
The direction of international criminal justice is considered by some prominent 
academics to be skewed against certain states and actors.725 As Chuter argues, ‘[t]he great 
myth of international justice (and I do not use that term unkindly) is that the law is the 
same for all, and that context makes no difference’.726 The focus of the ICC on Africa, to 
the detriment of pursuing other situations just as worthy of attention, and the ignoring 
of situations concerning powerful states are examples of the practice leading to this 
belief.727 Yet, the dissatisfaction of African states and the AU goes beyond the ICC,  also 
including continued dissatisfaction with the international governance system of the UN 
and the marginalisation of African views.728 In fact it covers a plethora of 
disappointments and disillusionment with the international order729 including UN 
bodies and institutions such as the Bretton Woods institutions, based on their structure 
and decision-making powers, the actions and decisions taken.730 
 
This inequality is raised as a key factor in the removal or reduction of African ownership 
resulting in states’ dissatisfaction with the ICC and it not living up to expectations.731 The 
long-held African dissatisfaction with the international and UN system has spilled over 
into the work of the ICC due to the UNSC’s interactions with and usage of the court. 
                                                        
725 Richardson (n 547); Charles C. Jalloh, Dapo Akande and Max du Plessis, ‘Assessing the African 
Union Concerns about Article 16 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’ (2011) 4 
African Journal of Legal Studies 5, 8.  
726 Chuter (n 501) 178. 
727 Chapter 5.1.3 of this thesis.  
728 Okowa (n 710); Ibrahim A. Gambari, ‘The Role of Africa in the United Nations’ (2012) 34 
American Foreign Policy Interests 178, 180 <http://www.ncafp.org/ncafp/wp-
content/uploads/2012/10/Gambari-Speech-PDF.pdf> accessed 21 April 2017. 
729 On the marginalisation and inequality within the global order see Immanuel Wallerstein, 
World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction (Duke University Press 2004).  
730 Adebayo Adedeji, ‘An African Perspective on Bretton Woods’ in Mahbub ul Haq, Richard Jolly, 
Paul Streeten, Khadija Haq (eds), The UN and the Bretton Woods Institutions: New Challenges for 
the Twenty-First Century (Palgrave Macmillan 1995); On attempts to recolonise Africa through 
international institutions like the Bretton Woods system see Charles Mubita, ‘Africa: How the 
Bretton Woods Use Aid for Recolonisation’ (New Era, 29 April 2016)  
<http://allafrica.com/stories/201605021156.html> accessed 19 June 2017. Numerous African states 
have called for reform of the UNSC, see Marina Macalhães Barreto Leite Da Silva, ‘United Nations 
Security Council Reform: An African Perspective’ (Accord Conflict Trends: 2015/3, 23 October 
2015) <http://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/united-nations-security-council-reform/>. 
accessed 19 June 2017; UN ‘In UN speech, South African President calls for reform of Security 
Council’ (UN News Centre, 28 September 2015) 
<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=52021#.WUfydhPyveQ> accessed 19 June 2017.  
731 On the ICC’s purpose see Chapters 1.2 and 9 of this thesis. 
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There have been perceived undermining of African initiatives, double standards and 
politicisation of ICC justice in favour of a powerful few and their allies.  
 
Evidence of such African concerns emerged during the court’s negotiation phase. While 
common ground on the overall structure and procedural aspects was easy to find, with 
the majority favouring a separate independent court, conflicting views were held with 
regard to the role of the UNSC and the UNGA. Proposals included no referral role for the 
UNSC,732 a referral role with no veto permitted,733 and referrals in line with the UNSC’s 
mandate.734 African concerns centred on the political nature and manipulation of the 
UNSC and the impact of this on investigations being deferred or obstructed.735 Generally, 
African states preferred that the UNSC’s role was kept to determining acts of aggression 
in line with Chapter VII of the UN Charter (UNCh). Regarding the UNGA, a more minor 
role in terms of procedural aspects was preferred. Sudan however called for the UNGA to 
have ‘a role in punishing war criminals [and] the right to express reservations should also 
have been granted’,736 possibly because the UNGA is less open to manipulation by the 
UNSC’s Permanent Members.  
 
The concerns raised over the UNSC’s role are clearly demonstrated by the treatment of 
the Article 16 deferral requests and the UNSC and Western states’ use of the ICC as a 
foreign policy tool.  
 
7.2.2 Article 16 Deferral Requests 
 
Under Article 16 of the Rome Statute the UNSC has the power to defer an investigation 
or prosecution for twelve months (renewable) and the use of this has led to criticisms 
about the double standards applied.737 From early on, the request of the USA (one of the 
UNSC Permanent Members) to protect non-ICC members peacekeepers from the ICC’s 
                                                        
732 Angola, 8th Plenary Meeting (n 190) para 53, Democratic Republic of Congo, 7th Plenary 
Meeting (n 189) para 93.  
733 Botswana, 8th Plenary Meeting (n 19-) para 66. 
734 Namibia, 4th Plenary Meeting (n 192) para 57. 
735 This criticism re-emerged with the UNSC’s referral of the situation in Darfur, Sudan to the ICC, 
and again with the referral of the situation in Libya.  
736 Sudan Mr Alhadi, 9th Plenary Meeting (n 190) para 78. 
737 Juliet Okoth, ‘Africa, The United Nations Security Council and the International Criminal 
Court: The Question of Deferrals’ in Gerhard Werle, Lovell Fernandez and Moritz Vormbaum 
(eds), Africa and the International Criminal Court (Asser Press 2014) 206.  
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jurisdiction has been renewed yearly,738 providing impunity for such individuals unless 
national courts investigate and prosecute. Such a pre-emptive, broad brush use of Article 
16 is in direct contrast to the Sudan case where an issue of international peace and 
security following a UNSC referral of the situation to the ICC was ignored. 
 
After the arrest warrant for Sudanese President al Bashir was issued African states and 
the AU requested an Article 16 deferral.739 However, the response to such a request was 
lacklustre.740 The UNSC did put the matter on its agenda but did not debate the issue 
beyond the scope of the United Nation Mission in Darfur’s (UNAMID) mandate 
extension,741 resulting in no Article 16 deferral. This poor handling of the request showed 
a disregard for the concerns of the regional organisation mandated to deal with peace 
and security within Africa, as well as being the partner organisation of the UN in tackling 
the conflict in Darfur.742 Furthermore, for the UNSC to not address a matter of peace and 
security, which it is mandated to do, may be seen as the UNSC using the law as and 
when it suits their ‘political objectives’.743 
 
The discarding of the request and ignoring of AU concerns resulted in the regional 
body’s decision to adopt a non-cooperation stance towards the ICC.744 However, not all 
African states supported the decision, but admittedly Chad’s opposition may have been 
motivated by political reasons.745 Furthermore, the impact of this non-cooperation 
decision has only been with regards to the arrest of al Bashir, as the ICC ‘would not be 
able to succeed in [its] work if we did not have cooperation from the [African] states’.746 
 
Disquiet over Article 16 deferrals was made worse by the UNSC’s dismissal of Kenya’s 
request regarding the prosecutions of President Kenyatta and Deputy President Ruto. 
However, unlike the Sudan case, the Kenyan request was discussed. The UNSC 
                                                        
738 Jalloh, Akande and du Plessis (n 725) 16-21. 
739 Decision of the Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, Doc. Assembly/AU/13 (XIII), Addis Ababa, July 1-3, 2009, 8; Communiqué of the 
207th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council at the Level of the Heads of State and 
Government (29 October 2009) Doc. PSC/AHG/COMM.1(CCVII) 5. 
740 Tladi, ‘When Elephants Collide’ (n 7) 390-1; Jalloh, Akande and du Plessis (n 725).  
741 Jalloh, Akande and du Plessis (n 725) 21. 
742 The AU and UN are partners in the United Nations African Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).  
743 Tladi, ‘When Elephants Collide’ (n 7) 397. 
744 Doc. Assembly/AU/13 (XIII) (n 651) 10. 
745 Ssenyonjo (n 661) 390-1.  
746 Interview with ICC Official (The Hague, The Netherlands, 16 February 2016). 
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concluded that it was not permitted to grant the request as the matter was neither an 
Article 16 issue nor a UNSC matter as it did not relate to international peace and 
security.747  
 
The failure of the UNSC to agree to an Article 16 deferral does not demonstrate bias or 
unequal treatment, but the disregarding of legitimate concerns and the failure to 
adequately consider both requests does. This undermining and dismissal of the AU and 
African states’ deferral requests does diminish their ownership in the process before the 
UN institution. It is problematic that the UNSC can consistently renew Article 16 
deferrals when it concerns the USA’s troops but is unwilling to even debate a request 
when it relates to the President of the non-ICC member Sudan. Leaving issues of legality 
to one side,748 the message such a resolution sends in relation to future potential cases 
undermines the purpose and spirit of the Rome Statute and the provision. It also calls 
into question how international courts are perceived to contribute to peace and security, 
if at all, and which organisation’s approach is followed. The ICC was not envisioned as a 
court to hold only non-powerful states to account, but a universal court applicable to all.  
 
Finally, claims that al Bashir’s deferral is sought merely to ensure his impunity749 are 
overstated. An Article 16 deferral applies for a period of 12 months after which the UNSC 
can either renew it or allow the ICC prosecution to continue. At no time did African 
states or the AU call on the UNSC to permanently defer the case, their issue is instead 
the impact of the arrest warrant on their peace efforts and the unnecessary prolonging of 
the conflict.750 As the timing and not the propriety of the arrest warrant and prosecution 
are the issue,751 should it emerge that the deferral is merely being used to protect al 
Bashir, then the UNSC is under no obligation to renew it. Genuine consideration of the 
deferral requests would not detract from the seriousness of the crimes. Instead, it would 
demonstrate the UNSC discharges its Rome Statute obligations in a manner where no 
state’s concerns are privileged. Whereas currently powerful states, such as the USA, are 
afforded protection from non-existent prosecutions and investigations.  
                                                        
747 Tladi, ‘When Elephants Collide’ (n 7) 397. 
748 Robert Cryer, ‘Sudan, Resolution 1593, and International Criminal Justice’ (2006) 19 Leiden 
Journal of International Law, 195–222. 
749 Rowland J V Cole, ‘Africa’s Relationship with the International Criminal Court: More Political 
than Legal’ (2013) 14 Melbourne Journal of International Law 670, 697.  
750 Similar reservations were expressed in relation to the ICC referral over the situation in Libya. 
See Ssenyonjo (n 661) 395. 
751 Jalloh, Akande and du Plessis (n 725) 22. 
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7.2.3 The Politics of UNSC Referrals 
 
UNSC ICC referrals do not necessarily reflect the will of the community of states,752 and 
with the court being used as a foreign policy tool by powerful states UNSC referrals are 
unevenly applied.753 The UNSC’s reasoning behind the referral of the Libya situation has 
been criticised for its use of the ICC.754 The purpose of the referral is claimed to have 
been done to effect regime change by using the ICC as a political negotiation tactic. Such 
arguments appear credible because: the stance of NATO, the ICC and the Transitional 
National Council reflected no place for the Gaddafi regime;755 the OTP initiated an 
investigation uncharacteristically quickly, raising doubts over the Prosecutor’s 
impartiality and his own political motivations;756 and finally, the UNSC did not follow up 
or support the ICC after the overthrow of Gaddafi, indicating a lack of UNSC 
commitment to the prosecutions.757 Similar UNSC inaction is evident in relation to the 
ICC ASP referrals on non-cooperation by ICC members.758 
 
Outside of the UNSC some Western states have used the ICC as a foreign policy tool. 
Both the Mali and Côte d’Ivoire situations have suffered from the influence of a foreign 
government pushing for self-referrals.759 The colonial history of this intervening state 
negatively impacts on the perception of justice.760 This can be seen as a reduction in 
ownership perpetrated by a former colonial master. Additionally, the ability of the 
intervening states to potentially commit international crimes, while subsequently having 
their actions legitimised as the “heroes” for ICC involvement,761 is duplicitous and 
undermines the notion of an independent and fair international court. Thus, it becomes 
harder to argue for deterrence, reconciliation, promotion of peace and security or TJ as 
justification for ICC prosecutions. 
 
                                                        
752 Cole (n 749) 677. 
753 Chuter (n 501) 172. 
754 Bassiouni, ‘The NATO campaign’ (n 714); Kersten ‘Between justice and politics’ (n 515).  
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756 Kersten ‘Between justice and politics (n 515) 463. 
757 Ibid 467. 
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759 Krever (n 496); Schmitt (n 497). 
760 Schmitt (n 497) 138 and 142. 
761 Ibid 138; Stahn, ‘Justice civilisatrice’ (n 515) 61. 
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Overall, the role envisioned for the UNSC was in the interests of justice alone, but it has 
subsequently been manipulated into serving the political self-interest of a few powerful 
states. The handling of the Article 16 deferrals requests, the referral of Libya, and the 
self-referrals of Mali and Côte d’Ivoire are demonstrative of the inequality of the 
international system playing out at the international criminal justice level. This 
undermines African ownership of the processes and reduces agency before the 
institutions by imposing a hierarchy and unequal approach.  
 
 
7.3 Conclusion 
 
The ICC has not fully dispensed impartial justice. Instead, it has an almost exclusively 
African case load which has undermined domestic efforts to pursue justice and does not 
allow for local contexts. The perception created is of an out of touch discriminatory 
court going against regional and national interests. Additionally, the international court 
produces little to no value in promoting peace and security while simultaneously 
ignoring and undermining African efforts to deal with such matters, despite the AU’s 
mandate. Consequently, the ICC’s international criminal justice undermines African 
ownership creating dependencies and, in the long run, hindering the fight against 
impunity.  
 
Chapter 5 and 6 of this thesis identified the limitations of ICC accountability and 
complementarity. Together with the removal of ownership and replication of the 
international system’s inequality, they make the case for an African regional criminal 
court to remedy the shortcomings.  
 
While it is tempting to dismiss African and AU efforts based on previous failures,762 this 
is overly simplistic and disrespectful. Africa lacks capacity, but this does not justify the 
disregard shown by the ICC and UNSC. Placing ownership within the continent will 
reduce dependency on the ICC,763 minimising perceptions of inequality and improving 
                                                        
762 Mba Chidi Nmaju, ‘A Review of the Shortcomings and Consequences of the African Union’s 
Peace Ideals: The Interventions in Libya and Cote D’Ivoire’ (2013) 7 Human Rights and 
International Legal Discourse 112.  
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capacity shortcomings. The continual marginalisation of African states and the double 
standards adopted by the UN and ICC undermines trust, a fundamental for good 
international relations and the smooth operation of institutions. Should Africa lose trust 
in the ICC it will be a result of the international court not living up to expectations, the 
misuse of its judicial power and the reproduction of the international system’s 
deficiencies. 
 
The need for an African regional criminal court is therefore strongly based in the notion 
of claiming back ownership for international criminal justice, enabling regional 
contextualisation, increasing continental capacity and a closer alignment to peace and 
security and the goals of the AU.764 This would move international criminal justice 
towards a TJ approach at the same time as improving the likelihood of ICL living up to 
its rationale and purpose. 
 
  
                                                        
764 On the peace and security goals of the AU see Chapter 2.1 of this thesis.   
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Chapter 8  
The ICC and the Issue of Immunity 
 
 
When examining UJ Chapter 3 concluded that immunity limits which individuals can be 
prosecuted, negatively impacting the fight against impunity. However, the ICC is an 
international court and has explicitly removed immunity as a barrier to prosecution.765 
To assess whether the ICC’s lack of immunity contributes to the need for an African 
regional criminal court, this chapter seeks to answer whether the ICC creates a 
customary law immunity exception for all international courts.  
 
One of the founding principles of international law and international relations is the 
sovereign equality of states.766 When the ICC attempted to prosecute a sitting African 
Head of State (al Bashir) ‘the whole backlash then started from there’767 between Africa 
and the international court as immunity seeks to guarantee sovereign equality.768 
Despite ICC member states waiving immunity before the court,769 only former Heads of 
State and Government have ever been prosecuted before international courts and 
tribunals. Charles Taylor went before the SCSL when he was no longer Liberia’s 
President; Slobodan Milošević was no longer in power when his own country 
surrendered him to the ICTY, making any immunity claim by him mute;770 and Saddam 
Hussein was prosecuted by the Iraqi Special Tribunal after the USA overthrew him, 
although his trial has been heavily criticised for lacking legality and for victor’s justice.771 
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Consequently, no African state or the AU envisioned one of their incumbent leaders 
being brought before the ICC without its consent. 
 
However, under UNSC Resolution 1593 the situation in Darfur, Sudan was referred to the 
ICC and the immunity enjoyed by al Bashir and other senior state officials was 
considered inapplicable.772 While Sudan is not an ICC member state it is a member of the 
UN and, according to UNCh Articles 25 and 103, members will carry out UNSC decisions 
and UNCh obligations take precedence over any other international obligation, 
including customary law.773 Yet Sudan has routinely sought to invoke immunity for al 
Bashir, as has the AU by encouraging its members not to cooperate with the ICC.774 This 
has led to accusations that the AU and Africa states are seeking to protect their leaders 
and promote impunity.775 
 
While it is of course possible that African states may condone al Bashir’s actions and 
seek impunity for him and other leaders who commit atrocities, this thesis argues that it 
is the prosecution of a sitting Head of State or Government, the interpretation of 
immunity under international law and sovereign inequality which is really at stake. As 
the ICC only has jurisdiction over Sudan due to a UNSC referral, Africa’s relationship 
with the UN and the replication of international inequalities, discussed in Chapter 7, has 
to be taken into account, in particular the Article 16 deferral requests. Furthermore, the 
pursuance of the case against Kenyatta and Ruto, even after elected to President and 
Deputy President of Kenya respectively, led to non-cooperation from the member state. 
Consequently, the case was dropped due to lack of cooperation and witness 
tampering.776 Yet, the court’s decision not to require the presence of the accused during 
the trial777 demonstrates recognition of the interference such prosecutions can have on 
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sovereignty and on the day to day running of a country. Most recently, the immunity and 
sovereignty issues arose again in relation to Libya and the attempted prosecution of 
Gaddafi and his son Saif.778 Following the death of Gaddafi, the matter is no longer 
before the ICC or the UNSC.  
 
This position is supported by the fact that African states and the AU are ‘not saying the 
ICC is targeting Africans, they are saying the ICC is targeting African leaders’.779 This is 
an important distinction to make as ‘there was not much of an outcry, even when we 
[the ICC] arrested Gbagbo, there was not much of an outcry that we were targeting him, 
because he was not a leader at that time’.780 Similarities are seen in the objections to UJ 
raised by African states and in relation to Sudan who ‘have been cooperating with us [the 
ICC] initially […] genuine cooperation, we have got an agreement with the Sudanese 
Government for them to assist us with arresting the LRA’.781 It was only when their 
President was indicted that tensions occurred. The issue here appears to be more one of 
interpretation of immunity for Heads of State and Government and the respect of 
sovereignty. How does this interpretation issue contribute to the need for an African 
regional criminal court? This chapter starts by looking at the two categories of immunity 
(functional and personal) and whether this has created interpretation differences.  
 
 
8.1 Immunity Before International Courts and Tribunals 
 
As the number of international courts and tribunals has increased so too has 
consideration of immunity for international crimes. While it is possible to distinguish 
between international criminal mechanisms established by the UN and other treaty-
based institutions, this section deals with them simultaneously to avoid repetition of the 
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issues. As with immunity before domestic courts, there are distinct categories of 
immunity – functional and personal – afforded to the different levels of official.782  
 
8.1.1 Functional Immunity 
 
Functional immunity is not necessarily a barrier to prosecution before foreign domestic 
courts, although whether this is a customary rule or treaty law exception is less clear. For 
a custom to create an exception the three elements of duration and consistency, 
generality of practice, and opinio juris (accepted as law) must be satisfied.783 The 
customary rule exception was first articulated in the ICJ Arrest Warrant judgment and 
then restated in the Certain Immunities case and is typically based on the nature of the 
crime or the nature of the tribunal.784 These two factors will be the focus of this section 
to explore whether it reflects the doctrinal position.  
 
First, the nature of the crime being international in character is repeatedly used as 
justification for removing immunity before international and foreign domestic courts.785 
There is ample state practice for setting aside low-level state officials’ functional 
immunity but less so for more senior officials.786 Arguing that the nature of the crime is 
jus cogens (compelling law) is highly controversial, as even when courts have relied on it 
as part of their reasoning it was to reinforce jurisdiction claims and not as a basis in 
itself.787 Cassese finds functional immunity undermines international criminal justice 
and the Nuremberg trials’ paradigm of the irrelevance of official capacity, which creates 
an international obligation to exercise jurisdiction.788 However, it is unclear why he does 
not distinguish between criminal responsibility and immunity in the analysis. 
Additionally, the creation of an obligation on states to exercise jurisdiction is 
problematic as it is difficult to implement. Cole’s argument that the jus cogens obligation 
has reached customary law status overriding sovereign immunity is based on the ICC 
provisions and international human rights laws’ accountability requirements.789 Yet, it is 
                                                        
782 See Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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785 Chapter 3.3.1 of this thesis. 
786 Cassese et al. (n 9) 241. 
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hard to see how this obligation has reached the status of customary international law,790 
particularly given human rights treaties typically do not impose individual criminal 
responsibility.791 
 
Second is the nature of the tribunal. As the ICJ rightly stated immunity does not equate 
to impunity due to the possibility of an international criminal court having 
jurisdiction.792 Before these judicial mechanisms there is a trend denying functional 
immunity, although it must be noted that these tribunals benefit from provisions 
explicitly addressing immunity. For example, the ICTR Statute Article 6(2), ICTY Statute 
Article 7(2) and SCSL Statute Article 6(2) adopt identical wording whereby ‘[t]he official 
position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or Government or as a 
responsible Government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility 
nor mitigate punishment.’ Consequently, a state official is prevented from using 
immunity as a procedural plea in the proceedings.  
 
Yet, this is not to say there is complete removal of immunity under international law as 
the nature of the tribunal and court has played an important role in the exclusion. The 
UN ad hoc tribunals (ICTY and ICTR) were unique in their being established pursuant to 
UNSC Chapter VII powers, benefitting from the associated binding nature of the 
provisions and ability to disregard international law principles and rules.793 When it 
comes to the other treaty based institutions, like the SCSL and ICC, the immunity 
provisions are only applicable to state parties, those non-state parties who formally 
accept jurisdiction, and those non-state parties referred to the court by a UNSC 
resolution.  
 
Despite the ICJ being unable to find a customary exception for personal immunity it has 
been said there is a functional immunity exception.794 All international criminal courts 
and tribunals have precedent and provisions addressing immunity, supported further by 
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the lack of legal argument challenging the approach to functional immunity. The ICJ 
Arrest Warrant case expressing the possibility of an international court having such 
jurisdiction demonstrates there was an envisioned situation in which immunity was not 
a barrier to proceedings.  The ICTY then took up this role and addressed the matter in 
the Milošević,795 Kristić,796 and Blaškić797 cases, finding a valid immunity exception 
provision. Whereas the ICTR had no challenges to its exercising jurisdiction where 
functional immunity could be argued, similarly the ICC has had little challenge over the 
prosecution of former President Laurent Gbagbo. 
 
The lack of state objection to the above prosecutions, especially Milošević, is used as 
evidence for state acceptance of the immunity exception, but this is unpersuasive. While 
the judicial bodies have found immunity inapplicable, the institutions are limited in 
scope, both geographically and temporally. Thus, the impact of the immunity exception 
is narrow because most states are unlikely to object to the lack of protection when there 
is little to no chance of it applying to them, as such these courts would be perceived as a 
“safe court”.798 The same holds true for the ICC as immunity is waived by state consent, 
ensuring states control before which court and under what circumstances they do not 
have immunity. Taking into account the lengthy negotiations and debate surrounding 
the ICC’s establishment it is impossible to extend this agreement to any subsequent 
international court without explicit state agreement. Additionally, the lack of universal 
membership to the ICC further erodes any claims that states have not objected and 
accepted a customary exception to immunity. Accordingly, the lack of state objection is 
not acquiescence to the creation of a customary exception.  
 
Overall, as customary international law requires opinio juris, the most state practice can 
be said to reflect is the acceptance of an exception to immunity before specific courts 
and tribunals based on either a Chapter VII decision or limited applicability due to a 
bilateral/multilateral treaty. To conclude otherwise would contradict the general 
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798 On the selectivity of justice and the notion of safe courts, see Cryer, Prosecuting International 
Crimes (n 312) 232-238.  
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principles and rules on treaty law, such as Article 34 under the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties (VCLT) which prevents third parties from being bound by treaty 
provisions they are not a party to. Otherwise, it would enable states to do collectively 
what they are not entitled to do individually, therefore despite the Nuremberg trials, the 
ICTY, and SCSL incorrectly finding there is a customary law exception,799 it is more 
accurate to say that there is evidence of such a trend emerging but it has not yet reached 
the status of a custom.800  
 
8.1.2 Personal Immunity 
 
The claim there is ‘customary international law which creates an exception to Heads of 
State immunity’ before international courts801 is not universally accepted.802 As a 
principle of international law states enjoy immunity803 which provides the basis for 
individual immunity for state officials.804 The argument for this customary law exception 
is based on four grounds: the ICJ Arrest Warrant judgment holding that international 
courts may have jurisdiction and are not barred by immunity; functional immunity’s 
rationale lacks applicability before international courts; international practice supports 
the exception; and the prioritisation of human rights through broadening of its 
protection and increased accountability.805  
 
First, relying on the ICJ judgment is problematic. While the DRC’s Minister of Foreign 
Affairs immunity was upheld, there is a lack of clarity as to whether the immunity 
                                                        
799 Cassese et al. (n 9) 242-5. There is an argument that the ICJ implicitly recognises the exception. 
However, it is hard to see how because the court stipulated situations where function immunity is 
possibly inapplicable, not that there is a customary rule exception.  
800 The opposite view is adopted by Cassese which this author finds to be based on normative 
reasoning as opposed to doctrinal. Ibid 245. 
801 The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Decision Pursuant to Article 87(7) of the 
Rome Statute on the Failure by the Republic of Malawi to Comply with the Cooperation Requests 
Issued by the Court with Respect to the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir) 
ICC-02/05-01/09, Pre-Trial Chamber (12 December 2011) para 43 (hereafter Malawi Decision); 
Dapo Akande ‘ICC Issues Detailed Decision on Bashir’s Immunity (…At long last…) But Gets the 
Law Wrong’ EJIL: Talk! (15 December 2011) <http://www.ejiltalk.org/icc-issues-detailed-decision-
on-bashir’s-immunity-at-long-last-but-gets-the-law-wrong/> accessed 14 March 2017; Micaela 
Frulli, ‘Piercing the Veil of Head-of-State Immunity: The Taylor Trial and Beyond’ in Charles 
Chernor Jalloh (ed), The Sierra Leone Special Court and its Legacy (Brill: Nijhoff 2015) 329. 
802 O’Keefe, International Criminal Law (n 333) 545; Cole (n 749) 686. 
803 Yang (n 335) 426; Martin Dixon, Robert McCorquodale and Sarah Williams, Cases & Materials 
on International Law (5th edn, OUP 2011) 304. 
804 Chapter 3.3 of this thesis.  
805 Cassese et al. (n 9) 320-2. 
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discussed by the ICJ was personal or functional.806 The inclusion by the ICJ of a 
jurisdictional condition (that international courts ‘may’ have jurisdiction)807 prevents 
such courts from automatically ignoring an immunity defence. The practice of other 
international courts and tribunals does not support the exclusion either. The ICTY and 
ICTR statutes explicitly prevents immunity from being a procedural barrier,808 as does 
the Rome Statute.809 It is impossible to rely on the ICC provision to support an exception 
claim as the Rome Statute does not apply to all states and uncertainty surrounds its 
applicability to non-state parties.810 The ICC’s Article 27(2) immunity provision has been 
confirmed by the court as a waiver of immunity by its member states and for those states 
accepting the jurisdiction pursuant to an Article 12 declaration.811 
 
Second, the personal immunity of Head of State and Government and senior state 
officials’ is based on state immunity - the prevention of interference and adjudication of 
a state’s actions by another state, and the principle of sovereign equality and good 
relations amongst states.812 International courts may not appear to impact on state 
relations and sovereign equality in the same way as domestic courts813 because they deal 
with vertical not horizontal relationships.814 However, that is illogical as international 
courts ‘are often created by states’815 and to pretend otherwise would permit states to do 
collectively what they are unable to do individually, subverting the underlining rationale 
of immunity.816  
 
Despite the often held assumption that international courts are impartial and 
independent, the reality is politics do play a role. For example, the ICC’s independence 
was queried over the referral of the Sudan situation and the use of the court as a political 
                                                        
806 Tladi, ‘The Immunity Provision’ (n 333) 6. 
807 Dapo Akande, ‘International Law Immunities and the International Criminal Court’ (2004) 
98(3) The American Journal of International Law 407, 418.  
808 Article 7(2) and Article 6(2) respectively.  
809 Article 27(2). 
810 Contrast Akande, ‘International Law Immunities’ (n 807) and Cole (n 749) 687, with Cassese et 
al. (n 9) 324-5. 
811 Malawi Decision, para 18. 
812 Chapter 3.1 of this thesis. 
813 On this argument as made by the ICC, see Ssenyonjo (n 661) 410.  
814 Akande, ‘International Law Immunities’ (n 807) 416; Cassese et al. (n 9) 324-5; Fox and Webb 
(n 328) chapter 2. 
815 Akande ‘ICC Issues Detailed Decision’ (n 801)   
816 Ibid; Akande, ‘International Law Immunities’ (n 807) 418. 
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tool by the UNSC and the international community.817 Additionally, the donor pressure 
placed on Malawi to arrest and surrender al Bashir, should he have attended the 
scheduled AU Summit there, directly resulted in the decision of Malawi to no longer 
host the Summit to avoid addressing the immunity issue.818 It is difficult to claim there is 
no interference when financial aid is used as a political tool to achieve the prosecution of 
a Head of State. While not the action of the international court itself the matter still goes 
to the crux of immunity’s rationale, preventing state interference and protecting 
sovereign equality of states. Furthermore, the ICC, in its concession to excusing 
Kenyatta’s appearance before the court, recognised that its actions can interfere in a 
Head of State discharging his duties.819 
 
Third, the nature of a tribunal as a customary rule exception argument also suffers from 
deficiencies. Relying on the SCSL’s prosecution of Charles Taylor is flawed as the 
judgment has been criticised for incorrectly stating the law and for its inappropriate legal 
justifications.820 While the jurisdiction stemmed from the nature of the court being an 
international tribunal,821 this confused the tribunal’s nature with its legal foundation. 
The SCSL sought to place its establishment within the UNCh Chapter VII framework, 
however the statute is actually a bilateral treaty institution and not a Chapter VII 
court.822 Thus, the SCSL is distinct from the ICTY and ICTR, which were established 
pursuant to a Chapter VII decision. Unlike the SCSL, The ICTY and ICTR’s decisions are 
binding on all UN member states, as per Article 25 UNCh, and the UNSC was able to set 
aside a principle of international law (the immunity of Heads of States and 
Government).823 Nevertheless, the SCSL judges did not rely on the Chapter VII 
framework to deny immunity.  
 
                                                        
817 Lee J. M. Seymour, ‘The ICC and Africa: Rhetoric, Hypocrisy, Management, and Legitimacy’ in 
Kamari M. Clarke, Abel S. Knottnerus and Eefje de Volder (eds), Africa and the ICC: Perceptions of 
Justice (CUP 2016) 119.  
818 Ssenyonjo (n 661) 393. 
819 ICC Press Release, ‘Trial Chamber V(b)’ (n 777).  
820 Micaela Frulli, ‘The Question of Charles Taylor’s Immunity: Still in Search of a Balanced 
Application of Personal Immunities?’ (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1118, 1123. 
821 Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor (Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction) SCSL-2003-01-I 
(31 May 2004) para 49 and 53. 
822 Established by agreement between Sierra Leone and the UN and not with the UNSC. See Frulli, 
‘Charles Taylor’s Immunity’ (n 821) 1124. 
823 O’Keefe, International Criminal Law (n 333) 498; Frulli, ‘Piercing the Veil’ (n 801) 327-8; Frulli, 
‘Charles Taylor’s Immunity (n 821) 1119-1127; Akande, ‘International Law Immunities’ (n 807); for 
an alternative view see Cassese et al. (n 9) 321-2. 
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The ICC, adopting an opposing approach, held a referral of non-state parties by the 
UNSC provides evidence to the customary rules on immunity.824 Such reasoning is 
nonsensical as it is highly questionable whether states such as China, Russia and the USA 
consider their participation in the UNSC referral as accepting all Heads of States’ 
immunity is excluded before the ICC because it is an international court.825 Additional 
arguments for the ability of the ICC to set aside customary international law immunity 
utilise the court’s framework and the primacy of the Rome Statute before that of treaties 
and principles of international law, therefore Article 27(2) applies over any customary 
rule.826 However, the ICC is not part of the UN system, unless related to a UNSC referral, 
and has no ‘superior authority over other international conventions’.827  
 
Further doubts over state practice arise as, despite successful prosecution of certain 
sitting state officials, no incumbent Heads of State and Government or senior state 
officials have ever been successfully prosecuted. As discussed on page 163, Charles 
Taylor, Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milošević were former Heads of State when 
prosecuted. Similarly, before the ICC, Laurent Gbagbo is the former President of Côte 
d’Ivoire. The immunity issue for the international court’s attempted prosecution of an 
incumbent Heads of State (Uhuru Kenyatta) was negated because Kenya is a member 
state and any immunity has been legally waived.828 Regarding non-member states Sudan 
and Libya, the removal of immunity is based on the UNSC’s ability to set it aside as part 
of the referral. While the immunity issue has become moot following Gaddafi’s death, for 
al Bashir it is still highly controversial.829 Consequently, the state practice does not 
support the customary exception to immunity.  
 
It is also impossible to ignore the fact that the ICC is not a universal court as over one 
third of all states are non-members. As customary law requires opinio juris and state 
practice, the non-member states’ conduct together with the limited scope of the ICC and 
its express immunity provision does not satisfy this. Furthermore, this conduct may be 
categorised as a persistent objector as the objection is clear.830 Although in this author’s 
                                                        
824 Malawi Decision, para 43; Akande, ‘The Legal Nature of Security Council Referrals’ (n 773). 
825 Akande ‘ICC Issues Detailed Decision’ (n 801). 
826 O’Keefe, International Criminal Law (n 333) 546. 
827 Fox and Webb (n 328) 562. 
828 The case has subsequently been withdrawn, Kenyatta Withdrawal Decision. On the waiver of 
immunity see the Malawi Decision, para 18. 
829 Cassese et al. (n 9) contrasted with Akande, ‘International Law Immunities’ (n 807). 
830 Crawford (n 295) 28.  
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view it is more than mere persistent objector behaviour and rather a lack of evidence for 
state practice, especially when considering the concept of ‘safe courts’ and the 
accompanying influence of the lack of state objection.831 
 
Finally, it is hard to dismiss the increase in accountability mechanisms and their 
expanding scope, especially given the permanent nature of the ICC. However, while 
international law is broadening the scope of human rights protection and accountability, 
this is not through criminalising conduct but rather by obligating states to suppress such 
conduct. This misunderstanding is explained by Xiaodong Yang as the criminal and 
penal terminology used within human rights conventions creates a false sense of 
individual responsibility, while not acknowledging such treaties impose only state 
liability and the opportunity to pursue civil remedies and compensation.832  
 
The human rights prioritisation seen in Cassese’s argument that upholding immunity 
‘would mean to bow to traditional concerns of the international community (chiefly, 
respect for state sovereignty)’, whilst respecting human rights and justice demands state 
sovereignty be overridden by the international community.833 This is unpersuasive as 
merely arguing the moral justification for a customary rule exception does not make it 
legally true. State practice and the situations in which immunity is removed are not 
trumped by any customary international law or jus cogens norms of human rights.834 
Thus, the fourth and final ground for a customary law exception focuses on a normative 
argument to advance a desirable standard of behaviour while disregarding certain 
doctrinal aspects.835  
 
Overall, the arguments for a personal immunity customary law exception are not 
convincing. There is inadequate duration and consistency of practice and no generality 
of practice or opinio juris.  
 
 
                                                        
831 See section 8.2.1 of this thesis.  
832 Yang (n 335) 427-8. 
833 Cassese et al (n 9) 245-6. 
834 On jus cogens and immunity see Chapter 3.5.2 of this thesis. 
835 On the distinction between normative and doctrinal debates see Tladi, ‘The Immunity 
Provision’ (n 333) 4.  
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8.2 Conclusion 
 
Immunity of Heads of State and Government and state officials has played an important 
role in promoting and securing sovereign equality amongst all states. Yet, the emergence 
of international criminal justice mechanisms has sought to limit immunity’s applicability 
through specific provisions in the constitutive instruments. The ICC has successfully 
removed immunity pursuant to Article 27(2) and Article 98 for member states, non-
member states accepting jurisdiction, and UNSC referred cases, thus offering the 
potential for an all-encompassing level of accountability where no one is outside its 
reach. Consequently, a customary international law exception belief has developed. The 
conclusion of this chapter disputes this on the basis that the conditions required for a 
custom to develop have yet to be met. For functional immunity, neither the nature of the 
crime or the tribunal provides a sufficient argument. Despite the seriousness of 
international crimes, and the all too common involvement of state officials in their 
commission, there is no clear exception to immunity based on the conduct being an 
international crime and the principle of jus cogens. While a trend is evident for such an 
exception emerging this is narrowly confined to specific courts and tribunals.  
 
Furthermore, regarding personal immunity, there is insufficient state practice to support 
the above assertion. While the Arrest Warrant case provides that immunity may be 
exercised by international courts with jurisdiction and thereby preventing impunity, it is 
a conditional and not automatic jurisdiction. Additionally, the rationale underpinning 
immunity stands as politics is inevitably at play within the workings of international 
courts. The nature of the court also fails to have sufficient opinio juris due to the 
unlikeliness of states intending UNSC referrals to reflect acceptance of the removal of 
immunity for all Heads of States before an international court. Finally, despite the 
broadening of human rights protections this is misunderstood as imposing individual 
responsibility instead of the actual state responsibility through suppressing the conduct. 
It may be welcomed from a moral and normative standpoint, but the law has not yet 
developed to such a standard. 
 
The ICC is able to pursue any individual under its jurisdiction regardless of immunity, 
yet has been unsuccessful and there remain a number of individuals outside its scope. 
Basing a customary exception on the nature of the crimes is problematic as it implies 
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other conduct is less serious and subject to immunity. Despite the fact lesser conduct 
facilitates conflicts and the commission of core international crimes immunity would be 
upheld. To date, there is no clear customary law exception to immunity. Given this, an 
African regional criminal court could provide a forum where prosecutions are pursued in 
an equal and fair manner without politics interfering, and help clarify any customary law 
exception while furthering the justifications for establishing international courts.   
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Chapter 9  
The Purpose of the ICC 
 
 
By exploring the various aspects of the ICC framework, practices and policies, this thesis 
concludes that the limitations of accountability, complementarity, ownership and 
immunity contribute to the need for an African regional criminal court. This chapter 
now turns to the purpose of ICL and the ICC to figure out how this contributes to the 
need for an African regional criminal court based on the theoretical foundation and 
justification for international prosecutions and courts. The chapter starts by reflecting on 
the purpose of the ICC before moving to consider how the findings of Chapters 5 to 8 
support the rationale for the ICC and international prosecutions. The final section of the 
chapter draws the above findings together setting out the extent to which there is a need 
for an African regional criminal court based on the role regional courts play.  
 
It may appear counter-intuitive to analyse these purposes at the end of Part II, but to 
illustrate whether the ICC fulfils ICL’s aims, an examination of the international court, 
its practices and policies was first required.  
 
9.1 The ICC’s purpose as evidence of ICL’s rationale 
 
Having considered the meaning of punishment within the contrasting normative 
philosophical approaches justifying its use in Chapter 1, it is now appropriate to consider 
which theories, aims and purposes are put forward by the ICC.  
 
Chapter 1.2 of this thesis established that ICL is grounded in domestic criminal law, IHR 
and IHL theories reflecting naturalism, positivism, moral universalism, liberalism, 
deontological and utilitarian approaches. The background to which has sought to justify 
the establishment of international courts and their accompanying prosecutions and 
punishment on the grounds of: seeking retribution; promoting deterrence; contributing 
to reconciliation; and peace and security. With the emergence of TJ theories, the scope 
of international courts and prosecutions took on additional roles beyond those 
traditionally seen in ICL. This section sets out the enumerated purpose of the ICC to 
gauge which of ICL’s rationale and objectives the international court finds it contributes 
 177
towards. This will be used to analyse to what extent the ICC furthers ICL, enabling an 
assessment of the need for an African regional criminal court. 
 
The ICC adopts the moral right approach to sentencing and finds the objective behind it 
is for retributive and deterrence approaches.836 While reconciliation is not directly 
addressed in terms of punishment, the Trust Fund for Victims is considered by the 
international court as a means by which reconciliation can be achieved.837 The ICC’s 
contribution towards peace and security is reflected in the international court’s 
argument that it contributes to ending conflicts.838 Finally, the TJ aspirations of the 
international court are captured by Christian Rodriguez who finds that the ICC ‘plays an 
important role’ in those states moving towards ‘democratic and human rights norms … 
[through] encouraging the development of domestic judiciaries’.839 However, the ICC’s 
policy approach on positive complementarity calls this into question.  
 
Overall, the main justifications for international courts and prosecutions are enumerated 
in the judgments and work of the ICC. The next section of this chapter questions 
whether the international court has lived up to its purpose and whether this contributes 
to the need for an African regional criminal court.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
836 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, et al. (Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 
of the Statute) ICC-01/0501/13, Trial Chamber VII, (22 March 2017) para 19. Also see fThe 
Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi (Judgment and Sentence) ICC-01/12-01/15 (27 September 
2016) para 67; On deterrence more generally see The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga (Decision on 
Sentence pursuant to article 76 of the Statute) ICC-01/04-01/07-3484-tENG-Corr (23 May 2014) 
para 37-38; The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 
76 of the Statute) ICC-01/05-01/08-3399 (21 June 2016) para 10. 
837 ICC, ‘How the Court Works’ <https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/how-the-court-works> accessed 18 
October 2018. 
838 ICC Press Release ‘Justice plays a “crucial role” in maintaining international peace and security: 
ICC Prosecutor briefs the United Nations Security Council’ (24 October 2014) ICC-OTP-20141024-
PR1055 <https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1055> accessed 31 January 2017. 
839 C Rodriguez, ‘Libya and the International Criminal Court: A Case Study of Shared 
Responsibility’ (2013) 4 People Ideas and Things Journal <http://pitjournal.unc.edu/article/libya-
and-international-criminal-court-case-study-shared-responsibility> accessed 12 October 2018.  
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9.2 The ICC and ICL Rationales in Practice 
 
In this section each of ICL’s rationales for establishing international courts will be taken 
in turn to assess whether the ICC fulfils these stated aims. This will then be used to 
consider whether there is a need for an African regional criminal court. 
 
9.2.1 Retribution 
 
If retribution is understood in line with the ICTY that prosecutions are not pursued for 
revenges sack but as ‘duly expressing the outrage of the international community at 
these crimes’,840 then the ICC is likely to fulfil this purpose. The Trial Chamber expressly 
stating retribution is a purpose in its sentencing appears to comply with the domestic 
criminal law understanding of punishment. However, given the theoretical 
understanding of retribution and the outrage that accompanies the commission of ICC 
offences, this justification will likely always be expressed by any international court. 
There are some concerns over the true extent to which retribution can be relied on 
because of the accompanying societal goals which the ICC, scholars and practitioners 
place on international courts in contradiction to the theoretical understanding.  
 
9.2.2 Deterrence  
 
In order for deterrence to be met the international court needs to demonstrate that 
prosecutions before it are a matter of certainty, have an element of immediacy, the 
punishment imposed is severe and there needs to be comprehensibility of the law 
surrounding the offences.841  
 
Taking each factor in turn shows the limited value of deterrence by the ICC. First, with 
respect to certainty research has shown that deterrence is only effective when 
accompanied by the likelihood of being caught.842 Yet, there is a slim chance of an 
individual being charged by the international court. As we have seen, the ICC’s form of 
accountability limits which individuals and crimes are brought before it and, together 
with the international court’s complementarity approach, the scope of ICL has been 
narrowed. The selective nature of the prosecutions is further reflected in the one-sided 
                                                        
840 Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski (Judgment) ICTY IT-95-14/1-A (24 March 2000) 185.  
841 See Chapter 1.2.2.1.2 of this thesis. 
842 Dunbar and Langdon (n 24) 325. 
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prosecutions, limited ICC membership and the international court’s inability to pursue 
cases against the world’s major powers and their allies.843 This uncertainty is not specific 
to the ICC as the problems are compounded by the specific conflict and temporal 
limitations placed on the ad hoc tribunal and courts’ jurisdiction,844 and the weak 
judicial systems of many states transitioning from a conflict situation to peace.845 
Therefore, a far greater quantity of international crimes are committed than are brought 
before either national or international courts. Until this changes and there is a real 
chance of coming before the ICC, ICL and the ICC will not deter individuals from 
committing crimes.   
 
One of the greatest challenges for the ICC, in terms of certainty, is the lack of an 
international law enforcement system negatively impacting the probability of being 
caught and brought before a court.846 Where a state itself is committing the crimes 
national law enforcement systems are not a viable option. It also may be hard to rely on 
third states to intervene given other international law principles and obligations 
surrounding intervention including the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
 
Immediacy is also sorely lacking. While the ad hoc tribunals took time to be established, 
the ICC has not fared much better due to the admissibility considerations and the ways 
of gaining jurisdiction. The time taken between the court opening its first investigation 
in the DRC in June 2004, the start of the first trial in January 2009 and the reaching of 
the verdict in March 2012 is deeply concerning. This is exacerbated by the fact that 
Thomas Lubanga, the accused, had been in ICC custody since March 2006 despite the 
ability of local courts to prosecute him.847 
 
Furthermore, the severity of punishment under ICL and before the ICC has been called 
into question,848 impacting both retribution and deterrence considerations. Many have 
                                                        
843 Chapter 5.1.3 of this thesis.  
844 Article 1 ICTY Statute; Article 1 ICTR Statute; Article 1 SCSL Statue; Article 1 Statute of the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007) Attachment; and Article 1 Law 
on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers, Law on the Establishment of the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed 
During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (2001) (Cambodia), as amended by 
NS/RKM/1004/006 (Oct. 27, 2004). 
845 2016-18 Strategic Plan, 33; Drumbl, ‘A Hard Look at the Soft theory’ (n 32) 4. 
846 Dunbar and Langdon (n 24) 324. 
847 Chapter 6.1.2 of this thesis. 
848 Drumbl, ‘A Hard Look at the Soft theory’ (n 32) 11. 
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criticised ICL for treating the extraordinary through ordinary means,849 yet the main 
issue of severity of punishment is evidence of less severe and shorter sentences than 
domestically established.850 For example, the ICC imposed a lesser sentence for Simone 
Gbagbo than that of the Cote d’Ivoire national courts for the ordinary crimes she was 
charged with.851 This is not unique to the international court, there was a mismatch 
between the sentences meted out by the ICTR, which does not impose the death penalty, 
with that of the Gacaca courts for which the death penalty is permitted.852 
 
Finally, the comprehensibility of ICL for the average person is questionable and, while a 
complete answer is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is possible to point to factors which 
may influence comprehensibility.853 ICL is concerned with actions which are illegal 
under international law and ideally also under national law. However, this does not take 
into account those situations where the conduct is legal under domestic legislation or 
permitted and/or encouraged through official policies, thereby creating conducive 
environments for such acts to flourish. Additionally, the deterrence theory assumes that 
the perpetrator is tantamount to the common criminal, meaning, the perpetrator is a 
rational but deviant actor. Yet, considering the context in which international crimes are 
committed there is a strong likelihood the perpetrator believes in the moral correctness 
of his actions and therefore may lack remorse. There may also be a permissive societal 
environment and ideological cause which facilitated the commission of the crimes.854 
The perpetrator is unlikely to be a rational actor for deterrent purposes when the 
perpetrator believes what he is doing is permitted or justified and there is no cost.855 
Given the strong evidence that international criminals are not motivated by deviant 
behaviour but rather by political and ideological considerations, or opportunistic, 
deterrence is a hard aim to achieve.856  
                                                        
849 Jens David Ohlin, ‘On the Very Idea of Transitional Justice’ (2007) 8 Whitehead Journal of 
Diplomacy and International Relations 51, 63. 
850 Drumbl, ‘A Hard Look at the Soft theory’ (n 32) 11. 
851 Heller (n 590) 638. 
852 On the consequences for both deterrence and retribution see Damaška (n 77). 
853 On the lack of ICL knowledge and the so the so-called Western-type legal systems and rules in 
Africa see Oko (n 33) 367-8. 
854 Drumbl, ‘A Hard Look at the Soft theory’ (n 32) 8; Klabbers (n 44) 252. 
855 Klabbers (n 44) 264. 
856 Drumbl, ‘A Hard Look at the Soft theory’ (n 32) 8; Klabbers (n 44) 252-3. 
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Overall it is clear that while deterrence is a laudable aim and part of the purpose of ICL 
taken up by the ICC, the reality of its impact is minimal.857 As Jan Klabbers argues, while 
punishment for the sake of punishment may not sit well with our liberal sentiments, 
given the limited deterrent impact of ICL it may be the best justification.858  
 
9.2.3 Reconciliation 
 
While the extent to which a court can contribute to reconciliation is debatable,859 as it is 
a purpose of ICL and a rationale for the ICC there is a need to consider the justification. 
The accountability offered by the international court does little to address reconciliation 
due to the limited number of prosecutions and lack of enforcement powers. The result is 
that many perpetrators of ICC offences remain at large where it is possible for their 
victims to come into routine contact with them. The negative effect of this is used by TJ 
theories to argue for prosecutions and justice to prevent re-traumatisation and the 
return to conflict/lawlessness as a result of impunity.860  
 
In terms of the ICC complementarity, the international court has been limited in its 
ability to promote reconciliation due to the favouring of certain victims and crimes, and 
its strict admissibility requirements preventing alternative methods which could better 
serve reconciliation from being explored.861 Furthermore, the ICC has been unsuccessful 
in encouraging national prosecutions for a number of reasons and in some instances has 
undermined them,862 reducing the international court’s impact on promoting 
reconciliation through prosecutions at the domestic level. 
 
9.2.4 Peace and Security 
 
ICL’s instrumentalist purpose of maintaining peace and security863 is taken up by the ICC 
through the international court’s efforts to help end conflicts. Yet, it is unclear how a 
court can contribute to ending conflicts when it conducts its work in ongoing conflict 
                                                        
857 M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Perspectives on International Criminal Justice’ (2009-10) 50 Virginia 
Journal of International Law 269; Mullins and Rothe (n 44); Fletcher, ‘The Theory of Criminal 
Liability’ (n 17); Klabbers (n 44); Henham (n 23). 
858 Klabbers (n 44) 265. 
859 Chapter 1.2.2.1.1 of this thesis. 
860 See Section 1.2.3 of this chapter. 
861 Chapter 7 of this thesis. 
862 Chapter 7. 
863 On this instrumentalist purpose see Bushnell (n 42).  
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situations. It might actually have the opposite effect of prolonging a conflict or 
sustaining a situation.864  
 
Additionally, there are concerns over how the ICC has been used to undermine the AU’s 
peace and security agenda as well as the UNSC’s use of the international court. While the 
AU gives way to UNSC decisions on the maintenance of peace and security, conflicting 
approaches to peace and security can undermine the legitimacy of the international 
court in this regard. This is seen most clearly in the Libya situation and with the UNSC’s 
lack of engagement with the Article 16 deferral requests and their impact on 
international peace and security.  
 
9.2.5 Transitional Justice  
 
TJ offers a broader approach to the pursuit of justice than ICL as it incorporates more 
than criminal prosecutions.865 However, the analysis undertaken in this section is limited 
to the two dominant approaches as identified in Chapter 1.2.3 of this thesis which 
address TJ and prosecutions: to prevent the re-emergence of lawlessness and/or conflict; 
and the capacity development and the lasting legacy of prosecutions. 
 
The ICC is mandated to pursue those bearing the greatest responsibility for international 
crimes. Yet, as Part II of this thesis has shown the international court has had to adapt 
and pursue lower level individuals than originally envisioned. Additionally, only a small 
number of individuals accused of international crimes have been prosecuted over the 
twenty year existence of the ICC. Therefore, the chances of victims perceiving 
perpetrators are benefiting from impunity is high, especially when there is no 
accompanying national prosecutions or justice initiatives. In spite of this, there is little 
empirical evidence supporting the claim that ICC prosecutions, or a lack thereof, have 
led to the re-emergence of conflicts or lawlessness within the situations under 
investigation. What’s more the ICC has tended to ignore the political and social 
conditions in favour of its own prosecutions, at the expense of local community wishes. 
                                                        
864 Recently, in The Gambia, where then President Yahya Jammeh having conceded defeat in the 
elections, refused to relinquish power due to threats of his prosecution before the ICC. While not 
excusing his holding on to power, the impact of a potential ICC prosecution contributed to 
destabilising the situation. Arguably, if ICL and the ICC are to end conflicts and contribute to 
peace and security, it would have been better for a successful change of leadership before 
threatening/pursuing criminal prosecutions. ‘Showdown in The Gambia’ (n 362); Bosco (n 363).  
865 See Chapter 1.2.3 of this thesis. 
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Prosecutions are argued by Vsuki Nesah as possessing ‘future orientated capacity 
building functions … [and] can constitute a “lasting legacy in the countries 
concerned”’.866 As a permanent court with a limited number of prosecutions it is too 
early to fully judge the ICC’s legacy, particularly as all the situations under investigation 
are ongoing. However, what is clear from Chapters 5 to 7 is that there is no capacity 
development and evidence of a lasting legacy at the national level. Unlike with the SCSL, 
the ICC’s approach to complementarity, both in terms of admissibility and as a policy, 
has undermined domestic efforts at prosecutions, kept the international court’s expertise 
in house, and narrows the focus of investigations through ‘the same person same 
conduct’ test.  
 
Overall section 9.2 of this chapter demonstrates that despite ICL’s numerous 
justifications for establishing international courts and pursuing prosecutions, the ICC 
falls short across all five rationales. Taken together with the international court’s limited 
accountability, context insensitive pursuit of justice, complementarity approach 
prioritising prosecutions in the Hague over encouraging national prosecutions and 
judicial development, and the removal of African state ownership over the justice and 
peace and security agenda, there is an opportunity for an African regional criminal court 
to address these shortcomings.  
 
 
9.3 The Role of Regional Criminal Courts 
 
To date the creation of international courts have been dependent on the UN and the 
priorities of the international community at large. The result being mechanisms which 
do not reflect the reality of the offence committed and the situation on the ground. 
However, should a region develop an accountability mechanism with both ICL and TJ 
elements, a region-centric approach could be adopted. Within such a mechanism, the 
region’s priorities and additional purpose could be included. The benefit of a 
regionalised approach is that it could move accountability from a single state viewpoint 
to a more inclusive regional one taking into account the transboundary and regional 
                                                        
866 Nesah (n 85) 790. 
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impact of the crimes and actors.867 There is also the potential for regional courts to 
address the shortcomings of the ICC to positively contribute to ICL while supporting 
(and developing) the basis for establishing international courts. 
 
 
9.5 Conclusion 
 
The purpose of ICL is to hold individuals accountable, punish as appropriate and 
simultaneously contribute towards international peace and security. The ability of the 
ICC to advance these purposes is questionable. While retribution is easily achieved with 
every successful prosecution, deterrence and reconciliation prove more challenging. In 
terms of deterrence the ICC’s investigations and prosecution’s lack certainty, the time 
taken to bring an investigation to trial reduces the international court’s immediacy, its 
sentencing practice lack severity in comparison to domestic prosecutions for normal 
crimes, and the level of comprehensibility has yet to be fully demonstrated. 
Furthermore, the practice of the OTP and the international court has reduced 
possibilities for reconciliation, while it remains to be seen whether the current ICL 
system can achieve this. As ICL’s aims have expanded what the ICC has to offer has not. 
The international court has not successfully encouraged domestic prosecutions and its 
record shows a one-sided bias due to the case selection and privileging of victims and 
certain crimes. However, the ability to adopt a more transitional justice approach to 
international criminal justice may provide an opportunity to create a regional system 
which promotes and better meets the aims of ICL. This will need to be achieved in a 
different way than that of the ICC which has done little to contribute to TJ in terms of 
fighting impunity at a local level, capacity development and a lasting legacy in the 
situations where the international court intervenes.  
 
The argument advanced in this chapter and throughout Part II is that the ICC suffers 
from numerous shortcoming in terms of its infrastructure, policies and practice, which 
in turn prevent the purpose of international courts and prosecutions from being 
                                                        
867 On why a regional approach to transitional justice is worth looking into, see Amy Ross and 
Chandra Lekha Sriram, ‘Closing Impunity Gaps: Regional transitional justice processes?’ (2013) 
Transitional Justice Review 3. 
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achieved. It is these key features and shortcomings which contribute to the need for an 
African regional criminal court.  
 
Having established there is a need for such a regional court, Part III scrutinises the 
International Criminal Law Section of the African Court of Justice and Human and 
Peoples’ Rights. The aim being to gauge the extent to which the new court will address 
the identified shortcomings of the international system and contribute to ICL.   
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Part III 
Establishing an African Regional Court 
 
 
Part III draws on the conclusions of Part I and II to answer what contribution the ICLS 
might make to international criminal justice. Using the evaluative criteria from Part II 
the chapters in this Part make the case that the new court, established under the Malabo 
Protocol, offers a regional approach to international criminal justice from which Africa 
would benefit. The ICLS is a unique court with wider reaching aims than either the ICC 
or ICL’s original purposes cater for. The new court offers a broader form of 
accountability addressing both crimes and actors which more accurately reflect the 
experience of Africa than the international court does. The continental structure is 
reflected within the complementarity envisioned, which will likely encourage 
prosecutions at the national, (sub)regional, and international level. Chapter 13 argues 
that the opportunity for African ownership to be significantly improved is provided by 
the ICLS provided the new court is situated within the AU framework, specifically, 
within APSA. The final chapter of Part III focuses on the most controversial aspect of the 
new court – the immunity provision. Chapter 14 argues that while the provision is 
unwelcome on a normative level, from a doctrinal perspective it does not violate 
international law. Additionally, the immunity, which is concluded as being personal 
immunity, is not actually the doom and gloom picture that the literature makes out. 
Instead, it appears to be a reflection of African states’ concerns over the erosion of 
sovereignty and the protection the provision offers is confined to a very select few.  
 
Despite the positive picture painted, Part III does raise the weaknesses and challenges 
the adoption of the Malabo Protocol presents to international criminal justice. The AU’s 
institutional weakness are made clear, while the deficiencies in the Protocol’s provisions 
are placed in their context. Overall, Part III argues that the ICLS offers a means through 
which to promote Pan-Africanism and solutions to the international system’s 
shortcomings, although in an imperfect manner.  
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Chapter 10  
The International Criminal Law Section of the African 
Court  
 
 
UJ prosecutions and the ICC are flawed tools for addressing international crimes. 
However, does the AU’s proposed regional criminal court offer solutions to the 
international system’s shortcomings? The first step in answering this question is to 
examine the purpose of the ICLS to establish any similarities with ICL and the ICC. Thus, 
this chapter delves into the aims and objectives set out in the new court’s constitutive 
instrument – the Malabo Protocol. Also considered is whether the AU’s approach to 
justice influences the ICLS’ purpose and how, if at all, this contributes to addressing the 
international system’s shortcomings.  
 
The establishment of the ICLS is alleged to be driven by anti-ICC sentiments,868 but 
interviews conducted with African state and AU officials do not reflect this. Instead four 
key motivations were revealed: the abuse of the UJ principle; the indictments against 
sitting African leaders; the selectivity of ICC justice and African concerns being ignored 
by the international system; and as part of the fight against impunity.869 Also, the 
consultant hired to draft the Malabo Protocol includes the need to create the crime of 
unconstitutional change of government as per the ACDEG.870  
 
The AU’s official decisions and reports show support for the development of 
international criminal justice approaches beyond those available at the international 
level.871 The preference is for a local or regional approach in contrast to the context 
insensitivity of the ICC and other non-African states’ jurisdiction.872 In fact, Egypt felt it 
                                                        
868 du Plessis, ‘A New Regional International Criminal Court’ (n 2) 289. 
869 Interviews with African State and African Union Officials (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, April - June 
2015). 
870 Deya (n 228). See ACDEG Article 25(5), ‘Perpetrators of unconstitutional change of 
government may also be tried before the competent court of the Union’. 
871 EX.CL/478 (XIV) (n 252) 14; AU-EU Expert Report; Progress Report of the Commission on the 
Hissene Habre (n 252). 
872 see Libya and Sudan’s position in the Report of the Meeting of Ministers of Justice and/Or 
Attorneys General on Legal Matters 14 and 15 May 2012, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia Min/Legal/Rpt. 
(part of EX.CL/731 (XXI)) 4. 
 188
was an important development for the African Court to have international criminal 
jurisdiction.873  
 
Whatever the motivation, the Malabo Protocol is an innovative and bold approach as a 
regional criminal court has not been attempted before.874 While the motivations for 
establishing the African Court are multifaceted, if the ICLS is anti-ICC one would expect 
this to be reflected in its purpose, and consequently, on its ability to address the 
international system’s shortcomings.  
 
 
10.1 The ICLS’ Aims and Objectives 
 
The ICC is an independent criminal court, whereas the ICLS is part of the judicial organ 
of the AU. How this structure impacts the new court’s purpose is the first point explored.  
 
Under the AUCA the African Court of Justice (ACJ) is the ‘principal judicial organ of the 
Union’.875 Following the merger of the ACJ with the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR)876 the ACJ was replaced as the AU’s judicial organ by the 
merged African Court of Justice and Human Rights.877 With the Malabo Protocol the 
ICLS was introduced into the merged court, which was renamed the African Court of 
Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Court).  
 
Although the AUCA is silent as to the role of its judicial organ, the Malabo Protocol 
clearly sets out the objectives and the principles meant to guide the African Court’s 
work. The African Court is to play a ‘pivotal role’ in advancing the AU’s institutional aims 
and direction,878 strengthening commitments to peace and security, and ‘promot[ing] 
                                                        
873 Ibid 4. 
874 The European Union has proposed a more limited body, the European Public Prosecutor’s 
Office, to ‘investigate and prosecute EU-fraud and other crimes affecting the Union's financial 
interests’. <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/judicial-cooperation/public-
prosecutor/index_en.htm> accessed 25 June 2017.  
875 Article 2 Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union. Article 5(1)(d) AUCA establishes 
the ACJ as an organ of the Union and Article 18 provides for the Court of Justice’s establishment. 
876 AU Assembly, Assembly/AU/Dec.45 (III) Third Ordinary Session, 6-8 July 2004, Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia; Assembly/AU/Dec.83(V) Fifth Ordinary Session, 4-5 July 2005, Sirte, Libya. 
877 Article 1 Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights.  
878 Preamble Malabo Protocol. 
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justice and human and peoples’ rights’.879 Such purposes are seen in ICL’s justification 
for international courts as a contributor to peace and security and the need to 
strengthen the protection of individual human rights.880 At the same time, ‘the political 
and socio-economic integration and development of the Continent’ is to be promoted.881 
Such a role is unprecedented for an international court and is not envisaged under ICL’s 
original purposes of retribution, deterrence and reconciliation, but is more reflected of 
TJ. The additional new court’s purposes are in contrast to the ICC’s which, as an 
independent court, does not have to reconcile with other organisations’ objectives or 
consider the political integration or socio-economic development of its member states.882 
 
The ICLS acts as a preventative body by complementing ‘national, regional and 
continental bodies and institutions in preventing serious and massive violations of 
human and peoples’ rights’.883 By ensuring accountability and deterring future violations 
the new court is in keeping with ICL’s purpose. But, as this thesis concluded, the ICC’s 
deterrent effect has been minimised by its selective prosecutions.884 Thus, the ICLS will 
need to avoid this as the new court’s ability to deter future crimes is dependent on the 
immediacy and certainty of its prosecutions, the severity of its punishment and the 
comprehensibility of its decisions.885   
 
Like UJ prosecutions and the ICC, the ICLS is to contribute to the AU’s ‘commitment to 
fighting impunity’.886 However, the authenticity of the AU and African states’ 
commitment has been questioned because of the Malabo Protocol’s immunity 
provision.887 Such claims demonstrate an inadequate understanding of the organisation’s 
aims, objectives, programmes and its conceptualisation of justice, reconciliation, peace 
                                                        
879 Ibid. 
880 See Chapter 1.2 of this thesis.  
881 Ibid.  
882 Chapter 9 of this thesis.  
883 Preamble Malabo Protocol. 
884 Chapter 9.2.2 of this thesis.   
885 Ibid.  
886 Preambular para 12, Malabo Protocol. On the AU’s principles see Article 4 of the AUCA, 
particularly Article 4(o). 
887 Simon Alison, ‘AU members decide this week on whether leaders accused of serious crimes by 
the African Court will get immunity’ (ISS Today, 24 June 2014) <https://issafrica.org/iss-
today/think-again-at-the-new-african-court-will-power-mean-impunity> accessed 20 June 2017; 
Interview with African State Official (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 8 May 2015). 
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and security. The genuineness of certain African states to ending impunity may be 
doubted,888 but the Malabo Protocol is not evidence of such.  
 
A more accurate assessment is that, for the AU and its member states, it is a matter of 
timing and not the prosecutions themselves which raise concerns, as seen in the debates 
on al Bashir’s arrest warrant and the referral of Libya to the ICC.889 For the AU, a 
criminal prosecution that ignores the peace and security imperatives should be 
resisted890 as judicial measures can further obscure the dynamics of the varied and 
complex issues surrounding conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction.891 While 
not excusing the inadequate and sometimes stalled efforts of the AU, it should not be 
forgotten that the AU is a young institution still finding its identity. It has to address a 
plethora of justice and peace and security issues with limited capacity and capability. At 
the same time, the organisation is trying to work within the international system 
alongside the often (perceived) marginalisation of their efforts and preferred 
approaches.892  
 
The picture emerging is one of an ICLS intrinsically linked to the AU’s organisational 
aims and objectives.893 Thus, the importance of peace and security, the defence of 
sovereignty and Pan-Africanism cannot be ignored by the new court, as these are 
fundamental to the organisation.894 Yet, these notions do not appear as part of the 
original purposes of ICL or the ICC. Instead, the ICLS has to mix ICL’s purposes with 
those of a political organisation designed to address the multifaceted challenges of 
Africa. It will be up to the new court to reconcile the AU’s institutional objectives with 
ICL’s more traditional ones, particularly in terms of contributing to peace and security. 
 
The fact the AU has linked justice with peace, reconciliation and its internal structure 
entwines politics and the new court. Given that the ICC has been unable to prevent 
politics from creeping into its work, despite claiming to be an apolitical entity, the ICLS 
                                                        
888 Ibid.  
889 See Chapter 7.2.2 of this thesis.  
890 On how the different framing of conflict analysis leads to different approaches see Sarah 
Nouwen, ‘The Importance of Frames: The Diverging Conflict Analyses of The United Nations and 
The African Union’ (2013) 107 Proceedings of the ASIL Annual Meeting 330.  
891 Interview with African State Official (Pretoria, South Africa, 11 November 2015). 
892 Chapter 7 of this thesis. 
893 Articles 3 and 4 AUCA. 
894 Chapter 2.1 of this thesis. 
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as an AU organ adopts a different approach. An acknowledgment of a level of 
politicisation within the pursuit of ICL is reflected in how the AU understands and 
conceptualises justice, the new court and its approach to peace, security and continental 
development. This then enables a different discussion which forces the questions and 
uncertainties raised in Part II over the purpose of ICL and the intended outcomes of 
establishing international criminal courts to be confronted. 
 
 
10.2 African Notions of Justice 
 
The previous section has shown how the ICLS’ placement within an AU organ has 
expanded the new court’s purpose beyond that of the ICC. This section investigates 
whether the AU’s notion of justice impacts the new court’s purpose and addresses the 
international system’s shortcomings.   
 
In developing an approach to justice the AU has produced a number of reports and 
recommendations regarding conflicts and accountability which have been 
institutionalised.895 While no legal obligations are imposed on member states, the 
reports’ value is in their indicating the AU’s preferred approach and concept of justice.  
 
In keeping with current ICL trends, the primary responsibility for prosecution is placed 
on states,896 and in recognition of the ICC’s limitations and in hopes of improving 
‘broader social functions and [to] leave legacies of change in the justice system’ of the 
state.897 
 
The AU’s Pan-African heritage is evident in the justice policies as efforts are made to 
‘entrench African values in international accountability mechanism’.898 But, at no point 
                                                        
895 For example, the Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (hereafter the 
PCRD); Report of the African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur (29 October 2009) 
PSC/AHG/2(CCVII) (hereafter the Mbeki Report); African Union Panel of the Wise, Peace, Justice, 
and Reconciliation in Africa: Opportunities and Challenges in the Fight Against Impunity, (The 
African Union Series, International Peace Institute February 2013) (hereafter the Impunity 
Report); and Draft African Transitional Justice Policy Framework, annexed to Panel of the Wise 
Impunity Report (hereafter the TJPF).  
896 Mbeki Report 245; Impunity Report 18. 
897 Mbeki Report 254.  
898 Impunity Report 63. 
 192
does the organisation seek international criminal justice approaches that do not adhere 
to core international law principles.899 For example, when developing the Policy on Post-
Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) international standards and legal 
norms were included, but African instruments and approaches were given the same level 
of respect and status.  
 
A consequence of the above is the linking of justice to reconciliation, human rights and 
peace. A mirroring of the justifications for the establishment of international courts. 
These objectives are felt to be ‘interconnected, mutually dependent and equally 
desirable’,900 particularly because of the overlapping themes and elements surrounding 
justice and reconciliation.901 The AU’s Panel of the Wise identified that peace, justice and 
reconciliation are considered a manifestation of the peace versus justice dilemma,902 but 
argue that this is based on two incorrect assumptions: that peace processes are narrowly 
viewed as ‘solely about ending conflicts’;903 and that justice is retributive in nature 
permitting ‘prosecution or criminal accountability’ only.904  
 
For the AU, prosecutions do not play an exclusive role in dispensing justice or in post-
conflict situations. Justice is more than merely prosecution because retribution is not the 
overarching goal.905 As Africa was a testing ground for TJ, with both judicial and non-
judicial methods used, African values were expressed and influenced the policy and legal 
approaches adopted.906 Similarly, the ICC has recognised how the responsibility to 
protect doctrine has ‘refocused attention on ways to manage and end impunity’.907  
 
Despite linking justice to peace and reconciliation, the two are not a ‘substitute for 
robust legal measures’, instead prosecutions should complement justice and ‘enhance 
                                                        
899 Impunity Report 3. 
900 Mbeki Report, ‘letter of transmittal’ iv.  
901 This is not the result of a misunderstanding of the concepts but rather the questions asked, 
Mbeki Report 201. 
902 For developments in the debate seen Mark Kersten, ‘Bringing Conflict into the Peace Versus 
Justice Debate’ (Justice in Conflict, 9 December 2014) 
<https://justiceinconflict.org/2014/12/09/bringing-conflict-into-the-peace-versus-justice-debate/> 
accessed 28 June 2017. 
903 Impunity Report 11. 
904 Impunity Report 11. 
905 TJPF 19. 
906 Impunity Report 58.  
907 Impunity Report 63. 
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the prospect of reconciliation’.908 When prosecutions occur they should be at the local, 
regional and international levels.909 Therefore, while accountability is required910 
criminal prosecutions do not play an exclusive role as a wider more encompassing 
process is advocated for,911 including the development of a package of interventions 
related to justice.912 This is something the ICC has been unable to achieve.913 For 
example, the ICC has achieved little in terms of reconciliation in Darfur, Sudan because 
of the ‘dominant discourse on justice and politics in Sudan’914 and the selective number 
of prosecutions.  
 
In light of the AU’s broader concept of justice, accountability and reconciliation need to 
be balanced.915 This requires the root causes of the conflict to be addressed916 helping 
create sustainable peace while advancing justice. The AU considers prosecutions are 
insufficient for dealing with mass violations as the judicial ‘mechanism[s] often only 
satisfies the need of some victims and of directly concerned societies’.917 As the AU’s 
work on peace and security addresses a wider range of actors and issues than 
prosecutions, the Draft African Transitional Justice Policy Framework (TJPF) responds to 
the organisation’s overall objective by determining that prosecutions can be 
supplemented with other measures.918 The effect of which is to tie the work of the ICLS 
into the broader peace and security agenda of the AU. This is in furtherance of the peace 
and security justification for establishing international courts. 
 
Contrary to the ICC’s approach the AU finds it impossible to undertake prosecutions 
during conflicts,919 except in those instances where the spoilers to the situation are 
removed from the conflict or peace process as happened in Yugoslavia.920 The ICC has 
come up against numerous challenges during its investigations in the DRC, impacting 
                                                        
908 Mbeki Report 319. 
909 TJPF 27-29. 
910 Mbeki Report 285. 
911 Mbeki Report para 205.  
912 Mbeki Report 317.  
913 Chapter 5 of this thesis.  
914 Mbeki Report 244.  
915 Mbeki Report introductory note.  
916 TJPF 26. 
917 TJPF 26. 
918 TJPF 26. 
919 Mbeki Report 81.  
920 Impunity Report 11.  
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which cases and situations have been pursued.921 Consequently, there is a need to find 
‘creative ways to address this issue within the limitations of the international law on 
amnesty’.922 Therefore, compliance and the promotion of African perspectives, not 
impunity, is the overall goal of improving criminal justice for the AU.923 
 
Moving beyond the original aims of ICL, the AU adopts a TJ sequencing approach to 
justice. Prosecutions are to be implemented after peace and reconciliation attempts have 
been made. This suggests that while prosecutions can contribute to peace and 
reconciliation they are not the dominant method by which to achieve them. While 
prosecutions may not be possible during the conflict or peace negotiations, 
investigations however should be undertaken.924 At the same time, national and 
international justice initiatives should be included in the ongoing peace talks.925 To 
balance TJ obligations with the AU objectives of ending conflict, restoring public order 
and addressing the ‘underlying causes of the conflict or repression’,926 accountability 
should not be pursued at the expense of sequencing mechanisms.  
 
The AU is not blind to the challenges sequencing brings, instead the trade-offs produced 
are recognised and accepted.927 Whenever justice is at issue a contextual approach is 
needed.928 Unlike the current ICC and ICL approach traditional justice and reconciliation 
mechanisms have a role in ending impunity. However, not for the most serious 
violations as the mechanisms are an inappropriate method, ill-equipped to deal with 
such crimes.929 The inclusion of the traditional mechanisms is part of the AU’s holistic 
strategy930 which views the mechanisms as offering rich possibilities as, by their nature, 
they are close to victims’ groups.931 
 
                                                        
921 Chapter 5.2.3 of this thesis.  
922 Impunity Report 18.  
923 Impunity Report 11.  
924 Mbeki Report 295. 
925 Mbeki Report 295. 
926 TJPF 14-15 lists more objectives. 
927 TJPF 9. 
928 TJPF 24. 
929 Mbeki Report 198. On the traditional method of paying diya in the Sudan context see para 212. 
On the inappropriateness and challenges in using these mechanisms see van der Wilt ‘Universal 
Jurisdiction under Attack’ (n 401) 1063-4. 
930 Impunity Report 25. 
931 Impunity Report 25. 
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Traditional justice and reconciliation mechanisms help the AU move away from purely 
retributive justice and are an important part of the process. Yet, their use is dependent 
on adherence to the African Human and Peoples’ Rights Charter (Banjul Charter) and 
other formal mechanisms.932 Traditional justice mechanisms cannot be used as 
alternatives to formal criminal prosecutions to perpetuate impunity.933 When addressing 
the underlying causes of conflict, the mechanisms are limited to instances where there is 
a link to socio-economic rights and issues.934  
 
A disconcerting trend is the introduction of a retributive character into these 
reconciliation mechanisms to prevent ICC jurisdiction.935 As prosecutions of human 
rights violations are thought to jeopardise reconciliation processes,936 the retributive 
nature negates any reconciliatory value the traditional mechanisms brought to the table, 
while ignoring ICL and TJ’s other purposes. But care needs to be taken when using such 
mechanisms as the ability of tribal leaders to positively contribute to peace is not 
guaranteed.937 Traditional mechanisms are beneficial at the local level, but can pose 
challenges at the national level. In Sudan, the government has been able to manipulate 
the traditional mechanisms for their own political purposes.938 Thus, questions should be 
asked as to whether the mechanisms inadvertently benefit political agendas beyond 
justice and exactly whose justice is being pursued.  
 
In the pursuit of a TJ approach, the AU’s TJPF carves out roles for state and non-state 
actors to create partnerships. National actors lead in the planning, implementing and 
monitoring of TJ process; (sub)regional actors act as guarantors and support national 
actors; continental (AU) actors provide the necessary policy, legislative, technical and 
financial institutional support; and international actors are to partner with the AU, 
                                                        
932 TJPF 19. 
933 TJPF 19 and 26. 
934 TJPF 20. 
935 Ifeonu Eberechi, ‘Who Will Save These Endangered Species? Evaluating the Implications of the 
Principle of Complementarity on the Traditional African Conflict Resolution Mechanisms’ (2012) 
20 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 22, 23. 
936 Brian Walsh, ‘Resolving the Human Rights Violations of a Previous Regime’ (1996) 158(3) 
World Affairs 111 as cited in Lyn Graybill and Kimberly Lanegran, ‘Truth Justice and Reconciliation 
in Africa Issues and Cases’ (2004) 8 African Studies Quarterly 1, 4.  
937 Brian A. Kritz and Jacqueline Wilson, ‘No Transitional Justice without Transition: Darfur - A 
Case Study’ (2011) 19 Mich. St. U. Coll. L. J. Int'l L. 475, 492. 
938 Karin Willemse, ‘Darfur Tribal Courts, Reconciliation Conferences and ‘Judea’ in Kamari M. 
Clarke, Abel S. Knottnerus and Eefje de Volder (eds), Africa and the ICC: Perceptions of Justice 
(Cambridge University Press 2016).  
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REC/RMs and individual states.939 In contrast to the ICC, which limits the role of these 
other actors, the TJPF seeks an ecosystem in which the various actors work in support of 
each other. In turn, the reliance on the ICC should be reduced as national and regional 
prosecutions are strengthened.940   
 
Over the years, the AU has developed a notion of justice encompassing elements of both 
ICL and TJ and promoting the various justifications for establishing international courts. 
The result is a broad approach including more than prosecutions. The AU’s institutional 
identity and ideology has been key in pushing for Pan-Africanism and greater 
involvement and ownership of the peace, security, justice and reconciliation processes. 
Additionally, the AU’s experience with the ICC and UNSC has been negative in so far as 
the ICC’s ‘impartial use and lack of sensitivity to regional particularities’ has gone.941  
 
Yet, the AU’s implementation of its justice approach is not without its own problems. 
The Mbeki Report has been described as ‘a remarkable blueprint’942 and that its style 
‘should be chosen in future situations where there is genuine commitment’ to justice.943 
But, the AU’s unclear strategy to conflict and post-conflict situations has crippled the 
organisation’s ability to effectively discharge its peace, justice and reconciliation 
mandate.944 It is likely the AU’s approach overextends the organisation,945 compounded 
by its overlapping mandates with those of the UN and REC/RMs which do not have 
clearly defined roles and responsibilities.946   
 
Still, this alone is insufficient to dismiss the AU’s broader approach to justice and lack of 
focus on prosecutions. The international legal community may have a ‘prosecution 
preference’,947 but the lens applied by the AU to crisis situations prevents this at the 
                                                        
939 TJPF 58. 
940 TJPF 28.  
941 Lutz Oette, ‘The African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur: A Precedent for Regional Solutions 
to the Challenges Facing International Criminal Justice’ in Vincent Nmehielle (ed), Africa and the 
Future of International Criminal Justice (Eleven International Publishing 2012) 358. 
942 Ibid 366. 
943 Ibid 368. 
944 Ibid; Gustavo de Carvalho and Amanda Lucey, ‘Fractured peacebuilding in the Central African 
Republic: Lessons for African Union engagement’ (ISS Policy Brief 87 July 2016) 7-8; Tatiana 
Carayannis & Mignonne Fowlis, ‘Lessons from African Union–United Nations cooperation in 
peace operations in the Central African Republic’ (2017) 26(2) African Security Review 232. 
945 Oette (941) 369; Graybill and Lanegran (n 936) 8. 
946 de Carvalho and Lucey (n 944) 5 and 9. 
947 Miriam Aukerman, ‘Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crime: A Framework for Understanding 
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continental level. By taking into account the political context of situations948 the AU 
typically see conflicts as an expression of governance failure and not through a criminal 
lens.949 For example, the UNSC members France, the UK and the USA see Sudan as a 
criminal state950 influencing their push for ICC involvement and prosecutions. 
Meanwhile, the AU views the situation as a governance issue and ‘a failure of ability’ by 
the Sudanese government,951 influencing the Mbeki Report’s approach and the necessity 
for additional non-prosecutorial mechanisms.952 Similarly, the AU’s preference for a 
political approach in Libya can be explained by the organisation’s conflict analysis 
lens.953 This goes to the heart of the tensions between the ICC and AU – whether 
prosecutions contribute to ending conflicts – which the ICC has not done. As such, the 
disagreement over certain ICC and UNSC actions and the use of UJ by Western states 
cannot be seen as ‘blanket opposition to justice’,954 but rather the prioritisation of the TJ 
and peace and security approaches over retribution and deterrence.  
 
 
10.3 Conclusion 
 
The ICLS’ purpose goes beyond that of the ICC’s and the original aims of ICL. As part of 
the AU’s principal judicial organ the new court is to: advance the institution’s aims; 
strengthen the commitment to peace and security; promote justice and human and 
peoples’ rights; promote political and socio-economic integration and development; act 
as a preventative and deterrent mechanism; and fight impunity. To fulfil these purposes, 
the new court will need to demonstrate it can: deliver accountability while 
simultaneously reinforcing that the primary responsibility lies with states; address the 
underlying causes of conflict; advance African values and leadership; promote 
ownership; increase national and regional capacity to ensure sustainability; improve 
peace and security to promote development; and balance accountability with 
reconciliation. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Transitional Justice’ (2002) 15 Harvard Human Rights Journal 39 as cited in Graybill and Lanegran 
(n 936) 4.  
948 Nouwen, ‘The Importance of Frames’ (n 890) 333. 
949 de Carvalho and Lucey (944).  
950 Nouwen, ‘The Importance of Frames’ (n 890) 334.  
951 Ibid 334. 
952 Ibid.  
953 Ibid 331.  
954 Impunity Report 2. 
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Part II concluded that the practice of the ICC and its OTP has reduced reconciliation, 
taken a de-contextualised approach to its investigations and prosecutions, and does not 
fulfil all of ICL’s purposes. Whether the ICLS practice will undermine ICL’s and its own 
purpose remains to be seen. Nevertheless, the ICLS has retributive aspects in its penal 
nature, but the AU’s focus on reconciliation and peace and security, to ensure former 
enemies are able to peacefully coexist, prevents retribution from being its overarching 
purpose.  
 
The ICLS, like the ICC, is a judicial mechanism mandated to pursue criminal 
accountability. It is not for the new court to implement the AU’s policies on justice, 
peace and reconciliation. The ICLS’ purpose can contribute solutions to the international 
system’s shortcomings by: first, the AU’s notion of justice offering the chance to build on 
the lessons learned from the international court to go beyond the original purposes of 
ICL and justification for establishing an international criminal court. Second, the new 
court can take into account the political context and other factors affecting peace and 
reconciliation efforts and, at the same time, advance African values and AU objectives. 
Third, the new court provides scope to build complementary relationships with other 
(sub)regional and international actors pursuing justice and fighting impunity. This has 
the potential to contribute to deterrence if prosecutions amongst the different courts are 
more certain, occur with some form of immediacy, severity of punishment and 
comprehensibility of ICL are improved. 
 
The true test of how the ICLS’s purpose provides solutions to the international system’s 
shortcomings and, thus, the need for an African regional criminal court lies in its 
elaboration of its aims. The next step is therefore to determine how the new court’s 
approach to accountability, complementarity, ownership and immunity fulfil its purpose 
and contribute to ICL.   
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Chapter 11   
Accountability Before the African Court 
 
 
To provide solutions to the ICC’s shortcomings the ICLS’ accountability will need to 
address the international court’s institutional and jurisdictional limitations. Despite the 
AU’s notion of justice including more than prosecutions, the meaning of accountability 
used here is the same as in Part II – criminal in nature with accompanying penal 
sanctions – because both the ICLS and ICC are judicial mechanisms. This does prohibit 
consideration of the African Court’s contribution to justice through pursuing state 
responsibility for human rights violations,955 but this is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
How can the ICLS positively respond to the shortcomings of the international system? 
This chapter begins by looking at the geographical and temporal reach of the court, the 
type of individuals it can prosecute, how jurisdiction is gained, and the offences 
included. Then the discussion moves to the institutional capacity of the new court 
supporting its accountability framework, to determine whether this contributes to the 
need for an African regional criminal court. Lastly, other identified hurdles to ICLS 
accountability are examined revealing both the differences and similarities to the ICC. 
 
 
11.1 Jurisdictional Limitations 
 
Chapter 5 concluded that the ICC’s accountability is limited by its temporal reach and 
constrained by its membership. The international court is expected to advance peace and 
security, but actually can only consider core crimes for which only a select few cases have 
been pursued in a decontextualized manner, negating the deterrence, reconciliation, 
peace and security and TJ rationale for the international court. Does the ICLS provide a 
solution to these limitations?  
                                                        
955 This will be pursued by the African Court’s Human Rights Section. For criticisms on the 
Malabo Protocol’s impact on human rights see, Manisuli Ssenyonjo and Saidat Nakitto, ‘The 
African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights ‘International Criminal Law Section’: 
Promoting Impunity for African Union Heads of State and Senior State Officials?’ (2016) 16 
International Criminal Law Review 71; Amnesty International (n 1); du Plessis, ‘A case of negative 
regional complementarity’ (n 1).  
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11.1.1 Geographical and Temporal Jurisdiction 
 
Indistinguishable from the ICC, the ICLS sets out its temporal jurisdiction in accordance 
to the principles nullum crimen sine lege (non-retroactivity of the law) and nulla poena 
sine lege (no penalty without law) – only crimes committed after the protocol has 
entered into force are within the new court’s competence.956 The Malabo Protocol will 
enter into force thirty days after ratification by fifteen AU Member States.957 For states 
which subsequently ratify the protocol, only those crimes committed on or after the date 
of ratification are within the new court’s jurisdiction.958 Accountability is limited by the 
new court’s inability to deal with past crimes which are left to national courts and the 
ICC.  
 
Taking its cue from the ICC, only those crimes committed: in a member state’s territory 
or on board one of its vessels or aircraft; by a national of a member state against a victim 
who is a national of a member state; or against a vital interest of a member state are 
within the ICLS’ geographical jurisdiction.959 This last condition extends accountability 
beyond that of the ICC creating an opening to address the underlying causes of conflict 
and improve peace and security in a region-centric manner.960 However, no clarification 
is provided on what constitutes a vital interest leaving the possibility for misuse of the 
provision by states by, for example, bringing a claim against a political opponent under 
the guise of a threat to a vital interest of that state. The effect of which would be to 
undermine the legitimacy of the new court as a contribution to peace and security and 
TJ.  
 
As the Rome Statute is open to all states to ratify it has the potential for truly universal 
membership. The ICLS, as part of a regional organisation’s judicial organ, does not. 
Membership is restricted to AU member states,961 that being ‘the Continental African 
States, Madagascar and other Islands surrounding Africa’.962 However, should all African 
                                                        
956 Article 46 E(1) ACS. 
957 Article 11 Malabo Protocol.  
958 Article 46 E(2) ACS. 
959 Article 46E bis 2(a)-(d) ACS.  
960 See section 11.1.4.2 of this chapter.  
961 Article 1 Malabo Protocol.  
962 Article 1(2) OAU Charter. See Article 27(1) AUCA which restricts ratification of the AUCA to 
‘the Member States of the OAU’.  
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states ratify the Malabo Protocol the new court would offer universal continental 
accountability.  
 
When ratifying the Malabo Protocol states sign up to all three of the African Court’s 
sections. Yet, given that ‘the slow pace of ratifications of all conventions and legal 
instruments of the AU is [sic] always being raised as a concern [during] almost every 
summit’,963 it is doubtful that the protocol will come into force any time soon. Currently, 
only thirty out of fifty-five states are members of the ACtHPR.964 Even if all thirty states 
ratified the Malabo Protocol this would still leave twenty-five AU members as non-
parties. Getting these twenty-five states to ratify the Malabo Protocol will be a challenge 
as ‘how are they going to buy into this thing [the African Court] if you want them to also 
assume the criminal element of it’965 when they have yet to accept the human rights side 
of the court.  
 
As a treaty-based institution the Malabo Protocol ‘does not create either obligations or 
rights for a third State without its consent’.966 As such non-state parties can accept 
jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis ‘by declaration lodged with the Registrar’.967 This method 
has been successfully used by the ICC to extend its reach when Côte d'Ivoire made a 
declaration accepting ICC jurisdiction in 2003,968 before it ratified the Rome Statute in 
2013.  
 
11.1.2 Individuals and Corporations under the Jurisdiction 
 
When the Malabo Protocol is in force the new court will have jurisdiction over crimes 
effecting or committed in African states. Any individual over the age of eighteen, 
                                                        
963 Interview with African State Official (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 29 April May 2015). 
964 As of the 15 June 2017. <https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7778-sl-
protocol_to_the_african_charter_on_human_and_peoplesrights_on_the_estab.pdf> accessed 6 
April 2018.   
965 Interview with African State Official (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 29 April May 2015). 
966 Article 34 VCLT. 
967 Article 46E bis ACS. 
968 Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Declaration Accepting the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Court, 18 April 2003, <http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/7DA08D8E-FF5E-40C8-92D7- 
F058D5B032F3/279779/ICDE2.pdf> accessed 15 June 2017.  
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regardless of nationality, can be prosecuted for committing a Malabo Protocol offence969 
provided the preconditions to exercising jurisdiction are satisfied.970 
  
The exercise of such jurisdiction over non-nationals however may be challenged. For 
example, the USA’s use of Status of Force Agreements with ICC member states has 
hindered the international court’s ability to exercise jurisdiction over American 
nationals.971 To avoid replication of this by the USA or any other country the AU and the 
ICLS should rely on the legal obligation of treaty signatories to not ‘defeat the object and 
purpose’ of the treaty.972 Additionally, the organisation should call on its members to 
support the new court and take decisions accordingly.   
 
Where the ICLS does excel in offering a solution to the ICC shortcomings is in the 
imposition of corporate criminal liability.973 Corporate complicity in African conflicts has 
been ignored by the ICC because of its individual criminal liability focus.974 In contrast, 
the new court pursues accountability reflective of the realities of the continent and offers 
improvements to peace and security and TJ by addressing the underlying causes of 
conflict. 
 
11.1.3 How the ICLS Gains Jurisdiction 
 
Again, the ICC’s approach to gaining jurisdiction has shaped the ICLS’ accountability 
with the three ways in which the court gains jurisdiction.975 First, with the 
uncontroversial method of state referral.976 Nevertheless, the ICC’s use of this provision 
has raised concerns over the genuineness of the self-referrals to the international court 
by the DRC and Uganda.977 To ensure credibility, the ICLS will need to refrain from 
repeating the international court’s experience and introduce safeguards to prevent states 
politicising the new court for their own gain.  
 
                                                        
969 Article 46D ACS. 
970 See Article 46E bis ACS.  
971 On the impact of such agreements see Chapter 5.1.3 of this thesis.  
972 Article 18 VCLT. 
973 Article 46C ACS. 
974On corporate complicity see Karolien Bais and Mijnd Huijser, The Profit of Peace: Corporate 
Responsibility in Conflict Regions (Routledge 2005). 
975 Article 46H(2) ACS. Article 13 Rome Statute.  
976 Article 46F(1) ACS. 
977 See Chapter 6.2 of this thesis. 
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The ability of state referrals to contribute to accountability at the continental level is 
questionable. Despite the use of the ICC by African states, their track record in referring 
cases to the regional human rights mechanism is poor.978 The AU is trying to change 
African states’ perception of continental mechanisms by calling for more active 
engagement and unity amongst its members to reform the organisation.979  
 
The second way the court gains jurisdiction is by the Prosecutor initiating a proprio motu 
investigation.980  This is modelled on the ICC provision which, at the time, many African 
states supported.981 That said, not all African states supported the Rome Statute 
provision982 raising doubts over the extent to which the states are happy to grant such 
powers to the ICLS’ Prosecutor. Regardless, the proprio motu method for gaining 
jurisdiction can increase accountability if the Prosecutor receives good quality and 
credible information. Yet, the inability to prosecute crimes committed in a non-member 
state can negatively impact on the perception of justice. The ICC has received large 
volumes of information relating to non-member states which the Prosecutor cannot act 
on. To avoid this, the ICLS Prosecutor and OTP must provide clear, detailed 
explanations as to why investigations are not pursued, which will enhance transparency 
and avoid misunderstandings and misinformation.  
 
In a departure from the ICC, the third method is referral by the AU Assembly or Peace 
and Security Council (PSC).983 The provision pays deference to the AU’s policy making 
organs with a peace and security mandate which can issue legally binding decisions. It 
also reflects the peace and security justification for establishing international courts by 
linking the work of the new court to these organs. The Assembly is composed of Heads 
of State and Government who meet twice yearly (usually end of January and June), too 
infrequent to ensure referral of situations befitting such prosecutions. The PSC meetings 
however are need dependent with the body being comparable to the UNSC with a 
rotating fifteen state membership. While the UNSC’s use of its referral power and the 
                                                        
978 Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes (n 312) 162. 
979 Careien du Plessis, ‘‘AU Chair Urges African Leaders to Unite Behind Continental Body’ (EWN, 
29 January 2018) <http://ewn.co.za/2018/01/29/au-chair-urges-african-leaders-to-unite-behind-
continental-body>  accessed 13 March 2018.    
980 Article 46F(3) ACS. 
981 Guinea 5th Plenary Meeting (n 201) para 19; Senegal 4th Plenary Meeting (n 192) para 16.  
982 See Rome Conference Meeting Notes; Egypt Mr El Masry, 9th Plenary Meeting (n 190) para 87; 
Nigeria Mr Ibrahim, 7th Plenary Meeting (n 189) para 88; Sudan, Mr Alhadi, 9th Plenary Meeting 
(n 190) para 77. 
983 Article 46F(2) ACS. 
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accompanying politicisation of the ICC raise concern over the desirability of the 
inclusion of PSC and Assembly referrals, certain safeguards within the PSC may help 
mitigate the politicisation of the ICLS. For example, the rotating membership with no 
veto power prevents replication of the UNSC permanent members’ use of their veto 
power from hampering an ICLS referral as PSC decisions are taken by consensus or two 
thirds majority.984 Furthermore, a PSC member is unable to participate in any decision 
when they are a ‘party to a conflict or situation under consideration’, instead the state is 
limited ‘to present[ing] its case to the’ PSC. 985 Yet, there is no definition provided as to 
when a state is considered a party to a conflict. As such this safeguard is unlikely to fully 
prevent political manipulation of PSC decisions. 
 
Nevertheless, the Assembly and PSC will need to address impartiality concerns and will 
also need to follow up on referrals. This is vital in dispelling claims that the new court is 
being used as a political tool, providing the opportunity for the two bodies to address 
any cooperation issues or other concerns of the ICLS Prosecutor. By assigning referral 
powers to both bodies the new court promotes ownership, African leadership and the 
advancement of African values and norms. Additionally, the level of assistance offered by 
the PSC can be enhanced by situating the ICLS into the African Peace and Security 
Architecture (APSA).986  
 
All African states are AU members, increasing accountability as the Assembly and PSC 
can refer non-member states to the ICLS. Consequently, as with the UNSC ICC referrals, 
the Assembly and PSC help to fill a gap, although imperfectly, that would otherwise exist 
if only self-referrals and prorio motu investigations applied.  
 
Unlike the ICC, only certain entities are permitted to submit cases to the African Court: 
 
African individuals or African Non-Governmental Organizations with 
Observer Status with the African Union or its organs or institutions, but 
only with regard to a State that has made a Declaration accepting the 
competence of the Court to receive cases or applications submitted to it 
directly. The Court shall not receive any case or application involving a 
                                                        
984 Article 8(13) PSC Protocol. 
985 Art 8(9) PSC Protocol 
986 Chapter 13 of this thesis. 
 205
State Party which has not made a Declaration in accordance with Article 
9(3) of this Protocol.987  
 
The original merged court permitted ‘individuals or relevant Non-Governmental 
Organizations accredited to the African Union and its organs’ to submit cases.988 The 
Malabo Protocol’s more restrictive approach has been criticised,989 but is unlikely to 
affect the working of the ICLS. Pursuant to Article 16 any entity can submit information 
to the ICLS OTP. It is then for the Prosecutor to assess ‘the seriousness of information 
received … [and they] may seek information from States, organs of the African Union or 
United Nations, intergovernmental or non-governmental organizations, or other reliable 
sources that he or she deems appropriate’.990 
 
In general, the means by which the ICLS gains jurisdiction has done little to provide 
solutions to the ICC shortcomings. Where it does provide an improvement is in 
removing the accountability hurdle created by the UNSC Permanent Members’ veto 
power.  
 
11.1.4 The Crimes under the Malabo Protocol 
 
The ICC has proven unable to pursue a plethora of crimes as it focuses on the core 
international crimes only, hindering the international court’s ability to advance peace 
and security. To establish whether the ICLS addresses this shortcoming, this section 
considers the core crimes under the new court’s jurisdiction.  
 
11.1.4.1 The Core Crimes 
 
Matching the Rome Statute offences the Malabo Protocol includes genocide,991 crimes 
against humanity,992 war crimes,993 and aggression.994 However, there have been 
developments to the definitions used. 
                                                        
987 Article 16 ACS, replacing Art 30(f) of the original Merger Protocol.   
988 Article 29 Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. 
989 Amnesty International (n 1) 34. 
990 Article 46G ACS.  
991 Article 28B ACS. 
992 Article 28C ACS. 
993 Article 28D ACS. 
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Under the Protocol’s crimes against humanity provision acts ‘committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack or enterprise’ are criminalised.995 The inclusion of 
enterprise expands accountability by encompassing joint criminal enterprises. This 
provides a solution to the ICC’s inability to hold to account all the orchestrators of such 
crimes. But, the lack of a definition for enterprise is problematic.996   
 
The war crimes definition merges both international and non-international armed 
conflict offences into one provision and adds fifteen crimes not provided for by the 
ICC.997 For example, the First Additional Protocol of the 1977 Geneva Convention gains 
explicit recognition which the Rome Statute was unable to achieve.998 In line with 
regional and international standards the defined age of child soldiers has risen from 
fifteen to eighteen.999 The ICC defines child soldiers as those under the age of fifteen 
preventing prosecutions and charges related to the use of sixteen and seventeen year 
olds, distorting the reality on the ground. The use of child soldiers is prolific across 
African conflicts, but by the Malabo Protocol not including their recruitment by non-
state actors in international conflicts1000 it has impeded the accountability of an 
otherwise welcome development.1001  
 
For the ICC the most controversial provision was aggression, taking years before a 
definition was agreed.1002 The Malabo Protocol has developed the Rome Statute provision 
and made it more Africa relevant and reflective of the AU structure.1003 For example, an 
act of aggression is defined with reference to a ‘manifest violation’ of: the UNCh; the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
994 Article 28M ACS. For an indepth study of the individual crimes see Gerhard Werle and Mortiz 
Vormbaum (eds), The African Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Malabo Protocol (TMC Asser 
Press Springer 2017). 
995 Article 28C(1) ACS, emphasis added. 
996 Amnesty International (n 1) 17. 
997 Articles 28D(b)(v), 28D(b)(xxviii)-(xxxiii), 28D(e)(xvi)-(xxii) and 28D(g) ACS. 
998 Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes (n 312) 270. 
999 The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child; the Paris Principles and 
Commitments on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict 2007; the Optional Protocol to 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict all 
use eighteen whereas, The Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Additional Protocols to 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions use fifteen. 
1000 Article 28D(b)(xxvii) ACS. 
1001 Article 28D(e)(vii) ACS. See Kai Ambos, ‘Genocide (article 28B), Crimes Against Humanity 
(Article 28C), War Crimes (article 28D) and the Crime of Aggression (Article 28M)’ in Werle and 
Vormbaum (n 994) 44-45. 
1002 Chapter 5.1.4 of this thesis.  
1003 See Articles 28M(A), 28M(B)(a) and 29M(B)(f) ACS. 
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AUCA; ‘the territorial integrity and human security of the population of a State Party’;1004 
and the AU Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact.1005 This definitional approach 
enables the ICLS to advance African values and further AU aims.   
 
Accountability for aggression is further expanded as the new court includes conduct 
committed by ‘non-State actor(s) or by any foreign entity’.1006 This recognises that these 
actors can have a similar impact as state actors can. At the same time, the wider 
definition could be criticised.1007 Caution needs to be exercised to avoid delegitimising 
and criminalising otherwise legitimate opposition groups and struggles which 
international law exempts from aggression.1008 The incorporation of self-determination 
and popular uprising groups is unwelcome, yet the reality of which actors are involved in 
current conflicts forces ICL to respond to more than just state actors.1009 It will be up to 
the Prosecutor and judges to prevent the new court from becoming a tool for dealing 
with political grievances and thereby losing credibility. If cautiously used, the provision 
could improve peace and security by addressing the underlying causes of conflict, as per 
ICL and the ICLS’ purpose.  
 
The ICC is restricted in pursuing an aggression prosecution by having to notify the UN 
Secretary-General in situations where no UNSC aggression determination has been 
made.1010 Six months after this notification, if the UNSC has made no determination or 
decided otherwise, the ICC Prosecutor can proceed with the investigation provided the 
Pre-Trial Division has authorised it.1011 No such limitation is placed on the ICLS 
Prosecutor, turning the crime into a purely legal question. The result is the 
depoliticization of the most politicised crime in ICL and, potentially, increasing the 
likelihood of prosecution. There is the potential for ICL’s aims of deterrence, peace and 
security and TJ to be advanced due to turning aggression into a legal consideration only. 
                                                        
1004 Article 28M(A) and also see Article 28M(B)(a) ACS.  
1005 Article 28M(b)(f) ACS. 
1006 Article 28M(B) ACS. 
1007 Ssenyonjo and Nakitto (n 955) 87.  
1008 Mathew Lippman, ‘The Right of Civil Resistance Under International Law and the Domestic 
Necessity Defense’ 8(3) Dickinson Journal of International Law 349; Matthew Noah Smith, 
‘Rethinking Sovereignty, Rethinking Revolution’ (2008) 36(4) Philosophy & Public Affairs 405. 
1009 Dan Saxon, ‘Violations of International Humanitarian Law by Non-State Actors during 
Cyberwarfare: Challenges for Investigations and Prosecutions’ (2016) 22(3) Journal of Conflict and 
Security Law 555; Annyssa Bellal, Gilles Giacca, and Stuart Casey-Maslen, ‘International law and 
armed non-state actors in Afghanistan’ (2011) 93(881) International Review of the Red Cross.  
1010 Pursuant to Article 39 UNCh.  
1011 Article 15 bis (6)-(8) Rome Statute. 
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Regional organisations are permitted to deal with matters of peace and security,1012 but 
the UNSC can still preclude the ICLS from exercising jurisdiction. A UNSC resolution 
imposing alternative action regarding the conduct, or a non-aggression determination, 
would be legally binding. Any advancement in accountability would be countered, at the 
same time raising questions over the international system’s bias if the UNSC uses this 
power to derail legitimate legal proceedings to protect one of its Permanent Members 
and/or their allies.  
 
Some developments are more restrained, lacking impact and engagement with the 
ongoing ICL debates. The inclusion of ‘acts of rape or any other form of sexual violence’ 
as genocidal conduct is welcome as it codifies the existing case law,1013 including that of 
the ICC. Yet, other issues are left unaddressed. For example, human rights groups, 
supported by some national precedent, have been advocating for political groups to be 
considered a protected category.1014 However, the lack of such a radical change to the 
definition can be explained by the Genocide Convention’s definition being ‘too settled to 
reopen’.1015  
 
In brief, the ICLS core crimes have made some strides to provide solutions to the ICC’s 
shortcomings in pursuing such prosecutions. The ability to introduce a more contextual 
approach increases the new court’s relevance for Africa. In turn, the new court will be 
able to fulfil the additional purposes beyond the original ones of ICL – the promotion of 
peace and security and the AU’s aims and objectives. Whether this has gone far enough 
in addressing all the problems arising from the ICC will be tested by the practice and 
policies of the ICLS OTP and judges.  
 
Certain critics raise concerns over the different interpretations that may emerge between 
the ICC and ICLS and what this will mean for ICL and accountability.1016 Such criticism 
does not take into account the Malabo Protocol’s replication of ICC provisions and the 
                                                        
1012 Article 52(1) UNCh ‘Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional 
arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of 
international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such 
arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of 
the United Nations.’ 
1013 Article 28 B(f) ACS. 
1014 Ambos, ‘Genocide’ (n 1001) 41. 
1015 Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes (n 312) 246. 
1016 Amnesty (n 1) 29. 
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context specific nature of the expanded definitions. It is highly likely that the new court 
will take a similar approach to the Elements of Crimes as the international court, but 
with a more African focus and relevance. A similar contextual approach can be seen in 
the jurisprudence of the ICTR and SCSL.1017 
 
11.1.4.2 The Additional Crimes 
 
For the first time an international criminal court will seek to prosecute crimes beyond 
the core crimes.1018 Chapter 10 concluded that the purpose of the new court is more 
expansive than existing international criminal courts and tribunals: addressing 
underlying causes of conflict; advancing African values and norms; improving peace and 
security; and supporting AU institutional aims and objectives. However, does this 
provide a solution to the international system’s shortcomings? This section starts by 
scrutinising the additional crimes under the new court’s jurisdiction and what they offer 
that the ICC does not.  
 
In contrast to the ICC, the ICLS seeks to address the underlying causes of conflict with a 
mixture of transnational and treaty-based crimes taken from various regional and 
international instruments.1019 These include the crimes of: unconstitutional change of 
government,1020 piracy,1021 terrorism,1022 mercenarism,1023 corruption,1024 money 
laundering,1025 trafficking persons,1026 trafficking in drugs,1027 trafficking in hazardous 
waste,1028 and the illicit exploitation of natural resources.1029 
 
                                                        
1017 The ICTR set the precedent for first genocide ruling by an international court in the Akayesu 
case as well as providing a definition of rape in the case. The SCSL was the first tribunal to find 
individuals guilty for the crime of recruiting child soldiers in The Prosecutor v Alex Tamba Brima, 
Bria Bazzy Kamara, Santigie Borbor Kanu (Judgment) SCSL-04-16-T-613 (20 June 2007). 
1018 The Special Tribunal for Lebanon has prosecuted the crime of terrorism. 
1019 See Table 3 page 212 of this thesis. 
1020 Article 28E ACS. 
1021 Article 28F ACS. 
1022 Article 28G ACS.  
1023 Article 28H ACS. 
1024 Article 28I ACS. 
1025 Article 28I Bis ACS. 
1026 Article 28J ACS. 
1027 Article 28K ACS. 
1028 Article 28L ACS. 
1029 Article 28L Bis ACS. 
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Criticism abounds over the ‘extensive’1030 list of ICLS crimes considered to be too 
broad,1031 and likely to slow the new court down.1032 This is made worse by the ability to 
add additional crimes which ‘reflect developments in international law’.1033 How enabling 
a court to evolve in accordance to international law can be seen as undesirable is not 
clear. But, the concern over the potential burden placed on the ICLS is valid given the 
current financial and capacity constraints of the institution.1034 The new court’s work will 
be delayed further given the vast number of applicable laws and treaties (international, 
regional and national) which can be taken into account.1035 Yet, it can also be argued that 
the ability to take into account a wider range of legal instruments will improve 
judgments, reconciling the applicable international and regional approaches to help 
advance African values and norms, while simultaneously highlighting the 
complementary nature of the international and regional.  
 
During the Rome Conference, the attempts to include drug-trafficking1036 and other 
treaty-based crimes were unsuccessful.1037 At the time, it was felt the non-core crimes 
were best left to national courts to deal with,1038 reflecting the international community’s 
lack of will to intervene in such matters.  
 
Similarly, during the Malabo Protocol negotiations 
 
‘some countries were very vocal to say, “we just see a shopping list of 
crimes and most of these crimes are issues that we can address in our 
own countries without a problem, why are we including them in this” […] 
the consultants were very adamant that it is a necessary thing to do.’1039  
 
                                                        
1030 Amnesty International (n 1) 15. 
1031 Ssenyonjo and Nakitto (n 955) 86-90. 
1032 du Plessis, ‘A case of negative regional complementarity’ (n 1).  
1033 Article 28A(2) ACS. 
1034 See section 11.2 of this chapter.  
1035 Amnesty International (n 1) 24.  
1036 Schabas, An Introduction to the Criminal Court (n 607) 10. 
1037 This included calls for offences related to nuclear weapons, money laundry, terrorism, drug-
trafficking and other crimes against UN and associated personnel, see Rome Conference 
Negotiation Minutes. 
1038 Prep Com Summary, para 12. 
1039 Interview with African State Official (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 29 April May 2015).  
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Treaty-based crimes may be better prosecuted at the domestic level,1040 but this ignores 
the current lack of such prosecutions. The core crimes may have no applicable statute of 
limitation, but both domestically and internationally many of the non-core crimes do 
reducing the ability of a national court to advance accountability. Article 28B of the 
Malabo Protocol avoids this by stipulating there are no applicable statutes of limitation 
to any of the crimes, ensuring the new court can contribute to accountability even when 
a domestic court cannot. Plus, UJ does not extend, at best, beyond the core crimes and 
the lack of ICC jurisdiction over the crimes means the conduct will go unaddressed, 
resulting in impunity.  
 
Considering the ICC is insensitive to context, the non-core crimes reflect the African 
context. The AU links development with peace, security and accountability,1041 which 
reflects both ICL’s peace and security and TJ objectives, at the same time the broader list 
of crimes is accepted by the ICC as being associated with conflicts.1042 The non-core 
crimes have been refined and expand on the existing international and/or regional 
instruments to reflect the continent’s challenges. Examples include, the crime of 
unconstitutional changes of government. Despite requiring the prosecution of such 
conduct,1043 the AU lacked an appropriate court in which to prosecute the offence. The 
most the organisation could do was suspend membership.1044 Desiring a penalty which 
would act as a deterrent,1045 it was thought appropriate to include the crime as an ICLS 
offence. Piracy made headlines in 2005 with the increase in such activity off the coast of  
 
                                                        
1040 Ademola Abass, ‘The Proposed International Criminal Jurisdiction for the African Court: Some 
Problematical Aspects’ (2013) 60 Netherlands International Law Review 27, 34. 
1041 See Chapter 10.3.2 of this thesis.  
1042 2007 Policy Paper, 9. 
1043 Article 25(5) ACDEG. 
1044 For example, Burkina Faso, Mali and Mauritania have been suspended due to coups d'état. 
BBC, ‘AU to drop Mauritania after coup’ (BBC News, 9 August 2008) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7551531.stm> accessed 30 June 2016; Celeste Hicks, ‘Mali 
Suspended from African Union’ (The Guardian, 23 March 2012) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/mar/23/mali-suspended-african-union-coup> 
accessed 30 June 2016; Aljazeera, ‘African Union suspends Burkina Faso after military coup’ 
(AlJazeera, 19 September 2015) <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/09/african-union-
suspends-burkina-faso-military-coup-150919073352770.html> accessed 30 June 2016.  
1045 See n 233, para 11(iii). 
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Table 3 – Origin of Malabo Protocol Crimes Definitions  
Crime Origin of Definition 
Genocide Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court  The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide  
Crimes Against Humanity Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
War Crimes Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court First Additional Protocol of the 1977 Geneva Convention 
Crime of Aggression Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court References AU Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact  
The Crime of Unconstitutional Change of Government The African Charter on Democracy, Election and Governance (ACDEG) 
Piracy 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)  Djibouti Code of Conduct 
Terrorism OAU Convention on Prevention and Combating Terrorism 
Mercenarism OAU Convention on the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa 
Corruption African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption 
Money Laundering African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption 
Trafficking in Persons 
UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UN Trafficking 
in Persons Protocol) 
Trafficking in Drugs 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 
Trafficking in Hazardous Wastes 1991 Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa (Bamako Convention) 
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Somalia,1046 with Nigeria also suffering from acts of piracy for many years.1047 Sadly, Africa 
has become synonymous with corruption,1048 with many of those committing the offence 
being a ‘public official, his/her family member or any other person’.1049 The inclusion of 
state officials’ family members reflects the growing instances of such individuals being 
implicated in corruption scandals.1050 
 
This African relevance is recognised, and subsequently dismissed, by Amnesty 
International because the crimes ‘are yet to be well articulated and established in 
international law’.1051 As the international community lacks the political will to address 
these crimes, and is complicit in the commission of some of the crimes, the lack of 
international articulation alone cannot be the determinative factor over whether a 
regional organisation is able to address continent relevant conduct. Additionally, ICL 
will be developed and the justification for prosecutions advanced. 
 
The crimes based on African regional instruments attempt to reinforce the original 
treaty intention, advance African values and norms while promoting ownership, none of 
which the ICC does. There will also be harmonisation of laws at the continental level, 
encouraging adoption and enforcement domestically and sub-regionally.1052 Part of the 
AU’s aim is to harmonise the laws amongst its members,1053 which the new court will 
contribute to. Yet, while there are advantages to adopting definitions from existing 
instruments it may discourage those states not party to those treaties from signing and 
ratifying the Malabo Protocol if their original concerns are not adequately addressed.  
 
                                                        
1046 ‘Piracy 'on the rise' off Somalia’ (BBC News, 8 November 2005) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4415196.stm> accessed 30 June 2016. 
1047 ‘Piracy report says Nigerian waters the most deadly’ (IRIN News, 27 July 2004) 
<http://www.irinnews.org/report/50843/nigeria-piracy-report-says-nigerian-waters-most-deadly> 
accessed 30 June 2016.  
1048 This by no means implies other regions, states, Governments or private individuals are not 
involved in corruption scandals, or corruption more generally.  
1049 Articles 28I(1)(a)-(d) ACS. 
1050 Kolawole Olaniyan, Corruption and Human Rights Law in Africa (Hart Publishing 2014) 
Chapter 3, which identifies Equatoguinean, Nigerian and Angolan family members involved and 
benefiting from corruption. 
1051 Amnesty International (n 1) 16. 
1052 José E. Alvarez, ‘Crimes of Hate/Crimes of State: Lessons from Rwanda (1999) 23 Yale Journal 
of International Law 365, 418-36.  
1053 Article 11(3) Protocol Relating to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community 
Relating to the Pan-African Parliament.  
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Despite the contribution the Malabo Protocol offences offer in addressing the ICC’s 
shortcomings, the overly broad provisions and lack of definitions is thought to violate 
the principle of legality.1054 This can be easily rectified by creating Elements of Crimes to 
assist the judges, providing further definitions and interpretation guidance in a similar 
manner to the ICC’s Elements of Crime.  
 
The crimes may develop differently between African national systems and the court.1055 
Yet, this would be no different than between the ICC and national systems, or between 
national systems themselves, which has not proved to be an insurmountable hurdle to 
accountability. As with the Rome Statute, there is nothing within the Malabo Protocol 
placing an obligation on member states to adopt implementing legislation.1056 But, if the 
ICLS Elements of Crimes offer clear and coherent guidance, states and the REC/RMs 
would benefit. The new court’s complementary provision can also help by taking any 
differences into account during an admissibility assessment.1057 This would address the 
concerns over the narrowing of accountability by the ICC’s interpretation of its 
admissibility criteria and positively contribute to ICL and the international system.1058 
  
The ICC is a limited accountability mechanism with little significance for peace and 
security and regional needs. On the whole, the ICLS offers a set of offences which 
attempt to address the core-crimes and those non-core crimes which underlie the causes 
of conflict.  
 
 
11.2 Institutional Capacity Limitations 
 
Accountability before the ICC was narrowed further because of the institutional 
limitations faced by the international court. To what extent is ICLS accountability likely 
to suffer the same fate? This section reviews the AU and ICLS institutional framework 
starting with the organisation’s and the new court’s budget. 
 
                                                        
1054 Amnesty International (n 1) 17.  
1055 du Plessis, ‘A case of negative regional complementarity’ (n 1).  
1056 Nouwen, Complementarity in the Line of Fire (n 582) 20.  
1057 Chapter 12 of this thesis.  
1058 Chapter 6.1 of this thesis. 
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11.2.1 Budget Constraints 
 
From the beginning, financial concerns plagued the Malabo Protocol’s adoption 
process,1059 resulting in a financial and structural framework based on pragmatism, 
gradualism, and flexibility.1060 Building on the complementary nature of the ICC,1061 the 
new court is envisioned as a mechanism ‘operating in an “ecosystem” where there are 
other organs and institutions that would share some of the division of labour’.1062 
However, can the AU afford the new court? 
 
International criminal prosecutions are expensive, with the ICC’s 2018 budget estimated 
at €151,475,700 (about US$186,761,178).1063 In contrast the entire AU budget for 2018 is 
US$769, 381,894.00 funded from member contributions (US$318,276,795) and partner 
organisations (US$451,105,099).1064 Of this the ACtHPR is allocated US$11,820,159.00, with 
$10,581,742 funded by members and the $1,238,417 program budget covered by partner 
monies.  
 
If the new court is underfunded no matter what jurisdictional develops have been made 
accountability will not be achieved. The success of the ICLS ‘depends on the AU member 
states, because they are the ones who contribute to the budget of the AU, if really they 
want a court to work, they will have to fund the court’.1065 However, African states’ track 
record in meeting their contribution obligations is lacking,1066 reducing the prospect of a 
sustainable ICLS. 
 
Despite the AU reviewing the financial implications of the new court there is still 
uncertainty surrounding the actual costs. One African state official is  
                                                        
1059 See Chapter 2.5 of this thesis.  
1060 Report, the Legal Instruments and Recommendations of the Ministers of Justice/Attorneys 
General – Draft Protocol on Amendments to the AfCtJHR EX.CL/773(XXII), Annexed Financial 
Report, para 14 (hereafter Annexed Financial Report). 
1061 See Chapter 12 of this thesis.  
1062 Annexed Financial Report, para 10.  
1063 ASP, Proposed Programme Budget for 2018 of the International Criminal Court, adopted 
Sixteenth Session, New York, 4-14 December 2017, ICC-ASP/16/10, Table 1. 
1064 Decision on the Budget of the African Union for the 2018 Financial Year Doc. 
PRC/Rpt(XXXIV), EX.CL/Dec.965(XXXI), adopted at the 31st Ordinary Session of the Executive 
Council, 27 June to 01 July 2017, Addis Ababa.  
1065 Interview with African State Official (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 8 May 2015). 
1066 Ini Ekott, ‘The AU's Funding Woes Continue’ (Good Governance Africa, 5 January 2017) 
<https://gga.org/the-aus-funding-woes-continue/> accessed 15 April 2018.  
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still not convinced that we have any idea of how much this court is going 
to cost us, because what was presented to member states was more of the 
salaries of the additional staff that is going to be needed […] but there was 
no operational funding […] You need money to do it, or you need 
countries to say […] we have expertise, who will take over the witness 
protection, you need the buy in of countries too, accepting to host some 
of the accused people or suspects while the trial is going on, and all those. 
But all those things are things that are not clear at the moment, but we 
were informed that some of these things will be clear as we go on.1067 
 
If states are unsure of the costs it will prove difficult to motivate them to contribute, 
especially when the majority of African states already struggle to fulfil their AU 
contribution obligations. These concerns are echoed by commentators querying the 
ICLS’ financial constraints.1068 The inclusion of fourteen crimes, when the ICC only has 
four, compounds the concerns because it will overstretch an already underfunded 
organisation and court.1069 This is before the cost of training judges and investigators has 
been taken into account.1070 
 
The African Court will share resources across its three sections and, as the AU has never 
had a functioning Court of Justice or a criminal court, the additional financial resources 
required are a matter of speculation. The extra resources will have to come from 
somewhere while minimising the financial consequences on other AU bodies. The AU 
has created a large number of institutions which are dependent on donor monies.1071 
Whether this is a result of the organisation’s grandiose plans for itself and its legacy1072 or 
a result of trying to satisfy donor funding conditions is debatable. Unfortunately, donors 
do influence the AU and African states1073 and which institutions get established.1074   
 
As the new court’s purpose includes the strengthening of peace and security, is it 
possible to use some of the AU’s peace and security budget to fund the court?  
                                                        
1067 Interview with African State Official (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 29 April May 2015). 
1068 Ssenyonjo and Nakitto (n 955) 87; Amnesty International (n 1) 25, 31; du Plessis (n 1).  
1069 Amnesty International (n 1) 29; du Plessis (n 1). 
1070 Amnesty International (n 1) 25-26.  
1071 Ibid 31. 
1072 Chapter 2.1 of this thesis.  
1073 Ssenyonjo (n 661) 393.  
1074 ISS notes the AU’s independence depends on its ability to be self-sufficiently funded, Liesl 
Louw-Vaudran, ‘A new financing model for the AU: will it work?’ (ISS Today, 25 July 2016) 
<https://issafrica.org/iss-today/a-new-financing-model-for-the-au-will-it-work> accessed 10 April 
2018. 
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This is unlikely as the programme budget is primarily donor funded. The AU partner 
countries have made it clear ‘that we are not going to support this court at all with our 
money. So, we are basically not going to give you any funding as we are against the 
creation of this court’.1075 While it is not for third parties to fund the court, the 
justification of the refusal on grounds of immunity is hypocritical.1076 European states are 
just as reluctant to hand over their leaders and senior state officials to the international 
court, which certain officials consider inapplicable to them.1077 Instead of holding the AU 
and African states to ransom, further undermining African ownership and reinforcing 
the inequality of the international system, the EU should live up to its perceived 
leadership role in human rights and international justice and assist with attempts to 
improve accountability at the regional level.  
 
These donor threats 
 
just fuelled emotions … [and African states at an AU Summit responded 
by] saying “we don’t care, they can go with their money, we will support 
this court financially ourselves” […] now how are we going to have money 
for this court and other things, practically, it doesn’t make sense.1078  
 
The funding structure of the ICLS leaves the issue of accountability vulnerable. This 
thesis has concluded that national courts and the ICC do not fully discharge their 
obligations in pursuing criminal justice because of financial restraints. Like the ICC, the 
new court’s uncertain and inadequate funding means the ICLS will not easily respond to 
increases in its caseload and to new situations. One way to address the financial 
shortfalls is for the Assembly and PSC referrals to include an element of financial 
assistance from their own budgets.1079 Yet, the Assembly’s role in the financial 
sustainability of the court has been questioned because of the potential for dependency 
on the body and the political influence it may exert over the court.1080 It remains to be 
seen how the Court can attract funds without compromising its independence.1081 
 
                                                        
1075 Interview with African State Official (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 29 April May 2015). 
1076 Amnesty International (n 1) 31.  
1077 See n 152.  
1078 Interview with African State Official (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 29 April May 2015). 
1079 For a discussion on why this is appropriate, see Chapter 13.4 of this thesis.   
1080 Amnesty International (n 1) 29-30.  
1081 Ssenyonjo and Nakitto (n 955) 90. 
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11.2.2 Policies and Prosecutorial Approach Under Resource Constraints  
 
The ICC OTP’s limited budget resulted in few cases pursued and minimal deterrence. 
This is compounded by the narrow approach to case selection and the policy of only 
pursuing those who bear the greatest responsibility, leaving national courts to fill the 
gap.1082 Can the ICLS avoid this?  
 
By utilising its position as an AU organ the new court can encourage cooperation from 
states, the REC/RMs and the ICC to share the workload.1083 The ability of the ICLS to 
pursue those bearing the greatest responsibility is curtailed by Article 46A bis’ upholding 
the immunity of sitting Heads of State and Government and certain senior state 
officials.1084 Instead, the ICLS OTP can carve out a strategy addressing lower level 
officials and those individuals not typically covered by the ICC. Counter-intuitively the 
immunity provision may result in greater accountability overall if the ICLS and ICC focus 
on different individuals accused of core-crimes. For the non-core crimes, the immunity 
provision restricts accountability, but not necessarily to a large degree.1085 
 
The Malabo Protocol does not prevent the new court from adopting a bottom up 
approach to investigations and sharing the information with the relevant state. 
Alternatively, the ICLS OTP can wait until the official is no longer in office to pursue a 
case. This would be in contrast to the ICC OTP’s practice, potentially addressing the 
ICC’s narrowing of accountability.  
 
11.2.3 Reliance on Cooperation and its Consequences 
 
As with the international court, the ability of the ICLS to deliver accountability will 
depend on cooperation from a range of actors: the situation state; state parties; other AU 
bodies and organs, in particular the PSC and Assembly; AU member states; other 
international courts and organisations; and non-African states. Article 46L(1) and (2) set 
out the type of cooperation and judicial assistance state parties are to give to the court. 
The preference for the ICLS to work in an “eco-system” is reflected in Article 46L(3) as 
                                                        
1082 Chapter 5.2.2 of this thesis.  
1083 Chapter 12 of this thesis.  
1084 On the Malabo Protocol’s immunity see Chapter 14 of this thesis.  
1085 On the immunity provision and the non-core crimes see Chapter 14.3 of this thesis. 
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the court is ‘entitled to seek the co-operation or assistance of regional or international 
courts, non-States Parties or co-operating partners of the African Union and may 
conclude Agreements for that purpose’. 
 
The Malabo Protocol grants wide leeway for cooperation yet, unlike under the Rome 
Statute, the ICLS Prosecutor cannot conduct an investigation without cooperation.1086 
This is unlikely to impact accountability as the success of an investigation without 
cooperation is highly circumspect. There is also no reason to suspect African states will 
not cooperate with the ICLS as the experience of the ICC shows that they do cooperate, 
albeit quietly.1087 
 
As part of the ICLS’ purpose is to deter further crimes the court’s ability to enforce its 
judgments is crucial.1088 A unique characteristic of the ICLS is the ability to call on the 
AU’s complementary organs and mechanisms.1089 The ICC is incapacitated in certain 
areas due to security and access concerns, yet the new court could seek support from AU 
peace support operations. Alternatively, the AU could train its peace support personnel 
to assist in investigative work to support the ICLS’ work.1090  
 
Finally, if the ICLS cannot enforce its judgments, the improvement to accountability will 
not materialise. At the same time, the new court will not live up to it purpose: to deliver 
accountability; address the underlying causes of conflict; advance African norms and 
values; prevent and deter future crimes; and contribute to ending impunity.1091 While 
there is symbolic value in the issuing of international judgments,1092 the political will of 
African states to enforce the new court’s judgments is lacking. ACtHPR judgments have a 
very low enforcement rate,1093 as do AU decisions generally,1094 which needs to be 
                                                        
1086 Article 57(3)(d) Rome Statute. 
1087 Interview with ICC Official (The Hague, The Netherlands, 16 February 2016). 
1088 Chapter 1.2.2.1.2 of this thesis.  
1089 Chapter 12 and 13 of this thesis.  
1090 On this possibility see Chapter 13.5.3 of this thesis.  
1091 On the purposes of the new court see Chapter 10 of this thesis.  
1092 Chapter 5.2.3 of this thesis.  
1093 Rachael Murray, ‘Report on the 1997 Sessions of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights – 21st and 22nd Sessions: 15-25 April and 2-11 November 1997’ (1998) 19 Human 
Rights Law Journal 169, 171. 
1094 See Report of the Commission on the Implementation of Previous Decisions of the Executive 
Council and the Assembly, adopted at Thirty-Second Ordinary Session, 25-26 January 2018, Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia, EX.CL/1049(XXXII).  
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addressed if African states are serious about increasing international criminal justice and 
improving peace and security across the continent.  
 
11.2.4 Personnel Constraints 
 
The bleak finances of the AU pose significant hurdles to accountability and the problem 
of finding qualified staff.1095 A reality faced by the AU, but this also highlights the need to 
build continental capacity, which a regional criminal court can do better than the ICC 
and improve TJ. For example, the Sierra Leonean domestic judicial system ‘has 
developed as a result of the Special Court for Sierra Leone [such that they] can safely try 
whosoever is found for war crimes etc. … [yet] one can say if the ICC was in existence, 
one may suggest that it would need to refer to the ICC’.1096 This capacity development 
would not have occurred had the ICC had jurisdiction because it does not address local 
capacity development.1097  
 
The complementarity provision partially sets out the scope for the ICLS to facilitate 
capacity development but the new court will still need to avoid falling into the trap of 
the ICC of keeping expertise in-house.1098 
 
The ability of ICLS accountability to offer a solution to the ICC’s shortcomings is reduced 
by the allocated staffing quotas. The allocations are generally insufficient as the number 
of judges assigned to the new court is too low to provide an adequate number of judges 
from the initial trial to final appeal.1099  
 
 
11.3 Malabo Protocol Ratification  
 
Regardless of the accountability increase the ICLS offers it is prevented from being 
achieved because the Malabo Protocol has not entered into force.  
 
                                                        
1095 Amnesty International (n 1) 25. 
1096 Interview with African State Official (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 18 May 2015). 
1097 Chapter 6.2 of this thesis.  
1098 Ibid. 
1099 Amnesty International (n 1) 26; Ssenyonjo and Nakitto (n 955) 87.  
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The AU’s ability to encourage its member states to ratify the Protocol is the biggest 
hurdle to accountability. The ACtHPR suffers from low membership which could be an 
indicator that the African Court is likely to suffer from ratification problems.1100 States 
are unable to pick and choose which African Court Section to join, and ‘if you expect 
them [African states] to ratify and become states parties to all these three chambers, 
then it becomes a problem’.1101  
 
The slow ratification of AU treaties is an ongoing problem which ‘has always been raised 
as a concern at almost every [AU] Summit, that we [African states] are not ratifying our 
own conventions. We are very good at creating all these instruments, but we don’t want 
to become state parties’.1102 Reasons for this include rationalism, constructivism and 
liberalism, but a more convincing argument is that ‘the source of a given treaty, the 
subject-matter of the treaty and the perception that a treaty threatens sovereignty’ are 
determinative factors.1103 
 
Africa’s experience with the ICC, and the UNSC’s use of the international court, makes 
the prospect of another mechanism potentially eroding sovereignty less appealing. Yet, 
Clarke’s explanation that African states ratified the Rome Statute partially because of the 
good governance requirement of international institutions points towards factors other 
than criminal justice and the threat to sovereignty as a motivation.1104  
 
Overall, the Protocol’s inclusion of individual responsibility for gross human rights 
violations, as a means to seek greater accountability, is redundant if fewer states sign up 
to the African Court. There will be an overall loss of accountability for the violations as 
even the human rights court will have lost members.1105 This is only a problem if the 
required fifteen ratifications never occur. Once the new court is in place the Assembly 
and PSC referrals can mitigate some of the accountability hurdles non-membership 
poses.1106 Admittedly this is not a perfect solution as it relies on one of the two bodies 
deciding to refer the situation.  
 
                                                        
1100 Ssenyonjo and Nakitto (n 955) 90. 
1101 Interview with African State Official (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 29 April 2015). 
1102 Ibid.  
1103 Abass, ‘The Proposed International Criminal Jurisdiction’ (n 1040) 38. 
1104 Clarke, ‘Why Africa?’ (n 147) 326-332. 
1105 Ssenyonjo and Nakitto (n 955) 91.  
1106 Chapter 12.1 of this thesis.  
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11.4 Conclusion 
 
The ICLS offers a more comprehensive form of accountability than the ICC. Corporate 
criminal liability brings those actors complicit in numerous African conflicts within the 
court’s jurisdiction, achieving a more holistic accountability that is reflective of African 
reality. At the same time, the fourteen crimes address a plethora of issues hindering 
justice, development and peace and security. Removing the context insensitive approach 
of the ICC the new court’s accountability adopts a region centric approach in an attempt 
to address the problems which the international community and the ICC have no 
appetite for.  
 
ICLS accountability offers solutions to the international system’s shortcomings, but to 
achieve them and fulfil its purpose, the court and African states will need to tackle 
numerous obstacles. Most notably the organisation’s financial constraints and the 
impact this has on the sustainability of the ICLS. A sufficient number of judges needs to 
be provided and all personnel should be suitably trained and qualified. None of the 
challenges are insurmountable should the AU and its member states genuinely commit 
to the new court.   
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Chapter 12  
The African Court and Complementarity 
 
 
The principle of complementarity encourages domestic prosecutions of international 
crimes, leaving international judicial mechanisms as a last resort. In Chapter 6, this 
thesis identified flaws in the international court’s approach which undermines the 
complementarity principle. The ICC admissibility criteria is so narrowly interpreted that 
investigations and prosecutions have been limited. The international court fares no 
better even when complementarity is considered as a big idea or policy approach. The 
ICC actively discouraged national prosecutions and implemented no capacity 
development to speak of. The result is a system promulgating state dependencies on the 
ICC by undermining African ownership, while prioritising the OTP’s interests.  
 
Does the Malabo Protocol address these shortcomings? To answer this the chapter 
investigates how the court approaches complementarity at the national, (sub)regional 
and international levels. The next undertaking is the examination of the ICLS’ 
admissibility criteria for any similarities to the ICC’s, followed by the impact this has on 
accountability. The final point considered is whether there is an ICLS policy approach to 
complementarity which can rectify the ICC’s inadequacies on the matter.  
 
 
12.1 The Levels of Complementarity  
 
Both the ICC and ICLS place the primary responsibility for prosecutions with national 
courts,1107 but the Malabo Protocol extends the principle of complementarity still further. 
The ICLS’ jurisdiction is complementary to ‘National Courts, and to the Courts of the 
Regional Economic Communities where specifically provided for by the 
Communities’.1108 This creates three levels of prosecutions: the continental level (the 
ICLS); the (sub)regional level (the REC/RMs); and the national level (domestic courts). 
Missing from the complementarity provision is the international level (the ICC). 
                                                        
1107 Article 17 Rome Statute and Article 46H ACS. 
1108 Article 46H(1) ACS.  
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Whether this affects the solutions offered by the Protocol in addressing the ICC 
shortcomings is scrutinised with reference to the levels of complementarity and AU 
working practices.  
 
12.1.1 National and (Sub)Regional Complementarity 
 
This section delves into the national and (sub)regional level of complementarity. The 
ICLS continues the trend of primary responsibility lying with the state, only stepping in 
when this method has failed.  
 
Part of the new court’s purpose is to strengthen peace and security, a matter which the 
AU works collaboratively on with the REC/RMs.1109 Article 46H(1) recognises this and 
continues the working practice, minus the hierarchical relationship usually adopted 
between the AU and REC/RMs.1110 At present, this contributes little to the international 
system’s shortcomings as none of the REC/RMs courts have criminal jurisdiction.1111 
Albeit, the East African Court of Justice was rumoured to be extending its jurisdiction to 
include individual criminal liability.1112 The inclusion of the REC/RMs may seem 
premature, but the Malabo Protocol creates an opportunity to widen accountability by 
encompassing the (sub)regional level, preventing future conflicts of interest.  
 
                                                        
1109 The AU recognises eight REC/RMs: Arab Maghreb Union; Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa; Community of Sahel–Saharan States; East African Community; Economic 
Community of Central African States; Economic Community of West African States; 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development; Southern African Development Community.  
1110 Articles IV(iii) and (iv), and Article XX(i) Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in 
the Area of Peace and Security between the African Union, the Regional Economic Communities 
and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and North 
Africa (hereafter AU REC/RMs MOU). 
1111 There is no known REC/RM court which has successfully adopted international crimes into its 
court’s jurisdiction. The (sub)regions are unopposed to expanding jurisdiction, however, they are 
waiting to see how the ICLS functions to learn from the new court’s experience and hopefully 
receive support. Discussion with participant judge at the ‘Geographies of Justice Workshop’ 
hosted by the Peace and Security Training Centre, Institute of Security Studies, Ethiopia, 
November 2014.  
1112 Despite claims the East African Community had extended the East African Court of Justice’s 
jurisdiction, the court does not appear to have been endowed with it and  the court’s website 
makes no reference to international crimes <http://eacj.org/?page_id=27> accessed 30 June 2016; 
Christabel Ligam ‘EACJ to handle criminal offences’ (The East African 7 December 2013) 
<http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/EACJ-to-handle-criminal-offences/-/2558/2103006/-
/bkbsq5/-/index.html> accessed 30 June 2016. 
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If the REC/RMs courts introduce criminal jurisdiction ‘there is going to be a proliferation 
of courts to try international crimes’,1113 with overlapping state membership.1114 This could 
negate the broadening of accountability by encouraging additional mechanisms to 
pursue prosecutions, opening the ICLS up to delays and/or obstructing its ability to 
exercise jurisdiction. This can be minimised by adopting memorandums of 
understanding (MOUs) or formal policies on cooperation and with the interpretation of 
the admissibility criteria.1115 Additionally, if more courts exist and work collaboratively 
ICL will be improved as the number of prosecutions is likely to increase, impacting on 
retribution, deterrence, peace and security and TJ.  
 
Overall, the broader complementarity approach encourages a wider range of actors to 
take ownership of justice initiatives and increase accountability.  
 
12.1.2 International Complementarity 
 
The Malabo Protocol is silent over any international level complementarity. As the new 
court seeks to encourage prosecutions, criticism of the lack of reference to the ICC is 
unsurprising. The Protocol could be seen as the AU’s way of substituting the 
international court,1116 which would diminish African voices and authority regarding ICC 
governance.1117 This chapter argues that by exploring the Protocol, such critiques are 
superficial, demonstrating an inaccurate understanding of the AU’s background and the 
ICLS’ relationship with the ICC. For example, the ICLS’ immunity provision prevents the 
prosecution of certain senior state officials and Heads of State and Government.1118 This 
impedes the court from becoming a substitute as there is no competing jurisdiction over 
such individuals.1119 
 
Certain African states argued for a provision setting out the relationship, but ‘those who 
are not state parties to the ICC, they didn’t want to mention anything in the protocol 
                                                        
1113 Interview with African State Official (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 8 May 2015). 
1114 Abass, ‘The Proposed International Criminal Jurisdiction’ (n 1040) 45.  
1115 Section 12.3 of this chapter. 
1116 Amnesty International (n 1) 9. 
1117 du Plessis, ‘A New Regional International Criminal Court’ (n 2) 293. 
1118 Ssenyonjo and Nakitto (n 955) 94. 
1119 For more on immunity see Chapter 14.  
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talking about the ICC, saying that it is a neo-colonialist instrument’.1120 The compromise 
was an administrative agreement,1121 but the uncertainty surrounding the issue means 
African states do not ‘understand how [the ICLS] was going to affect those who are 
already state parties [to the ICC] and how is it going to work with the ICC’.1122   
 
If the Malabo Protocol enters into force, ‘there are going to be two courts […] and we are 
going to be the same state parties to the two instruments’,1123 and the jurisdictional 
conflicts will need to be addressed. Treaties do not bind third parties,1124 placing the ICC 
beyond the AU’s remit as the organisation cannot impose its will on the international 
court without the ICC’s consent. Given the lack of guidance, despite states calling for 
clarification on the matter,1125 the Malabo Protocol has done itself a disservice. The 
uncertainty regarding the relationship is a major barrier to ratification with negative 
implications for accountability and for the new court fulfilling its purpose.  
 
The lack of international complementarity does not narrow accountability as it is not the 
first time an AU treaty does not mention an international actor with concurrent 
competence on a matter. The UNSC has primacy over the maintenance of international 
peace and security,1126 yet the AU’s RECs MoU on Peace and Security1127 and The Protocol 
Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union 
(PSC Protocol) grants the AU ‘primary responsibility for promoting peace, security and 
stability in Africa’.1128 Clearly in violation of the UNCh and international law, two 
interpretations can be used: that the AU does not seek to conflict with Article 24(1) 
UNCh;1129 or more accurately, given the PSC Protocol Article 17’s  recognition of the 
UNSC, Article 16 is situated within the principle of subsidiarity and the hierarchical 
relationship between the AU and the REC/RMs.1130 Both AU and REC/RMs highest 
                                                        
1120 Interview with African State Official (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 8 May 2015). 
1121 Ibid. 
1122 Interview with African State Official (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 29 April 2015). 
1123 Interview with African State Official (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 8 May 2015). 
1124 Article 34 VCLT.  
1125 Interview African State Official (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 29 April 2015). 
1126 UNCh Chapter VIII deals with regional organizations and Article 24 grants the UNSC ‘primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security’.   
1127 Article IV(ii) AU REC/RMs MOU. 
1128 Article 16 PSC Protocol.  
1129 Abass, ‘African Peace and Security Architecture’ (n 24). 
1130 Article IV(iii) and (iv), and Article XX(i) AU REC/RMs MOU. 
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decision-making bodies are composed of Heads of State and Government, legally 
permitting them to agree to the hierarchical relationship.  
 
There is no hierarchical relationship between international courts and the ICC is willing 
to assist and work with the new court. However, ‘there is still some resistance to involve 
[them]’,1131 which the AU can be faulted for. It may be possible to interpret the Malabo 
Protocol in such a way as to take into account the legitimate concerns over the ICC while 
at the same time incorporating the ICC into complementarity decisions. If so, this would 
contribute to the ICLS’ ability to offer a solution to the ICC’s narrow application of the 
complementarity principle.  
 
 
12.2 Complementarity as an Admissibility Criteria  
 
Can the ICLS admissibility criteria provide an interpretation which includes the ICC at 
the same time as addressing the international system’s shortcomings?  
 
Unlike the Rome Statute, the Malabo Protocol explicitly refers to complementarity in 
Article 46H. The admissibility criteria, based on the Rome Statute,1132 sets out the test for 
when the ICLS can exercise its complementary jurisdiction: 
 
a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a 
State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the 
State is unwilling or unable to carry out the 
investigation or prosecution; 
b) The case has been investigated by a State which 
has jurisdiction over it and the State has decided 
not to prosecute the person concerned, unless 
the decision resulted from the unwillingness or 
inability of the State to prosecute; 
c) The person concerned has already been tried for 
conduct which is the subject of the complaint; 
d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify 
further action by the Court.1133 
 
                                                        
1131 Interview with ICC Official (The Hague, The Netherlands, 16 February 2016). 
1132 Article 17(1) Rome Statute.  
1133 Article 46H(2) ACS. 
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The criteria seek to ensure primary responsibility for prosecutions remains with states, 
and the ICLS as a court of last resort. Subsections a) and b) set out the two-part 
complementarity test taken at the preliminary investigative stage and when a case comes 
before the court. Mimicking the ICC provision, the first question is whether the case is 
being investigated or prosecuted; and second, is the state in question unwilling or unable 
to prosecute. Subsections c) and d) cover the non bis in idem principle and gravity 
respectively.  
 
A problem with the Protocol’s drafting process is the copy and paste approach adopted.  
Provisions from the Rome Statute are copied into the Protocol which contradict with its 
other provisions, purposes and aims. For example, despite the Malabo Protocol including 
complementary jurisdiction with the REC/RMs courts Article 46H refers to states only. 
The implication being only national investigations and prosecutions are applicable, 
which is illogical because the Protocol and the AU seek to develop an ecosystem of 
judicial mechanisms. By only including states the ICLS’ contribution to addressing the 
ICC’s shortcomings is limited as it does not encourage prosecutions by the REC/RMs and 
ignores the international court’s role in ending impunity.  
 
Part of the ICC’s admissibility criteria includes the ‘same person same conduct’ test, 
which Chapter 6 concluded narrows accountability and reduces ownership by African 
states. The ability of the ICLS to offer a solution to these shortcomings depends on it 
adopting alternative interpretations.  
 
There is no obligation to follow other international courts’ judgments, although 
decisions of the ICJ and regional human rights courts are ‘given great deference and 
considered ‘highly persuasive’’.1134 The ICC considers external decisions to be merely 
persuasive,1135 only considering them when no precedent from within the court’s own 
jurisprudence exists.1136  
 
                                                        
1134  Stewart Manley, ‘Referencing Patterns at the International Criminal Court’, (2016) 27 EJIL 191, 
196. 
1135 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Decision) ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, Trial Chamber, (14 
March 2012) para 603. 
1136 D Terris, C Romano and L Swigart, The International Judge: An Introduction to the Men and 
Women Who Decide the World’s Cases (OUP 2007) 120.  
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A different interpretation of the ‘same person same conduct’ test is therefore possible. If 
done to prevent replication of the international court’s restriction on sovereignty, which 
hinders a bottom up approach to cases, accountability and ownership would be 
improved.  
 
Additionally, whereas the ICC’s admissibility criteria shape national prosecutions to 
mirror its own,1137 the new court can use a more context sensitive approach by working 
with national and (sub)regional courts to inform the same person same conduct test 
decisions. This will increase accountability by adhering to a more successful division of 
labour than the ICC accomplishes. A by-product of a more active division of labour is the 
reduction in the need for ICLS prosecutions helping relieve some of the financial 
pressures on the new court while improving continental capacity. This would advance TJ 
as well as positively contributing to ICL’s development. 
 
The ICC’s application of the ‘unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation 
or prosecution’1138 test is problematic. The Lubanga case and the Uganda situation raise 
doubts over whether the ‘genuinely’ aspect of the test has been consistently applied.1139 
The Malabo Protocol has removed the term “genuinely”, but despite the criticism that 
this will open the floodgates1140 the actual impact will be minimal because the guidance 
for determining unwilling and unable is identical to that under the Rome Statute.1141 The 
ICLS will need to protect itself from states claiming inability for self-serving political 
reasons and should refrain from pursuing cases as a means to justify its own existence 
and undermining the purpose of ICL.  
 
Overall, the new court’s admissibility criteria can offer a solution to the ICC’s narrow 
interpretation of the test to encourage prosecutions and broaden accountability. What it 
does not do is provide an express method by which to include complementarity at the 
international and (sub)regional level.  
 
 
                                                        
1137 Chapter 6 of this thesis.  
1138 Article 17(1)(a) Rome Statute. 
1139 Chapter 6.1.3 of this thesis.  
1140 Abass, ‘The Proposed International Criminal Jurisdiction’ (n 1040) 44. 
1141 Compare Article 46H(3) and (4) ACS with Article 17(2) and (3) Rome Statute. 
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12.3 The Inclusion of the ICC and REC/RMs  
 
How can the ICLS attempt to address the ICC’s shortcomings without any direct 
reference to the international court? There are two ways this can be achieved: through 
the court’s cooperation and assistance provision; and judicial interpretation of the 
admissibility criteria. 
 
12.3.1 International Cooperation and Assistance 
 
Article 46L(3) entitles the ICLS ‘to seek cooperation or assistance … [from] regional or 
international courts, non-States Parties or co-operating partners of the African Union’. 
This provision reflects the AU’s dissatisfaction with the ICC’s work and relationship with 
Africa. The international court has done little to improve national, let alone regional or 
continental, capacity to prosecute international crimes and build a strong judiciary.  
 
Article 46L(3) provides an opportunity for the kind of cooperation and assistance many 
had hoped the ICC would provide and for which national judiciaries have criticised the 
international court for.1142 For example, in response to the ICC ASP President’s concerns 
over the new court an African state official explained  
 
What [the ICC] needs to do, because they [the ASP President] were 
concerned that now they were going to have a court that competes with 
them […] is to mobilize funding internationally to assist member states to 
improve the justice systems so that we have the capacity to try these 
crimes, and make sure that all of us, we have signed and ratified, we 
domesticate the Rome statute, and that, most parties, most countries 
would eventually sign, then you would have universal jurisdiction […] she 
said it was not a primary mandate. 
 
Where the ICC shied away from mutual cooperation and assistance, Article 46L(3) 
encourages all courts and actors involved in fighting impunity within African to work 
together, increasing accountability and African ownership over the process. If the ICLS 
uses the provision, and receives genuine support and assistance from AU partners and 
other courts including the ICC, there is the potential to reduce African dependency on 
donors and the international court’s prosecutions. This would support TJ and improve 
                                                        
1142 Clark, ‘Chasing Cases’ (n 497) 1190-6. 
 
 
231
peace and security if the bodies work collaboratively, both objectives of establishing 
international courts. 
 
The ICC does nothing to address the capacity of Africa to pursue prosecutions. The ICLS’ 
cooperation and assistance provision enables the new court to approach Africa specific 
courts like the residual mechanisms for the ICTR and the SCSL as well as other non-
African courts. This increases institutional knowledge and helps the ICLS learn from 
other courts and domestic prosecutions, something the Malabo Protocol has been 
accused of not doing.1143  
 
Article 46L(3) removes aspects of the political difficulties in including the ICC directly by 
setting out a relationship in which Africa benefits. To avoid repeating ICC mistakes the 
ICLS will need to address the reluctance of the AU and certain members to engage with 
the international court, as evidenced by the organisation’s resistance to setting up an 
ICC liaison office at the AU and in their not seeking ICC assistance when drafting the 
Malabo Protocol.1144 To be a viable solution, the new court will need to improve the 
institutional relationship than currently exists between the AU and the ICC.  
 
12.3.2 The Interpretation of the Admissibility Criteria 
 
The Malabo Protocol admissibility criteria only refers to states. This is contrary to Article 
46H(1) levels of complementarity as it ignores the REC/RMs and the ICC, replicating the 
latter’s limited approach to complementarity. The ICC has been criticised for its needless 
replication of prosecutions in relation to Simone Gbagbo following a successful national 
prosecution and, again, with the Lubanga prosecution given the ability of the DRC to try 
him.1145 Both instances have negatively impacted justice and accountability, not to 
mention the unnecessary use of scarce resources. 
 
Despite the lack of a hierarchy between international criminal courts providing ‘no legal 
reason that the ICC would defer to the ACtJHR’,1146 both the international court and the 
ICLS need to reconcile their jurisdiction to avoid competing claims and unnecessary 
                                                        
1143 Amnesty International (n 1) 15.  
1144 Joomlasupport, ‘AU rejects ICC office in Africa’ (The Observer 28 July 2010) 
<http://observer.ug/news-headlines/9485-au-rejects-icc-office-in-africa> accessed 12 May 2018.  
1145 Chapter 6.1.2 of this thesis.  
1146 Amnesty International (n 1) 22.  
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overlapping prosecutions. Can the ICLS avoid exacerbating the situation and potentially 
rectify ICC shortcomings?  
 
Miles Jackson proposes a legally sound method of bringing regional courts into the ICC 
framework which the new court can also adopt.1147 Achieved through questioning 
whether a prosecution by the ICLS can constitute a prosecution ‘by a State which has 
jurisdiction over it’ and thus, be inadmissible before the ICC.1148 Conversely, this can be 
applied by the ICLS to overcome the exclusion of the ICC and the REC/RMs and 
encourage such prosecutions.  
 
The basis of Jackson’s hypothesises is that ‘a genuine prosecution by a lawfully 
constituted regional tribunal should be seen as prosecution by a state such that the case 
is inadmissible before the ICC’.1149 To reach this conclusion, ‘the proper understanding of 
the legal relationship between states and regional tribunals and the contextualized 
application of the principles of treaty interpretation’ was applied.1150 
 
When establishing international courts states delegate their national jurisdiction to the 
legally constituted court.1151 States cannot do collectively what they are not able to 
individually,1152 but collective responses to international crimes are permitted.1153 The 
VCLT requires provisions to be interpreted using the terms ordinary meaning, taking 
into account the context, object and purpose of the treaty.1154 Since the Rome Statute is 
‘akin to the constituent instrument of an international organization […] the objectives 
assigned to the organization by its founders play a more central role’.1155  
 
Both the ICC and ICLS objectives include ending impunity while leaving primary 
responsibility for prosecutions with states. Consequently, a state’s decision to delegate 
                                                        
1147 Miles Jackson, ‘Regional Complementarity: The Rome Statute and Public International Law’ 
(2016) 14 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1061.  
1148 Article 17(1)(a) Rome Statute. For those who argue ‘state’ cannot be interpreted in any way but 
strictly see Max du Plessis, ‘Implications of the AU Decision to Give the African Court Jurisdiction 
Over International Crimes’ (2012) 235 Institute for Security Studies Paper. 
1149 Ibid abstract.  
1150 Ibid 1062. 
1151 Ibid 1066. 
1152 Ibid 1067. 
1153 Dapo Akande, ‘The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over Nationals of Non-
Parties: Legal Basis and Limits’ (2003) 1 Journal of International and Comparative Law 618, 626. 
1154 Article 31.  
1155 Ibid 1065. 
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jurisdiction to a regional court is commensurate to a state prosecuting the case. If the 
ICLS adopts this interpretation an African state which referred a matter to either a 
REC/RMs court or the ICC would be asserting ownership over the process, something 
which the ICC has undermined.  
  
Plus, complementarity has the protection of sovereignty at its core1156 and this 
interpretation sees referrals as the ‘use of sovereignty for international ends’ when 
prosecuting international crimes.1157 When a state delegates its jurisdiction to a lawfully 
constituted (sub)regional or international court it should be viewed as the state 
exercising its sovereignty.1158   
 
The AU and the new court seek to ‘defend the sovereignty … of its Member States’1159 and 
this interpretation does just that. As has been pointed out by this thesis, the genuineness 
of the ICC self-referrals has been called into question.1160 The ICLS should take this into 
account to prevent political manipulation by a state and should not pursue cases to 
justify its own existence.1161 
 
On the whole, Article 46H’s omission of reference to the ICC and REC/RMs can be 
overcome. By encouraging prosecutions at the national, (sub)regional, continental and 
international level the ICLS offers a solution to the narrow focus of investigations and 
prosecutorial efforts of the ICC while positively contributing to ICL. 
 
 
12.4 The Implications of Complementarity for Accountability 
 
The ICLS’ version of complementarity encompasses more mechanisms than the ICC, 
encouraging a greater division of labour. But the financial burden from multiple 
memberships and the accompanying contribution requirements may prove too 
                                                        
1156 Chapter 6 of this thesis; On how ICC goals are not always in opposition to sovereignty, see 
Jackson (n 1147) 1068. 
1157 Robert Cryer, ‘International Criminal Law vs State Sovereignty: Another Round’ (2006) 16 
European Journal of International Law 979, 986.  
1158 Jackson (n 1147) 1069. 
1159 Article 3(b) AUCA. 
1160 Chapter 6.1.3 of this thesis.  
1161 Clark, ‘Chasing Cases’ (n 497). 
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cumbersome for some African states,1162 especially for those already struggling to meet 
their current contribution obligations.1163 This may be at the expense of accountability as 
the various mechanisms become financially unsustainable.   
 
For ICLS complementarity to be a solution to the ICC’s shortcomings such burdens will 
have to be minimised, if not fully overcome.  
 
The concern over the onerous costs implementing legislation place on states1164 is 
disproportionate to what is actually required. Neither the Rome Statute nor the Malabo 
Protocol obligate states to enact implementing legislation, only requiring cooperation.1165 
The apprehension over the necessary work required to draft the legislation is not 
convincing.1166 When the Rome Statute was adopted the same issues would have applied 
and, if raised, would likely have been seen as an excuse to avoid addressing impunity. 
 
For the states which have already adopted ICC implementing legislation, little work 
needs to be done in relation to the core crimes because the ICLS provisions closely 
resemble the Rome Statute. These states and the new court ‘cannot ignore jurisprudence 
that has been established by the ICC or other tribunals, so if anything, […] if they’ve got 
progress, they can only improve’.1167  
 
If states chose to adopt implementing legislation for the non-core crimes more work will 
be required. Yet, as the crimes are based on existing suppression treaties states should 
have started to address the issues already, which would only improve accountability both 
nationally and continentally in the long run. It may also contribute to reconciliation by 
re-enforcing acceptable norms and standards to be applied to such prosecutions. 
 
The Malabo Protocol reflects the AU’s objective to encourage the harmonisation of laws 
amongst its Members. This would increase capacity and the potential of national 
prosecutions if the offences are incorporated into domestic law by removing the need to 
                                                        
1162 du Plessis, ‘A case of negative regional complementarity’ (n 1). 
1163 Ekott (n 1066). 
1164 Amnesty International (n 1) 29.  
1165 Nouwen, Complementarity in the Line of Fire (n 582) 20.  
1166 Amnesty International (n 1) 29.  
1167 Interview with ICC Official (The Hague, The Netherlands, 16 February 2016). 
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rely on UJ and international courts to pursue such cases. In turn, emphasising that 
primary responsibility to prosecute lies with states.  
 
If the above, onerous cost critique, had raised concerns over the desirability of 
harmonising laws that would be different. But, as the Malabo Protocol does not require 
implementing legislation the criticism is based on a misunderstanding as well as being 
an unconvincing argument.  
 
 
12.5 The Notion of Positive Complementarity 
 
The ICC coined the term positive complementarity which encompasses the promotion of 
national prosecutions alongside the OTP’s preliminary examinations, investigations and 
trials.1168 But the ICC has not lived up to this, which has been compounded by the 
narrowing of the concept by the ASP’s report on complementarity.1169  
 
Does the Malabo Protocol offer a fix for this? Nothing explicitly refers to positive 
complementarity but a similar omission did not prevent the ICC OTP from developing 
the approach.1170  
 
The ICC has decided capacity building is beyond its mandate, but this is not so for the 
ICLS. Part of the new court’s purpose is to build capacity and advance AU aims and 
objectives, providing a legal argument for positive complementarity’s applicability. This 
reflects a TJ approach to prosecutions and justice as well as the contribution to peace 
and security justification for international courts. 
 
The AU Decisions and Reports call on states to develop national capacity and ‘ensure 
that they investigate or prosecute … [as they] should explore the full range of options for 
deliver[ing] local justice before considering recourse to international tribunals’.1171 The 
need for the capacity and capability improvement was to limit the use of the ICC ‘except 
                                                        
1168 Chapter 6.2 of this thesis 
1169 See n 645.  
1170 Chapter 6.2 of this thesis. 
1171 Report of the Commission on the Meeting of States Parties to the Rome Statute on the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) [Assembly/AU/DEC.221 (XII)] Assembly/AU/13(XIII) 
MinICC/Rpt. R7. 
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when it deems that national courts are unable or unwilling, thereby avoid[ing] the 
perception of foreign interference in African affairs’.1172 
 
Also, the decisions, documents and reports addressing justice, peace and security find 
capacity building is a crucial step for states reclaiming ownership over international 
criminal justice and development. It provides the opportunity to incorporate African 
values and norms into the processes, contextualise the situations, and enables a 
balancing of accountability and reconciliation at the national level.  
 
There is also a need for the court to undertake this role based on the new court’s 
inability to prosecute Heads of State and Government and senior state officials. The 
respective state’s national courts are the only other option, besides the ICC, which can 
pursue such prosecutions and should be supported in such endeavours. While it is 
unlikely a state will prosecute its own Head of State or Government, the Habré 
precedent shows the need for creating a judicial system capable of such prosecutions for 
when it does become viable. This will help address accountability and the gap left by the 
Protocol’s immunity provision.1173   
 
The ICLS has a clear mandate to undertake capacity building, which can help rectify the 
undermining of national prosecutions by the ICC and the dependencies created by 
keeping the international court’s expertise in house. This would follow the capacity 
development experienced in Sierra Leone with the SCSL as opposed to the ICC’s practice. 
 
The African Court is likely to be underfunded and a positive complementarity approach 
can minimise the impact of this on accountability. By building national and REC/RMs 
capacity more robust judicial systems will emerge, alleviating the dependency on both 
the ICC and the ICLS over time. This will reduce financial pressures on the new court if 
prosecutions were not its main focus but instead the concentration would be on capacity 
development and investigative and prosecutorial assistance. 
 
 
                                                        
1172 Progress Report of the Commission on the Implementation of Decision 
Assembly/AU/Dec.270(XIV) on the Second Ministerial Meeting on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) – EX.CL/607(XVII) para 14. 
1173 On the immunity provision’s impact on accountability see Chapter 14 of this thesis. 
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12.6 Conclusion  
 
The strength of the ICLS is in its more inclusive approach to complementarity than the 
international court, reflecting the continental structure and addressing certain ICC 
shortcomings.  
 
The most significant way the Protocol’s complementarity offers a solution to the ICC’s 
limitations is by helping to build national and (sub)regional capacity, increasing 
ownership, African expertise and knowledge of ICL and investigative techniques, At the 
same time creating a continental ecosystem to address justice, peace, and security 
thereby positively contributing to the international system. 
 
The ability of the new court to take a different interpretation to the admissibility criteria 
than that of the ICC creates the opportunity to rectify the international court’s 
narrowing of accountability and prosecutorial focus. The ‘same person same conduct’ 
test can be reinterpreted by the ICLS in a manner which promotes ownership and 
encourages accountability at the national and (sub)regional level. By preventing 
unnecessary overlaps in prosecutions, complementarity and accountability will be 
improved as the different courts have more freedom to help end impunity. More 
prosecutions before various judicial mechanisms create additional opportunity for the 
retributive aspects of ICL to be achieved, possibly contributing to deterrence, and 
improving peace and security by ensuring victims do not perceive perpetrators as 
enjoying impunity and thus reducing the likelihood of conflicts re-emerging.  
 
The court does not use its complementarity provision to position itself as an alternative 
to the ICC. The lack of reference to the international court should not be overstated or 
used to argue the ICLS is anti-ICC and anti-accountability. What the Malabo Protocol 
has done is to set out a cooperation and assistance relationship with the international 
court to minimise the chance of the ICC continuing to undermine national prosecutions 
and decrease the continent’s dependency on it. This shifts the approach away from 
Africa’s subjugation towards ownership and collaboration.  
 
By adopting Jackson’s proposal on how to interpret ‘state’ under the admissibility criteria 
the new court can encourage prosecutions, protect sovereignty and avoid conflicts of 
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interest with the ICC. In turn, both the ICC and ICLS can fulfil their purpose and create a 
true division of labour for international prosecutions.   
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Chapter 13  
Reasserting African Ownership  
 
 
The ICC has a context insensitive approach which has undermined African states’ efforts 
at pursuing accountability and has ignored the AU’s attempts to address conflict 
situations. The result has been the creation of dependencies on the international court at 
the expense of African capacity, further marginalising Africa and subjecting it to double 
standards in the fight against impunity. Does the ICLS provide solutions to these 
shortcomings and also increase ownership?  
 
To answer this, this chapter investigates whether the accountability and 
complementarity approaches of the new court contribute any resolutions. The ICLS 
position within the AU judicial organ is then explored to gauge whether this creates any 
opportunities which can address the ICC’s shortcomings at the same time as furthering 
the new court’s purpose. The meaning of ownership used here is the same as that 
employed in Chapter 7 – having a stake in the international justice and peace and 
security initiatives as opposed to complete control over the courts and international 
system.1174 
 
 
 13.1 The ICLS’ Accountability Approach and Complementarity 
 
Chapter 11 has shown how the ICLS offers a wider form of accountability than the ICC. 
The ability of the court to pursue both individuals and corporations for core and non-
core crimes provides a more robust method to address the underlying causes of conflict 
and improve peace and security. Does this contribute to ownership and provide a 
solution to the ICC’s shortcomings?  
 
Possibly one of the biggest improvements to ownership is how the non-core crimes 
address Clarke’s criticism that the ICC crimes shield Western states from their 
                                                        
1174 Chapter 7 of this thesis. 
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complicity in African resource conflicts.1175 This broader range of crimes are more 
reflective of the violations occurring within Africa than of those offences and 
prosecutions pursued by the ICC. The non-core crimes also recognise those African 
concerns that the international community is unwilling to pursue,1176 providing a more 
region-centric approach to the crimes. Plus, the impact of the ICC’s narrow focus on 
accountability is minimised without challenging the international court directly.1177   
 
The inclusion of corporate criminal liability further exposes corporate actors’ complicity 
and role in conflicts, enabling African states and the AU to overcome some of the 
hurdles to peace and security ignored by the ICC and international system.  
 
 
13.2 Ownership Through Accountability and Complementarity 
 
The ICC has undermined capacity development with its restrictive interpretation of the 
admissibility criteria and its limited approach to positive complementarity. The 
international court is unable (and perhaps unwilling) to recognise the continental 
structure and roles of the AU and REC/RMs in pursuing justice, peace and security. In 
contrast, the ICLS adopts a more inclusive approach in an attempt to encourage 
prosecutions at the national and (sub)regional level. Does this contribute solutions to 
the ICC’s shortcomings?  
 
The ICLS is mandated to assist in building state capacity, which is the single most 
effective way to promote ownership. For states to have a stake in the justice and 
accountability process there needs to be relevant expertise and capabilities to pursue 
prosecutions and other peace and security initiatives. The new court is perfectly 
positioned to make use of its comparative advantage as part of the regional organisation 
that brings together all the REC/RMs and states to develop expertise, share best practices 
and act as a repository for methods for addressing justice, peace and security. The ICC is 
neither in the position to nor willing to take on this role.  
 
                                                        
1175 Clarke, ‘Is the ICC targeting Africa’ (n 681). 
1176 Chapter 10 of this thesis.  
1177 Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
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By not positioning itself as a competitor court to the ICC the ICLS’ complementarity 
provision promotes ownership through reflecting the continental structure and working 
relationships between the different African actors. For example, the harmonious and 
complementary role of the ICLS is supported by the African Court’s objective to 
‘complement the protective mandate of the’ African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR).1178 While the Human Rights Section of the African Court deals 
specifically with human rights issues ICL has human rights elements to it,1179 which the 
new court can address in the form of individual responsibility for state-based violations. 
Furthering the IHR and IHL understanding of ICL and justifying international courts 
through the peace and security approach and TJ’s moral universalism and political 
liberalism basis. 
 
The ICC’s undermining of national prosecutions and ignoring of AU efforts to address 
the situations in Sudan and Libya reduced African ownership.1180 To encourage a more 
equal relationship with the international court, the UN and other actors, Article 46L(3) 
carves out a cooperation and assistance approach whereby neither the agency of the new 
court nor its ownership of the process is challenged. This reinforces the lack of a 
hierarchical relationship between international criminal courts, a point which at times 
seems to be overlooked. 
 
Despite heavy criticism of the Protocol for not referencing the ICC,1181 adopting Jackson’s 
rethinking of the admissibility criteria provides a sound method to bring the ICC and 
REC/RMs into the ICLS framework. Thinking of state referrals as an act of sovereignty in 
delegating their responsibility to prosecute promotes ownership if a state freely decides 
to self-refer. 
 
The Malabo Protocol offers solutions to redress the ICC’s undermining of ownership 
through an inclusive approach to complementarity with the national, (sub)regional, 
continental and international levels working together. 
 
 
                                                        
1178 Article 4 Malabo Protocol. 
1179 M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Criminal Law Volume I: Sources Subjects and Contents (3rd 
edn, Martinus NIjhoff 2008) 157.   
1180 Chapters 6.1.2 and 7.1 of this thesis. 
1181 See Chapter 12.1.2 of this thesis. 
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13.4 The Court’s Placement within the African Union  
 
The ICLS is in a unique position that no other international criminal court has been able 
to benefit from – its inclusion in a regional organisation’s court. Chapter 10 has already 
shown the impact this has on the expanded purpose of the court and by situating the 
court into the overall organisational structure, and applying the AU’s concept of justice, 
a more holistic understanding of the new court is achieved. In turn, many of the 
ownership and agency challenges can be addressed.  
 
This thesis does not argue that the politicisation of international criminal justice in and 
of itself is detrimental. Rather, a bias one-sided application which replicates the 
inequality of the international system does a disservice to ICL by delegitimising the 
associated judicial mechanisms. This was seen in Part II of this thesis where the UNSC, 
NATO, former ICC Prosecutor and the self-referring states sought to manipulate the type 
of accountability pursued. While the AU’s linking of peace, security and justice 
automatically politicises the initiatives, if safeguards are put in place to limit the negative 
aspects it is not a fait accompli that the political challenges faced by the ICC and its 
relationship with the UNSC will be replicated with the new court. 
 
Does the AU’s notion of justice address the international system’s ownership 
shortcomings? 
 
Peace and security form a basis for the establishment of international criminal courts,1182 
and they are fundamental to the AU.1183 As such, the notion of justice incorporates peace 
and reconciliation as inseparable elements because durable peace requires both 
accountability and reconciliation.1184 This interlinking shifts the new court’s purpose 
from the original ICL ones to include transitional justice aims. Broader than the ICC’s 
purpose the ICLS’ objectives include 
 
strengthening the commitment of the Africa Union to promote sustained 
peace, security and stability on the Continent and to promote justice and 
human and peoples’ rights as an aspect of their efforts to promote the 
objectives of the political and socio-economic integration and 
                                                        
1182 See Chapter 1.2 of this thesis.  
1183 Chapter 2.1 of this thesis.  
1184 Mbeki Report 2. 
 
 
243
development of the Continent with a view to realizing the ultimate 
objective of a United States of Africa.1185  
 
The ICLS is expected to advance the policy and ideological underpinnings of the AU, 
while at the same time the new court can develop its own identity through how it 
interprets and promotes the organisation’s objectives to reinforce the continental 
principles and values.1186 For example, the non-core crimes originating from AU/OAU 
instruments can increase ownership by interpreting the elements in line with the 
continental context.  
 
Where within the AU’s framework should the ICLS sit to solidify the Malabo Protocol’s 
approach to ownership and offer a viable solution to the ICC’s shortcomings? The new 
court needs to be situated alongside other AU institutions which complement its 
purpose and mandate.  
 
 
13.5 The African Peace and Security Architecture  
 
This section explores the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and its 
capabilities to assess whether the ICLS should be situated within this framework. APSA’s 
focus is ‘built around structures, objectives, principles and values, as well as decision-
making processes relating to the prevention, management and resolution of crises and 
conflicts, post-conflict reconstruction and development’,1187 which ICLS’ purposes 
complement.1188 To help APSA discharge its broad mandate, five pillars (composed of AU 
organs and bodies) are used: the PSC,1189 the Commission,1190 the Panel of the Wise,1191 the 
                                                        
1185 Preamble Malabo Protocol. 
1186 Article 31 and 32 VCLT. 
1187 AU, African Peace and Security Architecture: African Union’s blue print for the promotion of 
peace, security and stability in Africa <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/african-peace-and-
security-architecture-apsa-final.pdf> accessed 28 June 2017.  
1188 The AU’s different approach to framing conflict analysis through a criminal and political lens 
shapes the promotion of TJ over the UN and ICC’s exclusive criminalisation focus. Nouwen, ‘The 
Importance of Frames’ (n 890). 
1189 Article 6 and 7 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the 
African Union (hereafter PSC Protocol). 
1190 Article 10 PSC Protocol. 
1191 Article 11 PSC Protocol. 
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Continental Early Warning system,1192 the African Standby Force,1193 and the Peace 
Fund.1194 
 
Despite not being included in the AUCA, the APSA gained prominence through the 
PSC,1195 whose goal is to ‘enhance our capacity to address the scourge of conflict […] and 
to ensure that Africa, through the African Union, plays a central role in […] peace, 
security and stability’.1196 As the PSC is the ‘standing decision-making organ for the 
prevention, management and resolution of conflicts’1197 it is key to addressing impunity 
and promoting ownership. 
 
How does APSA achieve its goal and does it improve ownership? Roadmaps have been 
adopted which set out the approach to be taken, supported by each of the five pillars.1198 
Most recently the 2016-2020 APSA Roadmap (hereafter the Roadmap) uses the PCRD to 
conceptually link justice within the APSA.1199 The Roadmap seeks to improve self-
reliance and promote Pan-Africanism through consensus and synergy between the AU 
and the REC/RMs.1200 The ICLS supports this through its complementary provision and 
the relationship envisioned with the REC/RMs courts.  
 
A strategic priority is to engage in conflict prevention through ‘addressing the root, 
proximate and structural causes of conflict’,1201 in particular narcotics, piracy, human 
trafficking and small arms proliferation which the new court’s crimes cover. A clear link 
is therefore made for a peace and security justification for establishing the new court. 
Cooperation amongst states is the best method to combat these crimes, therefore 
regional and continental legislation makes sense as it offers a means to address these 
issues. A benefit of such legislative measures is the removal of the dependence on 
bilateral agreements while imposing minimum standards. 
 
                                                        
1192 Article 12 PSC Protocol. 
1193 Article 13 PSC Protocol.  
1194 Article 21 PSC Protocol. 
1195 Article 2 PSC Protocol. This protocol also provides the legal basis for APSA. 
1196 Preamble PSC Protocol. 
1197 Article 2 PSC Protocol. 
1198 The roadmaps typically cover a four-year period. 
1199 African Peace and Security Architecture Roadmap 2016-2020, 39 (hereafter Roadmap). 
1200 Roadmap, 10.  
1201 Roadmap, 23.  
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Yet, the Roadmap does not explain how to achieve its objective of ‘promot[ing] peace, 
security, and stability on the continent’,1202 and other emergency situations or restoring 
peace, short of the Assembly’s directing the Executive Council on conflict 
management.1203 This is when the AU’s notion of justice can be utilized to find ways to 
support peace and security. For example, transitional justice approaches addressing both 
peace and justice elements can be adopted as the PSC is able to: perform ‘any other 
function as may be decided by the Assembly’, including coordinating and conducting 
humanitarian action ‘to restore life to normalcy in the event of conflicts or natural 
disasters’1204 and peace building activities during and after conflicts.1205 Additionally, the 
referral powers of the Assembly and PSC provide a way to incorporate the ICLS into the 
peace and security agenda. 
 
APSA comprehensively provides an ownership role for the AU and its members states 
through addressing peace, security and justice matters. While the UNCh grants primary 
responsibility for international peace and security to the UNSC,1206 the PSC Protocol 
bestows ‘primary responsibility for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa’1207 to 
the AU. But, as this thesis concluded, this provision is not in conflict with international 
law as it should be interpreted as reflecting the hierarchical relationship between the AU 
and REC/RMs and not that of the UNSC.1208 
 
 
13.6 The ICLS in the Context of Peace and Security  
 
While the ICC finds peace and security beyond its mandate1209 the ICLS cannot ignore 
the AU’s institutional objective of promoting peace and security. Does situating the new 
court within APSA contribute to improving ownership and address the ICC’s 
shortcomings? 
 
                                                        
1202 Article 3(f) AUCA.  
1203 Article 9(g) AUCA. 
1204 Article 15 PSC Protocol. 
1205 Article 14 PSC Protocol. 
1206 UNCh Chapter VIII deals with regional organizations, and Article 24 grants the UNSC ‘primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security’.   
1207 Article 16 PSC Protocol. This was reiterated in Article IV(2) AU REC/RMs MOU. 
1208 Article 17 PSC Protocol and Chapter 12.2.2 of this thesis. 
1209 2007 Policy Paper, 8; 2003 Policy Paper, 7. 
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13.6.1 Justice, Reconciliation and Peace and Security 
 
To start with both APSA and the ICLS (through the AU’s notion of justice) see peace and 
security as important to the socio-economic development of the continent and a means 
to achieving stability. While ‘ICL does not fit as well into [the peace and security 
structure] as everyone thought’,1210 the AU has to reconcile its key mechanisms for 
addressing these issues. Unlike the ICC, which only pursues accountability, it would be 
illogical for the AU to isolate two of its key mechanisms for addressing peace, security, 
justice and reconciliation from each other. Additionally, by linking the ICLS to peace and 
security the AU is replicating the justification of the UNSC in establishing the ICTY and 
ICTR, contributing to the development of ICL and TJ. 
 
13.6.2 The Role of the PSC under the Malabo Protocol 
 
The PSC’s mandate and role within the AU structure and APSA means its referral power 
to the ICLS is significant to peace, justice and reconciliation.1211 States are able to request 
intervention by the AU to ‘restore peace and security’1212 and should the PSC determine 
criminal prosecutions necessary it can refer such situations to the court. Additionally, 
other APSA bodies can recommend the use of the new court which the PSC and 
Assembly can adopt, as happened when the Mbeki Panel called for the establishment of 
a hybrid court in Sudan.1213 
 
The ability of the AU to intervene in situations of grave concern1214 has traditionally been 
understood as meaning military intervention, reflecting states’ concerns at the time.1215  
                                                        
1210 Interview with African State Official (Pretoria, South Africa, 11 November 2015). 
1211 Article 46F ACS. 
1212 Article 4(j) AUCA.  
1213 Chapter 10.3.2.2 of this thesis. 
1214 Article 4(h) AUCA. Situations where core crimes are committed are thought to be the basis for 
such an intervention. See the proposed amendments to Art 4(h) in the Protocol on Amendments 
to the Constitutive Act of the African Union <https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7785-
treaty-0025_-
_protocol_on_the_amendments_to_the_constitutive_act_of_the_african_union_e.pdf> accessed 
23 April 2018.  
1215 Dan Kuwali, ‘The rationale for Article 4(h)’ in Dan Kuwali and Frans Viljoen (eds), Africa and 
the Responsibility to Protect: Article 4(h) of the African Union Constitutive Act (Routledge 2014); 
Dan Kuwali, ‘The meaning of ‘intervention’ under Article 4(h)’ in Dan Kuwali and Frans Viljoen 
(eds), Africa and the Responsibility to Protect: Article 4(h) of the African Union Constitutive Act 
(Routledge 2014). 
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This understanding prevents an article 4(h) intervention from including referral to the 
ICLS. However, given that the AU’s notion of justice incorporates peace and security, 
and the destructive impact of the ICC over ownership and other transitional justice 
interventions, there is a case to be made for interpreting this intervention to include 
criminal prosecutions.  
 
The need for military intervention is not completely replaced given the practicalities of 
conducting investigations and prosecutions during ongoing conflicts.1216 Here the use of 
military action to reduce the intensity of the conflict or its complete termination would 
be followed by criminal prosecutions. This is most likely a purely academic debate as the 
PSC has never taken an Article 4(h) decision despite the numerous occasions it could 
have done so.  
 
13.6.3 Reconciling AU and ICLS Objectives 
 
Unlike the ICC, the ICLS has been given a more challenging task to deliver on numerous 
objectives. It is to fight impunity, promote peace and security and address the 
underlying causes of conflict while also advancing African values and norms for a 
continent lacking monolithic cultures and needs. Two examples illustrate how situating 
the ICLS within APSA enables the new court’s purpose to be reconciled with that of the 
AU’s, promote ownership and contribute to developing ICL and TJ.  
 
First, the AU is ‘relatively, quickly, successful in the peace and security area’1217 whereas 
international prosecutions are slow.1218 The organisation’s peace and security agenda 
adopts a contextual approach to situations, including a policy of transitional justice. It 
may be that adopting a sequential approach, whereby the immediate peace and security 
challenges are dealt with first with prosecutions making up part of the subsequent 
initiative, will help address the ongoing hurdles to peace and to the underlying causes of 
the conflict. 
 
Second, the preventative objective of the ICLS is part of the AU’s objective to fight 
impunity.  The new court seeks to achieve prevention with complementary prosecutions 
                                                        
1216 Impunity Report, 11. 
1217 Interview with African State Official (Pretoria, South Africa, 11 November 2015). 
1218 Chapter 5.2.2 of this thesis.  
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by national and (sub)regional courts. While deterrence is required for prevention, for 
both the ICLS and ICC this is hard to achieve because of the lack of an enforcement 
mechanism and the uncertainty surrounding prosecution. However, APSA can support 
the work of the new court and contribute to enforcement and deterrence. A radical 
proposal, worth further research, is the use of the African Standby Force (ASF) to assist 
in the enforcement of arrest warrants.1219 As the ASF is not a peacekeeping force but 
rather a peace support force1220 there is a case to be made for such powers being within 
their mandate. Adding further weight to the proposal is the role of the PSC within the 
new court and the ability to decide on ASF involvement in situations the council has 
referred. Yet, the issue surrounding troop accountability for crimes committed while in 
situ is paramount.1221 Additionally, states may not welcome this usage of the ASF because 
of concerns over the PSC’s political manipulation.  
 
13.6.4 The Mutual Dependence between the ICLS and APSA 
 
Like the ICC, the ICLS will never be able to deliver full accountability as the new court 
‘does not mean you will have hundred percent justice […] over the ICC’.1222 Limitations in 
capacity aside, the ICLS can contribute to accountability when working together with 
national, regional and international levels. APSA’s approach to peace and security is to 
work with states, REC/RMs and international partners to achieve its goals, an experience 
that will be useful to the new court. Situating the ICLS within APSA perfectly locates the 
new court to advance the AU’s aims and policy direction as expected of it.1223 It would 
also contribute to capacity development in the area of ICL and prosecutions, an objective 
of TJ. 
                                                        
1219 The ASF was officially declared operational in June 2016. Declaration adopted during the 9th 
Ordinary Meeting Of The Specialized Technical Committee On Defence, Safety And Security held 
4 June 2016, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/9th-stcdss-final-
declaration-english-.pdf> accessed 23 April 2018.  
1220 Article 13(3) PSC Protocol.  
1221 David Smith and Paul Lewis, ‘UN peacekeepers accused of killing and rape in Central African 
Republic’ (The Guardian, 11 August 2015) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/11/un-
peacekeepers-accused-killing-rape-central-african-republic> accessed 28 June 2017; Stewart M. 
Patrick, ‘The Dark Side of UN Peacekeepers’ (Newsweek, 8 August 2015) 
<http://www.newsweek.com/why-are-un-peacekeepers-still-sexually-abusing-children-361065> 
accessed 28 June 2017; UN, ‘UN peacekeepers exempted from war crimes prosecution for another 
year’ UN News Centre (12 June 2013) 
<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=7402#.WVdveRPyveQ>  accessed 28 June 
2017.  
1222 Interview with African State Official (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 18 May 2015). 
1223 Chapter 10 of this thesis. 
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When addressing peace and security the AU is not only concerned with core 
international crimes, as the ICC is, but also the socio-economic and other underlying 
causes of conflict. The new court’s ability to promote peace and security and address the 
underlying causes of conflict, by including the non-core crimes, mirrors the aims of 
APSA. This provides a means to address concerns brought up by the Roadmap over 
conduct contributing to fragility,1224 which is beyond the mandate of the ICC. Plus, the 
ICLS’s aim to promote justice and human and peoples’ rights is linked to the root causes 
contributing to instability and conflicts. 
 
As the only permanent regional or international judicial mechanism able to address the 
underlying causes of conflict it is within this area where the new court has the greatest 
potential to contribute to justice, peace and security, and TJ. However, the effect of the 
immunity provision may limit this for both the ICLS and APSA.1225 Nevertheless, the 
inclusion of core and non-core crimes enables a more accurate representation of 
criminal liability and the reality of the situation than that provided by ICC. 
Consideration of the facilitating environment for international crimes and those actors 
involved increases the chance of an African understanding of justice being met,1226 and 
for the new court to contribute towards reconciliation, peace and security and TJ 
objectives.  
 
As this thesis concludes, the AU’s notion of justice can improve ownership over the 
justice and peace and security processes. The inclusion of non-judicial mechanisms 
means the ICLS is not exclusively responsible for the promotion of accountability and for 
ending impunity. It will be up to the new court and the REC/RMs courts to complement 
and support national systems to prosecute. The ICLS should be seen as one of many 
elements to be utilised, as appropriate, in post-conflict situations. 
 
The ICLS is only capable of dispelling criminal accountability but it can contribute to the 
AU’s broader notions of justice, including peace and security, if states cooperate and the 
full range of crimes are pursued. Should the new court find it is working in opposition to 
the AU’s notion of justice both institutions’ credibility will be reduced, negatively 
impacting ownership.  
                                                        
1224 Roadmap, 19. 
1225 Chapter 14 discusses the immunity provision and its impact on accountability.  
1226 African in the sense of what is put forward by the AU.  
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The new court’s symbolic, and real, value is in the reduction of dependencies on the 
international court and international system to address continental challenges. To 
achieve this states need to live up to their legal, political and moral obligations and by 
implementing AU decisions and instruments.1227 States cannot take a passive role while 
at the same time calling for the AU to oversee peace, security and justice, yet relegate the 
new court to the sideline through lack of membership. But, the new court ‘will never 
unite [Africa], because justice by itself, it divides, justice tries to bring forth the truth […] 
most people hate the truth, so they will always be opposed [to the ICLS]’.1228 
 
 
13.7 Conclusion 
 
The ICLS is unlike any other international criminal court. As part of the AU’s judicial 
organ it must be seen in a wider context – that of the organisation’s Pan-African ideology 
and focus on peace and security. The new court demonstrates an attempt to make ICL 
more relevant to Africa through a contextualised approach increasing the AU’s and 
states’ level of ownership, predominantly by adopting TJ justifications for its 
establishment. This has been achieved by the inclusion of non-core crimes and corporate 
criminal liability to address the underlying causes of conflict.  
 
As a means by which to address the ICC’s ownership shortcoming the ICLS can only 
achieve so much on its own. By situating the new court within the APSA its purpose can 
be better fulfilled and, more importantly, its additional objectives not applicable to the 
ICC are contextualised. For example, the role of the PSC in both APSA and the ICLS 
means there will be a permanent court which the council can make use of as part of its 
conflict and post-conflict mandate. The new court can promote peace and security while 
simultaneously fighting impunity, shifting the peace versus justice debate to reflect the 
AU’s preference for transitional justice.  
 
The AU’s notion of justice includes more than criminal prosecutions seeking to impact 
reconciliation, peace, security and socio-economic development. Whether one agrees 
with the stated objectives and aims of the Court or not, this holistic understanding and 
                                                        
1227 Interviews African State Officials (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, May - June 2015).  
1228 Interview with African State Official (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 8 May 2015). 
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placement means the ICLS becomes a key tool that states and the AU can utilise in their 
efforts to address accountability, conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction. 
 
The five pillars of APSA can be mobilised to improve capacity creating self-reliance 
within the continent in line with the Pan-African ideology. Perhaps the strongest 
argument for the Court being situated within APSA is that it will reduce current 
dependencies on an imperfect international court that replicates the inequalities Africa 
has long complained of.  
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Chapter 14  
Understanding Immunity under the Malabo Protocol 
 
 
Chapters 11 thru 13 have shown the potential for the ICLS to positively contribute to 
international criminal justice and to address the international court’s shortcomings 
through the new court’s approach to accountability, complementarity and ownership. 
The last remaining question is whether immunity, as provided for by the Malabo 
Protocol, supports, limits or negates these developments? This chapter starts by 
scrutinising the immunity provision before moving on to its compliance with 
international law. The impact of the provision on the new court’s purpose is the final test 
in determining what influence immunity has over the Malabo Protocol’s solutions to the 
ICC’s shortcomings. As the African Court is an international court only the law of 
immunity before such courts is discussed. 
 
The original draft African Court statute contained an immunity provision similar to that 
of the ICC,1229 but coinciding with the timing of the inclusion of states into the drafting 
process the provision was changed in 2012.1230 In light of the renewed opposition to ICC 
indictments of African Heads of State and Government, and within the context at the 
time, it appears likely that the change was in response to the international court.1231 
African states chose to take a purely doctrinal approach to immunity instead of the 
normative interpretation of the original draft. Consequently, negative assumptions over 
the motivation and purpose of the provision abound in the literature.1232  
 
The reality is not that simple. The inequality within the international system and double 
standards exhibited by the ICC play a role, as does the lack of a homogenous approach to 
                                                        
1229 Early drafts contained Article 46B(2) ‘Without prejudice to the immunities provided for under 
international law, the official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or 
Government, Minister or as a responsible government official, shall not relieve such person of 
criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment’, as cited in Ssenyonjo (n 661) 414. 
1230 Deya (n 228); Opening Statement by Prof. Vinvent O. Nmehielle, Legal Counsel and Director 
for Legal Affairs of the African Union Commission, 1st Session of the Specialized Technical 
Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs (Government Legal Experts) as cited by Amnesty 
International (n 1) 11, footnote 47; EX.CL/731 (XXI) (n 152); EX.CL/846(XXV) Rev.1 (n 152). 
1231 Tladi, ‘The Immunity Provision’ (n 333) 4. 
1232 Amnesty International (n 1); Viljoen, ‘AU Assembly should consider human rights 
implications’ (n 230); du Plessis, ‘A case of negative regional complementarity’ (n 1). 
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immunity amongst African states. Arguably the change in the provision was key to 
ensuring the protocol was adopted by the Assembly as the Rome Conference experience 
shows that certain states never signed up to the international court because of their 
concerns over immunity.1233  
 
 
14.1 The Immunity Provision  
 
This thesis concluded that different types of immunity (personal and functional) prevent 
prosecution of certain individuals, shaping the level of accountability possible. The ICC 
does not uphold either immunity but, regardless, has been unable to pursue Heads of 
State and Government. Does the ICLS immunity provision affect the new court’s ability 
to offer solutions to the ICC’s shortcomings? This section examines what type of 
immunity the Malabo Protocol provides for.  
 
The most controversial provision of the Malabo Protocol is Article 46A bis1234 which 
upholds immunity for Heads of State and Government and senior state officials: 
 
No charges shall be commenced or continued before the Court against 
any serving AU Head of State or Government, or anybody acting or 
entitled to act in such capacity, or other senior state officials based on 
their functions, during their tenure of office. 
 
The clumsily drafted provision creates uncertainty over whether personal or functional 
immunity is applicable; and which ‘other senior state officials based on their functions’ 
are protected.1235 Article 46A bis has been criticised for granting impunity to Heads of 
State and Government and senior state officials.1236 Functional immunity is thought to 
apply,1237 but the more convincing interpretation is that the provision protects personal 
immunity only.1238 The VCLT treaty interpretation rules provide for consultation of the 
                                                        
1233 Sudan in particular has been very consistent in its objections to the assertion that immunities 
for Heads of States apply even when related to alleged international crimes being committed.  
1234 Amnesty International (n 1); Viljoen, ‘AU Assembly should consider human rights 
implications’ (n 230); du Plessis, ‘A case of negative regional complementarity’ (n 1). 
1235 For an analysis of the different legal interpretations see Tladi, ‘The Immunity Provision’ (n 333) 
7-8. 
1236 Ibid.  
1237 Ssenyonjo and Nakitto (955) 93.  
1238 Tladi, ‘The Immunity Provision’ (n 333) 8. 
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AU’s position on the issue.1239 The organisation does not distinguish ‘between the 
immunities of heads of states and those of other senior state officials’.1240 For this reason, 
“based on their functions” should be seen as evaluative criteria for which senior state 
officials to include.1241 This would support the ICJ’s focus on the nature of the function1242 
and whether the official’s function, as a representative of state, is predominantly internal 
or external.1243 
 
The AU discussed the provision ‘and its conformity with international law, domestic laws 
[…] and jurisprudence [… the] challenges inherent in widening immunities’,1244 the lack 
of a definition and the problems surrounding ‘providing an exhaustive list’.1245 As a 
compromise, the Malabo Protocol leaves the determination of which functions and 
officials are protected to judges on a case-by-case basis. On the one hand this is 
problematic as it creates uncertainty and the potential for inconsistent application and 
interpretation. On the other hand it removes the political dynamics involved in the 
drafting process from influencing the individuals included, which likely would have 
slowed down the drafting process. Thus, the judges can interpret the provision to 
minimise the immunity provision’s scope, increasing the number of individuals within 
the court’s jurisdiction.  
 
Personal immunity only applies for the duration of the official’s tenure in office and 
Article 46A bis is limited to the period the individual is in office. Despite functional 
immunity being disregarded as a defence by previous international courts, under 
international law such protection would apply regardless of employment status. This 
makes it hard to argue the Malabo Protocol provides for functional immunity.  
 
                                                        
1239 Articles 31 and 32 VCLT.  
1240 Tladi, ‘The Immunity Provision’ (n 333) 8; Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.1 (n 686) §9; 
EX.CL/846(XXV) Rev.1 (n 152) para 26. 
1241 EX.CL/846(XXV) Rev.1 (n 152) para 26. 
1242 Arrest Warrant case Joint Separate Opinion, para 53; Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance 
case, para 196.  
1243 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo case (n 265) para 47; Certain Questions of 
Mutual Assistance case, para 185-6 rejected the claim by Djibouti that its Procureur de la 
République and Head of National Security had immunity before French courts. 
1244 EX.CL/846(XXV) Rev.1 (n 240) para 25. 
1245 Ibid. 
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Overall, the personal immunity before the ICLS is a more limited form of protection than 
functional immunity by applying only to those senior state officials who satisfy the 
‘based on their functions’ criteria.  
 
 
14.2 Compliance with International Law 
 
The purpose behind Article 46A bis is ‘to address the categories of individuals who 
should be covered by immunities while serving their tenure […] pursuant to the relevant 
Assembly Decisions’ on immunity.1246 During discussions on jurisdiction of particular 
concern was immunity and its conformity with customary law and the Vienna 
Conventions.1247 Chapter 8 concluded that the ICC’s approach to immunity has not 
created, nor is it reflective of, a customary law exception, but does Article 46A bis violate 
international law? 
 
The trend amongst international courts is to include a provision removing immunity as a 
barrier to prosecution. The Malabo Protocol’s failure to follow suit has raised doubts 
over its compliance with international law. Despite the claim that the Arrest Warrant 
Case removed immunity for senior state officials, and by analogy Heads of State and 
Government,1248 international law does not reflect this.1249 The ICJ decision does not 
enable international criminal courts to automatically disregard immunities, rather 
recognising there are instances where such courts may exercise jurisdiction.1250 For 
example, the ICTY, the ICTR and SCSL provisions do not remove immunity but instead 
disregard immunity as a defence.1251 In practice, the individual still benefits from 
inviolability, but if they come before the court there is no immunity defence to rely on. 
This reflects the difference between jurisdiction and responsibility with the provisions 
addressing the responsibility side1252 although, practically, the defence exclusion ‘seem[s] 
implicitly to treat that status as of no relevance as a bar to its jurisdiction’.1253 The ad hoc 
                                                        
1246 Ibid para 24. 
1247 See Sudan’s position in EX.CL/731 (XXI) (n 240) 4; Ethiopia’s position on immunity and the 
proprio motu powers of the Prosecutor, R EX.CL/731 (XXI) (n 240) 5. 
1248 Arrest Warrant case Judgment, para 61. 
1249 Chapter 2.2.5 of this thesis.  
1250 Arrest Warrant case Judgment, para 60. 
1251 Fox and Webb (n 328) 555. A. 
1252 Ibid 555-6. 
1253 Ibid 556. 
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tribunals and the SCSL relate to specific conflicts and timeframes limiting the 
applicability of their immunity exception.  
 
The ICC immunity provision does not provide concrete proof of an exception as the 
scope of the provision is not without its detractors;1254 the waiver of immunity is only 
applicable for its members, which has yet to reach universal status; and Article 27 has a 
contentious nature within the Rome Statute with various perspectives over third parties 
and immunity under the law of treaties. Hence, an exception to immunity based on the 
tribunals and the ICC provisions alone does not acknowledge that the exclusion stems 
from the constitutive instruments and the consent of states for those specific 
institutions. 
 
The ICC argues customary international law denies immunity because nothing within 
that law specifically grants it.1255 If this were the case there would be no need for a 
specific stipulation removing immunity or disregarding the defence. Logically, it seems 
that states assumed immunity was present and the issue needed to be addressed 
explicitly. The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber’s view is that if no evidence of a customary rule 
upholding immunity exists there is also no evidence of a rule having developed denying 
immunity. This is hard to accept because the judgement lacks explanation.1256 The habit 
of the ICC to conflate UNSC actions and Chapter VII powers with the establishment of 
customary international law only serves to reduce the credibility of the argument.1257 
Furthermore, the ICC lacks consistent reasoning for the removal of immunity for third 
party states, weakening any exception claim.1258  
 
If one accepts that customary law neither permits nor prohibits immunity, then ‘Article 
46Abis is neither reflective of nor inconsistent with customary international law’.1259 
Thus, negating the criticisms that the Malabo Protocol provision violates international 
law. 
                                                        
1254 These debates focus on Article 27 and 98 of the Rome Statute, see Akande, ‘The Legal Nature’ 
(n 773); Paola Gaeta, ‘Does President Al Bashir Enjoy Immunity from Arrest (2009) 7 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 315. 
1255 Malawi Decision, 23. 
1256 Ibid 43.   
1257 For an explanation of this position see Tladi, ‘The Immunity Provision’ (n 333) 13-4. 
1258 Abel Knottererus, ‘The immunity of al-Bashir: The Latest Turn in the Jurisprudence of the ICC’ 
(EJIL: Talk! 15 November 2017) <https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-immunity-of-al-bashir-the-latest-
turn-in-the-jurisprudence-of-the-icc/> accessed 1 April 2018. 
1259 Tladi, ‘The Immunity Provision’ (n 333) 15. 
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Chapter 8 established that international law has not conclusively removed immunity 
before all international criminal courts.1260 Article 46A bis is therefore not in violation of 
international law, and is in keeping with the rationale for immunity.1261 Despite the 
rationales for state immunity and for Heads of State and Government being the same,1262 
others contest this on the grounds that the ‘sovereign equality of states – does not apply 
to the exercise of jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals since, though created 
by states, they are not themselves states’.1263  
 
The contrary is argued here. The forum of the prosecution is irrelevant as the effect is the 
same – interference with state functioning and, if successfully prosecuted and enforced, 
regime change. For example, the use of the ICC in Libya by the UNSC demonstrates that 
an international court is not free from manipulation by states for their own benefit at the 
expense of sovereignty.1264 Additionally the attempted prosecutions of Kenyan President 
Kenyatta and Deputy President Ruto highlights the link between sovereign equality and 
regime change, with the ICC recognising its role in interfering with the ability of the 
accused to perform their official duties.1265  
 
If a sitting Head of State or Government is found guilty, penal measures are imposed 
preventing them from remaining in office. The ability of the state and its citizens to 
determine their own domestic trajectory and internal workings of that state are 
compromised. This may appear less problematic regarding Heads of State and 
Government who remain in power through unconstitutional or dictatorial means, but 
the legal reality is nevertheless the same. Plus, any cooperation, assistance or other 
support received from a state in bringing the accused before the court, when the state is 
under no other legal obligation, equates to interference and breaches sovereign equality.  
                                                        
1260 Chapter 8 of this thesis. 
1261 For a discussion on the rationales and different concepts of immunity see Fox and Webb (n 
328) Chapter 2. However, Tladi takes the opposite view that ‘the rational for immunity of states 
and its officials --- sovereign equality of states --- does not apply to the exercise of jurisdiction of 
international courts and tribunals since, thought created by states, they are not themselves 
states.’ ‘The Immunity Provision’ (n 333) 13. This thesis argues that it is irrelevant whether it is a 
state or an international court which seeks to exercise jurisdiction, the effect would be the same – 
the interference with the functioning of a State. Additionally, if the opposite view is adopted, the 
international court would be placed above the state, and states are unlikely to agree to such a 
hierarchical system without their explicit consent (as with the ICC). The fact not all states have 
ratified the Rome Statute demonstrates the unwillingness to adopt this hierarchical approach.   
1262 On the rationale for Head of State immunity see Chapter 2.2.2 of this thesis. 
1263 Tladi, ‘The Immunity Provision’ (n 333) 13. 
1264 Chapter 7.1.5 and 7.2.3 of this thesis.  
1265 ICC Press Release, ‘Trial Chamber V(b)’ (n 777). 
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Removing the immunity would also introduce a hierarchical system as international 
criminal courts are granted the ability to circumvent restrictions placed on states, yet 
states cannot confer powers they do not themselves possess.1266 This is why immunity 
can only be removed as a prosecutorial barrier by state consent, or a UNSC Chapt VII 
decision. The lack of universal ratification of the Rome Statute demonstrates states 
unwillingness to accept the complete removal of immunity, whether or not for self-
preservation. 
 
On the whole, the rationale for Heads of State and Government immunity before 
international courts is the same as state immunity because of the effect of its removal. 
The arguments proposed here are not used to justify the actions of such individuals, but 
rather to demonstrate that the rationales are comparable.  
 
In conclusion, Article 46A bis does not violate international law but upholds the 
rationale for personal immunity for Heads of State and Government and other senior 
officials based on the official’s functions. It does however go against the trend of 
international criminal courts removing immunity as a procedural barrier to prosecution.  
 
 
14.3 Pursuing Justice versus Impunity  
 
The ICLS’ purpose significantly shapes how the new court proposes to address the 
shortcomings of the international system. If personal immunity is upheld in accordance 
to Article 46A bis does this limit or negate the ICLS’ contribution to the need for an 
African regional criminal court?  
 
The first step in answering this lies in identifying which of the new court’s purposes are 
likely to be impacted by the immunity. These include: delivering accountability; 
addressing the underlying causes of conflict; advancing African values and norms; 
ensuring states have primary responsibility for prosecutions; improving peace and 
security; promoting AU aims and objectives; fighting impunity; seeking individual and 
                                                        
1266 Henry G. Schermers & Niels M. Blokker, International Institutional Law: unity within division 
(4th edn, Martinus Nijhoff 2004) §209. 
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corporate criminal responsibility; preventing and deterring crimes; and promoting 
justice. Additionally, immunity will influence complementarity and ownership and 
agency.  
 
Chapter 11 concluded that the ICLS offers a significant increase in accountability due to 
the inclusion of non-core crimes, the accompanying ability to address the underlying 
causes of conflict and corporate criminal responsibility.  
 
Immunity will not impact corporate criminal responsibility because the individuals 
covered are not protected. For state owned corporations international law is clear, 
commercial dealings are not covered by immunity.1267 But, when it comes to the non-
core crimes and the ability to tackle the underlying causes of conflict immunity does 
present challenges. Typically, the crimes require some form of official complicity1268 and 
the immunity provision prevents the Heads of State and Government and a small 
category of senior state officials from being prosecuted, reducing accountability overall. 
However, not all state officials are exempt. This is an important distinction as many of 
the crimes rely on the complicity of state officials whose functions are unlikely to fulfil 
the immunity provision’s criteria. The limited scope of Article 46A bis’ can minimise the 
impact of immunity on accountability.  
 
This more limited interpretation offered by personal immunity circumvents the concerns 
expressed that Article 46A bis will maintain the status quo of only low-level rebels being 
prosecuted.1269 Instead, only the highest official (Heads of State and Government) and a 
select few other senior officials will be beyond the new court’s reach while they remain in 
office. Thus, a more positive picture emerges, albeit not perfect. The ICLS is permitted to 
pursue cases against high-level rebels as well as many senior state officials, though the 
extent to which it will remains to be seen.  
 
Whether intended or not, the immunity provision contributes to both accountability and 
complementarity as it prevents the ICLS from becoming a substitute for the ICC.1270 The 
international court will remain the forum in which sitting Heads of State and 
                                                        
1267 Fox and Webb (n 328) Chapter 12. 
1268 n 418.  
1269 Ssenyonjo and Nakitto (n 955) 93-4. 
1270 Tladi, ‘The Immunity Provision’ (n 333) 14-15. 
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Government and certain senior state officials can be prosecuted. As argued before the 
new court will deal with those other officials as a complement to the ICC, leaving the 
controversial and paralysing aspects of immunity to the international court.1271 The 
Malabo Protocol’s immunity provision also reduces the need for the ICC to pursue lower 
level individuals, instead bringing the international court back to its original purpose by 
it focusing on those bearing the greatest responsibility.  
 
The provision reflects the new court’s envisioned position within an ecosystem of 
mechanisms including national, REC/RMs and international courts contributing to the 
fight against impunity. The ICLS has the potential to alter the trajectory of international 
criminal justice within Africa by ‘expand[ing] the reach of international criminal justice 
… [a]ssuming African states that are not party to the ICC Statute become party to the 
expanded African Court, then the reach of the international courts to potential situations 
and perpetrators becomes enlarged’.1272 While African state officials raised doubts over 
the likelihood of ratification,1273 the case can be made that the immunity provision makes 
it harder for states to reject membership to the African Court without appearing to 
support impunity.  
 
The practical effect of upholding immunity means the responsibility to prosecute a 
sitting Head of State or Government falls to the individual state, reiterating their primary 
responsibility to prosecute. While this is part of the purpose of the new court the reality 
is that if the state or ICC does not prosecute the incumbent Head of State or 
Government will be out of reach of any court until they vacate office.  
 
Amnesty International views the immunity provision as preventing deterrence,1274 but 
this is an oversimplified statement. As an aim of ICL it is hard to prove deterrence 
                                                        
1271 As this author articulated during a workshop hosted by the Institute of Security Studies, ‘The 
principle of Complementarity and the African Court – Lessons from the ICC’ (Geographies of 
Justice Workshop, Peace and Security Training Centre Institute of Security Studies, Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia, November 2014). 
1272 Tladi, ‘The Immunity Provision’ (n 333) 14. 
1273 Chapter 11.3 of this thesis. 
1274 Amnesty International (n 1) 24. On the possibility that international criminal prosecution do 
not act as a deterrent because of the reasoning behind the crimes commission see Patrick 
Wegner, ‘International Criminal Law and Deterrence – A Pointless Endeavour?’ (Justice in 
Conflict, 25 October 2011) <https://justiceinconflict.org/2011/10/25/international-criminal-law-
and-deterrence-–-a-pointless-endeavour/> accessed 30 June 2016. 
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occurs, particularly when the conduct is linked to ideological reasoning.1275 The 
immunity provision also does not equate to impunity as the individuals concerned can 
be prosecuted after they leave office. This point was made by the ICJ in the Arrest 
Warrant case,1276 with the precedent for such prosecutions in Africa having been set with 
Senegal’s trial of former Chadian dictator Hissène Habré. Moreover, the court will not 
apply immunity in all situations. For example, when faced with the crime of an 
unconstitutional change of government the individuals involved can be prosecuted 
despite being the de facto Heads of State or Government. The AU does not legally 
recognise such a regime as the legitimate government, and as part of the organisation’s 
judicial organ the ICLS will have to find the immunity inapplicable.1277 This may prove 
challenging to implement if the sitting government uses unconstitutional means to 
retain their position as it is not clear whether the AU will denounce them as 
unconstitutional.  
 
The critique that Article 46A bis is at odds with AU principles and objectives1278 
demonstrates an inaccurate prioritisation of the organisation’s aims and ignores its 
background. Matters of peace and security are paramount to the AU’s existence and 
greatly influence its practice and policies. The preferred approach is to balance the need 
for reconciliation with prosecutions.1279 Therefore, the immunity provision enables the 
new court to contribute to the fight against impunity (albeit imperfectly) and promote 
justice, while at the same time abiding by the AU’s aim of defending sovereignty. This is 
a fundamental principle of international law relied on by African states to address the 
inequality in the international system, and as such is unlikely to be disregarded by their 
regional court.1280  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
1275 See Chapter 1.2.2.1.2 of this thesis. 
1276 Arrest Warrant case Judgment, para 60. 
1277 The AU does not recognise illegitimate governments following an unconstitutional change of 
government, suspending the state’s membership to the organisation as per Article 25 ACDEG.  
1278 Amnesty International (n 1) 27. 
1279 Chapter 10.3.2 of this thesis. 
1280 On the importance of sovereignty see Chapter 10.3.1 of this thesis. 
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14.4 Conclusion 
 
As undesirable as the Malabo Protocol’s immunity provision may be there is no legal 
reason that the approach of the ICC and other ad hoc tribunals has to be followed. This 
fact, coupled with the lack of a customary law exception, means Article 46A bis does not 
violate international law.  
 
The ICLS provides diverse and innovative solutions to the ICC and international system’s 
shortcomings. Despite appearing to take the fight against impunity significantly 
backwards, in fact the immunity provision has mixed repercussions. Only personal 
immunity is upheld for a select few individuals - Heads of State and Governments and 
certain senior state officials. The senior state officials covered are limited as the personal 
immunity is ‘based on their function’, similar to the ICJ’s criteria. By not providing a 
definitive list of which functions and officials are protected the new court’s judges can 
adopt a restrictive interpretation and further limit the applicability of personal 
immunity.  
 
The impact of immunity on the ability of the new court to fulfil its numerous purposes is 
both positive and negative. It does limit accountability to the extent that a select few 
high-ranking individuals are exempted from prosecution, but only while they are in 
office. The ability to address the underlying causes of conflict is minimally affected as 
those officials likely to be complicit in the commission of the non-core crimes are 
unlikely to have functions justifying immunity. The status quo of prosecuting low-level 
rebels may persist, but the ICLS will have jurisdiction over high-level rebels and state 
officials and it will be up to the Prosecutor to ensure the cases reflect the reality of the 
situation. This criticism is also more damning of the ICC because that court has the 
ability to prosecute any state official but has consistently been unsuccessful.  
 
Immunity forces the ICLS to encourage and support national prosecutions of those 
individuals outside its jurisdiction, furthering the aims of the envisioned judicial 
ecosystem across the continent and internationally. The AU has numerous aims and 
objectives related to promoting peace, security and justice alongside the defence of 
sovereignty and socio-economic development. The ICLS has to reconcile broader often 
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overlapping and contradictory purposes than the ICC, which requires a transitional 
justice approach to be adopted.  
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Chapter 15 
Conclusion 
 
 
The international legal system currently offers two ways to fight impunity: by pursuing 
either UJ or ICC prosecutions. In this thesis it has been asked whether there is a further 
need for a regional criminal court in Africa. Answering this central question required an 
understanding of whether the gaps and shortcomings of UJ and the ICC help to make 
this case. The conclusions presented in Part I and II indicate that the international 
system is composed of imperfect mechanisms. These imperfections create the need for 
an African regional criminal court that would address these flaws, strengthen efforts to 
fight impunity, and fulfil the agenda for peace and development on the African 
continent.  
 
15.1 UJ the ICC and the Need for a Regional Criminal Court 
 
Limited crimes 
 
The core crimes are offences of concern to the international community yet the manner 
in which these crimes are considered and prosecuted does not reflect a sensitivity to the 
challenges of African conflict situations, nor does it address regional concerns. 
Furthermore, the crimes are insufficient in fulfilling the purposes of ICL and that of the 
ICC because they do not contribute to peace, promote deterrence, reconciliation or 
advance TJ. The inability of the international court and UJ to question conduct and 
activities which facilitate violent conflict is the biggest hurdle to establishing a successful 
preventative mechanism. Overlooking the underlying crimes leaves open the potential 
for conflict resurgence and the commission of further crimes and undermines the basis 
for TJ.  
 
Attempts to expand UJ crimes by relying on human rights obligations is not effective. 
The use of human rights has blurred the lines between suppression obligations and the 
imposition of state responsibility with individual criminal responsibility.  
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The ICC has pursued prosecutions and investigations which do not fully represent the 
crimes committed due to the focus on the core crimes. The international court also 
ignores many of the actors who are directly and indirectly complicit in the commission 
of the crimes. Coupled with the inability to pursue corporate criminal liability, the 
limited crimes do not sufficiently address the ICL purposes of deterrence, prevention or 
reconciliation, let alone those of TJ.   
 
Few cases pursued 
 
Relatively few international prosecutions have been pursued and this means there is a 
limited contribution to the fight against impunity. Despite UJ legislation across 
numerous states, very few states actually pursue such cases. This is because UJ cases are 
not typically based on state policy, but rather on the ease of access to courts and the 
involvement of NGOs.  
 
Even though the AU has adopted a UJ model law and African domestic legislation 
incorporates UJ crimes to varying degrees, there has been no increase in such 
prosecutions. Given the lack of strong NGOs across the continent and the procedural 
hurdles imposed by the African states’ legislation, the lack of UJ prosecutions is 
unsurprising. With the successful Habré prosecution Africa demonstrated its capability 
to use UJ but the numerous external and internal pressures placed on Senegal to 
prosecute cannot be easily replicated.  
 
Dependency 
 
It has been shown in this thesis that the capacity constraints of the ICC have limited and 
shaped the OTP’s policies in such a way that accountability has been narrowed. The 
OTP’s positive complementarity policy does little to offset this narrowing as neither 
capacity building nor a division of labour have been undertaken. In fact, the evidence 
points to the opposite – active undermining and removal of cases from national 
jurisdictions. The strict interpretation of the ‘same person same conduct’ test, forces a 
particular prosecutorial focus if states want to challenge admissibility. 
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The complementarity principle was meant to ensure that the ICC was a court of last 
resort, however it has not fulfilled this role. Instead, there is a narrowing of 
accountability and a reduction in the number of individuals prosecuted due to the strict 
ICC admissibility requirements. Despite claiming to pursue those bearing the greatest 
responsibility the ICC has not done this. Instead it has used the gravity test to justify its 
one-sided investigations in both Uganda and the DRC.  
 
Furthermore, budget constraints at the ICC have impacted negatively on the cases 
pursued. Taken together with security and access concerns it could be said that the ICC 
has pursued cases which are to its own benefit and has justified its own existence at the 
expense of local initiatives and communities. It is inevitable that an international court, 
claiming to deal with cases from across the globe, will have capacity constraints. 
However, the selectivity of prosecutions cannot be adequately justified and lends 
credence to those suspicious of political motivations.    
 
Instead of encouraging domestic prosecutions the ICC has created dependencies and 
made it hard for states to assume their primary responsibility in pursuing prosecutions. 
In the international court’s rush to launch its first prosecutions, the complementarity 
principle has been narrowly interpreted. States are given little choice but to adopt the 
ICC’s investigative and prosecutorial focus or risk their efforts being insufficient for an 
admissibility challenge. This was most clearly demonstrated by the Lubanga and Simone 
Gbagbo prosecutions. The resulting overlap in prosecutions not only sees domestic 
prosecutions relegated to a lower status than those of the ICC, but wastes the already 
overstretched resources of the international court.  
 
Inequality in the international system 
 
The problem with both UJ and the ICC is that they have inadvertently replicated the 
inequality of the international system. UNSC referrals were meant to circumvent the 
restrictions on pursuing non-ICC member states. However, the UNSC Permanent 
Members’ veto power and the political determination of the referrals prevent this 
method from being a reliable gap filler. What results is de facto impunity for the 
Permanent Members and their allies. 
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Furthermore, the use of UJ has been predominantly undertaken by former colonial 
powers and this has made African states suspicious of their motives. The role played by 
France in encouraging the self-referrals of Mali and Côte d'Ivoire to the ICC is of concern 
given French complicity and any crimes committed by its military in these situations are 
overlooked. The structural inequalities in the international systems persist and influence 
the ICC itself, even though the pursuit of international criminal justice is premised on 
political impartiality.   
 
While the ICC’s immunity provision in theory helps to fight impunity, the unfortunate 
unintended consequence is that it may actually assist in any regime change agenda, 
perpetuating the international system’s inequality. The use of the ICC in the situation in 
Libya by the UNSC bears the hallmarks of political manipulation of the international 
court in order to remove the Gaddaffi regime. This is shown by the quick turnaround 
time within which the Prosecutor opened the investigation and the subsequent lack of 
follow up after the Gaddaffi regime had been overthrown. Until there is a realistic chance 
of every state being subjected to a UNSC referral the pursuit of international criminal 
justice is biased. Politically weak states may rightly fear the misuse of the ICC by the 
UNSC Permanent Members.  
 
Similar to its shortcomings in the broader international system, the ICC has also 
undermined AU peace and security initiatives in Sudan and Libya due to the different 
conflict analysis lens applied. The difference between criminalisation and the wider 
societal context is important in determining the preferred approach and in 
understanding what will contribute to ending a conflict.  
 
African ownership has been severely undermined by the ICC and by the UNSC’s use of 
the international court. It has been shown that the ICC has created an adverse 
dependency at the expense of African states, and then used that same dependency and 
African inability and lack of capacity to justify the international court’s interventions.  
 
Immunity 
 
Despite the Rome Statute removing immunity as a barrier to prosecution the ICC has 
been unable to successfully prosecute a sitting Head of State or senior state official. The 
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prosecution of the non-member state Sudan’s President is complicated given its origin as 
a UNSC referral, while the prosecutions against Kenyatta and Ruto highlight the 
difficulties the court faces in prosecuting a member state which has waived immunity. It 
has been concluded that there are other factors at play beyond the law on immunity 
which prevent the ICC from pursuing these cases.  
 
The consistent opposition to prosecutions of sitting Heads of State and Government and 
senior state officials is not unique to African states. As discussed, China, Israel and the 
USA have opposed attempts to use UJ against their senior officials, while certain 
European states do not consider the ICC to apply to them. As a result, international 
criminal justice increasingly seems to be an instrument of strong states against weaker 
states which again reinforces systemic inequalities and bias.   
 
While there may not be widespread trust that African states will pursue genuine 
prosecutions, these states feel they have credible reasons and excuses given the ICC 
ignores their concerns and demonises any legitimate challenges they make against the 
international court.  
 
It has been established that the international system’s shortcomings are such that there 
is a need for a regional criminal court within Africa to address these gaps, and to act as a 
counter balance to the broader structural inequalities inherent in the international 
system which impinge on the role of the ICC. The original purpose of ICL prosecutions 
was to encourage deterrence, prevention and reconciliation. Yet, as has been shown in 
this thesis, both UJ and the ICC have not lived up to these aims. The international court 
has demonstrated the limitations of this understanding of ICL’s purpose. While peace 
and security and TJ are also used as theoretical and practical justifications for the 
establishment of international courts, neither UJ nor the ICC have contributed to this 
aspect of the international system. 
 
To act as a deterrent, there needs to be certainty, immediacy and comprehensibility of 
the prosecutions and severity of punishment. There are very few UJ or ICC prosecutions 
which reduces the level of certainty. The length of time taken to bring a case to trial 
reduces the immediacy as well. In Part I of this thesis it was demonstrated that the 
reason for pursuing UJ cases is not based on state policy but rather the ease of access to 
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courts and the involvement of NGOs. Regarding the sentences imposed, it has been 
shown that international punishments are more lenient than domestic sanctions such as 
in the ICC sentencing of Simone Gbagbo.  
 
Nevertheless, the track record for prevention is hard to gauge as there is little actual 
prevention offered given that both the ICC and UJ are decontextualized mechanisms and 
are far removed from the actual underpinnings of violent conflict in Africa. While it is 
not necessarily the role of another domestic court to take into account the context of a 
case pursued there are grounds for arguing that the ICC should. The international court 
has claimed that it contributes to ending conflicts, but the evidence set out in this thesis 
does not support this claim. Instead, the ICC has pursued one-sided prosecutions 
ignoring certain African and non-African governments’ involvement as well as ignoring 
the underlying causes of the conflict.  
 
Although generally the ability of trials to contribute to reconciliation is disputed, in the 
case of the ICC it is concluded that bias, one-sided prosecutions and the undermining of 
national efforts to prosecute and address the crimes does little to support reconciliation.  
 
 
15.2 The Solutions Offered by the ICLS  
 
The ICLS is an international criminal court with purposes additional to those of the ICC 
that must also be taken into account alongside the pursuit of criminal justice. It is 
through these other purposes that the Malabo Protocol and the new court offer solutions 
to the shortcomings of the international system.  
 
In contrast to the ICC the ICLS takes a region-centric approach, pursuing international 
criminal justice as it is understood at the international level but at the same time 
applying the AU’s notion of justice. The result is a broadening of purposes including 
those which seek to address a multitude of African concerns. 
 
The level of accountability offered by the ICLS surpasses that of both ICC and UJ 
prosecutions. Not only does the new court include the core crimes but the numerous 
underlying causes of conflict and conduct of concern to the region are represented by 
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the non-core crimes. The scope of the offences facilitates the linking of justice with 
peace and security in an attempt to find durable solutions to conflicts and contributes to 
furthering this justification for establishing international courts. The international 
community is disinterested in pursuing crimes of regional concern. Therefore, African 
states, like other regions, have been left to find ways to address their own concerns 
outside of the international framework. The AU is best placed to tackle the non-core 
crimes. It is not appropriate for an outside entity to determine continental priorities, 
especially a mechanism like the ICC which lacks contextual understanding. Furthermore, 
given its regional proximity the AU is not influenced by the broader structural 
inequalities of the international system.   
 
An essential element of the AU’s region-centric accountability approach is the 
incorporation of corporate criminal responsibility into the Malabo Protocol. The ICC 
does not address such actors despite their complicity in the crimes under OTP 
investigation. With the ICLS the corporate actors are subject to investigation and 
prosecution. This will hopefully address the actions of these entities which have long 
destabilised Africa, fuelling conflicts and violating the rights of ordinary citizens. This 
will advance ICL’s retributive, peace and security purposes and incorporates TJ 
approaches.   
 
In addition, the biggest contribution made by the ICLS and Malabo Protocol is in 
offering a solution to the reduction in ownership caused by the ICC over the justice 
process and also peace, security and reconciliation. The complementarity principle has 
been formulated to reflect the continental structure and encourage prosecutions at the 
national and (sub)regional levels, resulting in greater self-reliance and capacity 
development which the ICC has significantly undermined.  
 
This is not achieved by positioning the ICLS as an alternative to the ICC. Instead, the 
Malabo Protocol attempts to redress the imbalance in the ICC relationship, which 
reproduces the international system’s inequalities, by creating a cooperation and 
assistance dynamic. The lack of reference to the ICC or REC/RMs in the admissibility 
criteria is easily overcome by interpreting Article 46H to include state referrals to other 
courts as a sovereign act. This enables the new court to defend sovereignty (an aim of the 
AU) while encouraging the pursuit of accountability. There is no legal reason why both 
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the ICC and ICLS cannot pursue different cases in order to achieve greater accountability 
overall.  
 
The ICLS can create its own identity and become as regionally relevant as possible. The 
AU and African states may never have their interests completely aligned with the ICC 
and international community. The AU’s use of its Pan-African ideology to create a 
regional mechanism capable of promoting regional interests without contradicting or 
violating international law justifies the ICLS’ inclusion in the APSA. Locating the new 
court within the APSA framework helps to fulfil the ICLS’ purpose of promoting the aims 
and objectives of the AU while simultaneously fighting impunity through pursuing 
individual and corporate criminal responsibility.   
 
The placement within APSA enables the ICLS to be used as a tool to assist in addressing 
the underlying causes of conflict as well as the core crimes, taking into account the AU’s 
preference for the concurrent pursuit of justice, peace and reconciliation. As a 
permanent court included in the peace and security agenda of APSA the ICLS 
significantly improves ownership over the justice and peace processes. African norms are 
considered important and on an equal level to those of the international community. By 
accommodating peace and security with justice and reconciliation the AU’s lens of 
conflict analysis becomes evident. The ICC has been unable to contribute to peace as it 
can only find solutions through criminalisation at the expense of the political context. 
The more holistic understanding and approach to conflicts demonstrated by the AU’s 
notion of justice calls for the sequencing approach of TJ to be used and not by 
prosecutions first and foremost. The ICLS provides a means by which the AU and its 
members can demonstrate that they are not opposed to accountability. The new court 
will become part of the pursuit of peace and justice and not part of the peace versus 
justice debate, offering an opportunity to strengthen the international system and the 
basis for pursuing prosecutions before international criminal courts.  
 
The most radical of all solutions examined in this thesis is the proposed enforcement 
mechanism. The ASF is part of APSA which may be used to support the work of the ICLS 
to enforce warrants, create safe environments for investigations and/or assist in the 
investigative stages if appropriately trained. However, further research is needed to 
explore the legalities of this as well as the feasibility aspect.  
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Overall, it has been concluded in this thesis that the Malabo Protocol and the ICLS do 
provide solutions to the continental issues which have plagued Africa for decades and 
offer a mechanism which furthers ICL and TJ purposes.  
 
 
15.3 The Limitations of the ICLS  
 
The main limitation of the ICLS stems from the very same thing that makes the court an 
attractive solution to the international system’s shortcomings – its inclusion in an AU 
organ.  
 
As innovative as the ICLS is the AU’s institutional weaknesses and capacity constraints 
are the greatest hurdle to implementing any of the solutions and contributions identified 
in this thesis. Just as the ICC has suffered from funding uncertainty, the ability of the AU 
to fund and sustain the new court has yet to be proved. The AU’s peace and security 
efforts have suffered from inadequate personnel and funding shortfalls. As it has been 
argued that the ICLS should be placed within APSA, it is likely the new court will suffer 
the same fate. Taking into account the reliance on donor money and the fact that it is 
impossible to use its programme budget to fund the court, already the future of the ICLS 
looks uncertain.  
 
While the Malabo Protocol offences are needed the definitions have suffered as a result 
of the drafting process. The copy and paste approach using the Rome Statute and other 
international instruments has been at the expense of the principle of legality. Significant 
work still needs to be done to provide well thought out elements of the crimes to make 
the definitions compliant with legal principles and implementable.  
 
The Malabo Protocol has not removed political considerations from the workings of the 
ICLS. The role given to the PSC and Assembly to refer cases, while welcome, creates the 
potential for continental politics to influence which situations get referred. However, 
given the lack of permanent PSC membership and no veto powers the likelihood of the 
problems which have arisen with UNSC referrals and protection of certain members and 
their allies being replicated is reduced. Nevertheless, the new court might have replaced 
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broader international structural and political shortcomings with those of the continental 
region instead. 
 
While the Malabo Protocol’s immunity provision goes against the current trend amongst 
international courts it is not in violation of international law. It has been concluded that 
the impact on accountability is reduced by applying personal immunity only for a very 
select few individuals. This is an imperfect compromise to the complete removal of 
immunity but does not fully negate the other developments and solutions offered by the 
ICLS.   
 
Finally, the legal uncertainties surrounding the Malabo Protocol prevent states from 
signing and ratifying the protocol. While African states are slow to support their own 
regional mechanisms, the lack of clarity may prove to be the largest hurdle to overcome 
resulting in the ICLS becoming redundant before it is even established.  
 
 
15.4 Concluding Comments 
 
It has been argued throughout this thesis that the Malabo Protocol and the ICLS do not 
undermine ICL and the fight against impunity as has been claimed in the majority of the 
literature. Instead, the mechanism is a more nuanced response to the multifaceted 
challenges raised by the international system’s pursuit of criminal justice. It offers the 
opportunity for an international court to explicitly address the reasoning for establishing 
international courts through greater focus on reconciliation, peace and security and TJ. 
Something the current system merely pays lip service to. While the literature continues 
the hero/villain narrative to discourage opposition to the ICC, the result is a lack of 
critical engagement concerning the international court’s shortcomings effectively 
preventing any other mechanism from making a significant contribution to ICL.  
 
It is concluded in this thesis that there is a need for a regional criminal court in Africa, 
and potentially in other regions too. This research will help to shift the focus away from 
seeing the ICLS and Malabo Protocol as anti-ICC rhetoric, towards a discussion of ways 
to fix the flaws in the Protocol. The findings in this thesis provide a way to approach the 
current debates on the ICC and ICLS and dispel the school of thought which sees the 
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new court as a challenge to the international court. Instead, the ICLS should be seen as a 
complement to the international system, and as an attempt to deal with regional issues 
in a region-centric manner. The ICC is never going to take up the nuanced challenges 
facing Africa and remains an inappropriate mechanism to do so because it is a 
decontextualized judicial mechanism.  
 
Additionally, this thesis shows that the ICLS is not an anti-ICC instrument. It is not 
against accountability and pursuing criminal justice, instead the ICLS should be thought 
of as opposed to the narrow accountability provided by the ICC and in favour of breaking 
free from the inequalities of the international system which Africa has experienced for 
decades.  
 
While it is tempting to dismiss African and AU efforts as lacking in substance given 
previous failures, this is overly simplistic. Africa lacks capacity but this does not justify 
the disregard shown to the organisation and the Malabo Protocol. Placing ownership 
within the continent will prevent the current dependency on outside assistance from the 
ICC and the perpetuation of inequalities and capacity shortcomings. It may also force the 
development of a more proximate judicial capacity, sensitive to contextual nuances. The 
continual marginalisation of African states and the double standards adopted by the UN 
and ICC undermine trust, a fundamental for good international relations and for the 
smooth operation of institutions. If Africa loses trust in the ICC as an institution it would 
be because the international court does not live up to expectations, misuses its power 
and reproduces the deficiencies of the international system. 
 
With the new court, the AU is taking steps to become more self-reliant (in line with its 
Pan-African heritage) and asserting greater ownership over justice processes. This 
requires the AU to take a more inclusive approach to peace and security and show real 
commitment to fighting impunity. In addition to the research in this thesis, further work 
needs to be done on ways to strengthen the crimes set out in the Protocol to remove the 
uncertainty and overly broad definitions, and to create realistic implementable crimes 
which can truly advance justice, peace and reconciliation within Africa.  
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